Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smith, a registered sex offender, was convicted of driving with a revoked license and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment followed by mandatory supervised release. To begin his supervised release, Smith needed the Illinois Department of Corrections to approve a host site. On his release date, Smith submitted two host sites. The Department had not investigated the proposed sites. A parole supervisor ordered Smith’s parole officer, Anderson, to issue a parole violation report rather than release Smith. Anderson’s report contained incorrect statements, claiming that electronic monitoring was a condition of Smith’s supervised release and that the Department had attempted to place Smith at a host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic monitoring requirement. Smith spent another six months in custody before being released on good‐time credit. He sued Anderson under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Anderson. For relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity bars Smith’s claim. No court has held that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements; lacking these arrangements, their continued detention does not violate clearly established rights. View "Smith v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Quiroz brokered large drug transactions and, in 2015, was convicted for his role in a methamphetamine transaction. In a second trial that year, he was convicted for his role in a marijuana transaction. Before each trial, Quiroz moved to suppress statements he made after his arrest, arguing that he was not read his Miranda warnings. The arresting officer testified that he read Quiroz his Miranda rights, that Quiroz seemed to understand, and that Quiroz made inculpatory statements after being told about recordings of his conversations. The district court found that the warnings were given and that Quiroz voluntarily waived his rights and admitted the statements into evidence. The court also admitted, under the hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements, recorded conversations between Quiroz and the government’s confidential informant, and recordings of other declarants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the circumstances in the record shows that Quiroz understood his rights even though he did not explicitly acknowledge that understanding. The court was permitted to consider the out-of-court statements, so long as it had some independent evidence of the conspiracy. In both cases, it did. Its finding of a conspiracy was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Quiroz" on Justia Law

El-Bey, a "Moorish national," created an EIN for the Trust, naming himself as the trustee and fiduciary. El-Bey filed six tax returns for the Trust, each seeking a $300,000 refund, signing each return, identifying himself as the fiduciary, and listing his date of birth as the date of trust creation. The IRS flagged these returns as frivolous and notified El-Bey that he would be assessed a $5,000 penalty per return if he failed to file a corrected return. El-Bey returned the letters to the IRS, including vouchers and tax forms bearing no relation to the returns. Based on the fourth and fifth tax returns, the IRS mailed two $300,000 refund checks, which El-Bey deposited, using the funds to purchase vehicles and to buy a house. After the sixth return, El-Bey was indicted on two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and six counts of making false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 287. The district court allowed El-Bey to proceed pro se and appointed standby counsel over El-Bey’s objection. El-Bey advanced irrelevant arguments, interrupted the judge, and made it challenging to manage the trial. The court expressed frustration, but later instructed the jurors, who indicated that they could continue to be impartial. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial. Statements by the court in the presence of the jury conveyed that El-Bey was guilty or dishonest and impaired El-Bey’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. View "United States v. El-Bey" on Justia Law

Bryant was convicted of murdering his stepmother. He was 17 years old at the time of the 2000 killing. Under Indiana law juveniles in police custody have a statutory right to “meaningful consultation” with a parent before waiving their constitutional rights. Bryant met with his mother and made an incriminating statement to her. Detectives surreptitiously recorded their conversation; the incriminating statement was introduced at Bryant’s trial through the testimony of both eavesdropping officers. Bryant’s counsel’s objection to the first officer’s testimony was overruled. On appeal, the state court held that the statement should not have been admitted, but because Bryant’s counsel did not object to the second detective’s testimony about the same statement, the error was unpreserved and effectively harmless. On state postconviction review, Bryant unsuccessfully raised a “Strickland” claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation claim stemming from a falsehood in a police report. Bryant then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state appellate court reasonably applied Strickland and Brady, finding no reasonable probability of a different outcome, because any errors were ultimately harmless and the evidence of Bryant’s guilt was plentiful. View "Bryant v. Brown" on Justia Law

