Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Schock resigned from Congress in 2015, after disclosures about trips he took at public expense, the expense of his elaborate office furnishings, and how he had applied campaign funds. Schock was charged with mail and wire fraud, theft of government funds, making false statements to Congress and the Federal Elections Commission, and filing false tax returns. Schock moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the charges are inconsistent with the Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause and with the House of Representatives’ constitutional authority to determine the rules of its proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The indictment arises out of applications for reimbursements, which are not speeches, debates, or any other part of the legislative process. Submitting a claim under established rules differs from the formulation of those rules. The foundation for Schock’s rule-making” argument—the proposition that if Body A has sole power to make a rule, then Body A has sole power to interpret that rule—does not represent established doctrine. “ Judges regularly interpret, apply, and occasionally nullify rules promulgated by the President or another part of the Executive Branch, as well as statutes enacted by the Legislative Branch; why would reimbursement rules be different?” View "United States v. Schock" on Justia Law

Schmidt admitted to murdering his wife but tried to rely on the Wisconsin-law defense of “adequate provocation” to mitigate the crime from first- to second-degree homicide. A state trial judge held a pretrial hearing on that substantive issue, allowing Schmidt’s counsel to attend but not allowing him to speak or participate. The judge questioned Schmidt directly and ruled that Schmidt could not present the adequate provocation defense at trial. A jury convicted Schmidt of first-degree intentional homicide, and he was sentenced to life in prison. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not violate Schmidt’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Seventh Circuit granted habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent guaranteeing counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings, including whenever “potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation.” View "Schmidt v. Foster" on Justia Law

Charged with two counts of financial institution fraud, making a false statement to a financial institution, and bankruptcy fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344, 18 U.S.C. 1014) for submitting false documents concerning his sale of two Chicago properties and making a false statement to a financial institution that influenced a mortgage loan for one property, and with making false statements in his bankruptcy petition, 18 U.S.C. 152(3), Peterson pled guilty to one count of financial institution fraud and one count of bankruptcy fraud. He was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, and five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution of $166,936. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding a two‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) because Peterson used “sophisticated means.” This case involved significant actions to conceal the trail of money and to obscure the identity of the provider and recipient of funds, distinguishing it from the typical mortgage fraud. The district court did not commit procedural error in failing to provide its reasons under section 3553(a) for imposing the discretionary conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing; the court incorporated those conditions directly from the PSR, explicitly adopting the PSR and its reasoning at that hearing. The PSR identified the section 3553(a) factors upon which the determination was made. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Groce faced nine counts: three for sex trafficking; conspiracy to engage in interstate transportation for prostitution; interstate transportation for prostitution; maintaining a drug house; using or carrying a firearm in maintaining the drug house; attempted sex trafficking; and witness retaliation. The jury heard evidence he abused and coerced two women to cause them to prostitute involuntarily. He preyed on their drug addictions and other vulnerabilities, manipulated debts, and physically abused or threatened them and caused a third woman to prostitute involuntarily. He was convicted on all but Count 8, and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated the witness retaliation convictions after the government conceded that the jury instruction failed to state a particular unsupported element. The court affirmed the sex trafficking convictions, rejecting Groce’s arguments that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victims’ alleged prostitution histories; barring cross-examination of a victim on her alleged prostitution history after she testified she had no such history; issuing an instruction lowering the mens rea (reckless disregard) required for sex trafficking; admitting prejudicial evidence of uncharged sex trafficking. View "United States v. Groce" on Justia Law

Presiding over Wade’s 2008 sentencing for possessing child pornography, Judge Gilbert imposed a sentence of just 36 months, although the guidelines recommendation was 120 months’ imprisonment. Judge Gilbert also granted Wade an early termination of supervised release. FBI agents subsequently seized Wade’s computer when executing a search warrant and discovered over 2000 images of child pornography. Wade pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b), his base offense was increased 13 levels due to the number and the especially odious content of the images. Wade’s total offense level of 28 and criminal history category of II would have prescribed a recommended sentence of 87-108 months’ imprisonment, but because Wade committed a repeat offense, his recommendation became the statutory minimum term: 120 months. Wade argued that the mandatory minimum term was appropriate because his addiction to pornography and his stress caused his recidivism, the guidelines accounted for the reasons the government gave for varying upwards, and he had support from family. Judge Gilbert imposed a sentence of 132 months’ imprisonment followed by 10 years’ supervised release, noting his previous leniency and expressing concern that Wade would offend again. The judge observed that “not a single 3553(a) factor” favored Wade. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge responded to Wade’s mitigation arguments and adequately justified Wade’s sentence, View "United States v. Wade" on Justia Law

