Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A confidential informant told Winnebago County Deputy Jones that he had purchased crack cocaine from “a larger black male” who was selling drugs from his house and agreed to participate in a controlled buy, stating that the suspect would drive to meet the CI to make the sale. Jones surveilled the address the CI had reported and, several times, saw a man fitting the description drive to meet different individuals in the car. Deputies positioned surveillance on the house and neighborhood and set up the controlled buy. Under continuous observation, the suspect drove and met the CI, then returned to the house. The CI returned with 0.7 grams of a white, rock-like substance that later tested positive for cocaine. In a warrant affidavit, Jones described the CI’s participation in the buy but said little about the CI himself, who did not appear. Executing the warrant, deputies found heroin, crack cocaine, marijuana, a loaded pistol, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Haynes admitted that everything seized was his, that he intended to distribute the drugs, and that he kept the gun for protection. Haynes was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence. The relevant factors support the CI’s reliability. Even without the CI’s tip, the controlled buy provided probable cause. View "United States v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Hathaway, then 44, was convicted of knowingly transporting a minor (then 13) across state lines to engage in criminal sexual activity and of traveling between states to do so, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a). The PSR recommended that Hathaway pay $4,489 in restitution, including $1,089 for the girl’s counseling expenses, $3,100 for costs incurred in relocating her to California after she was found at Hathaway’s home, and $300 for the costs of retrieving the girl’s belongings from Hathaway’s home. Hathaway opposed the inclusion of the victim’s counseling expenses. Hathaway’s attorney confirmed that he had no further objections. The district court denied Hathaway’s objection, citing the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A; imposed a 400‐month prison term; and ordered Hathaway to pay $4,489 as restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected, as waived, Hathaway’s arguments that relocation expenses were not directly related to his criminal conduct and that the retrieval expenses were not properly supported in the record. Hathaway knew of his right to object and stated on the record that he had no further objections. Whatever the strategic thinking might have been at the time, the fact that Hathaway challenged some, but not all, of the restitution calculations, while expressly declining to raise other objections, exhibits intentional relinquishment. View "United States v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

Three Menard Correctional Center officers were preparing inmates to walk from the cell house to dinner when Wilborn rushed out of his cell and attacked Johnson. Bennett and Lloyd took Wilborn to the ground and ordered him to “cuff up” and claim that Wilborn violently resisted. The officers’ testimony was generally consistent; they denied striking Wilborn after they had restrained him. Wilborn testified that he was compliant and in handcuffs when Ealey used pepper spray and that the officers continued to beat him after restraining him. His former cellmate supported his story. Medical staff examined Wilborn but later that day Wilborn was transferred to Tamms Correctional Center. Tamms nurses evaluated Wilborn, recorded his cuts and bruises, gave him acetaminophen, and noted that Wilborn’s shoulder appeared abnormal and that he complained of dislocation. They scheduled Wilborn to see a doctor first thing the next day. Wilborn remained in the infirmary overnight, in pain. The next morning, the doctor sent Wilborn to a hospital, where another doctor reduced Wilborn’s dislocated shoulder about 24 hours after the fight. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Wilborn acted pro se. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the nurses because Wilborn failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court upheld findings that the officers were more credible than Wilborn and his witnesses and the entry of judgment in favor of all remaining defendants. View "Wilborn v. Ealey" on Justia Law

Kane County Sheriff’s investigators discovered that an IP address was using specialized peer-to-peer software to share child pornography over the internet. They gave this information to the Department of Homeland Security, which identified Niggemann as the owner of the IP address. The agents executed a search warrant at Niggemann’s West Dundee, Illinois home, seizing a laptop and a desktop computer. Both contained child pornography. Niggemann was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (a)(5)(B). Because he had a prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, Niggemann faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a much longer term of 235-293 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 182 months, far below the guidelines range but slightly above the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Niggemann’s argument that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he— rather than his wife—committed the crimes. Abundant forensic and other evidence links Niggemann to the child pornography. Niggemann’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence is squarely foreclosed by precedent. View "United States v. Niggemann" on Justia Law