Contreras pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking offenses in three separately charged criminal cases assigned to three different district judges. When calculating the guidelines range at sentencing, each judge applied an upward adjustment of two offense levels after finding that Contreras maintained a premises—his home— “for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his concurrent 87-month sentences, rejecting an argument that each judge erred by not comparing the frequency of legal activity to the frequency of illegal activity that occurred at his residence. The eight drug transactions that Contreras conducted at his home support a finding that drug trafficking was a primary use of the residence, not an incidental or collateral one. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sherman died from gunshot wounds. When police arrived, Sherman lay on the ground with 50-60 people gathered around. Long was tried for first-degree murder. No physical evidence tied Long to the crime. The state presented four witnesses; two recanted at trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor made improper statements, resulting in a new trial. At Long’s second trial, the state again presented the four eyewitnesses. One maintained her identification of Long. Two, having previously recanted, continued to deny having seen Long shoot Sherman, despite their prior videotaped statements. The prosecutor failed to correct Irby when she claimed that she had not previously stated that her identification was coerced; defense counsel impeached that testimony. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made comments that no evidence was presented that another individual committed the crime and referenced the contents of a letter written by Irby that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury found Long guilty. His state court appeals and post-conviction petitions were unsuccessful. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Long’s federal habeas petition, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claims procedurally defaulted and that Long had not shown a reasonable likelihood that Irby’s testimony or the closing argument prejudiced the outcome; and that Long’s ineffective assistance claim was without merit. “[W]hat occurred [Irby's testimony] may well have helped the defense rather than the prosecutor.” View "Long v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Convicted of multiple counts of sex trafficking, conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and attempted sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and 1594(c), Sawyer was sentenced to 50 years' incarceration. After unsuccessful appeals, Sawyer sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, stating that “the Government offered the Petitioner a plea offer, which included a term of imprisonment of 15 years” and that counsel advised him to reject it because “the Government’s case against him was weak.” Sawyer attached affidavits from his mother and grandmother, in which they attest to discussing the plea offer with Sawyer. The government argued that Sawyer’s petition failed to provide sufficient evidence that the government made him an offer. The district court denied Sawyer’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, noting that Sawyer did not attach a proposed plea agreement or an affidavit from trial counsel regarding any agreement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. If he is able to prove on remand that the government did offer a plea deal, Sawyer will have to establish that his attorney’s advice was objectively unreasonable and that, with competent advice, he would have accepted the plea deal, but at this point in the proceedings, Sawyer has sufficiently alleged both of those required elements. View "Sawyer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Saxon was convicted in Illinois state court of the 1995 first-degree murder of a 12-year-old girl, arson, and concealment of homicide. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. After his state appeals were exhausted, Saxon sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state’s case included testimony from 15 witnesses, numerous stipulations and exhibits. The victim’s mother testifed that Saxon was at her house almost every day, and was there the night the girl disappeared. Saxon’s aunt testified that she had lived at the residence with the garage in which the victim’s burned body was found before the fire and that Saxon frequently visited. By the time police obtained a search warrant for a sample of Saxon’s blood in 2000, Saxon was serving a 10-year prison sentence following a conviction for the sexual assault of his nephew. Saxon’s blood sample showed that his DNA matched the DNA profile found on the sperm fraction found on the victim’s body. Eventually, Saxon admitted that he had sex with the victim. The evidence was sufficient to find Saxon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged was not objectively unreasonable. View "Saxon v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law

After participating in a scheme that involved “retirement investment seminars,” Oliver pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for defrauding investors. Because Oliver used their money for personal expenses or invested it in high-risk schemes, investors lost a total of $983,654. The district court sentenced Oliver to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by failing to consider unwarranted sentencing disparities, relying on inaccurate information, not calculating the Guidelines range for supervision, and imposing a two‐level leadership enhancement. The sentence fell within the recommended Guidelines range and Oliver failed to object at the time of sentencing. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Sanders has been in solitary confinement for eight years, and the prison plans to keep him there for another ten. He has been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and other conditions that make him dangerous to others. Sanders alleged in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that the isolation, heat, and restricted airflow in solitary confinement harm aggravate his psychological problems and his asthma. The filing fee in federal court is $400. Sanders asked for permission to litigate in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b), which is unavailable if the prisoner has, on three or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Sanders conceded that at least three of his prior suits or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of his suit, citing “the exception to the exception.” Sanders argued that his mental condition disposes him to self-harm, that he has twice tried to commit suicide, and has engaged in self-mutilation. Sanders’s history, coupled with the prison’s diagnosis of his condition, make his allegations plausible. The court stated that a court cannot simply disregard such an allegation as self-serving. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law