Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Armstrong’s Illinois conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed, based on a finding Armstrong’s guilty plea for unlawful restraint did not require him to register. Armstrong sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers who arrested him knew that he was not required to register, ignored and concealed exculpatory evidence, falsified documents, and propelled his prosecution. His previous case, with a nearly identical complaint, filed before his conviction was overturned, was dismissed as untimely and barred by the rule against collateral challenges to convictions. In this case, Armstrong sought leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and recruitment of a lawyer to help him. The court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened Armstrong’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), and concluded that the false-arrest claim already had been litigated and that other allegations did not state a “Brady” claim for a violation of due process or improper withholding of exculpatory evidence. The court dismissed an amended complaint with prejudice without appointing counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis of Armstrong’s request for the assistance of counsel was flawed for failure to ask: has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate the claim himself? View "Armstrong v. Villa Park Police Department" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Land Bank was created to return tax-delinquent and other troubled properties into productive use. But, in 2011, Walton, the Land Bank’s manager, and Johnson began orchestrating the sale and resale of the city’s properties through a nonprofit loophole and pocketing the profits. The total loss to the city was $282,782.38. Johnson and Walton were convicted of honest services wire fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to engage in money laundering. Walton was also convicted of receiving bribes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government provided substantial evidence that the two had specific intent, including evidence of kickbacks and making false statements, and provided to substantial evidence to support the money laundering convictions. Rejecting Walton’s argument that the court’s instruction on 10 U.S.C. 666 permitted the jury to convict him of accepting a gratuity and not a bribe, the court stated that the instruction and evidence made clear that Walton was convicted of accepting bribes, not gratuities. The convictions required proof of their bad intent (specific intent to commit fraud), so a good faith jury instruction was unnecessary. Both were properly subject to sentencing enhancements because their offenses involved a public official in a high-level decision-making position and they victimized vulnerable families. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Socha, Leonard, and Holm, each forged a stolen check. Holm admitted his forgery and implicated Leonard. Socha’s name was not mentioned. While Leonard was avoiding the police, Holm and Drews left Leonard at Vincent's (Holm's brother) house, dug a grave, then drove Leonard to the grave, murdered and buried him. Socha was 144 miles away, with Holm’s girlfriend, Mrazik, where they were seen in bars. Drews later bragged about the murder to Mrazik, who told a friend, who informed the police. Holm and Drews were arrested. Months later, Mrazik, Drews, and Holm alleged that Socha was involved in the murder plan and entered into plea agreements. Socha was convicted as a party to first-degree intentional homicide. Meanwhile, the police interviewed Swanson, Holm’s cellmate. The recording and interview transcript were turned given to Holm’s counsel, but Socha was not aware of the interview until after his trial. Swanson discussed his impressions that Holm was lying and that Holm’s accusation of Socha was concocted, but also called Socha “a major player in the murder.” Socha knew about the Swanson interview before he filed his appeal and post-conviction motions. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals characterized the Swanson evidence as “inconsequential” and not “very exculpatory.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding the state court decision “not so outlandish as to be unreasonable.” View "Socha v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Fadden earned over $100,000 per year but did not submit tax returns. After an audit, the IRS garnished his wages. Fadden filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay. Fadden claimed that he had no interest in any real property nor in any decedent’s life insurance policy or estate. Fadden actually knew that he would receive proceeds from the sale of his mother’s home (listed by the executor of her estate for $525,000) and would receive thousands of dollars as a beneficiary on his mother’s life insurance policies. A week later, Fadden mentioned his inheritance to a paralegal in the trustee’s office and asked to postpone his bankruptcy. When Fadden finally met with his bankruptcy trustee and an attorney, he confirmed that his schedules were accurate and denied receiving an inheritance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 152(1) for concealing assets in bankruptcy; 18 U.S.C. 152(3) for making false declarations on his bankruptcy documents; and 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) for making false statements during the investigation of his bankruptcy. Counts 1 and 2 required proof of intent to deceive. Fadden proposed a theory-of-defense instruction based on his assertion that his conduct was “sloppiness.” The Seventh Circuit upheld the use of pattern instructions, including that “knowingly means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” View "United States v. Fadden" on Justia Law

In 2014, following investigations by the Indiana Attorney General and FBI, a grand jury indicted Shorter and her company, Empowerment, which provided transportation to Medicaid patients, for health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and three counts of misusing a means of identification, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The government submitted evidence of Shorter’s personal involvement in Empowerment’s billing practices; the results of an Indiana Attorney General Investigation into Empowerment’s billing practices; an FBI search of Empowerment’s records; and the experiences of Empowerment employees and of clients who used its services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her convictions rejecting arguments challenging the indictment, the admission of certain evidence at trial and the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. The court noted “powerful” circumstantial evidence that permitted the jury to convict her, especially because the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that she “caused” the fraudulent billings. View "United States v. Shorter" on Justia Law

