Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before a Milwaukee-area Verizon store was robbed, witnesses in the store noticed a Mercedes sitting in the parking lot for an extended time. Just before the robber entered through the rear door, the Mercedes drove to the back of the store. As the robber fled, the Mercedes sped away at a high speed. Investigating officers thought the Mercedes was a “decoy,” intended to distract from the actual getaway car. Police stopped the Mercedes, which contained no evidence of involvement in the robbery. During a five-hour interrogation, the car’s occupants named King as the robber. King was arrested and admitted to the Verizon robbery and other robberies. A search of his home uncovered evidence of King’s involvement in several robberies. Charged with unlawfully taking and attempting to take wireless phones in interstate commerce by means of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, 18 U.S.C. 1951, 1952, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), King moved to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, stating that the Mercedes’s conduct cannot be confused with innocent behavior and that the police were not merely acting on a hunch. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Cunningham pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess stolen firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 922(j); possession of stolen firearms and ammunition, section 922(j); and possession of firearms by a felon, section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 60 months on the conspiracy count, 12 months on the 922(j) count, and 116 months on the felon‐in‐possession count, all to run consecutively; his total sentence was 188 months’ imprisonment, which was at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cunningham’s arguments that the district court’s limitation on his presentation of character witness testimony at sentencing violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) and that the resulting sentence is substantively unreasonable. Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) does not govern the calling of character witnesses at sentencing and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of Cunningham’s mitigation evidence. The sentence imposed was the product of the district court’s careful and compassionate consideration of all the evidence in a very difficult sentencing situation. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Cunningham pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess stolen firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 922(j); possession of stolen firearms and ammunition, section 922(j); and possession of firearms by a felon, section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 60 months on the conspiracy count, 12 months on the 922(j) count, and 116 months on the felon‐in‐possession count, all to run consecutively; his total sentence was 188 months’ imprisonment, which was at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cunningham’s arguments that the district court’s limitation on his presentation of character witness testimony at sentencing violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) and that the resulting sentence is substantively unreasonable. Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) does not govern the calling of character witnesses at sentencing and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of Cunningham’s mitigation evidence. The sentence imposed was the product of the district court’s careful and compassionate consideration of all the evidence in a very difficult sentencing situation. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Hudson was shot and killed; the gun was not recovered. Riley was charged with first-degree murder and being an armed habitual criminal. The judge severed the armed habitual criminal count and proceeded with the murder trial. In finding Riley not guilty of murder, the jury found that the prosecution had not proven “that during the commission of the offense of first-degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.” Three of the same witnesses testified at the armed habitual criminal trial before the same judge. The parties stipulated that Riley had two qualifying prior convictions, leaving the judge to decide only whether Riley possessed a gun. Defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in the stories of the state’s witnesses and noted that none of them could describe the gun allegedly possessed by Riley, despite identifying him as the shooter. The judge found Riley guilty. On direct appeal, the court ruled that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting Riley as an armed habitual criminal because whether he had possessed a gun was not decided at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his collateral estoppel claim. View "Riley v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Lemons called 911 to report vandalism. Officer Cates and his partner responded. Cates and Lemons were left alone in her home. Lemons claimed that Cates raped her; Cates claimed that they had consensual sex. Cates was charged with depriving Lemons of her civil rights and carrying a firearm in relation to that crime. The civil-rights charge was premised on the sexual assault. The government also alleged aggravated sexual abuse, which increased the maximum penalty to life in prison. A jury convicted Cates on the civil-rights count, acquitted him on the firearm count, and found that he committed aggravated sexual abuse. Cates’s lawyer withdrew. His new lawyer unsuccessfully moved to extend the deadline for post-verdict motions, which had expired months earlier. Cates was sentenced to 24 years. The new lawyer represented Cates on appeal but, unsuccessfully, challenged only the denial of his request concerning post-verdict motions. Seeking collateral relief, Cates alleged that his trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge a jury instruction. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of the petition. The judge improperly instructed the jury that “force” includes not just physical force but also psychological coercion and may even be inferred from a disparity in size. There is a reasonable probability that a properly-instructed jury would find the evidence insufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse, which would cap Cates’s maximum penalty at one year. View "Cates v. United States" on Justia Law

