Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For nearly a decade, Gries and McCullars actively participated in a private online chat room frequented by pedophiles sharing large volumes of child pornography. They were indicted for conspiracy to distribute child pornography, conspiracy to sexually exploit a child, and engaging in a child-exploitation enterprise. Other users of the chat room cooperated with investigators, pleaded guilty, and received sentencing consideration. The charges against Gries and McCullars proceeded to trial; several cooperators testified against them. To convict Gries and McCullars of the enterprise offense, the government had to prove that they committed three or more crimes against children “in concert” with three or more persons, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)(2). The jury found them guilty on all charges. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the jury’s special verdict was sufficient to support the section 2252A(g)(2) enterprise convictions without the conspiracy predicates, at sentencing the parties and the judge overlooked that the conspiracy counts are lesser-included offenses of the enterprise count. Instead of merging those convictions with the enterprise conviction and imposing sentence on the greater offense alone, the judge imposed concurrent sentences on all three convictions. That error violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. McCullars" on Justia Law

Patterson was indicted in 2012 on charges arising from his role in a conspiracy to rob a fictitious drug “stash house.” Following delays resulting from a determination that Patterson was not competent and subsequent efforts to restore Patterson to competency, a trial was held in 2015. Out of the five counts, Patterson was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846 and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) Patterson was sentenced to the guideline minimum of 168 months incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting his claims of violation of the Speedy Trial Act and his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights and that the prosecutor improperly bolstered witnesses’ credibility during opening and closing arguments. All of the challenged time periods were properly excluded under the Act. Although the delay was lengthy, it was primarily caused by factors outside the government’s control and was not substantially prejudicial to Patterson given the nature of the evidence against him.The prosecutorial statements did not reflect on the credibility of an individual witness or witnesses but instead on the investigation as a whole. The court vacated his sentencing on the drug count for lack of a specific finding on quantity and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police received a tip that a residence was being used as a drug house and secured a no-knock warrant. Entering, the officers saw Lee, beside a table holding a digital scale, a razor blade, sandwich baggies, a cell phone, $157 in cash, and a baggie containing 5.7 grams of cocaine. Officers searched Lee and found $582 and the house keys. Officers recovered two larger bags of cocaine, a loaded handgun, and latex gloves from other parts of the house. Lee claimed to be an innocent bystander, at the house was to help his brother move. Lee was convicted of drug crimes but acquitted of a firearm charge. Lee moved for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve objections, adequately cross-examine witnesses, and develop factual points at trial. Applying the Strickland standard, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Lee’s claim for lack of prejudice, explicitly addressing all but one of Lee’s complaints. Lee unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Under Supreme Court precedent, when a state court rejects a prisoner’s federal claim without discussion, a federal habeas court must presume that the court adjudicated it on the merits unless some state-law procedural principle indicates otherwise, even when the decision expressly addresses some but not all of a prisoner’s claims. Lee did not rebut the presumption, so the state court’s entire decision is subject to deferential review. The Wisconsin court reasonably applied Strickland. View "Lee v. Avila" on Justia Law

In 2000, Winfield was convicted of attempted murder. On direct appeal and post-conviction review, the Illinois appellate courts rejected Winfield’s challenges to his conviction and 30-year prison sentence. By agreement of the parties, a federal district court later reviewed Winfield’s conviction under a less deferential standard than called for after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), and granted Winfield habeas relief. In a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the state then sought to reverse its concession that the pre-AEDPA standard applied, which the district court denied as waived. The state had previously agreed that the Illinois courts had not considered the merits of Winfield’s ineffective assistance claim, then changed its position. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing AEDPA case law and principles of state comity. The state’s original agreement that a pre-AEDPA standard of review applied did not, alone, necessarily amount to an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Although waiver may be appropriate for some defenses or arguments available under AEDPA, such as the statute of limitations, the same is not true section 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review. View "Winfield v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While investigating a tip that illegal drugs were being sold from a south-side convenience store, Chicago Police Officer Brown sucker-punched a store employee for no apparent reason. As the dazed employee attempted to stagger away, Brown continued to beat and kick him for about two minutes. The beating was caught on the store’s surveillance camera. At his trial for willfully depriving the employee of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force inflicted by a law-enforcement officer, Brown sought to introduce expert testimony from a former Chicago police officer that Brown’s actions were consistent with departmental standards. The judge excluded the expert witness, reasoning that departmental policy was immaterial to the Fourth Amendment inquiry and that the expert’s proposed testimony might include an improper opinion about Brown’s state of mind. The jury found Brown guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Expert testimony about police standards may appropriately assist the jury in resolving some excessive-force questions, but sometimes evidence of this type is unhelpful and irrelevant, particularly when no specialized knowledge is needed to determine whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. The misconduct alleged here was easily within the grasp of a lay jury. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Hicks admitted to sexually molesting his former stepson, during a recorded phone call from a police station. During the call, before the confession, the victim repeatedly threatened to harm Hicks and to tell Hicks’s other minor son about the abuse. Hicks’s counsel played the entire recorded conversation to the jury. Later, the prosecutor referred to an earlier case in which Hicks had pleaded guilty after being accused of similar conduct. He asked the jury if it was “fair” that Hicks had been permitted to plea bargain to misdemeanors and receive probation and “Is that what should have happened here or should we deal with this?” Hicks’s counsel did not object. Hicks was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. After a failed state collateral challenge, he sought federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the state court unreasonably determined that Hicks’s counsel was credible when he testified that Hicks told him that he did not feel threatened during the call, Hicks did not suffer prejudice from the tape’s admission, because the other evidence of his guilt was sufficient to sustain his conviction. The court stated that it was “very troubled by the state court’s finding” regarding the prosecutor’s statements and defense counsel’s failure to object, but Hicks did not fairly present that claim to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and procedurally defaulted on the claim for relief. View "Hicks v. Hepp" on Justia Law

