Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois State Trooper Patterson observed a car abruptly switch lanes in front of a truck without using a signal on I-70. A dashboard camera recorded the traffic stop. Patterson reviewed documents from Moran, the driver, and Rodriguez, her fiance, who is from Mexico, and questioned them about their travel plans. They gave inconsistent answers. Eight minutes into the stop, Patterson discovered that Moran’s California driver’s license was suspended. After Patterson had everything he needed to issue citations and release them, Patterson called for a narcotics-detection dog, which was occupied with another traffic stop. Patterson took 22 minutes to issue three routine citations. The K-9 unit arrived 33 minutes after the stop. Despite an initial negative dog sniff, Patterson continued to question Moran, stating that he wanted to “make sure there is nothing illegal, is that all right? Moran nodded yes. Patterson searched Moran’s vehicle. Her trunk contained 7.5 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in luggage; Moran's purse contained $28,000 in cash. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order suppressing the evidence. A seizure that is “lawful at its inception” can violate the Fourth Amendment if “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” the initial purpose. When Patterson requested the dog, he only knew that the couple was coming from Los Angeles; that Moran had air fresheners in her car; that the couple did not have concrete travel arrangements; and that Rodriguez did not look up when Patterson approached the vehicle. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera" on Justia Law

Armenta worked at Passages as a certified nursing assistant and later as a regional director of certified nursing assistants. Passages billed its services to Medicare. Medicare paid $180 per patient per day for routine services but up to $700 for general inpatient services (GIP). Passages began paying directors based on the number of patients on GIP. The number of patients on GIP significantly increased because directors instructed nurses and nursing assistants to place patients who did not need that level of care on GIP. Passages received an audit request from a Medicare contractor. In response, Armenta and other Passages employees entered false information consistent with GIP care and billing into patient files, then submitted the altered files. Passages employees, including Armenta, were trained on the requirements for placing a patient on GIP. Armenta told the nurses to disregard the training. Armenta and others were charged with health care fraud. Only Armenta proceeded to trial. With a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on lying on the stand and altering records, her Guidelines imprisonment range was 63-78 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed her conviction and sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment plus $1.67 million in restitution. Although no government witness identified Armenta in court, the defense did not argue that the Armenta in the courtroom was not the same Armenta involved in the fraud. View "United States v. Armenta" on Justia Law

Miller obtained identifying information for several individuals without their knowledge or consent, which he used to open credit card accounts; he opened UPS mailboxes under the victims’ names to receive the cards, which he used to withdraw cash from ATMs. Miller also used personal identifying information to submit 600 fraudulent claims and obtain unemployment insurance benefits from the Texas Workforce Commission. Miller was charged with both schemes. After releasing him on bond, the court discovered Miller stole $13,750 from the correctional facility where he was detained. Miller fled to and was later found, in the Dominican Republic. Miller eventually pleaded guilty to mail fraud affecting a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting arguments that the indictment failed to specify proper means of identification of the victims and that the court improperly applied two points to his criminal history calculation for committing the charged crimes while under a criminal justice sentence. Miller possessed over 200 means of identification in a single notebook, used to carry out a common scheme and can only be convicted of one violation each of sections 1028(a)(7) and 1028A(a)(1), which criminalize the knowing possession of “a means of identification of another person” View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2010, Kirklin drove Jones and McCallister to rob a bank and gave Jones firearms. The two left with stolen money but were arrested near the scene. Kirklin was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence. His 171-month sentence included an 84‐month consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); such sentences vary based on whether the defendant was responsible for merely carrying or using the weapon, or for brandishing it, or for discharging it. Video evidence showed that Jones and McCallister had brandished weapons. The court did not instruct the jury to make a specific finding as to whether the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kirklin was responsible for the brandishing but made that determination at sentencing. The Supreme Court's 2002 Harris decision held that whether a firearm was brandished was a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense, and need not be submitted to the jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Three months after Kirklin’s sentencing, the Court granted certiorari in Alleyne, eventually holding that juries must make factual determinations that increase mandatory minimum sentences and that brandishing is an element of the conduct criminalized by the seven‐year mandatory minimum and must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Kirklin’s sentence and later upheld a denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Kirkland's attorney’s performance was not objectively unreasonable for failing to anticipate the overruling of Harris and failing to object to having the court make the factual finding. Given the strength of the evidence against Kirklin, even after certiorari was granted in Alleyne, a defense lawyer might have made a reasonable strategic decision not to challenge the brandishing issue. View "Kirklin v. United States" on Justia Law

