Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Williams was charged with two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank robbery, section 2113(a), (d); and three counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of those crimes, section 924(c). On the firearm counts alone, he faced a statutory minimum of 57 years in prison. The government offered a plea deal that would reduce his sentencing exposure by more than 39 years. After sending the terms to Williams’s attorney, the prosecutor emailed the proposal to Judge McCuskey pursuant to the judge’s standard practice. The judge replied by email, stating that the deal was “exceedingly fair” and “[o]nly a fool would refuse.” Williams pleaded guilty. The judge sentenced him to 18 years in prison pursuant to the agreement. A year later Williams moved to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that the judge impermissibly participated in plea negotiations in violation of FRCP 11(c)(1) and the Due Process Clause. He alleged ineffective assistance based on his lawyer’s failure to raise that violation and request recusal. A new judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 11(c)(1) forbids any judicial participation in plea negotiations, but this violation was harmless. That Williams would not have taken the plea deal but for the judge’s email is “not remotely plausible.” The government’s case was rock solid and the plea deal substantially reduced Williams’s prison exposure. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Owens, an Illinois prisoner, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that 43 prison employees and the Illinois Department of Corrections obstructed his access to courts in violation of the First Amendment. Owens alleges that at four different correctional facilities, over the course of seven years, he had insufficient access to the law library and his excess legal storage boxes, was unable to send mail required to prosecute his cases, and was denied supplies. The district judge dismissed several claims and defendants and later entered summary judgment for the remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Owens’s strongest claim for relief, that prison officials declined to advance him funds for legal mail in 2006-2010. was untimely. The court noted that “Owens—no stranger to the courts in this circuit—again filed an omnibus complaint against unrelated defendants and with claims arising from alleged conduct at four different prisons. As we have told him before, this scattershot strategy is unacceptable under Rule 20(a)(2) … and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b), (g).” View "Owens v. Evans" on Justia Law

Freeman, charged in Illinois state court with kidnapping and murder, moved to proceed pro se although the state had announced its intent to seek the death penalty. The judge denied his request, finding that he did not possess the necessary experience and abilities. Freeman proceeded to trial with the public defender and was convicted. While acknowledging that the right to self-representation cannot be denied based on limited education and legal abilities, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial, finding that Freeman's request was not unequivocal. The Seventh Circuit granted Freeman’s habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court holdings were contrary to and unreasonable applications of the Supreme Court’s 1975 holding, Faretta v. California. A judge’s inquiries into a defendant’s technical legal knowledge are not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to defend himself. Nothing in the record indicates Freeman took vacillating positions on his desire to represent himself. Neither a request to proceed pro se that is accompanied by a request to appoint standby counsel nor dissatisfaction with counsel makes a self-representation request equivocal. It was improper for the court to require Freeman to justify why he wished to proceed pro se beyond what he had explained in his motion. View "Freeman v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Fox was convicted of two Hobbs Act robberies. Because he used a firearm to commit the robberies, he was subject to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)’s mandatory sentencing add-on and was sentenced to 435 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Fox’s argument that he was entitled to a new trial because the district court denied him his right to be represented by counsel of his choice. The district court was within its discretion to deny Fox’s morning-of-trial motion for a continuance when there was no indication Fox was particularly close to retaining new counsel. The court rejected other arguments as foreclosed by controlling precedent but agreed that Fox is entitled to resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Dean v. United States, which permits district courts to take into account the sentencing add-on when fashioning a just sentence for the predicate robberies. View "United States v. Fox" on Justia Law

In 2007, Perry pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, based on his prior convictions for attempted murder and attempted armed robbery. The career offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a), used a definition of a “crime of violence” that included a “residual clause” that mirrored the “violent felony” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Perry challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2017, however, the Supreme Court rejected such challenges because the Guidelines are only advisory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Perry’s argument that the law of the Seventh Circuit did not make the Guidelines sufficiently advisory in 2007. Courts are free to reject the Guidelines based on sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Once the Supreme Court declared the Guidelines advisory, they remained advisory notwithstanding some erroneous applications in the district and circuit courts. Appellate courts cannot change constitutional law established by the holdings of the Supreme Court. If Perry believed he was sentenced under a mandatory guidelines regime contrary to Supreme Court precedent, he could have appealed. View "Perry v. United States" on Justia Law