A McDonald’s employee called 911 and stated that a vehicle had been sitting in the drive-through lane for an hour and that the driver might be sick. Fire and police units responded. When Officer Sheets-Walker arrived, she saw Paige standing outside the driver’s door of his vehicle, speaking with Fire Department Captain Hornick. Sheets-Walker detected an odor of marijuana coming from Paige. Hornick explained that he had found Paige asleep in the driver’s seat. Sheets-Walker continued to smell marijuana and planned to detain Paige temporarily. She suspected that Paige might have marijuana or a firearm because, in her experience, “drugs and guns are typically associated together.” Department policy dictated that an officer ensure that a person does not have drugs or a weapon before placing him in a police vehicle. Sheets-Walker patted Paige down and discovered a loaded firearm in his waistband. Sheets-Walker arrested him; she saw a bottle of alcohol on the driver’s seat.of Paige’s vehicle. She searched the vehicle and found a digital scale and clear sandwich bags containing 10.42 grams of crack cocaine and 9.24 grams of marijuana. Indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana, Paige unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; Sheets-Walker had probable cause to arrest Paige for possessing marijuana and for operating a vehicle while impaired and to believe that Paige’s vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity. View "United States v. Paige" on Justia Law

From 2006-2012 Packerland deceived at least one of its customers about the protein content of its Whey Protein Concentrate. Land O’Lakes purchased Packerland’s protein concentrate for use in making foods for calves and other young animals. Buyers infer protein levels from measuring nitrogen: a seller can add another nitrogen-rich substance to produce higher scores. The Ratajczaks, who owned Packerland, started adding urea to its protein concentrate. in 2006. Land O’Lakes suspected that the concentrate was high in nonprotein nitrogen but could not learn why; the Ratajczaks made excuses that Land O’Lakes accepted. The Ratajczaks sold Packerland in 2012. The new owner kept them as employees; they kept adding urea until the buyer learned what the truth. The Ratajczaks lost their jobs and settled for about $10 million before the buyer filed a complaint. Land O’Lakes stopped buying Packerland’s product and asserted claims of breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Packerland’s insurers refused to defend or indemnify it or the Ratajczaks; the Ratajczaks’ personal insurer refused to indemnify them for their settlement with Packerland’s buyer. The district court dismissed Land O’Lakes’s suit and ruled in favor of the insurers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Land O’Lakes’ claim to treble damages under RICO and state-law and the Ratajczaks’ claims that Packerland’s insurers and their own insurers had to defend and indemnify them. View "Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Ratajczak" on Justia Law

Moreno sold Alpha‐PVP, a designer drug that produces a powerful stimulant effect in its users before that drug was listed as a controlled substance. It was listed on the federal government’s Schedule I of controlled substances in 2014. Moreno pled guilty (21 U.S.C. 812(b)(1)(A)-(C)) to importing Alpha‐ PVP from China and dealing the drug in northwestern Wisconsin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 80-month sentence, rejecting Moreno’s argument that the district court assigned the wrong offense level to Alpha‐PVP when calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range. Alpha‐PVP is not specifically listed in the Sentencing Guidelines drug‐quantity tables, so the Guidelines required the district court to determine the “most closely related” controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1, appl. n.6, and then use that drug’s offense level for Alpha‐PVP. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the most closely related drug is methcathinone, another Schedule I controlled substance. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

In 2010, more than 100 people, including Bell, were arrested as part of the “Operation Blue Knight” investigation. In 2012, Bell and Walter were both charged with conspiring to sell more than 1,000 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846 and were convicted. The court sentenced Walter to 335 months and Bell to 276 months. The government’s case rested on evidence that Bell was inexplicably wealthy, physical samples of heroin seized from organization members, and expert testimony about drug trafficking. There were no controlled buys or recorded incriminating statements. The government’s case hinged on testimony from seven witnesses that had been charged with drug crimes; six were testifying pursuant to agreements that held out the possibility of reduced sentences. Bell’s lawyer elicited testimony that three of those witnesses had been arrested during the investigation but avoided revealing two instances in which Bell sold heroin in controlled buys, and that he was arrested in 2010 for doing so. The prosecution then elicited testimony about a recording of Bell selling heroin to a confidential informant. The prosecution also failed to disclose a damaging remark by one of its witnesses about a key government witness, who was a career criminal and relatively senior organization member. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the “Brady” error required new trials for both defendants. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law