Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Defendants were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, plus six other counts. The court gave a multiple conspiracies jury instruction and refused to give a proposed “meeting of the minds” instruction. The jury convicted the Defendants on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the government lacked sufficient evidence to prove the conspiracy between them and Rodriguez, a cooperating defendant and that the district court erred by refusing to give a “meeting of the minds” jury instruction. Mistrust, deceit or dishonesty amongst the Defendants did not negate their shared common objective of distributing cocaine. View "United States v. Masias" on Justia Law

Norton was part of a cocaine and heroin distribution conspiracy, driving to Chicago and Akron to move drugs and proceeds, and distributing drugs at his Indiana home. Law enforcement recruited a conspiracy member to record conversations; the informant stated that Norton planned to move $400,000 of drug proceeds. Federal officers contacted Indiana State Police Officer Shultz for a traffic stop. Federal officers trailed Norton for 20 miles, identified Norton’s vehicle to Shultz, told Shultz that Norton was driving 72 mph in a 55 mph construction zone, and instructed Shultz to make the stop. Shultz testified that he used radar to confirm Norton's speed. Shultz pulled Norton over. Norton allowed Shultz to search his car. Shultz found an unusual wire near the gas pedal and a shell casing. His drug-sniffing dog signaled to the vehicle. Shultz did not arrest Norton, but impounded the vehicle. After obtaining a warrant, officers conducted a thorough search, discovering $400,000 in cash. Months later, officers arrested Norton in a house near the Mexican border, where they found $179,000 in cash. At a hearing on Norton’s motion to suppress evidence collected from his vehicle, an Indiana Department of Transportation employee testified that the speed limit in the construction zone was 70 mph at the time of the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Norton’s conviction and sentence to a mandatory life term of imprisonment, upholding the denial of his motion to suppress and the admission of recorded statements made by the confidential informant. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law

Harden was convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin, the use of which resulted in the death of Schnettler, and was sentenced to life in prison under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). That provision imposes sentencing enhancements if the defendant commits a drug offense and “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that his heroin caused Schnettler’s death; that the district court failed to adequately instruct the jury on causation; that the district court erred by excluding testimony about an alternative heroin source; that the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after inadmissible evidence entered the jury room; and that the prosecution misstated evidence during closing argument. The court noted that the section 841(b) enhancement does not require proof that the death was reasonably foreseeable. View "United States v. Harden" on Justia Law

Sentencing judges ordinarily “group” counts of conviction when they involve “substantially the same harm,” U.S.S.G. 3D1.2. In 2014, the Seventh Circuit ruled (Sinclair) that when facing a particular combination of counts—the same combination in this case—a judge may not group them. Lamon pleaded guilty to: possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possessing a firearm in furtherance of that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Following Sinclair, the judge did not group Lamon’s drug‐trafficking conviction and felon‐in‐possession conviction; calculated guidelines ranges of 30-37 months for the section 841(a) and 922(g) counts, based on a total offense level of 17 and Lamon’s criminal history category of III; and sentenced Lamon to below‐guidelines concurrent terms of 24 months’ imprisonment on each of those counts, followed by the statutory minimum consecutive term of five years for the section 924(c) count, resulting in a total sentence of 84 months. Had the judge grouped the counts, Lamon’s total offense level would have been 15, resulting in a guidelines range of 24-30 months for each charge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to overrule Sinclair. In these circumstances, the felon‐in‐possession count has no impact on the guideline range for the underlying drug count, eliminating the rationale for grouping. View "United States v. Lamon" on Justia Law

Weaver was arrested for the murder of Sanders. The court disqualified Weaver’s attorney because he represented a potential state witness. Callico testified that he and Sanders sold drugs together and that on April 4, 2002, Weaver fired the fatal shots into Sanders’s car. Over Weaver's objection, Officer Pinal testified that on September 9, 2002, Pinal and another officer saw Weaver place a gun in his waistband and approached Weaver, identifying themselves as police. Weaver drew the gun and fled, eventually tossing the gun. A firearms expert testified that shots fired from the pistol Pinal recovered matched casings and bullets recovered from the Sanders scene. Callico admitted that he had an extensive criminal background and had initially stated that he did not know the shooter. Pinal acknowledged that he never had the gun or magazine tested for fingerprints and that, during the chase, he lost sight of Weaver for 30 seconds. Weaver’s counsel emphasized the time gap between Sanders’s murder and the recovery of the pistol and that Callico’s unreliable testimony was the only direct evidence. Weaver was convicted of first-degree murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the trial court denied him the right to his counsel of choice; his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call several witnesses and properly cross‐examine Callico; the state violated his due process rights by using Callico’s coerced and perjured testimony; and the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting evidence of other crimes related to the September 2002 incident. View "Weaver v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Dyer was charged in a fraudulent real estate (farmland) investment scheme. Dyer represented himself, with standby counsel. The judge admonished Dyer in the presence of the jury, that he must “follow the same rules of every lawyer.” Dyer stated that he wanted to stop the trial and plead guilty. Meanwhile, Dyer had been charged in a fraudulent insurance scheme. Dyer agreed to plead guilty to two counts of wire fraud and two counts of unlawful financial transactions in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges in both cases and a third case. At a change-of-plea hearing. Dyer testified that he was comfortable reading complex documents and had reviewed the agreement “extensively” with standby counsel. Dyer confirmed that no threats or inducements were made; that he was not using drugs or alcohol; and that the allegations were true. Both judges accepted the pleas. Dyer moved to withdraw his "farmland" plea before his sentencing hearing, claiming that Judge Stadtmueller was biased. The court denied Dyer’s motion and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Weeks later, Dyer asked to withdraw his "insurance case" plea, explaining that he was innocent but felt prejudiced by the proceedings in Judge Stadtmueller’s court and suffers from bipolar disorder. Dyer confirmed that nothing on the day of his change-of-plea hearing had substantially clouded his judgment and that he was not directly threatened. Judge Pepper sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment, concluding that Dyer’s disorder was not strongly mitigating because he chose to forgo treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in both cases. View "United States v. Dyer" on Justia Law

