Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1998 Haynes was convicted of 12 federal crimes and sentenced to life plus 105 years in prison. His direct appeal and a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 failed. After the Supreme Court retroactively held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C.924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague in labelling as a violent felony a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” the Seventh Circuit authorized Haynes to pursue another collateral attack. The district court concluded that Johnson implies the invalidity of the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii), under which Haynes’s life sentences were imposed and concluded that Haynes must be resentenced. The court did not invalidate any of his convictions. Haynes argued that three of his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions for use of a firearm in committing a crime of violence depended on a conclusion that interstate travel in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(2), is a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The length of Haynes’ new sentences for Hobbs Act robbery may affect the appropriate length of his section 924(c) sentences. When a judge in a section 2255 proceeding orders a resentencing, that proceeding is not over, and the decision is not appealable until that resentencing has occurred. View "Haynes v. United States" on Justia Law

Soon after he began working at a daycare, other teachers expressed concern about 20‐year‐old Al‐Awadi’s interactions with female children. Al‐Awadi was cautioned about his behavior. On a day when the daycare was shorthanded, Al-Awadi, the only adult in a room of napping children, pulled back the underwear of a girl and took pictures. He put his finger in her vagina. The girl woke up and complained to another teacher. She was later examined by a physician, who discounted Al-Awadi’s claim that the girl injured herself on his watch while she was playing on his lap and he was checking for injury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions for making and attempting to make child pornography, rejecting arguments concerning evidence that Al‐Awadi digitally penetrated the girl, an uncharged act. The “more likely than not” pattern jury instruction accurately told the jury how to assess evidence of acts other than charged crimes. The jury was also instructed that the government had to prove the elements of charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of the molestation was permissible because Al-Awadi placed his intent in taking the pictures at issue. Sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that Al‐ Awadi used the girl to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of the conduct. View "United States v. Al-Awadi" on Justia Law

Holton pleaded guilty to robbing an Illinois grocery store, carrying and using a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); a jury found him guilty of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery (robbery affecting interstate commerce), 18 U.S.C. 1951. He was acquitted of robbing two other stores. In sentencing Holton on the conspiracy count, the judge imposed a prison term roughly four years above the Guidelines sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held that a judge may consider evidence of conduct that is relevant to the offense of conviction, even if that conduct is uncharged, “so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge stated that she was not considering acquitted conduct, but that the conspiracy began with “robbing drug dealers” (uncharged) and evolved into robbing other businesses, so that the drug-dealer robberies were “connected in a substantial way to the conspiracy charge and conviction,” and were “significantly relevant ... uncharged conduct which I have authority to consider.” Although the judge did not state explicitly that Holton more likely than not robbed drug dealers, she said enough to show that she reached this conclusion and therefore did not err. View "United States v. Holton" on Justia Law

After his conviction for a felony in Illinois, Rodriguez-Contreras, a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was found in possession of a weapon and was convicted under 720 ILCS 5/24–1.1(a). The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that he was removable as an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43); violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which bars anyone convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm, is an aggravated felony. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The BIA did not address whether the substantive elements of the state offense match those of the federal law, which defines "firearm" as “any weapon … designed to … expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” Compressed air is not an explosive, so pneumatic weapons are not “firearms.” Illinois law defines a firearm as “any device ... designed to expel a projectile ... by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas or escape of gas.” Illinois law is broader than the federal law. The court rejected an argument that the Illinois statute is “divisible” and permits judges to determine which statutory provision was involved. Illinois has a single crime of weapon possession by a felon, with multiple ways of committing that crime. A definitional clause does not create a separate crime. Federal law does not foreclose Rodriguez-Contreras’ obtaining discretionary relief from removal. In exercising discretion the BIA may consider that Rodriguez-Contreras possessed a weapon that is subject to both state and federal prohibitions. View "Rodriguez-Contreras v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Dearborn pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846.. In 2015, the Seventh Circuit remanded for correction of certain conditions of supervised release. In a second appeal, Dearborn argued that during resentencing the court should have reconsidered its earlier denial of a motion to suppress evidence. He claimed that, in describing the investigation in the search warrant application, the officer did not inform the warrant judge that one of the controlled buys might have occurred one day later than specified in the search warrant application; the police might have used an unduly suggestive procedure in obtaining an identification of Dearborn from an informant; the informants had criminal histories and received compensation for helping the police; and certain audio and video recordings referred to in the application were of poor quality. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Dearborn waived that argument. The court noted that Dearborn did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea and that his arguments “could have been raised earlier” and were irrelevant to the re-sentencing proceedings. Dearborn has not shown that extraordinary circumstances required the district court to reconsider its earlier denial of a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Dearborn" on Justia Law

