Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jones took off running as officers in an unmarked police car approached. Officers Milone and Dillman gave chase, identifying themselves as police officer. At trial, Milone testified that, using a flashlight, he observed Jones holding his waistband while running, then observed Jones reach into his pocket, grab a firearm, and throw it over a fence. Dillman stated that he heard the gun hitting the ground. A gun was recovered behind the fence. Jones was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government successfully moved to preclude cross‐examination of Milone based on testimony he gave in another case (Brantley), pertaining to an armed robbery investigation, and his observations of the defendant from about 80 feet away. The Brantley judge concluded that he did not believe Milone was able to identify the subject from this distance, based on the squad video and photographs showing the amount of light, and an investigator’s testimony that she was unable to see anything from the same location. The judge emphasized that he was not suggesting that Milone testified untruthfully, but that his testimony reflected an inaccurate recollection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The probative values of allowing cross-examination of Milone based on Brantly would have been substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. The court also rejected a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by “vouching” for Milone’s testimony. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Valenti is a convicted felon and registered sex offender, with a 1993 California conviction for a “Lewd or Lascivious Act with [a] Child Under 14 Years.” Valenti claimed that Indiana violated his right to vote by refusing to let him enter a polling site located at a school (Ind. Code 35-42-4-14(b)). His neighborhood polling place is a school gymnasium. The state allows serious sex offenders to vote by absentee ballot, Ind. Code 3‐11‐10‐24(a)(12), at a county courthouse, or at a civic center. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, noting that Valenti does not even have a constitutional right to vote: Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives states the “affirmative sanction” to exclude felons from the franchise. His right to vote is only statutory and the Indiana statute survives rational basis review. “Indiana’s position is an iron‐clad fortress in light of the rational basis test.” View "Valenti v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Illinois authorities arrested Pope for pandering. While the case was pending, Pope was charged with violating the federal pandering law, based on the same events. Pope bounced between state and federal facilities under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, without acquiring primary custody. A federal court sentenced Pope to 100 months’ imprisonment; months later, an Illinois court sentenced him to five years. Pope was later moved from an Illinois facility to a federal facility. Seven months later, Pope was returned to a state facility, without a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, where he remained. In August 2010, Illinois paroled Pope and surrendered him to federal authorities. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated the start date of his federal sentence as August 2010; refused to give Pope credit for time served on his state sentence; and denied Pope’s request to retroactively designate the Illinois prison as his federal place of imprisonment. Pope filed a habeas petition in September 2014. In April 2015, the government replied. In July 2016, the court ordered BOP to credit Pope 30 days. More than two years after Pope filed, the court denied the remainder of his petition. In November 2017, BOP released Pope to supervised release. The Seventh Circuit declined to dismiss the petition as moot because over-incarceration carries weight in a motion to modify supervised release, BOP miscalculated the date Pope’s sentence commenced and abused its discretion in denying retroactive designation. View "Pope v. Perdue" on Justia Law

A federal warrant, issued in July 2015, authorized federal agents to use pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, historical cell-call records, and “electronic investigative techniques” to capture and analyze signals emitted by the subject phones, including in response to signals sent by law enforcement officers to find two cell phones and understand the nature of their owners’ apparently criminal activity. The reference to electronic investigative techniques is a description of a cell-site simulator, a device that pretends to be a cell tower and harvests identifying information, including location data, about every phone that responds to its signals. The Justice Department claims that it discards information about phones other than it is programmed to look for and that it does not receive the contents of any call. To obtain the contents of a call or message, agents would need a warrant under the wiretap statutes, while the 2015 warrant was issued under 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). Defendant argued that 2703(d)’s “reasonable grounds” standard violated the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard. The Seventh Circuit declined to address that issue because the 2015 warrant also recited the existence of probable cause. A warrant that authorizes police to follow a particular cell phone adequately describes the evidence to be acquired and is not “open-ended.” View "United States v. Sanchez-Jara" on Justia Law

Arreola-Castillo was convicted of a federal drug crime. Because he had at least two prior felony drug convictions, based on guilty pleas, in New Mexico, he was subject to the recidivism provisions of 21 U.S.C. 841 and received a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison. Had it not been for the mandatory life sentence, Arreola-Castillo’s Guidelines sentencing range would have been 188–235 months in prison. He subsequently challenged the underlying felony drug convictions in New Mexico state court; that court ultimately vacated them on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. He moved to reopen his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court denied his petition as time-barred under 21 U.S.C. 851(e), which prohibits an individual from challenging the validity of a prior conviction that is more than five years old at the time the government seeks the recidivism enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Arreola-Castillo is not challenging the validity of his prior convictions, but rather their very existence. Section 851(e), which assumes the existence of a prior conviction and addresses its validity, does not apply because his convictions have been vacated. The government forfeited an argument under the one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). View "Arreola-Castillo v. United States" on Justia Law