Bailey offered to sell marijuana to an informant who had already brokered the purchase of a firearm from him. The informant accepted the offer and purchased $40 worth of marijuana from Bailey contemporaneously with the firearm purchase. Bailey was convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bailey’s argument that the facts do not tie the gun and the marijuana purchase together so as to demonstrate that the gun actually furthered the marijuana sale and that his possession of the firearm was simply coincident with the marijuana transaction. Because it was the opportunity to purchase a firearm that brought the informant to Bailey and made possible the secondary sale of marijuana to the informant, the facts support the finding that Bailey’s possession of the weapon furthered the marijuana sale. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Bailey offered to sell marijuana to an informant who had already brokered the purchase of a firearm from him. The informant accepted the offer and purchased $40 worth of marijuana from Bailey contemporaneously with the firearm purchase. Bailey was convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bailey’s argument that the facts do not tie the gun and the marijuana purchase together so as to demonstrate that the gun actually furthered the marijuana sale and that his possession of the firearm was simply coincident with the marijuana transaction. Because it was the opportunity to purchase a firearm that brought the informant to Bailey and made possible the secondary sale of marijuana to the informant, the facts support the finding that Bailey’s possession of the weapon furthered the marijuana sale. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

While Cureton was under investigation for dealing crack cocaine, he used a gun to demand ransom for his roommate; her grandfather agreed by telephone to wire Cureton $4,500. A jury convicted Cureton of interstate communication of a ransom demand, attempted extortion (guidelines range, 240 months, the statutory maximum), and two counts of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (ransom demand and attempted extortion). Cureton's drug possession case had a guideline range of 360-720 months. In a third appeal, following re-imposition of a 444‐month sentence, the Seventh Circuit held that the ransom demand qualified as a “crime of violence.” The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2017 “Dean” holding, regarding consideration of section 924(c)'s mandatory minimum sentence when imposing sentences for other crimes. The Seventh Circuit noted that each of Cureton's sentencings has included the statutory maximum 240 months for the ransom demand, signaling that the judges were not inclined to reduce the sentence for that predicate crime; the 360 months of non‐924(c) sentences take into account several very serious crimes. No judge gave any sign that he believed that the reduced total sentence of 444 months was too severe. The Seventh Circuit ordered a limited remand so that the district court can determine whether it would have imposed the same sentence, knowing that under Dean, it may consider the mandatory sentence under section 924(c) when deciding the sentences for other crimes. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

While Cureton was under investigation for dealing crack cocaine, he used a gun to demand ransom for his roommate; her grandfather agreed by telephone to wire Cureton $4,500. A jury convicted Cureton of interstate communication of a ransom demand, attempted extortion (guidelines range, 240 months, the statutory maximum), and two counts of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (ransom demand and attempted extortion). Cureton's drug possession case had a guideline range of 360-720 months. In a third appeal, following re-imposition of a 444‐month sentence, the Seventh Circuit held that the ransom demand qualified as a “crime of violence.” The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2017 “Dean” holding, regarding consideration of section 924(c)'s mandatory minimum sentence when imposing sentences for other crimes. The Seventh Circuit noted that each of Cureton's sentencings has included the statutory maximum 240 months for the ransom demand, signaling that the judges were not inclined to reduce the sentence for that predicate crime; the 360 months of non‐924(c) sentences take into account several very serious crimes. No judge gave any sign that he believed that the reduced total sentence of 444 months was too severe. The Seventh Circuit ordered a limited remand so that the district court can determine whether it would have imposed the same sentence, knowing that under Dean, it may consider the mandatory sentence under section 924(c) when deciding the sentences for other crimes. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

Officers Bohlen and Rohde saw Avina near a Milwaukee high school with others, including known Mexican Posse street gang members. The assistant principal told the group to leave school property. They crossed the street. When school was dismissed, they began to harass pedestrians, yelling and flashing gang signs. The officers instructed them to leave the area. The group moved one block down, stood in front of a house that belonged to Avina’s cousin, and continued to harass pedestrians. After 15 minutes, the officers told them to disperse or be arrested. Most entered left. Avina rode his bike back to the school’s lawn. The officers decided to arrest him for trespassing. They could have issued a simple citation but believed that he would continue to loiter. They instructed Avina to get off his bike and put his hands behind his back. He cooperated. They escorted him to their squad car where Bohlen’s handling caused Avina’s arm to break. In Avina’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewed in the light most favorable to Avina, the record establishes that he was fully cooperative when Bohlen moved his arm with enough force to break it, which does not support the conclusion that Bohlen was placing Avina in handcuffs with objectively reasonable force. View "Avina v. Bohlen" on Justia Law