Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wagner responded to "Holly's" internet advertisement. “Holly” was actually an undercover federal officer. Wagner stated that he was 39. Holly replied that she was only 14 and trying to earn $300. Wagner told Holly he wanted to meet her and stated he was “clean and unable to get [her] pregnant.” After Holly failed to show for a planned rendezvous, Wagner messaged her every day. Wagner was not charged with any crime based on that conduct. He later engaged in chats with another undercover officer, posing as 15-year-old "Jen," during which he discussed the need for a fake i.d., and secrecy and sexual positions. He was arrested at a planned meeting. Agents discovered condoms and bed sheets in Wagner’s truck and internet searches for “Girls First Time Having Sex” on his computer. Wagner was convicted of knowingly attempting to persuade or induce a minor (Jen) to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2442(b). He was sentenced to 132 months’ imprisonment followed by 12 years of supervised release. His guidelines range incorporated uncharged conduct under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The uncharged conduct meets the guidelines’ definition of relevant conduct and was properly included. The district court provided sufficient reasoning for imposing a condition requiring his participation in computer monitoring. A condition limiting Wagner’s access to adult pornography, however, was poorly written and unclear. View "United States v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Bernstein, an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, to represent an indigent defendant in federal district court, hired forensic expert Speckin to analyze evidence for the defense. Bernstein disregarded the Act’s rules and failed to obtain the court’s preapproval; he submitted a voucher for the expert’s services six months after his client was sentenced, requesting $15142.90, about six times the statutory cap. The judge would not approve it. Speckin sued Bernstein in a Michigan state court, which entered a default judgment against Bernstein. Bernstein then unsuccessfully asked the federal district judge to vacate the state-court judgment or enjoin its enforcement. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. No statute authorized the district court to review the Michigan judgment. Bernstein hired Speckin outside the bounds of the CJA, so their dispute is one of private contract and governed by state law. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from granting an “injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” 28 U.S.C. 2283. Nothing in the CJA comes close to authorizing an injunction of state-court proceedings. View "United States v. Alkaramla" on Justia Law

Faucett possessed large quantities of child pornography, including 59 sexually explicit photos of his five-year-old granddaughter that he took while she was sleeping. When investigators found the collection on his computer, he initially denied knowledge of it. He later confessed. Faucett pleaded guilty to producing and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B). His presentence report detailed his alcoholism and mental-health issues, including ADHD, insomnia, depression, and anxiety. When he took the pictures of his granddaughter, he had active prescriptions for Adderall (for ADHD) and Paxil (an antidepressant). The defense strategy was acceptance of responsibility. He is serving a 30-year prison term. In a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, he claimed that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him that involuntary intoxication was an available defense and at least should have developed an argument about diminished capacity as a mitigating factor. The district judge denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that neither defense strategy would have had any chance of success. The Seventh Circuit affirmed without addressing whether involuntary intoxication is an available defense in a case like this one. Faucett did not articulate a viable factual basis for the defense even if it would apply. Nor was his counsel constitutionally ineffective for not arguing diminished capacity as a mitigating factor at sentencing. View "Faucett v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, a confidential informant informed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives about Toby Jones, the leader of a drug‐distribution operation on Chicago’s West Side. The informant introduced Toby and his brother, Kelsey, to ATF Agent Labno, who posed as a firearms and drug dealer. During several controlled drug purchases, Toby negotiated a drugs‐for‐guns transaction with Agent Labno. Eventually, Toby instructed one of his drug workers, Fields, to complete the transaction; Fields was arrested immediately after the exchange. Toby and Kelsey engaged in a week‐long effort to track down and kill the informant, resulting in two separate shootings. In the later shooting, Kelsey fled the scene in a getaway car driven by Whitfield. The brothers were later arrested and convicted of several crimes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court rejected claims that there was insufficient evidence to support convictions involving retaliatory intent, drug conspiracy, and possession of a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and upheld the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress eyewitness identification and its imposition of sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Ford and Hoefle were passengers in a car driven by Mincks when the car was stopped in Moline, Illinois for a traffic violation, around 2:00 a.m. Officers noticed open beer bottles and asked the men to exit the car. While frisking Ford they found a loaded pistol. Ford was arrested. Ford argued that the pat‐down exceeded the scope of a protective frisk for weapons. The government countered that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the men were armed and planned to avenge a shooting that had wounded Hoefle days earlier. The men had previously stated to investigators that they would deal with the shooting themselves. The government also contended that the officer who conducted the frisk had kept his hands outside of Ford’s clothing until encountering a heavy object weighing down his jacket. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. There was reasonable suspicion to frisk Ford under these circumstances. The officers had been warned via e‐mail that Ford and his companions might seek to retaliate for the shooting; the men likely had been drinking, as evidenced by the beer bottles, and their alcohol use gave the police greater reason to worry that one of them “might do something unpredictable, unwise, and dangerous.” View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

