Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a neighbor saw him brandishing a gun during an argument with his girlfriend and heard gunshots, Mancillas was convicted of two counts of possessing ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to a term of 100 months. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Indiana offense of strangulation is a “crime of violence” for Sentencing Guidelines purposes, so the district court did not err in calculating Mancillas’ base offense level. Applying the categorical approach, the court stated that the Indiana strangulation statute explicitly contemplates a degree of violent force in the final element of the offense. The court remanded for resentencing because the court summarily denied Mancillas’ clear and unequivocal request to represent himself at sentencing and failed to conduct a “Faretta” colloquy. Even at sentencing, where the complexities of trial and the difficult strategic choices are over, a court must respect the wishes of a defendant who unequivocally wishes to exercise his or her right to proceed pro se. This means undertaking a meaningful inquiry into a request for self-representation. View "United States v. Mancillas" on Justia Law

Brown, the manager of a company that provided home physician visits, and Talaga, who handled the company’s billing, were convicted of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; six counts of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347; and three counts of falsifying a matter or providing false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1035(a). The district court sentenced Mr. Brown to 87 months’ imprisonment, 34 months below the Guidelines’ range, stating that a significant sentence was warranted because of the duration of the scheme, the amount of the fraud, the need for general deterrence, and Brown’s failure to accept responsibility. Ms. Talaga was sentenced to 45 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Brown’s argument that the court’s assumptions about the need for general deterrence were unfounded and constituted procedural error and Talaga’s arguments that the court calculated the amount of loss for which she was responsible by impermissibly including losses that occurred before she joined the conspiracy. The district court was under no obligation to accept or to comment further on Brown’s deterrence argument. Talaga, as a trained Medicare biller, knew that that the high-volume billings were fraudulent. View "United States v. Talaga" on Justia Law

The DEA arrested Henshaw during a cocaine purchase; he had $3,174 in cash. In Henshaw’s residence, agents found $55,090 in cash, 750 grams of marijuana, and five ecstasy pills. Henshaw acknowledged that he was a marijuana dealer and that Pryor was Henshaw’s marijuana source. Henshaw represented that he was present only to test the cocaine for Pryor. Pryor died before Henshaw’s indictment. Henshaw was already subject to a four‐year felony conditional discharge sentence for selling two pounds of marijuana and a four‐year felony conditional discharge for possessing with intent to deliver over 500 grams of marijuana and had two earlier felony controlled substance convictions and a misdemeanor assault conviction. Henshaw pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Pryor in attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), & 846 and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(C) and did not contest that he qualified as a “career offender." The PSR calculated Guidelines range of 151-188 months; without the career‐offender designation, the range would be 57-71 months. The PSR represented that Henshaw had minimal involvement in the cocaine transaction; described his family history of abuse; and requested a 57-month sentence. The government recommended 151 months. The court imposed a sentence of five years’ probation. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence as unreasonable for failing to adequately account for considerations of specific deterrence. The sentence should reflect just punishment and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records.” View "United States v. Henshaw" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of rape, deviate sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping in 1983. As required by Illinois law, he registered as a sex offender for 10 years. In 2011, Illinois amended its Sex Offender Registration Act to define as a “sexual predator” a person who had been convicted of any felony offense after July 1, 2011, and had been required to register as a sex offender under a conviction that required registration for more than 10 years. When Johnson was convicted of felony theft in 2013, he became a “sexual predator,” required, for the rest of his life, to register in person several times a year and to give authorities his email address, any internet communications identity, any URL registered to him, and any new blogs or internet sites he maintains and to which he has posted. The district court dismissed Johnson’s challenge to the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a challenge to Johnson’s standing based on his move to Wisconsin. Johnson is free from most of the restrictions imposed by Illinois law, but the sexual predator classification imposed in Illinois continues to affect him even in Wisconsin. Rejecting an ex post facto challenge, the court stated that the Act does not apply retroactively; it does not change or increase the penalty for his 1983 rape conviction. View "Johnson v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Gumila, the head of clinical operations for a company that provided home medical care to the elderly, was convicted of 21 counts of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347 and three counts of making a false statement in a health-care matter, 18 U.S.C. 1035. There was testimony from more than 20 witnesses and documentary evidence establishing that Gumila regularly overruled physicians who wanted to discharge patients and instructed employees to bill services at unjustifiably high rates, to claim that patients were homebound even when they weren’t, and to order skilled-nursing services even if no doctor had ever examined the patient. The government estimated Medicare’s financial loss: approximately $2.375 million for unnecessary and upcoded home visits; $9.45 million for unnecessary skilled-nursing services that did not meet Medicare’s requirements; and $3.779 million for oversight services that did not qualify for payment or were never performed. The guidelines range was 151-188 months in prison. Gumila argued that the loss should be limited to payments for the eight patients specifically mentioned in the indictment ($14,449). The judge concluded that the government was not required to present specific evidence to prove the fraudulent nature of each individual transaction contributing to the total loss, determined that the loss estimate was reasonable, imposed a sentence of 72 months, and ordered Gumila to pay $15.6 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the loss calculation and the prison term as substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Gumila" on Justia Law

