Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves two defendants, Christopher Yates and Shawn Connelly, who were convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The conspiracy operated out of Macomb, Illinois, and lasted thirteen months, from January 2019 to February 2020. Yates supplied the drugs, initially from an unknown source in Joliet, Illinois, with alleged Mexican cartel connections. After the arrest of that supplier, Yates sought a new source. Connelly was among the distributors. The government conducted one seizure and nine controlled buys from members of the conspiracy during its investigation.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, both defendants pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The main dispute at Yates’s sentencing was the classification of the methamphetamine attributable to him as “ice” or “actual” (i.e., pure) methamphetamine, as opposed to its generic variant. The district court found that all 737.1 grams of methamphetamine for which the conspiracy was accountable was “ice” methamphetamine. Connelly raised two objections to the PSR at his sentencing hearing. He argued that the court could not rely on the statements of his coconspirators, Amber Phelps and Jeanna Rechkemmer, for purposes of determining the amount of methamphetamine handled by the conspiracy. He also contended that the full drug weight attributed to the conspiracy was not reasonably foreseeable to him. The district court denied both objections.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Yates challenged the district court’s finding that the methamphetamine attributable to the conspiracy was “ice” methamphetamine. Connelly once more attacked the district court’s calculation of the total drug weight attributable to him. The court vacated Yates’s sentence and remanded. The court found that the government must supply reliable evidence making that approximation reasonable. Because such evidence was lacking, Yates is entitled to resentencing. The court affirmed Connelly’s sentence. View "United States v. Yates" on Justia Law

The case involves two defendants, Christopher Yates and Shawn Connelly, who were convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The conspiracy operated out of Macomb, Illinois, and lasted thirteen months, from January 2019 to February 2020. Yates supplied the methamphetamine, initially purchasing the drugs from an unknown source in Joliet, Illinois, with alleged Mexican cartel connections. After the arrest of that supplier, Yates sought out a new source. Connelly was among the distributors.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois sentenced both defendants. Yates argued that the government failed to prove the purity of all the methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy, having only tested a small, unrepresentative amount. Connelly argued that the court should not have relied on his coconspirators’ statements to calculate the total drug weight, and that the full weight was not reasonably foreseeable to him. The district court rejected both arguments and sentenced Yates to 168 months in prison and Connelly to 188 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated Yates’s sentence and remanded the case. The court found that the government did not provide reliable evidence to support the district court's finding that the conspiracy involved at least 737.1 grams of “ice” methamphetamine. Therefore, Yates was entitled to resentencing. However, the court affirmed Connelly’s sentence, finding that the district court did not err in its calculation of the total drug weight attributable to him. View "United States v. Connelly" on Justia Law

The case involves Harold McGhee, who was convicted and sentenced for drug trafficking. In August 2021, law enforcement received information from a confidential source about a drug dealer distributing large amounts of cocaine in Peoria, Illinois. The dealer was said to drive a Chevy Malibu and supplied cocaine to a house on West Millman Street. With this information, along with details from other informants and a tracking warrant, the police identified McGhee as the suspected dealer. They conducted three controlled buys and a trash pull at McGhee's residence, which led to the discovery of rubber gloves and baggies with a white powdery residue that tested positive for cocaine. This evidence led to a search warrant for McGhee's residence, vehicle, person, and electronic devices, resulting in the discovery of nearly a kilogram of various drugs, a handgun, and other drug trafficking paraphernalia.McGhee sought to suppress the evidence recovered at his residence and moved for a hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. He argued that the affidavit's use of "SUBJECT PREMISES," in reference to both his residence and the Millman Street house, was impermissibly ambiguous. The district court denied the motion. McGhee later renewed his motion to suppress, arguing that the trash pull was constitutionally unreasonable because it was executed without a warrant. The court denied this motion as well.On appeal, McGhee raised ten challenges to the criminal proceedings resulting in his convictions and sentence. The court considered some of his arguments on the merits and resolved others on procedural grounds. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States v. McGhee" on Justia Law