Three masked individuals robbed a Milwaukee bank at gunpoint and fled with $4,737 in a Honda Civic with license plates 480-TNG. The next day, police stopped that vehicle; Anderson was the driver and sole occupant. When the officer approached, Anderson fled and was pursued at high speed until he crashed. A search of the Civic revealed a bag containing 39 individually-wrapped baggies of crack cocaine and a loaded 9mm pistol, plus red dye stains consistent with a dye pack planted with the stolen money to explode. Anderson was acquitted of armed robbery and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (bank robbery), but convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon, possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with a limited remand so that the district court can determine whether it would have imposed the sentence, knowing that it can consider the mandatory sentence. The court rejected Anderson’s argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when the proceedings continued after the courthouse closed. Anderson did not object to the continuation; anyone in the building before 5:00 p.m. could attend the entire trial and there were only minimal proceedings after 5:00 p.m. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Van Haften, a Wisconsin native, was caught traveling to Turkey to join ISIS. Van Haften holds several bizarre beliefs and has a vendetta against the government, having been convicted of statutory rape and designated a sex offender. Van Haften pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). The district court applied the terrorism enhancement (U.S.S.G. 3A1.4) because his crime was “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.” After hearing testimony about Van Haften’s delusional beliefs and his willingness to reform, the court gave him a below-guidelines sentence of 10 years. Without the terrorism enhancement, Van Haften’s range would have been 57–71 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting overwhelming evidence that Van Haften sought revenge against the government. While Van Haften’s motivations fluctuated over time and were sometimes incoherent, his actions were not irrational even if his factual predicates were false or absurd. It is unimportant why Van Haften wanted to retaliate against the government; he committed a crime calculated to retaliate against the government. A desire for safety and Islamic fellowship may have contributed his decision, but this was not Van Haften’s sole, or even primary, motivation. View "United States v. Van Haften" on Justia Law

Correa-Diaz, born in 1986 and a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a minor without parole. In 2004, Correa-Diaz, age 18, was arrested, based on a police officer’s observation of his conduct, in an automobile, with a 14-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on an attempted sexual intercourse charge and six months’ imprisonment a sexual contact charge. The court suspended Correa-Diaz’s sentence. In 2015, Correa-Diaz pleaded guilty to counterfeiting in violation of Indiana law and was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the 2004 offenses did not constitute aggravated felonies. Because the Indiana law focused solely on the age of the participants, section 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. That condition was satisfied and “perform[ing] or submit[ing] to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct” in violation of Indiana law constitutes “sexual abuse,” defined by the BIA “[t]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children.” View "Correa-Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit reversed defendant's conviction and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In this case, the district court granted defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and proceeded to trial. On September 9, 2016, the district court brought the motion to withdraw the guilty plea back to life and then summarily denied it. The court held that the September 9 proceedings resulted in a new change of plea, which the district court accepted without conducting the colloquy required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. On remand, defendant must have the opportunity to enter a new plea, either guilty or not guilty, and the government is free to decide whether to pursue a plea agreement. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

Little was shot to death at a gas station in 1991. Martinez and Luna claimed to have seen a man around the station at the time. Weeks later, Snow was arrested for robbing a different gas station. According to officers, Snow repeatedly asked about the Little investigation. Luna viewed a lineup and stated that Snow looked like the man he saw; Martinez made no identification. In 1999, Snow was indicted. Approached by the police, Snow provided false identification and fled. Claycomb, charged as Snow’s getaway driver, was tried first and acquitted. Snow told the judge that his appointed attorneys were unprepared for trial and unsuccessfully sought a continuance. Martinez identified Snow at trial. Luna did not. Twelve other witnesses testified that Snow indicated that he was involved in the crime. Snow and his wife testified that he was at home on the night in question. The jury found Snow guilty of first-degree murder. State courts denied Snow’s direct appeal. The Exoneration Project filed an unsuccessful post-conviction petition citing new evidence that one of Snow’s attorneys had since been disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding some claims procedurally defaulted. It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that counsel’s failure to introduce certain evidence did not affect the outcome of the case, that the attorney’s personal problems did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel that evidence allegedly withheld in violation of “Brady” was not material. View "Snow v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Indiana State Police conducted controlled buys at Tingle’s residence, then executed a search warrant. They found 165 grams of methamphetamine, digital scales, $5,520 in cash in the house plus $1,190 on Tingle’s person, and eight firearms, including a loaded handgun on a desk containing methamphetamine. The government offered Tingle a plea deal, stating that if he rejected the offer, it would seek a superseding indictment adding charges to increase the mandatory minimum sentence. Tingle rejected the offer. Tingle unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the additional charges based on prosecutorial vindictiveness. Tingle’s motions seeking disclosure of grand jury testimony and to suppress items found in the search were also denied. The court barred the government from introducing a 1982 drug conviction. The court stated that it would not label any witness as an “expert witness,” but nonetheless gave a jury instruction on expert witnesses, without identifying which witnesses were considered experts. The parties did not object. Tingle admitted to possessing the methamphetamine, but denied the distribution allegations, claiming the drugs were for personal use on a year‐long boat trip. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Tingle’s convictions for possessing and distributing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, rejecting arguments concerning the jury instruction, witness testimony about Tingle’s mental state, access to grand jury materials, and prosecutorial vindictiveness. View "United States v. Tingle" on Justia Law