Adams, age 20, was a member of the Vice Lords gang and had a lengthy criminal record. Officers stopped Adams on a probation warrant, then retraced his steps to where they first spotted him.They found a semiautomatic handgun with a 30-round magazine under a wheelchair ramp, where Adams had ditched it when he saw the police. Adams pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 87 months in prison—the top of the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge impermissibly considered unreliable evidence linking him to seven unsolved shootings when weighing the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The judge “wisely approached this material with caution” and declined to make any explicit findings on the subject. The judge relied on the government’s presentation only very generally, and only to the extent that it confirmed what the presentence report had documented: Adams is a headstrong gang member who began committing crimes at age 14 and immersed himself in the culture of firearms possession and violence. “That careful and limited approach raises no due-process concerns and was certainly not an abuse of discretion.” View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Officers Garcia and Murphy observed Sanchez fail to stop his van as required at intersections and fail to maintain his lane; his sliding door was completely open. Garcia activated his siren and lights. Sanchez did not stop. Sanchez eventually stopped and exited his van, stumbling. Garcia noted that Sanchez, driving on a suspended license, smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and was mumbling vulgarities. Sanchez refused instructions and took a swing at Garcia. Garcia performed an emergency takedown. The officers found an open beer can and marijuana in the van. Sanchez claimed Garcia struck him unprovoked. At the police station, an officer observed Sanchez lying on the floor, smelling of alcohol and mumbling profanities, and requested medical assistance. Paramedic Ragusa detected the odor of alcohol, but found Sanchez able to answer questions. Ragusa made a notation ruling out battery as a cause of Sanchez’s injuries. After he declined treatment, Sanchez was returned to the jail. The lockup keeper noted that Sanchez did not appear visibly intoxicated. Sanchez was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction and denied post-conviction relief. In federal court, Sanchez claimed excessive force and that Garcia lacked probable cause for arrest. The court instructed the jury that it must take it as conclusively proven that Sanchez was driving under the influence and allowed introduction, without objection, of Murphy’s deposition testimony, with Murphy’s accounts of what Garcia said, and of Ragusa’s paramedic’s report. The court excluded the lockup report. The jury ruled in favor of Garcia. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a new trial was not required. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Wilson was the Director, Chairman of the Board, President, and CEO of Imperial, which acquired e-Bio, which ran a fraud scheme, "Alchemy." It involved purchasing biodiesel from a third party and reselling it as though it had been produced by e-Bio, to take advantage of government incentives for renewable-energy production without expending production costs. Wilson was convicted of 21 counts: fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff; fraud in the offer or sale of securities, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) and 77x, and 18 U.S.C. 2; material false statements in required SEC filings, 15 U.S.C. 78ff and 18 U.S.C. 2; wrongful certification of annual and quarterly reports by a corporate officer, 18 U.S.C. 1350(c)(1); material false statements by a corporate officer to an accountant, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(5) and 78ff, and 18 U.S.C. 2; and false statements to government investigators, of 18 U.S.C. 1001. The dcourt sentenced Wilson to 120 months’ imprisonment and to pay $16,468,769.73 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of Wilson’s contentions reach the high threshold of showing that a reasonable jury could not have found him guilty. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence adequately supports the jury’s finding that Wilson knowingly and willfully made false statements to investors, regulators, an outside accountant, and government agents, and the reasonable inference that Wilson participated in “Alchemy.” View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Baer admitted that he murdered a 24-year-old woman and her four‐year‐old daughter in their home. He did not know the victims. Convicted of two murders, robbery, theft, and attempted rape, he was sentenced to death. He filed a direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, asserting prosecutorial misconduct. His convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Baer filed unsuccessful state post‐conviction proceedings alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on his convictions but granted relief with respect to the death penalty. The Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling was unreasonable under “Strickland.” Evidence of Baer’s mental health and drug use were the cornerstone of Baer’s defense, and defense counsel’s sole strategy for avoiding a death sentence was ensuring that the jury considered and gave effect to that evidence. Yet, Baer’s trial counsel failed to object to instructions that effectively blocked consideration of this crucial mitigating evidence. Counsel also deficiently failed to object to a pattern of prosecutorial prejudicial statements. “The record reflects that the trial judge missed numerous opportunities to stop or clarify the prosecutor’s statements and his absence was noticeable throughout trial.” View "Baer v. Neal" on Justia Law

Easterling, a Wisconsin inmate with convictions for sexually assaulting a minor and armed robbery, sued correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that they violated his constitutional rights to due process and freedom of association by denying him visits with his daughter in 2004 and 2013. Easterling, having inquired about visitation in 2013, was told that he would first have to complete a sex offender program that was not then available. Instead of filing a formal request, Easterling filed suit. The court dismissed the claims based on 2004 as time‐barred. With respect to the claims based on 2013, it entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that other defenses blocked that claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claims arising out of actions taken in 2004 were barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The remaining defendants permissibly denied him visits in 2013 because he did not use the correct procedure to request them. Easterling’s “information requests” in 2013 were not formal “denials” of visitation; the warden Haines and the probation officer were not liable for violating Easterling’s rights. View "Easterling v. Thurmer" on Justia Law