Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brock-Miller pled guilty, with a plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. She received a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. She then challenged her conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. The court declined to hold a hearing and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing. The district court erred when it concluded that her prior conviction under Indiana Code 16- 42-19-18 was a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. 802(44) and that Brock-Miller was eligible for a recidivist enhancement. The court analyzed the wrong version of the state law; there is little to no overlap between the controlled substances listed in the federal definition of “felony drug offense” and the prescription “legend drugs” regulated by the Indiana law. Counsel’s apparent error in identifying the applicable Indiana statute and failure to file a plainly meritorious objection could constitute deficient performance if proved. View "Brock v. United States" on Justia Law

Hicks led an organization that processed, packaged, and sold drugs in Chicago. A jury found him and co-defendants guilty of conspiracy with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Hicks’s presentence report put his offense level at 46, corresponding to a guideline sentence of life imprisonment. An offense level of 42 would have produced a range of 360 months to life. The district judge stated that the proper offense level was probably 45 but the table stops at 43, that it was immaterial to decide the exact offense level, and that the recommended life sentence would be fair given the quantity at issue and Hicks’s leadership role. The judge nonetheless imposed a below-guideline sentence of 360 months because he thought that Hicks was capable of reform. After his unsuccessful direct appeal, Hicks moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective because he did not explain federal conspiracy law and did not discuss the advantages of pleading guilty but had advised him that “there was a strong chance at walking.” The district judge denied Hicks’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that a guilty plea offered without any agreement would have had “no value.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hicks’s argument that his attorney’s performance prejudiced him is too speculative to require an evidentiary hearing. View "Hicks v. United States" on Justia Law

Henricks owned a towing business, an auto body shop, and a vehicle dealership, which he used to defraud insurance companies by filing fraudulent claims. Henricks’s wife, Catherine, worked at the companies sporadically and was an officer of two of them and a member of the other. She opened bank accounts and signed loan documents on behalf of the companies. Henricks pleaded guilty to mail fraud and immediately began to hide assets. He was sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution of $1,306,608.72. Catherine filed for divorce and for bankruptcy. Catherine entered an appearance as an interested person in Henricks’s criminal case. The district court found that Henricks had defaulted on his restitution payments and that the divorce was a sham, then determined the parties’ interests in properties so that Henricks’s property could be directed toward restitution. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court had jurisdiction under the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act to decide the parties’ property interests in Henricks’s criminal case and did not violate Catherine’s due process rights. The court, however, improperly relied upon post‐judgment conduct instead of determining the parties’ property interests as of the date of the judgment lien. Whether the divorce was a sham was relevant to whether Henricks’s defaulted on restitution, but is irrelevant to the parties’ ownership interests on the judgment date. View "Henricks v. United States" on Justia Law

Henricks owned a towing business, an auto body shop, and a vehicle dealership, which he used to defraud insurance companies by filing fraudulent claims. Henricks’s wife, Catherine, worked at the companies sporadically and was an officer of two of them and a member of the other. She opened bank accounts and signed loan documents on behalf of the companies. Henricks pleaded guilty to mail fraud and immediately began to hide assets. He was sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution of $1,306,608.72. Catherine filed for divorce and for bankruptcy. Catherine entered an appearance as an interested person in Henricks’s criminal case. The district court found that Henricks had defaulted on his restitution payments and that the divorce was a sham, then determined the parties’ interests in properties so that Henricks’s property could be directed toward restitution. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court had jurisdiction under the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act to decide the parties’ property interests in Henricks’s criminal case and did not violate Catherine’s due process rights. The court, however, improperly relied upon post‐judgment conduct instead of determining the parties’ property interests as of the date of the judgment lien. Whether the divorce was a sham was relevant to whether Henricks’s defaulted on restitution, but is irrelevant to the parties’ ownership interests on the judgment date. View "Henricks v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Singaporean shipping company, entered into shipping contracts with an Indian mining company. The Indian company breached those contracts. Plaintiff believes that American businesses that were the largest stockholders in the Indian company engaged in racketeering activity to divest the Indian company of assets to thwart its attempts to recover damages for the breach. Plaintiff filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). While the case was pending, the Supreme Court decided RJR Nabisco v. European Community, holding that “[a] private RICO plaintiff … must allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property.” The district court granted the American defendants judgment on the RICO claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff’s claimed injury—harm to its ability to collect on its judgment and other claims—was economic; economic injuries are felt at a corporation’s principal place of business, and Plaintiff’s principal place of business is in Singapore. The court noted that the district court allowed a maritime fraudulent transfer claim to go forward. View "Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol International Corp." on Justia Law