Cook County criminal defendants could secure pretrial release on personal recognizance; execution of a full deposit bail bond, to be fully returned upon performance of the bond conditions; or execution of a 10% bail bond, 10% of which (the Fee) was retained by the state upon performance of the bond conditions (725 ILCS 5/110-7). In 2014, Platt was arrested and charged with murder. His bail amount was $2 million. Platt executed a bail bond of $200,000. After Platt’s acquittal, the Clerk returned $180,000—his 10% deposit less the 10% Fee of $20,000. In 2015, Illinois amended section 5/110-7 to cap the Fee at $100 in Cook County, effective January 1, 2016. The return of Platt’s bail deposit depended upon the satisfaction of his bond conditions, not upon his acquittal. Platt sued on behalf of a putative class of individuals who paid a Fee of more than $100 during five years preceding January 1, 2016, alleging that retention of the Fee: violated their due process rights, having no rational relationship to the cost incurred in administering bail bonds; violated their equal protection rights; violated the Illinois Constitution uniformity clause; and constituted unjust enrichment. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that Platt did not challenge the process by which the Fee was imposed and alleged only disparate impact, not unequal treatment. The Fee bore a relationship to legitimate governmental interests. View "Platt v. Brown" on Justia Law

Hayes pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The indictment specifically charged him with possessing a model AK‐47 rifle. The plea agreement stated that the serial number on the AK‐47 “had been covered by a paint-like substance that prevented the serial number from being visible.” It was the government’s position that Hayes’ offense level should increase by four, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), because the serial number was “altered or obliterated.” Hayes conceded that the serial number was covered in a paint‐like substance, but argued that because the serial number was not “physically altered,” the enhancement should not apply. Hayes noted that the Forensic Science Laboratory of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives applied a “chemical solvent and light polishing” to the gun, which ultimately revealed the serial number. The court rejected his argument, calculated a Guidelines range of 84-105 months’ imprisonment, addressed the factors to be considered under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and imposed a sentence of 94 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the application of the section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement but remanded for recalculation of Hayes’s criminal history points. View "United States v. Hayes" on Justia Law

In 2002 Ranjel was indicted for participating in a Latin Kings drug-trafficking conspiracy in Aurora, Illinois. He fled to Mexico and remained there for nearly a decade. He surrendered in 2011. A jury later convicted him of conspiracy and related drug crimes. The district judge imposed a sentence of 235 months in prison followed by a five-year term of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of sentencing error that the judge miscalculated the drug quantity; misapplied a guidelines enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy; misapplied a guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice; and erroneously considered evidence of his involvement in a gang-related murder. View "United States v. Ranjel" on Justia Law

Feterick pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and was sentenced to a total of 49 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. The conditions of supervised release include one requiring that Feterick “participate, at the direction of a probation officer, in a substance abuse treatment program.” The Seventh Circuit vacated that condition. The district court had explained its belief that treatment may become necessary because of Feterick’s history of drug use, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1), and to assure his post‐incarceration rehabilitation, but the court made an erroneous finding that he had used cocaine in the months before the robberies. The evidence showed that Feterick used marijuana, not cocaine, during the year before the robbery. Even if drug treatment might be warranted by Feterick’s history of marijuana use and his short‐term abuse of Percocet, it is not clear that the judge would have imposed the treatment condition if aware that Feterick’s cocaine use was quite remote in time (20 years before the bank robberies). A resentencing limited to reconsideration of the drug‐treatment condition will suffice. View "United States v. Feterick" on Justia Law

Popovski pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for obtaining credit-card or debit-card numbers from abroad, encoding them onto blank cards and using those cards to withdraw money. Popovski was responsible for more than 1,000 account numbers but planned to use 800 of them in Peru. The district judge disregarded those 800 numbers, calculating intended loss based on actual or planned U.S. transactions, to conclude that the intended loss attributable to Popovski was $131,000, which added eight offense levels under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. The judge sentenced Popovski to 30 months’ imprisonment; his Guidelines range was 27-33 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 2B1.1 Application Note 3(F)(i) provides: “loss includes any unauthorized charges made with the counterfeit access device or unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.” Popovski unsuccessfully argued that cards with canceled numbers or with credit limits exhausted by earlier withdrawals should not count toward the number of devices. Popovski did not deny that he intended to steal from all of the persons whose account information he possessed; the Application Note indicates that his inability to carry out that intent does not diminish “loss.” That aggregate approach takes account of the possibility that some access devices won’t work, while others could produce more than $500. View "United States v. Popovski" on Justia Law