For nearly a decade, Gries and McCullars actively participated in a private online chat room frequented by pedophiles sharing large volumes of child pornography. They were indicted for conspiracy to distribute child pornography, conspiracy to sexually exploit a child, and engaging in a child-exploitation enterprise. Other users of the chat room cooperated with investigators, pleaded guilty, and received sentencing consideration. The charges against Gries and McCullars proceeded to trial; several cooperators testified against them. To convict Gries and McCullars of the enterprise offense, the government had to prove that they committed three or more crimes against children “in concert” with three or more persons, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)(2). The jury found them guilty on all charges. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the jury’s special verdict was sufficient to support the section 2252A(g)(2) enterprise convictions without the conspiracy predicates, at sentencing the parties and the judge overlooked that the conspiracy counts are lesser-included offenses of the enterprise count. Instead of merging those convictions with the enterprise conviction and imposing sentence on the greater offense alone, the judge imposed concurrent sentences on all three convictions. That error violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. McCullars" on Justia Law

Patterson was indicted in 2012 on charges arising from his role in a conspiracy to rob a fictitious drug “stash house.” Following delays resulting from a determination that Patterson was not competent and subsequent efforts to restore Patterson to competency, a trial was held in 2015. Out of the five counts, Patterson was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846 and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) Patterson was sentenced to the guideline minimum of 168 months incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting his claims of violation of the Speedy Trial Act and his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights and that the prosecutor improperly bolstered witnesses’ credibility during opening and closing arguments. All of the challenged time periods were properly excluded under the Act. Although the delay was lengthy, it was primarily caused by factors outside the government’s control and was not substantially prejudicial to Patterson given the nature of the evidence against him.The prosecutorial statements did not reflect on the credibility of an individual witness or witnesses but instead on the investigation as a whole. The court vacated his sentencing on the drug count for lack of a specific finding on quantity and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police received a tip that a residence was being used as a drug house and secured a no-knock warrant. Entering, the officers saw Lee, beside a table holding a digital scale, a razor blade, sandwich baggies, a cell phone, $157 in cash, and a baggie containing 5.7 grams of cocaine. Officers searched Lee and found $582 and the house keys. Officers recovered two larger bags of cocaine, a loaded handgun, and latex gloves from other parts of the house. Lee claimed to be an innocent bystander, at the house was to help his brother move. Lee was convicted of drug crimes but acquitted of a firearm charge. Lee moved for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve objections, adequately cross-examine witnesses, and develop factual points at trial. Applying the Strickland standard, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Lee’s claim for lack of prejudice, explicitly addressing all but one of Lee’s complaints. Lee unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Under Supreme Court precedent, when a state court rejects a prisoner’s federal claim without discussion, a federal habeas court must presume that the court adjudicated it on the merits unless some state-law procedural principle indicates otherwise, even when the decision expressly addresses some but not all of a prisoner’s claims. Lee did not rebut the presumption, so the state court’s entire decision is subject to deferential review. The Wisconsin court reasonably applied Strickland. View "Lee v. Avila" on Justia Law

In 2000, Winfield was convicted of attempted murder. On direct appeal and post-conviction review, the Illinois appellate courts rejected Winfield’s challenges to his conviction and 30-year prison sentence. By agreement of the parties, a federal district court later reviewed Winfield’s conviction under a less deferential standard than called for after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), and granted Winfield habeas relief. In a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the state then sought to reverse its concession that the pre-AEDPA standard applied, which the district court denied as waived. The state had previously agreed that the Illinois courts had not considered the merits of Winfield’s ineffective assistance claim, then changed its position. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing AEDPA case law and principles of state comity. The state’s original agreement that a pre-AEDPA standard of review applied did not, alone, necessarily amount to an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Although waiver may be appropriate for some defenses or arguments available under AEDPA, such as the statute of limitations, the same is not true section 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review. View "Winfield v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While investigating a tip that illegal drugs were being sold from a south-side convenience store, Chicago Police Officer Brown sucker-punched a store employee for no apparent reason. As the dazed employee attempted to stagger away, Brown continued to beat and kick him for about two minutes. The beating was caught on the store’s surveillance camera. At his trial for willfully depriving the employee of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force inflicted by a law-enforcement officer, Brown sought to introduce expert testimony from a former Chicago police officer that Brown’s actions were consistent with departmental standards. The judge excluded the expert witness, reasoning that departmental policy was immaterial to the Fourth Amendment inquiry and that the expert’s proposed testimony might include an improper opinion about Brown’s state of mind. The jury found Brown guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Expert testimony about police standards may appropriately assist the jury in resolving some excessive-force questions, but sometimes evidence of this type is unhelpful and irrelevant, particularly when no specialized knowledge is needed to determine whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. The misconduct alleged here was easily within the grasp of a lay jury. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law