Smith, a registered sex offender, was convicted of driving with a revoked license and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment followed by mandatory supervised release. To begin his supervised release, Smith needed the Illinois Department of Corrections to approve a host site. On his release date, Smith submitted two host sites. The Department had not investigated the proposed sites. A parole supervisor ordered Smith’s parole officer, Anderson, to issue a parole violation report rather than release Smith. Anderson’s report contained incorrect statements, claiming that electronic monitoring was a condition of Smith’s supervised release and that the Department had attempted to place Smith at a host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic monitoring requirement. Smith spent another six months in custody before being released on good‐time credit. He sued Anderson under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Anderson. For relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity bars Smith’s claim. No court has held that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements; lacking these arrangements, their continued detention does not violate clearly established rights. View "Smith v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Quiroz brokered large drug transactions and, in 2015, was convicted for his role in a methamphetamine transaction. In a second trial that year, he was convicted for his role in a marijuana transaction. Before each trial, Quiroz moved to suppress statements he made after his arrest, arguing that he was not read his Miranda warnings. The arresting officer testified that he read Quiroz his Miranda rights, that Quiroz seemed to understand, and that Quiroz made inculpatory statements after being told about recordings of his conversations. The district court found that the warnings were given and that Quiroz voluntarily waived his rights and admitted the statements into evidence. The court also admitted, under the hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements, recorded conversations between Quiroz and the government’s confidential informant, and recordings of other declarants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the circumstances in the record shows that Quiroz understood his rights even though he did not explicitly acknowledge that understanding. The court was permitted to consider the out-of-court statements, so long as it had some independent evidence of the conspiracy. In both cases, it did. Its finding of a conspiracy was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Quiroz" on Justia Law

El-Bey, a "Moorish national," created an EIN for the Trust, naming himself as the trustee and fiduciary. El-Bey filed six tax returns for the Trust, each seeking a $300,000 refund, signing each return, identifying himself as the fiduciary, and listing his date of birth as the date of trust creation. The IRS flagged these returns as frivolous and notified El-Bey that he would be assessed a $5,000 penalty per return if he failed to file a corrected return. El-Bey returned the letters to the IRS, including vouchers and tax forms bearing no relation to the returns. Based on the fourth and fifth tax returns, the IRS mailed two $300,000 refund checks, which El-Bey deposited, using the funds to purchase vehicles and to buy a house. After the sixth return, El-Bey was indicted on two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and six counts of making false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 287. The district court allowed El-Bey to proceed pro se and appointed standby counsel over El-Bey’s objection. El-Bey advanced irrelevant arguments, interrupted the judge, and made it challenging to manage the trial. The court expressed frustration, but later instructed the jurors, who indicated that they could continue to be impartial. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial. Statements by the court in the presence of the jury conveyed that El-Bey was guilty or dishonest and impaired El-Bey’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. View "United States v. El-Bey" on Justia Law

Bryant was convicted of murdering his stepmother. He was 17 years old at the time of the 2000 killing. Under Indiana law juveniles in police custody have a statutory right to “meaningful consultation” with a parent before waiving their constitutional rights. Bryant met with his mother and made an incriminating statement to her. Detectives surreptitiously recorded their conversation; the incriminating statement was introduced at Bryant’s trial through the testimony of both eavesdropping officers. Bryant’s counsel’s objection to the first officer’s testimony was overruled. On appeal, the state court held that the statement should not have been admitted, but because Bryant’s counsel did not object to the second detective’s testimony about the same statement, the error was unpreserved and effectively harmless. On state postconviction review, Bryant unsuccessfully raised a “Strickland” claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation claim stemming from a falsehood in a police report. Bryant then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state appellate court reasonably applied Strickland and Brady, finding no reasonable probability of a different outcome, because any errors were ultimately harmless and the evidence of Bryant’s guilt was plentiful. View "Bryant v. Brown" on Justia Law

Contreras pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking offenses in three separately charged criminal cases assigned to three different district judges. When calculating the guidelines range at sentencing, each judge applied an upward adjustment of two offense levels after finding that Contreras maintained a premises—his home— “for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his concurrent 87-month sentences, rejecting an argument that each judge erred by not comparing the frequency of legal activity to the frequency of illegal activity that occurred at his residence. The eight drug transactions that Contreras conducted at his home support a finding that drug trafficking was a primary use of the residence, not an incidental or collateral one. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law