Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

DiCosola started a business that produced compact discs in novelty shapes, for use as promotional items. The business morphed into a full‐service printing business, reaching about $1 million in gross annual sales and employing up to 10 people, including DiCosola’s immigrant father, who invested his retirement savings. In 2005, DiCosola started a side business for producing music, which sapped cash from the printing business. DiCosola’s 2007 loan application was rejected. He reapplied in 2008, providing fabricated tax returns that inflated his income by hundreds of thousands of dollars. Citibank issued DeCosola a loan of $273,500. DiCosola similarly used fabricated tax returns to obtain loans from Amcore, for $450,000 and $300,000. In 2009, after a few payments, DiCosola defaulted on the loans. In 2009, DiCosola falsified IRS forms to claim a refund of $5.5 million. In 2012, DiCosola was indicted for bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; making false statements to a bank, 18 U.S.C. 1014; wire fraud affecting a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1343; filing false statements against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 287. DiCosola was found guilty, sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay restitution of $822,088.00. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges relating to the testimony of DiCosola’s accountant. View "United States v. DiCosola" on Justia Law

ATF agents executed an arrest warrant at Coleman’s residence and observed what appeared to be heroin. After receiving his Miranda rights, Coleman stated that it was heroin for his personal use. The agents escorted Coleman to a vehicle. Coleman's wife, Charisse, said Coleman kept a gun and that Johnson and Coleman had been selling heroin for 20 years. She provided extensive details. In response to Coleman's unprompted statement, agents read Coleman his Miranda rights again. He signed a waiver and stated that he had guns and heroin inside the residence. Coleman gave consent to search. Agents nonetheless obtained a warrant and found drug paraphernalia, guns, and 168 grams of heroin. Coleman later identified a photo of Johnson and described their operation in detail. Both men had prior convictions for manufacturing and delivering a controlled substance. Chicago Police gave ATF information linking Johnson with a condominium. Agent Matuszczak's search warrant affidavit incorporated the affidavit submitted in support of the Coleman search. Agents executed the warrant at Johnson’s condo and seized 4.8 kilograms of heroin, $155,000 in cash, and items used to repackage and sell drugs. Johnson admitted owning the drugs and money and entered a conditional guilty plea under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of his motions to suppress the evidence; the known facts and circumstances supported a finding of probable cause. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Chambers pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (a)(5)(B). His attorney argued for a downward variance based on Chambers’s diminished capacity, U.S.S.G. 5K2.13. He was sentenced to 168 months, the low end of the range. Chambers voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal and challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance because counsel promised him a five-year sentence and failed to present mitigating evidence. Trial counsel testified that he never told Chambers he would receive a five-year sentence and that he decided against having Chambers’s therapist testify because it might look like Chambers was not accepting responsibility. The judge denied Chambers’s motion, noting that the PSR thoroughly described and counsel made arguments concerning Chambers’s background and mental-health issues. Chambers’s counsel on appeal abandoned him. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Chambers sought relief under Rule 60(b), arguing that he had been deprived of his opportunity to be heard when he was blocked from filing a pro se memorandum in support of his request for a certificate of appealability. The district judge concluded that she lacked authority to direct the appeals court to allow Chambers to submit a memorandum; Rule 60(b) only allowed her to remedy district court errors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the remedy for appellate counsel’s error is a motion to recall the mandate, which the court had already rejected. View "Chambers v. United States" on Justia Law

Mobley was shot in the leg; the shooter fled. The only physical evidence found by Gary, Indiana police was one spent shotgun shell. Earlier that day, Richardson had argued with his girlfriend while standing in Mobley’s yard. Mobley ordered them to leave. Only Holden was willing to give a formal statement to Detective Azcona, stating that “Chris” was the shooter. Azcona later testified that other, unidentified, sources stated that "Chris" had shot Mobley. Three weeks later, officer Hornyak received an anonymous phone call identifying Richardson as the shooter. After Richardson’s arrest, Azcona first spoke with Mobley. He brought prepared questions, which contained numerous references to “Chris.” Azcona showed Mobley a photo array and asked him not if he could identify the shooter, but whether he could identify “Chris Richardson.” Mobley chose his picture. Holden did not testify. Mobley admitted that he was drunk at the time he was shot, but stated that Richardson shot him. No other witness identified the shooter. The shotgun shell was not tested for fingerprints. Azcona testified about Holden’s identification of the shooter. The jury convicted Richardson. The Seventh Circuit reversed a denial of habeas relief. Indiana’s courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause cases. The use of Holden’s testimony and that of the unnamed informants to prove that Richardson was the shooter violated Richardson’s Confrontation Clause rights View "Richardson v. Griffin" on Justia Law

An officer saw a car in front of a Summit, Illinois liquor store, took down the license number, and prepared to make a traffic stop, but was called to another incident. After hearing that the store was robbed and seeing the security footage, which included a car of the same description, the officer radioed out the license number. Schreiber was in the car when it was stopped, with loose cash visible on the floor. After a state grand jury indicted him for that robbery, a DNA buccal swab was taken from Schreiber. That sample linked him to a 2010 bank robbery. Federal authorities charged him with that crime. Schreiber moved to suppress the DNA evidence, claiming that state authorities had lacked probable cause to arrest him for the 2011 store robbery and that the swab was the fruit of that illegal arrest. The district court denied the motion. Schreiber was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Police may take a buccal swab after an arrest supported by probable cause and that a grand jury’s issuance of an indictment is conclusive on the question of probable cause. Schreiber did not supply any disputed material facts, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Schreiber" on Justia Law

