Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A confidential source alerted Rock Island police that Watson was selling drugs from the home she shared with her husband, Leonard. Officers twice, one week apart, searched sealed trash bags left in a public alley outside the home. Both times the bags contained indicia of residency and tested positive for cannabis. Two days after the second positive test, officers obtained a state warrant to search the residence. Police executed the warrant the next day. The officer who had a copy of the warrant had to leave before Watson arrived home. When Watson asked to see the warrant, an officer had to return to the police station to get another copy. That copy apparently was not the correct one. Officers executed the warrant and, in addition to drugs, found a semi-automatic handgun. Leonard admitted he owned the gun. Because he had been convicted of a felony, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court denied Leonard’s motions to suppress the gun and to require disclosure of the tipster's identity. Leonard conditionally pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Officers are not required to wait until someone is home to conduct the search; warrant presentation is not required, so inadvertent presentation of the wrong warrant is not fatal. Regardless of the credibility of the tipster, the drugs contained in trash bags bearing sufficient indicia of residency established probable cause. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Herman, a member of the Latin Dragons gang, shot two people while he was stealing their guns. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement for the use of physical restraint, on the theory that Herman “restrained” the victims when he pointed guns and ordered them to stay put. Herman was awaiting sentencing on an unrelated Indiana charge for misdemeanor theft, which carries a maximum penalty of one year in prison, and asked the district court to order that his federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentence. The court responded that it could not “control what the [Indiana state court] will do.” Herman was sentenced to 120 months in prison, The Seventh Circuit vacated. Federal district courts can order that a federal sentence run concurrently with a state sentence not yet imposed. Such an order is binding on the Bureau of Prisons, which implements that directive by designating the state prison as the place of imprisonment for the federal crime for whatever time is necessary to carry out the order. A district court need not exercise its discretion but its failure to acknowledge that discretion is a mistake of law. On remand, the court should consider Herman’s argument regarding the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Herman" on Justia Law

Herman, a member of the Latin Dragons gang, shot two people while he was stealing their guns. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement for the use of physical restraint, on the theory that Herman “restrained” the victims when he pointed guns and ordered them to stay put. Herman was awaiting sentencing on an unrelated Indiana charge for misdemeanor theft, which carries a maximum penalty of one year in prison, and asked the district court to order that his federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentence. The court responded that it could not “control what the [Indiana state court] will do.” Herman was sentenced to 120 months in prison, The Seventh Circuit vacated. Federal district courts can order that a federal sentence run concurrently with a state sentence not yet imposed. Such an order is binding on the Bureau of Prisons, which implements that directive by designating the state prison as the place of imprisonment for the federal crime for whatever time is necessary to carry out the order. A district court need not exercise its discretion but its failure to acknowledge that discretion is a mistake of law. On remand, the court should consider Herman’s argument regarding the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Herman" on Justia Law

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Caguana’s 17-year-old son was charged with murder. His son’s friends, also arrested, became state witnesses. Caguana called Valentin to find a hitman to kill the two. Valentin contacted Chicago Police Detective Pentimone. Valentin had acted as an uncompensated “John Doe” for Pentimone in multiple search warrants. At a meeting, Caguana showed Valentin the witnesses' photographs and notes about their whereabouts, offering to pay $7,500 plus a Cadillac. Pentimone contacted the FBI, which joined the investigation. Valentin called Caguana and, in a recorded conversation, conveyed that he had found a hit-man and needed money. Caguana told Valentin to come to his garage, saying “We’re gonna do it.” Caguana gave Valentin $500 to purchase a gun and drove Valentin to show him where the witnesses lived. The next day, Caguana met with Valentin and a "hitman" in Valentin’s car. Their discussion of the details was recorded. Caguana was arrested as he exited Valentin’s car. Convicted of four counts of using a facility of interstate commerce with the intent that the murder-for-hire of two individuals be committed, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), Caguana was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. The jury rejected Caguana’s entrapment defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Caguana’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, with respect to his intent to pay for murder-for-hire and entrapment. The intent element of section 1958(a) does not require a legally binding contract. The sentence is substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Caguana" on Justia Law

