Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Faulkner, a high-ranking member of the Imperial Insane Vice Lords, was prosecuted for heroin distribution that occurred in 2007-2008, and for heroin found in his apartment. Following his arrest, Faulkner debriefed extensively with federal agents, explaining his role in the gang, their drug distribution activities, and the identities and roles of other gang members. He pled guilty to two counts of using a telephone to facilitate drug crimes. In 2013, while Faulkner was in prison, the government indicted him again, with 10 other defendants, including Sykes, for drug trafficking through the gang’s organization or within its territory. Sykes was not a member of the gang but a street-level seller. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants, Sykes’ 195-month sentence, and Faulkner’s 30-year sentence. The court rejected Faulkner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; his claim that he withdrew from the conspiracy as of the time of his arrest; his claim that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of hearsay statements from alleged co-conspirators; and his argument that his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by the two prosecutions. The court found Sykes’ above-Guidelines sentence reasonable under the Section 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Marmion and three co-defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Marmion’s codefendants received lengthy sentences (63 months, 144 months, and 168 months). Marmion aced a statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment and a guidelines range of 121-151 months but had provided substantial assistance and successfully completed a Pretrial Alternatives to Detention Initiative. The court sentenced him to 174 days’ time served and 10 years’ supervised release. Two and a half years later, Marmion’s probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervised release for possessing methamphetamine, failing a drug test, and admitting the recent use of methamphetamine. At the hearing, Marmion admitted that he had used methamphetamine 10 times within the previous six months. Based on his Grade B violation and criminal history category of III, the judge calculated a maximum term of 60 months’ imprisonment, with a recommended range of 8-14 months. Sentencing Marmion to 35 months’ imprisonment with no additional supervised release, the judge cited a policy statement that advises that upon revocation “an upward departure may be warranted” if the defendant’s “original sentence was the result of a downward departure,” U.S.S.G. 7B1.4, and the sentences of Marmion’s codefendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge properly considered the Guidelines, the sentencing of co-defendants, and other factors. View "United States v. Marmion" on Justia Law

Illinois police used a peer-to-peer file sharing program to download child pornography from a computer in Ryan’s home. The FBI obtained a warrant, searched Ryan’s home, and found a computer that contained peer-to-peer file sharing programs that had been used to download hundreds of child pornography files, plus a program used to block user-specific IP addresses from seeing the user’s activity or shared files, a list of what appeared to be law enforcement IP addresses, a program that encrypts peer-to-peer communications, and a folder with many images and videos of child pornography. Ryan was charged. Ryan invoked his right to trial by jury. Five days before trial, defense counsel moved to substitute counsel. At a hearing, Ryan testified that he had lost confidence in counsel and was frustrated with his inability to contact him. The court denied the motion. At trial, Ryan claimed the images must have been downloaded by his cousin who had access to his computer. The court sentenced Ryan to 157 months’ imprisonment, including an enhancement for knowingly distributing child pornography, and ordered the forfeiture of Ryan’s computer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ryan’s motion to substitute counsel. The sentencing enhancement was appropriate, based on the jury’s conviction and the use of sophisticated software; Ryan knew or was reckless in failing to discover others could download his files. View "United States v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Pankow started selling methamphetamine for a friend in 2015. After their supplier was incarcerated, Pankow’s friend drove to Minnesota to buy the methamphetamine. Pankow started helping her friend sell it out of their house and keeping a drug ledger. Pankow and the friend were returning from Minnesota with a purchase of methamphetamine when Wisconsin police stopped them for speeding. A K9 unit alerted to drugs in the car. Pankow had six outstanding arrest warrants. Officers searched the car and seized methamphetamine, marijuana, a drug ledger, and a large amount of cash. Pankow pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). The presentence report calculated a guidelines range of 108-135 months in prison. The parties agreed that the government would move under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 for a sentence reflecting substantial assistance. The government filed its motion without a specific recommendation about the sentence, emphasizing the need for relative parity with the sentences it requested for other conspiracy members. Pankow argued that mitigating factors, including her vulnerability to men, warranted a lower sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Pankow’s 84-month sentence. The court was not required specify to how much it “departed” from the guidelines range for Pankow’s substantial assistance and adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, detailing Pankow’s characteristics and explaining that she deserved a lower sentence than the 120-month floor advocated by the government. View "United States v. Pankow" on Justia Law

Pankow started selling methamphetamine for a friend in 2015. After their supplier was incarcerated, Pankow’s friend drove to Minnesota to buy the methamphetamine. Pankow started helping her friend sell it out of their house and keeping a drug ledger. Pankow and the friend were returning from Minnesota with a purchase of methamphetamine when Wisconsin police stopped them for speeding. A K9 unit alerted to drugs in the car. Pankow had six outstanding arrest warrants. Officers searched the car and seized methamphetamine, marijuana, a drug ledger, and a large amount of cash. Pankow pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). The presentence report calculated a guidelines range of 108-135 months in prison. The parties agreed that the government would move under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 for a sentence reflecting substantial assistance. The government filed its motion without a specific recommendation about the sentence, emphasizing the need for relative parity with the sentences it requested for other conspiracy members. Pankow argued that mitigating factors, including her vulnerability to men, warranted a lower sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Pankow’s 84-month sentence. The court was not required specify to how much it “departed” from the guidelines range for Pankow’s substantial assistance and adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, detailing Pankow’s characteristics and explaining that she deserved a lower sentence than the 120-month floor advocated by the government. View "United States v. Pankow" on Justia Law