Most commodities trading takes place with the participants using computers to execute hyper‐fast trading strategies at speeds, and in volumes, that far surpass those common in the past. Coscia commissioned and used a computer program to place small and large orders simultaneously on opposite sides of the commodities market in order to create illusory supply and demand, to induce artificial market movement. He was convicted under the anti‐spoofing provision of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5)(C) and 13(a)(2), and of commodities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348(1) and was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Act defines “spoofing” as “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the convictions supported by sufficient evidence. The anti‐spoofing provision provides clear notice and does not allow for arbitrary enforcement; it is not unconstitutionally vague. With respect to the commodities fraud violation, the court upheld a jury instruction on materiality: that the alleged wrongdoing had to be “capable of influencing the decision of the person to whom it is addressed.” The district court properly applied a 14‐point loss enhancement in calculating the sentence, given the nature and complexity of Coscia’s criminal enterprise. View "United States v. Coscia" on Justia Law

Based on a tip, DEA officers followed Harden and attempted a traffic stop. In attempting to evade officers, Harden attained speeds that were at least 21 miles per hour over the 25 mph speed limit. During the chase, he threw nearly two kilograms of cocaine out of the vehicle. The cocaine was subsequently recovered by law enforcement. Harden turned into a parking lot and made a U-turn, resulting in a collision with an agent’s vehicle. After the collision, the officers pulled Harden from the vehicle, which continued to move forward as his foot released the brake. Harden was uncooperative as he was arrested. Harden pled guilty, without an agreement, to possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release, rejecting Harden’s argument that the “safety valve” provision in 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) applied to him, which would allow the court to impose a sentence beneath the mandatory minimums. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Harden’s action constituted acts of violence or the threat of violence. That finding rendered Harden ineligible for the two-level safety valve reduction. View "United States v. Harden" on Justia Law

Anderson and three accomplices had robbed a Milwaukee bank in 2014. As they drove away, a dye pack burst inside a bag of currency, leaving some of the bills stained and singed. The robbers tossed the bag from the car. A citizen found it and gave it to police. Authorities found another $561 when, a day later, they arrested Anderson’s brother driving the stolen getaway car. Anderson pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d), and admitted stealing $4,237 in currency and about $500 in coins. The judge imposed 156 months’ imprisonment and ordered Anderson to pay $4,131 in restitution (a miscalculated amount). On remand, the case was assigned to a different judge; Anderson again changed lawyers. His third lawyer objected to the presentence report but said nothing about restitution. The judge sought clarification of the report’s restitution calculation. The prosecutor remained silent about the $2,107 of singed and stained currency in the government’s possession. The judge sentenced Anderson to 126 months’ imprisonment and again ordered him to pay $4,131 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, noting that defense counsel may have been unaware of the cash recovered immediately after the robbery. Under 18 U.S.C. 3664(e), the government must prove that the victim will not be made whole by returning stolen property that has been recovered. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

With a warrant, police installed and monitored a GPS locator on Holst's car, while investigating Holst’s participation in methamphetamine sales. Police tracked Holst’s car as it stopped at a particular place for more than an hour. An informant told them that Holst had traveled to buy methamphetamine. Police stopped Holst’s car as he was driving home and found that drug. Other officers obtained a warrant to search the house in whose driveway Holst’s car had stopped. The search of Castetter’s house turned up methamphetamine, other drugs, and approximately $62,000 in cash. Prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Castetter moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that information derived from the first warrant should be ignored because Holst lives in Michigan, where the first warrant issued, while Castetter lives in Indiana. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The Fourth Amendment does not concern state borders. States may decide not to authorize their police to acquire information extraterritorially or may elect to ignore information from other states’ officers, but Indiana did not do so. Tracking a car by GPS does not offend any state’s sovereign rights. While the first warrant was not based on information about Castetter, all the police learned by monitoring the GPS was the location of Holst’s car. Castetter lacked a privacy interest in that location. The Constitution is not offended if, by executing a warrant to search one person (Holst), police learn incriminating details about another (Castetter). View "United States v. Castetter" on Justia Law

Stephenson was convicted, in Indiana, of the 1996 murders of three people and of theft of ammunition from the trailer in which one victim was staying. Shell casings at the murder scene matched those taken from the trailer. The jury recommended the death penalty, which the judge imposed. Stephenson’s state appeal and petition for postconviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal judge ruled that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel had failed to object to Stephenson having to wear a stun belt in the courtroom. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The district judge then ruled that Stephenson had not been prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to object to his having to wear a stun belt visible to jurors in the penalty phase because the jury had already decided that Stephenson was dangerous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to guilt. Taken together, the evidence old and new, “rife with inconsistencies,” fails to establish Stephenson’s innocence. Stephenson was not prejudiced at the guilt phase by the jury foreman’s acquaintance with the sister of a victim, or two jurors’ discussion of Stephenson’s participation in a bar fight before the murders. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the guilt phase, noting that the Indiana Supreme Court has barred the future use of stun belts in courtrooms, which can compromise a defendant’s participation at trial because it relies on continuous fear. It is possible that Stephenson’s having to wear the stun belt—for no reason, given that he had no history of acting up in a courtroom—contaminated the penalty phase. View "Stephenson v. Neal" on Justia Law