Following his convictions for drug and firearms crimes, Hill was sentenced to 276 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Hill argued that his conviction for attempted murder under Illinois law did not qualify as an ACCA “violent felony,” which is defined as a crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. When a substantive offense would be a violent felony under section 924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense also is a violent felony. The court rejected Hill’s argument that even the completed crime of murder in Illinois is not a violent felony under the federal elements clause because is possible to commit murder in Illinois by administering poison, or exposing a baby to freezing conditions, or placing a helpless person in danger. The Supreme Court has held that “physical force” means “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person”: the wrongdoer applies energy to bring about an effect on the would-be victim. Both murder and attempted murder in Illinois are categorically violent felonies under section 924(e). View "Hill v. United States" on Justia Law

Each defendant was convicted of illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and is serving 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory floor for someone convicted of that crime who has three or more earlier convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) includes “burglary” in the list of violent felonies but does not define “burglary.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A conviction for residential burglary in Illinois under the 1982 revision of 720 ILCS 5/19-3 is “generic burglary” under Supreme Court precedent. In Illinois “[a] person commits residential burglary who knowingly and without authority enters the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” Rejecting an argument that “a tent, a vehicle, or other enclosed space” is not a “structure” under Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that the crime of residential burglary in Illinois does not cover the entry of vehicles (including boats) and tents. People live in trailers, which are “structures” as a matter of ordinary usage. Trailers used as dwellings are covered by the Illinois residential-burglary statute. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Collins pled guilty to distributing cocaine and at least 28 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 120 months in prison—the statutory minimum in light of a prior felony drug conviction. The district court added two offense levels under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) for his supervisory role in the offenses. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the sentence. While the guidelines have been advisory since 2005, the enhancement decision disqualified Collins from safety‐valve relief from the statutory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(4). This is an atypical drug case in which the judge based the role enhancement for Collins on a legal error. Without any criminal organization or hierarchy, Collins’s isolated, one‐time request to another independent dealer to cover for him on a sale did not make him a supervisor or manager within the meaning of the guideline. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Jewish inmates at prisons operated by the Indiana Department of Corrections, were transferred from one DOC facility to another (Wabash Valley) in order to maintain a kosher diet. Plaintiffs allege that Liebel, the DOC Director of Religious and Volunteer Services, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by failing to delay that transfer until the new facility offered opportunities for Jewish group worship and study. At the time of the transfer, the DOC was unable to recruit Jewish volunteers to Wabash Valley to lead worship or train inmate leaders. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Liebel summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Liebel did not violate clearly established law. Plaintiffs cited no case holding that the Free Exercise Clause provides prisoners the right to group worship when outside volunteers were unavailable to lead or train inmates or holding that a prison official violates the Free Exercise Clause by transferring inmates to a facility that does not provide congregate worship and study, or by failing to delay a transfer until the new facility provides congregate worship and study. View "Kemp v. Liebel" on Justia Law

After Foster pleaded guilty to illegal gun possession under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), the district court considered him to have three qualifying convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and imposed the minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. Foster had convictions for dealing in methamphetamine (a serious drug offense under ACCA), and Indiana robbery, an ACCA violent felony. Foster argued that his past conviction for Indiana’s Class B burglary of a dwelling was not a violent felony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence, finding his argument foreclosed by 2017 circuit precedent. Determining whether burglary under a given state's law is a violent felony presents a categorical question that focuses exclusively on the state crime's elements and not on the facts underlying the conviction. The state crime’s elements must be the same as, or narrower than, the elements of generic burglary as defined by the Supreme Court so that the crime covers no more conduct than the generic offense. Indiana’s Class B felony burglary is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or if the building or structure is a dwelling: Indiana Class B burglary is a violent felony. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law