Dillard and Chester were engaged in a conspiracy to distribute heroin. They sold heroin to Daniels, a confidential informant, three times. They were separately charged. In the affidavit, an FBI agent detailed several recorded or monitored transactions with Daniels, referring to him only as the “cooperating source.” While the defendants were in custody, Daniels was murdered. The government introduced: recordings of calls and meetings between Daniels and the defendants to arrange heroin sales; voice identification of the defendants on the calls; a separate recording of Chester in prison; testimony by officers who surveilled the transactions; still photos of transactions showing Dillard’s distinctive tattoo; testimony by Dillard’s girlfriend identifying his nickname, which could be heard on the recordings; cell phone records showing calls between the defendants before and after transactions; cell phone location data showing their movements relevant dates; and evidence concerning Chester’s gambling in the days following the sales. The jury was told only that Daniels was deceased and unavailable as a witness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dillard’s conviction and sentence. The district court adequately protected Dillard from references to his alleged membership in a notorious gang. The court’s decision, after a single juror was exposed to inflammatory press coverage, to dismiss only that single juror was sufficient remedial action; the jury was not exposed to significant prejudicial testimony. View "United States v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Dillard and Chester were engaged in a conspiracy to distribute heroin. They sold heroin to Daniels, a confidential informant, three times. They were separately charged. In the affidavit, an FBI agent detailed several recorded or monitored transactions with Daniels, referring to him only as the “cooperating source.” While the defendants were in custody, Daniels was murdered. The government introduced: recordings of calls and meetings between Daniels and the defendants to arrange heroin sales; voice identification of the defendants on the calls; a separate recording of Chester in prison; testimony by officers who surveilled the transactions; still photos of transactions showing Dillard’s distinctive tattoo; testimony by Dillard’s girlfriend identifying his nickname, which could be heard on the recordings; cell phone records showing calls between the defendants before and after transactions; cell phone location data showing their movements relevant dates; and evidence concerning Chester’s gambling in the days following the sales. The jury was told only that Daniels was deceased and unavailable as a witness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dillard’s conviction and sentence. The district court adequately protected Dillard from references to his alleged membership in a notorious gang. The court’s decision, after a single juror was exposed to inflammatory press coverage, to dismiss only that single juror was sufficient remedial action; the jury was not exposed to significant prejudicial testimony. View "United States v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Teague pled guilty to possession of a weapon by a felon. In a Presentence Investigation Report, the U.S. Probation Department assigned a base offense level of 14. The government argued the base level should be 20 because Teague had previously been convicted of a crime of violence--second-degree murder under Illinois law. The court held that second-degree murder as defined in Illinois law is not a crime of violence because it is not limited to intentional murder, calculated a Guideline range of 21–27 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Teague to 21 months’ imprisonment. The government appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The second-degree murder statute incorporates the intentional or knowing use of force element from the first-degree murder statute. An offender cannot be convicted of second-degree murder without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender acted with the intent or knowledge that his actions would cause the death of another, so the offense is a crime of violence under the elements clause of the Guidelines’ definition. Second-degree murder under Illinois law is also a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses because it fits within the generic definitions of murder or voluntary manslaughter. View "United States v. Teague" on Justia Law

Adrian established Red Brick Properties, to purchase, rehabilitate, and resell homes. Adrian's wife, Daniela, the only employee with a real estate license, served as office manager. They sought buyers who did not have good enough credit or a down payment and assisted them in applying for mortgage loans. In 2007-2009, Red Brick sold 45 houses, providing the down payment for each sale; the loan applications falsely stated that the buyers were using their own money. After closing, Red Brick provided the buyers with additional money, to ensure that they could make at least two payments before defaulting. Bank of America which provided the loans for 32 sales, all processed by one loan officer, opened an investigation. A jury convicted Adrian and Daniela of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. Following a remand, the PSR recommended a total loss amount of $1,835,861; the court sentenced Adrian to 36 months’ imprisonment, Daniela to 21 months’ (both sentences were below the Guidelines range), and imposed a $30,000 fine on each. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the intended loss calculation under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1, and the decision to deny Daniela a minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. Bank of America’s losses qualified as an “intended loss” regardless of its level of complicity. View "United States v. Tartareanu" on Justia Law

A confidential source alerted Rock Island police that Watson was selling drugs from the home she shared with her husband, Leonard. Officers twice, one week apart, searched sealed trash bags left in a public alley outside the home. Both times the bags contained indicia of residency and tested positive for cannabis. Two days after the second positive test, officers obtained a state warrant to search the residence. Police executed the warrant the next day. The officer who had a copy of the warrant had to leave before Watson arrived home. When Watson asked to see the warrant, an officer had to return to the police station to get another copy. That copy apparently was not the correct one. Officers executed the warrant and, in addition to drugs, found a semi-automatic handgun. Leonard admitted he owned the gun. Because he had been convicted of a felony, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court denied Leonard’s motions to suppress the gun and to require disclosure of the tipster's identity. Leonard conditionally pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Officers are not required to wait until someone is home to conduct the search; warrant presentation is not required, so inadvertent presentation of the wrong warrant is not fatal. Regardless of the credibility of the tipster, the drugs contained in trash bags bearing sufficient indicia of residency established probable cause. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law