The case involves Jay Liestman, who was convicted for transporting child pornography, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). Liestman had a prior conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law. The district court imposed an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment under § 2252(b)(1) due to his prior conviction. The main issue was whether the state conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction under § 2252(b)(1), which prescribes enhanced penalties for certain recidivist child sex offenders.Previously, the district court had ruled that Liestman's prior conviction for possessing child pornography triggered 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)’s enhancement for repeat sex offenders, which increases the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years if the defendant has a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to ... the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” Liestman argued that the enhancement did not apply because the Wisconsin statute reached offense conduct that Congress did not expressly enumerate in the text of § 2252(b)(1). The district court disagreed and sentenced Liestman to the enhanced mandatory minimum of 15 years.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in § 2252(b)(1) brings within the ambit of the enhancement any prior offense that categorically bears a connection with the conduct enumerated in § 2252(b)(1), regardless of whether it sweeps more broadly than that enumerated conduct in some respects. Therefore, Liestman's prior offense of conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law can serve as a predicate offense under § 2252(b)(1). View "United States v. Liestman" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Christopher Tate and Sandra Kellogg, who were charged with conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs and other drug offenses. They were tried jointly, and the jury convicted them on all counts. The district court imposed substantial, yet below-guidelines, prison sentences. On appeal, both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on one of the counts of their convictions and the enhancements used to determine their guidelines sentencing ranges.The court affirmed the convictions and sentences of both defendants. It concluded that the jury could have found that Tate at least jointly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car. The court also held that although Kellogg argued that she was not part of the larger conspiracy, she failed to establish prejudice resulting from the supposed variance between the larger conspiracy charged in the indictment and the smaller conspiracy proven at trial.Furthermore, the court held that the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court were justified. It found that the evidence supported the application of a 2-level firearm-possession enhancement against Tate, and that any error in its application would have been harmless. Similarly, the court found that Kellogg's challenge to the application of a 3-level enhancement for her role as a manager or supervisor of criminal activity was unavailing. Despite Kellogg's argument that she was not a "manager or supervisor" and that the criminal activity did not involve five or more participants, the court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings. View "United States v. Kellogg" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of two defendants, Christopher Tate and Sandra Kellogg, charged with conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs and other drug offenses. The government had charged twelve people with these offenses. Ten of them pleaded guilty, while Tate and Kellogg chose to go to trial. They were tried jointly, and the jury convicted them on all counts. Both defendants appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for one of their conviction counts and objecting to one of the enhancements used to determine their sentencing guidelines.The court found that the evidence was sufficient for both defendants' convictions. For Tate, the jury could have reasonably found that he at least jointly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car. For Kellogg, even if a juror could not have found a larger conspiracy connecting her, Harris, Mr. Tate, and others, she did not establish prejudice from the supposed variance between the larger conspiracy charged and the smaller conspiracy proven at trial.In terms of sentencing enhancements, the court found that the district court correctly applied the firearm-possession enhancement for Mr. Tate and the manager-supervisor enhancement for Ms. Kellogg. The court concluded that Mr. Tate's total offense level would have been the maximum under the Guidelines with or without the enhancement. As for Ms. Kellogg, she did not raise an objection to the enhancement in the district court and thus the matter was waived. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law

The case arose from a drug trafficking operation led by Keith White in an Indiana prison. White, along with others, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin after three inmates died of drug overdoses. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced under enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, which included two felony convictions for cocaine dealing. This was his second appeal challenging his sentence.White argued that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly determined based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. He contended that the guideline’s definition of a “controlled substance offense” unambiguously excluded inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, and thus the application note expanding this definition deserved no deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor did not unsettle Stinson v. United States, which provided that commentary in the Guidelines interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline. Thus, the court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the career-offender guideline.Additionally, the court rejected White's argument that the “major questions doctrine” invalidated the application note. The court concluded that the application note was not a “transformative expansion” of the Sentencing Commission’s authority, and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. White" on Justia Law

The case concerns Thomas Osadzinski, who was convicted for providing material support to a terrorist organization. In 2019, Osadzinski, a computer science student, developed a software program to facilitate the rapid duplication of terrorist propaganda videos for ISIS. He shared this program with people he believed were ISIS supporters, taught them how to use it, and used it to assemble and distribute a large collection of ISIS media. Osadzinski appealed his conviction, arguing that it violated the First Amendment because his actions constituted free expression. He also contended that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the material-support statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Osadzinski's arguments. The court held that although Osadzinski's actions could be regarded as expressive activity, this activity was coordinated with or directed by ISIS, a known terrorist organization, and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment. The court also rejected Osadzinski's claim that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the material-support statute. The court affirmed Osadzinski's conviction, ruling that his conduct fell outside First Amendment protection, clearly violated the material-support statute, and provided a reasonable basis for the jury to return a guilty verdict. View "USA v. Osadzinski" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, made by Shazariyah Hibbett, the defendant, who was sentenced for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant contested his sentence, arguing that the district court had wrongly applied a two-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight. Hibbett claimed that he was merely a passenger in a vehicle that evaded police, and he did not encourage the driver to flee.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had not erred. The court noted that evidence, including video footage of the vehicle evading police and statements from the driver, supported the enhancement to Hibbett's sentence. The court also rejected Hibbett's argument that the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 79.1, which pertains to control of trial exhibits, conflicted with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 55. The court stated that Hibbett had not demonstrated how the application of the local rule to his case caused him any harm.Therefore, the court upheld the district court's judgment, affirming Hibbett's sentence. The court also suggested that Hibbett's concerns about Local Rule 79.1 should be directed to the Advisory Committee for the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. View "USA v. Hibbett" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Tony Rogers, convicted of sexually assaulting his daughter, DAR, appealed his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rogers claimed his trial lawyer failed to move for in-camera review of DAR’s medical records, which he believed contained information about her mental health that could have impacted the credibility of her testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Rogers's claim, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Rogers then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. He contended that his trial counsel's failure to obtain DAR’s medical records or at least file a motion for in camera review violated his rights. The district court denied Rogers's petition, concluding that the state court decision did not contravene federal law and that the state court's application of the federal standard to Rogers's case was not unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. It found that Rogers's counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion for in camera review of DAR’s medical records. The court held that such a motion would have been meritless because Rogers could not make the preliminary showing of the records’ materiality required under state law. The court also found that Rogers's claim that he made a plausible showing for in camera review of DAR’s medical records was based on speculation and devoid of context. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Rogers v. Wells" on Justia Law