White and others bought merchandise with fake checks and then returned it for cash. Over four years, the group targeted 32 stores and inflicted actual losses of approximately $627,000. In his plea agreement, White admitted to a key paragraph: Beginning no later than in or around the fall of 2009 and continuing until at least in or around the summer of 2013, … VANCE WHITE …, together with … (the “co‐schemers”), knowingly devised, ... and participated in a scheme to defraud and to obtain money by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises." In reality, White was in prison for most of that time. He entered state custody in September 2009 and was released in August 2011. He went back into custody in August 2012, leaving him able to pursue the fraud for only one year. The court imposed a sentence of 35 months for wire fraud, plus a mandatory, consecutive 24 months for identity theft, all to run concurrently with sentences from two different Illinois cases. White is scheduled for release in August 2018. The Seventh Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court calculated White’s Guidelines range based on the loss caused by the entire scheme over four years. No evidence in the record provides sufficient support to hold White responsible for the entire duration. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Barnes pleaded guilty to offenses related to the distribution of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 300 months of imprisonment. Barnes did not appeal. In 2012, Barnes moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing that two Illinois convictions used to classify Barnes as a career offender (for robbery and aggravated discharge of a firearm) were no longer valid predicates. After his federal sentencing, Barnes persuaded a state court to convert those adult felony convictions to adjudications of delinquency. Barnes was 15 when he committed these crimes but was tried as an adult. The district court granted his motion and ordered a revised presentence investigation report, which did not use the delinquency adjudications to classify Barnes as a career offender but did count them in his criminal history score. After Barnes’s counsel noted a procedural irregularity in the state-court judgment, the government agreed that the court should not assess criminal history points for the juvenile offenses or the associated parole violation. The court sentenced Barnes to 189 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Barnes waived an argument that the district court incorrectly counted a local ordinance violation for “Smoking Marihuana at a Public Park” as part of his criminal history. Local ordinance violations do not count toward criminal history unless the underlying conduct would also violate state law, U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2). View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Michael, age 16, and three other young men attempted to rob a Rockford pizzeria at gunpoint. Pobjecky, an off‐duty police officer waiting for a pizza, shot and killed Michael. Video recordings captured part of the incident, which involved a struggle for a gun. Michael’s participation in the struggle was disputed. He was apparently crawling when Pobjecky shot him. Wounds showing that three bullets entered Michael’s back contradict Pobjecky’s claim that he shot as Michael advanced toward Pobjecky. All three surviving assailants were convicted of felony murder. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims by Michael’s estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Pobjecky’s use of deadly force was reasonable and justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pobjecky did not know that Michael was unarmed; he was in close quarters with multiple, moving, potentially armed assailants, who forced him to make split‐second, life‐or‐death decisions. The incident lasted only about 45 seconds from the moment the first assailant entered the pizzeria to the moment Pobjecky locked the door. It was objectively reasonable for Pobjecky to stay inside the locked pizzeria awaiting help. It would be objectively unreasonable to demand that he venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, to administer treatment to Michael. View "Horton v. Pobjecky" on Justia Law

House was convicted of six counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, based on his involvement in a fraudulent automobile loan scheme. House was personally involved in applying to credit unions for 51 loans for fictitious auto sales in 2013; 36 were approved, resulting in total loan proceeds of $1.1 million. House personally kept $105,589.96, more than any one of his co-defendants.The court determined the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range was 108-135 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced House to serve 108 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting House’s argument that the court improperly applied a three-level enhancement by finding that House was a manager or supervisor of the scheme under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b). The enhancement does not require an explicit finding that the defendant exercised direct control or authority over another participant. House was involved in the planning of the scheme, particularly with the idea to use fictitious car sales as a front for obtaining the loans. House used his business as the cover, which meant that he was necessarily involved in the key aspects of planning the scheme. House earned the most money and touched the highest number of transactions; the totality of his conduct qualified him for the enhancement. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law

In both cases, the defendants pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that each had three prior burglary convictions that were violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and sentenced each to the mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison. The defendants argued that their prior convictions for burglary in Wisconsin are not violent felonies under the ACCA so their sentences could be no more than 10 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has defined “generic burglary,” as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Because the Wisconsin statute extends to several types of vehicles, it is broader than “generic burglary” but, the court reasoned, the statute is divisible--it identifies different elements and thus different crimes rather than different means for committing the same crime. The district court properly applied the “modified categorical approach,” which focuses on the elements of the statutory offense, not the particular facts of the defendant’s crime. View "United States v. Sahm" on Justia Law

Police investigated Musgraves for dealing drugs. Searching Musgraves’ house, they found ammunition, which Musgraves, a felon, was not allowed to possess. Musgraves agreed to act as Detective McCray's informant and was released. Musgraves later contacted McCray, who told Musgraves to call 911. Someone called 911 and stated that a man parked in front of Musgraves’ house had a gun under the driver’s seat and cocaine in the visor. Police found Smith passed out inside a car, with cocaine in his pocket and in the visor. Musgraves insisted that there was a gun, prompting another search. Officers then found a handgun under the seat. McCray investigated the gun's history and concluded that Musgraves had planted the evidence to frame Smith. Musgraves was convicted on five charges, including possessing a firearm and distributing cocaine, based on framing Smith. The court determined that Musgraves was a career offender and sentenced him to 240 months (below the Guidelines range). The Seventh Circuit reversed the “framing” convictions. On remand, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Musgraves had distributed cocaine and possessed a firearm by framing Smith, which factored into its 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) analysis, and again imposed a 240-month sentence, stating that the career offender enhancement did not drive its decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The factual findings on the acquitted conduct are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, sufficient for guidelines sentencing. Even if the judge was wrong about the career offender enhancement, he made clear that any error would be harmless. View "United States v. Musgraves" on Justia Law