Laux broke into his ex‐wife’s home and murdered her with a crowbar. An Indiana jury decided that the aggravating circumstance that he committed murder during a burglary outweighed the primary mitigating circumstance that he had no criminal history and recommended a sentence of life without parole, which the court imposed. Indiana state courts affirmed Laux’s convictions and sentence. After a post‐conviction hearing, they also rejected the claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Laux filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective by not fully investigating and presenting all of the available mitigating evidence about Laux’s childhood that surfaced at his post‐conviction hearing. The state courts’ conclusion that Laux received effective assistance of counsel was not unreasonable. A defendant can often point to some additional subject and argue it should have been pursued further. The Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigation evidence—it requires counsel to make reasonable decisions about which matters to pursue. The evidence of Laux’s childhood failed to show significant hardship; he was never a victim of abuse or neglect, was never in trouble, and excelled in high school and college. View "Laux v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Van Cannon pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes higher penalties on section 922(g) violators who have three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” Van Cannon had five qualifying predicates, including Iowa convictions for burglary and attempted burglary and a Minnesota conviction for second-degree burglary. The judge imposed the mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. In 2015 the Supreme Court (Johnson) invalidated the "residual clause" in the “violent felony” definition. Van Cannon sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson. Days later, the Supreme Court (Mathis) held that Iowa burglary does not qualify under the definition. The government conceded that Iowa attempted burglary and burglary no longer qualified under ACCA but argued harmless error because three predicates remained. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Van Cannon's claims. He properly challenged his sentence within one year of Johnson. The Minnesota crime of second-degree burglary is not an ACCA predicate. A burglary counts for ACCA purposes only if its elements match the elements of “generic” burglary: “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Minnesota statute covers a broader swath of conduct, permitting conviction without proof that the offender had the intent to commit a crime at the moment he unlawfully entered or unlawfully “remained in” the structure. View "Van Cannon v. United States" on Justia Law

Romeoville Police received a call from a Wisconsin mother who stated that her 15-year-old daughter (April) left Wisconsin with an unknown man and called her from a motel, wanting to come home. Officers went to the motel, which had a reputation for prostitution and drug problems. A clerk stated that there was one guest from Wisconsin and showed the officers a photocopy of that guest’s identification. The officers proceeded to the room, where the door was propped open. The officers knocked and Key—who matched the identification—answered. Key said April had gone to a restaurant. The officers asked if they could check the room for the girl; Key consented. Inside the room, the officers saw a tablet open to the website backpage.com, which was commonly used to post prostitution advertisements; a large number of prepaid credit cards; used and unused condoms, and multiple cellphones. Crayton, another young woman, was in the room. Crayton stated that she and April were prostituting and that Key was their pimp. They found April at the restaurant. Following Key's arrest, officers seized the tablet, credit cards, cellphones, and other evidence from the room and Key’s car. Key unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court instructed the jury that voluntary participation by the victim was not a defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Key's conviction, upholding the denial of the motion and the jury instruction. View "United States v. Key" on Justia Law

Learn died after Perrone injected her with cocaine in 2008. Perrone pleaded guilty to unlawful drug distribution and stipulated that his distribution of the cocaine caused Learn’s death, claiming that they had made a “suicide pact.” The court applied a statutory enhancement that mandates a 20-year minimum prison term if unlawful drug distribution results in death. The Supreme Court later clarified that this provision requires a defendant’s drugs to be a but-for cause of the death, not merely a contributing cause. Perrone filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that the narrowed interpretation indicated that he is actually innocent of causing Learn’s death and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of a Seventh Circuit case decided one day before his sentencing that narrowly interpreted the enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the coroner’s report listed the cause of death as “[c]ombined toxicity with cocaine, ethanol and opiates,” Perrone stated he gave Learn additional cocaine because he concluded that she would not die without it. Perrone cannot establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even assuming that Perrone could show “deficient performance” by counsel, it is unlikely that he could satisfy the “prejudice” prong. The evidence of causation was strong and his plea agreement allowed him to obtain a sentence reduction for cooperating View "Perrone v. United States" on Justia Law

Tucker and co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin, with an allegation that a 2009 death resulted from the use of heroin distributed by the conspiracy. Tucker’s co-defendants pleaded guilty. Tucker and the government agreed to omit all evidence concerning the death and requested that the court not instruct the jury on that portion of the indictment. The prosecution stated that the death was "a sentencing factor and addresses the mandatory minimum sentence ... 20 years" and did not present evidence regarding a death. The jury convicted Tucker of conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and found that the offense involved more than one kilogram of heroin. The PSR explained that Tucker’s base offense level was 32 but recommended that, under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(2), the level should increase to 38 because his offense involved more than one kilogram of cocaine and “the offense of conviction establishe[d] that death or serious bodily injury resulted.” Tucker was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment after the court found that his drug distribution resulted in a death. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his habeas petition, in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Whether Tucker’s counsel should have known to challenge the 2D1.1(a)(2) enhancement, is not dispositive because he made a strategic decision not to do so, based on the reasonable calculation that his client would be better off if the jury did not hear evidence regarding the resulting death. View "Tucker v. United States" on Justia Law