Caguana’s 17-year-old son was charged with murder. His son’s friends, also arrested, became state witnesses. Caguana called Valentin to find a hitman to kill the two. Valentin contacted Chicago Police Detective Pentimone. Valentin had acted as an uncompensated “John Doe” for Pentimone in multiple search warrants. At a meeting, Caguana showed Valentin the witnesses' photographs and notes about their whereabouts, offering to pay $7,500 plus a Cadillac. Pentimone contacted the FBI, which joined the investigation. Valentin called Caguana and, in a recorded conversation, conveyed that he had found a hit-man and needed money. Caguana told Valentin to come to his garage, saying “We’re gonna do it.” Caguana gave Valentin $500 to purchase a gun and drove Valentin to show him where the witnesses lived. The next day, Caguana met with Valentin and a "hitman" in Valentin’s car. Their discussion of the details was recorded. Caguana was arrested as he exited Valentin’s car. Convicted of four counts of using a facility of interstate commerce with the intent that the murder-for-hire of two individuals be committed, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), Caguana was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. The jury rejected Caguana’s entrapment defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Caguana’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, with respect to his intent to pay for murder-for-hire and entrapment. The intent element of section 1958(a) does not require a legally binding contract. The sentence is substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Caguana" on Justia Law

Rodriguez pled guilty to dealing firearms without a license and distributing cocaine. In his plea agreement, Rodriguez admitted to selling cocaine to an informant on one occasion and selling firearms to that informant on eight other occasions. The plea agreement also suggests that Rodriguez was aware that the guns he sold were being used to commit felonies. Rodriguez admitted that he and the informant discussed the use of the weapons and Rodriguez continued to sell the informant firearms. The district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G 2K2.1(b)(5) for trafficking firearms and an additional four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for transferring a firearm with the knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense, which produced a guideline range of 135-168 months. The court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court improperly double counted when it applied both the trafficking and other-felony enhancements. Double counting is only forbidden when the text of the guidelines or the commentary expressly prohibits it; the guidelines do not prohibit simultaneous application of the trafficking and other-felony enhancements. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Jansen pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. Before sentencing, Jansen’s third attorney (Steinback) withdrew. His new attorney, Beaumont, requested Rule 16 discovery and obtained 42,700 documents. Jansen filed a pro se motion to continue his sentencing proceedings because none of his prior attorneys had requested or reviewed those documents. Weeks later, Beaumont withdrew, citing irreconcilable differences; he was replaced by Richards. Jansen indicated to the court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea as not “knowing and voluntary” because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Richards also withdrew. The court permitted Jansen to proceed pro se but denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced Jansen to 70 months’ imprisonment with a restitution payment of $269,978 to the IRS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, remanding the issue of restitution to allow the district court to clarify that its imposition of restitution is a condition of supervised release rather than a criminal penalty. The district court made the sound factual finding that Jansen hired Steinback “to negotiate the best possible plea agreement,” not to go to trial. Steinback formulated a “four-fold” “tactical strategy” that included forgoing investigation and discovery so that such a strategy was objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Jansen" on Justia Law

Illinois State Trooper Patterson observed a car abruptly switch lanes in front of a truck without using a signal on I-70. A dashboard camera recorded the traffic stop. Patterson reviewed documents from Moran, the driver, and Rodriguez, her fiance, who is from Mexico, and questioned them about their travel plans. They gave inconsistent answers. Eight minutes into the stop, Patterson discovered that Moran’s California driver’s license was suspended. After Patterson had everything he needed to issue citations and release them, Patterson called for a narcotics-detection dog, which was occupied with another traffic stop. Patterson took 22 minutes to issue three routine citations. The K-9 unit arrived 33 minutes after the stop. Despite an initial negative dog sniff, Patterson continued to question Moran, stating that he wanted to “make sure there is nothing illegal, is that all right? Moran nodded yes. Patterson searched Moran’s vehicle. Her trunk contained 7.5 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in luggage; Moran's purse contained $28,000 in cash. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order suppressing the evidence. A seizure that is “lawful at its inception” can violate the Fourth Amendment if “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” the initial purpose. When Patterson requested the dog, he only knew that the couple was coming from Los Angeles; that Moran had air fresheners in her car; that the couple did not have concrete travel arrangements; and that Rodriguez did not look up when Patterson approached the vehicle. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera" on Justia Law