Gill, part of a large heroin distribution operation, participated in a retaliatory shooting. In 2008, in Illinois state court, Gill pled guilty to aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in connection with that shooting. In 2009, the Chicago Police Department and the DEA launched an investigation that led to a federal indictment against Gill and others. In 2011, Gill pled guilty to conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute. On remand, the district court removed a 2-level drug premises enhancement and proactively removed another 2-level enhancement in anticipation of a retroactive Guidelines amendment. His new offense level was 36. The court concluded that Gill’s criminal history score should remain IIIl, considering Gill’s prior state conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 280 months. On a second remand, the court reduced Gill’s criminal history score by removing the prior state conviction but denied an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction because Gill did not turn himself in for 10 months after his arrest warrant issued. With a new criminal history score of I, an offense level of 36, and a mandatory minimum term of 20 years’ imprisonment, Gill’s guidelines range was 240 months. The court sentenced Gill to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of a reduction and finding that the court adequately addressed the sentence disparities between Gill and his codefendants. View "United States v. Gill" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant at Thurman’s residence after a cooperating informant purchased heroin inside. They discovered drug paraphernalia, two handguns, and a large amount of money. Thurman was charged with maintaining a drug‐involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); distributing 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Thurman unsuccessfully moved to exclude self‐incriminating statements that he made following his arrest and to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his cell phone. A jury convicted Thurman on the distribution charge but acquitted him on the other charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Thurman’s claims that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights or consent to the search of his cell phone and his challenge to the court’s sentencing findings that he was responsible for at least 700 grams of heroin and that he possessed a dangerous weapon. The court did not clearly err in crediting the officers’ testimony that Thurman consented to their questioning and to the search of his phone. The court made proper findings when applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Sentencing courts can consider conduct underlying an acquitted charge so long as that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Thurman" on Justia Law

The bank robber, wearing construction gear and a scarf wrapped around his face, held a firearm and demanded money. The teller gave him $3,000 with a concealed GPS tracking device. After the robber left, police responded. Within 10 minutes, a person (Edgeworth) matching the teller’s description was identified. Edgeworth attempted to flee. Police apprehended Edgeworth and found the stolen money, the GPS tracker, the construction outfit, and a loaded revolver. At an FBI facility, Edgeworth provided a video‐recorded post‐arrest statement. Edgeworth unsuccessfully moved to suppress the statements, alleging that officers physically assaulted him, coerced him, and made him believe that if he would not cooperate, he would be sent to prison for a long time. During voir dire, one potential juror indicated she needed to return to college. The judge did not follow up on her statement; she was seated on the jury. After the government’s case in chief, the college‐bound juror again indicated her need to leave. Both parties opposed her leaving. The judge advised the juror to remain on the jury. The jury convicted Edgeworth of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and brandishing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on that motion; conducting a flawed jury selection and declining to excuse a juror; and applying a two‐level enhancement for taking a financial institution’s property. View "United States v. Edgeworth" on Justia Law

When Ferguson was 17 years old he shot a woman three times during a carjacking, causing significant permanent injury. He was apprehended after a high-speed chase. Ferguson pleaded guilty to vehicular robbery by force and discharging a gun. The sentencing guidelines range was 198 to 217 months’ imprisonment but the district judge sentenced Ferguson to 600 months in prison (50 years). The Seventh Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded. A new judge imposed a 35‐year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ferguson’s argument that the district court failed to adequately consider his youth as a mitigating factor and to properly explain the above‐guidelines sentence. The judge expressly weighed the relevant factors and repeatedly emphasized that the guidelines did not adequately capture the seriousness of the offense, which was most comparable to attempted murder. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Terry, an Illinois prisoner proceeding pro se, sued prison officials and corrections administrators under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to a painful tumor on his neck and prevented him from timely filing suit on that claim. A district judge screened the case, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, held a “merit-review hearing,” and dismissed the complaint, ruling that it impermissibly joined two unrelated sets of claims against different defendants. Terry moved for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), stating that his claims were not unrelated. The judge denied the motion, observing that Rule 59(e) does not permit reconsideration of a nonfinal order of dismissal, and entered judgment ending the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The judge misunderstood his discretion to entertain Terry’s reconsideration motion. Though Rule 59(e) did not apply, a district judge may reconsider an interlocutory order at any time before final judgment. The judge should have done so; reading the complaint generously, Terry’s claims are related. The court noted that merit-review hearings at section 1915A screening must be strictly limited to “enabling a pro se plaintiff to clarify and amplify his complaint” and a transcript or other recording must be made. The record contains no transcript or digital recording of the judge’s merit-review hearing. View "Terry v. Spencer" on Justia Law