Shields parked his car partially in a crosswalk, in violation of a Chicago ordinance. Officers approached Shields, who was in the driver’s seat. They told Shields to get out of the car. He ran. An officer chased and tackled him and discovered that he was carrying a gun. Shields was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal based on his prior convictions for aggravated battery, residential burglary, and armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). His conviction and sentence were affirmed. Shields then moved under 18 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing, based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, that two of his convictions were not violent felonies under the ACCA. Johnson held that the definition of “violent felony” in the Act’s “residual” clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Residential burglary is an enumerated offense under the Act because the crime of burglary in Illinois aligns with the federal definition of burglary. The terms of the Illinois armed robbery statute, referring to either “use of force or … threatening the imminent use of force,” fall within the force requirements of the ACCA. View "Shields v. United States" on Justia Law

Sarfraz was convicted of sexually assaulting I.N., an immigrant who, with her father, briefly lived with Sarfraz after arriving in this country. I.N. testified that Sarfraz forced his way into her apartment, strangled her, threatened her with a knife, and raped her. Abundant physical evidence corroborated her account. Sarfraz claimed that I.N. consented to sexual intercourse and sought to introduce evidence that he and I.N. had engaged in consensual sexual contact while she was living with him. The judge excluded the evidence under Wisconsin’s rape-shield law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the state’s interest in excluding the evidence outweighed Sarfraz’s interest in admitting it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Sarfraz’s federal habeas petition. The state supreme court noted but did not separately analyze Sarfraz’s federal constitutional claims so the Richter presumption required treatment of its decision as an adjudication on the merits and required deferential review. That decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law. The Supreme Court has held that the application of evidentiary rules limiting a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence may not be disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s balancing of interests was not an unreasonable application of that standard, particularly in light of the slim marginal value of the excluded evidence. View "Sarfraz v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hampton, a convicted felon, robbed a post office at gunpoint. Weeks later, he was arrested after breaking into a business. When deputies searched Hampton’s home, they found three firearms; two were stolen. At the Sheriff’s Office, deputies informed Hampton that they were recording the conversation. Hampton interjected: “Actually, I want to change that. I haven’t even gotten a chance to get a lawyer or anything.” Deputies explained to Hampton why they wished to record the Miranda process, concluded that Hampton had not invoked his right to counsel, and, with the recorder off, advised Hampton of his rights. Hampton said: “Maybe I should have a lawyer,” but later said something the officers interpreted as permission to continue. Hampton does not contest that he agreed to proceed without counsel. Hampton signed a Miranda waiver and confirmed that he had not been threatened or received any promises. Hampton confessed to stealing scrap metal from empty buildings. After 90 minutes, Hampton confessed to the post office robbery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 132-month sentenced for robbing federal property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), rejecting arguments that robbery of federal property is not a crime of violence since it can be accomplished by “intimidation” and that Hampton unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is conducted by a judge, to collect evidence and determine whether probable cause exists to issue a criminal complaint. During the time at issue, a proceeding could subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath, and, issue search warrants; the proceeding could be conducted in secret so that the targets would be unaware of it. A Milwaukee judge commenced a proceeding to investigate alleged campaign‐finance violations and entered a secrecy order. The targets were not notified of the execution of search warrants for electronic records. Eventually a judge concluded that the targets of subpoenas had done nothing wrong--Wisconsin law did not prohibit coordination between campaign committees and outside groups to finance issue advocacy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. The court ordered that the proceedings be closed; a modified order required that all original documents relating to the proceeding be filed with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. All other copies were destroyed. MacIver filed suit on behalf of a putative class, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a)–(c), 2711(3), arguing that the proceeding did not constitute a “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Act's provision that “good faith reliance on … a court warrant or order … is a complete defense” and the defense of qualified immunity. MacIver’s interpretation of the Act was not “clearly established” at the time defendants’ warrants were issued. View "John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Ballard obtained a $280,000 loan from SBH to construct the Stone Fence residence, then requested another $90,000 to finish the property. There was insufficient equity to cover that amount; SBH lent him $20,000. Ballard obtained construction loans on properties in Bradley. Grant was the SBH loan officer for all three properties. Ballard submitted required Sworn Contractor’s Statements and Owner’s Payment Authorizations to the Kankakee County Title Company (KCTC), identifying the material and labor costs supposedly associated with his work on the Bradley properties. Ballard obtained $188,000 for the Bradley properties, where no work was performed. Ballard used the funds to complete Stone Fence. An SBH employee discovered Ballard’s scheme. Ballard was charged with three counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. At trial, Ballard admitted that he had misdirected funds; he argued a “good faith” defense that Grant and his supervisors knew and authorized Ballard’s acts and pressured him to complete Stone Fence. Ballard also claimed he did not read or sign the loan documents, implying that someone forged his signature. After Ballard was convicted, his attorney obtained a previously undisclosed audio recording of Grant, made during a prior, unrelated criminal investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in granting a new trial, finding the recording material. View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law