When the district court sentenced Cross (2000) and Davis (1992), the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines prescribed an elevated sentence for career offenders. A defendant qualified as a career offender upon his third felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a drug offense. The guidelines defined “crime of violence” in three ways: an elements approach, an enumerated offense approach, and the residual clause, which covered any offense that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Both Cross and Davis were sentenced under the residual clause. Neither objected at trial. The Supreme Court jettisoned the mandatory nature of the guidelines in 2005 (Booker). In its 2015 “Johnson” holding, the Supreme Court found identical residual language in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), unconstitutionally vague; in 2017 the Court held (Beckles) that Johnson does not extend to the advisory guidelines, including the career-offender guideline. The Seventh Circuit granted Cross and Davis relief from their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Beckles applies only to advisory guidelines, not to mandatory sentencing rules. Under Johnson, the guidelines residual clause is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants. Cross and Davis are entitled to be resentenced. View "De'Angelo Cross v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Williams, behind on paying SCCA condominium association fees, filed the first of five, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petitions so that creditors were stayed from initiating collection. Her scheme was to not make payments required by her Chapter 13 plan so that the court would dismiss the case; SCCA would file eviction and collection suits; Williams would then file a new Chapter 13 petition. After voluntarily dismissing her second bankruptcy petition, Williams signed a deed transferring the condominium to Wilke. A deed recorded weeks later returned title to Williams. Wilke paid nothing and never occupied the condominium but obtained loans secured by the condominium. In her subsequent bankruptcy petitions, Williams failed to disclose the transfers but stated, falsely, that Wilke was a co‐debtor and would contribute toward the mortgage. After dismissing Williams’s fifth petition, the court barred Williams from filing a new petition for 180 days. She again deeded the condominium to Wilke, who filed a bankruptcy petition stating it was his property. The court dismissed the case. Both were charged with bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. Wilke pled guilty and cooperated. The court limited the defense’s cross-examination of SCCA's board member and attorney about a class action lawsuit Williams had filed against SCCA and about SCCA’s treatment of Williams relative to other tenants, reasoning that the topics were an irrelevant attack on the underlying debt. Williams was convicted. With enhancements for causing a loss of $193, 291 and because the offense involved 10 or more victims, her Guidelines Range was 51–63 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced her to 46 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s limitation on cross-examination and to the sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told Officer Hronopoulos that Wheeler had guns in his Chicago apartment. This informant had previously given good information, so Hronopoulos drove the informant by Wheeler’s apartment to confirm the address and took the informant before a judge to testify in support of warrant applications. The judge issued warrants. That night, police executed the warrants and found guns, ammunition, and heroin. Wheeler was acquitted because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was his. Wheeler sued the city and the officers, raising a Fourth Amendment claim for an unlawful search and arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983) and a state‐law claim for malicious prosecution. The court rejected Wheeler’s argument that the warrant was defective because the informant’s tip was hearsay, reasoning the tip was not offered to prove the truth of the matter it asserted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There was probable cause for the search, arrest, and prosecution via the informant’s tip. The court rejected Wheeler’s “irrational argument” that there was a disputed fact as to whether the informant existed or gave the tip at all, as waived for not having been raised below, as was Wheeler’s supposed Brady claim concerning officers’ failure to procure fingerprint evidence. View "Wheeler v. Hronopoulos" on Justia Law

As CEO of the Chicago Public Schools, Byrd-Bennett worked behind the scenes to assure that companies headed by Solomon and Vranas received lucrative contracts. In exchange, Solomon and Vranas agreed that they would pay Byrd-Bennett a percentage of the revenue generated by those contracts when she came to work for them at the end of her tenure with CPS. After the fraudulent scheme was exposed, each participant pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 1346. Solomon was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, 30 months more than Byrd-Bennett received. Solomon argued that the district court erred by incorporating the value of a contract unrelated to the criminal agreement into his advisory sentencing guidelines calculation, resulting in an offense score that was four levels higher than Solomon believes it should have been and claimed that the disparity between Byrd-Bennett’s sentence and his sentence is unwarranted, making his sentence substantively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record supports the court’s decision to include the contested contract in the offense level calculation, and dissimilar cooperation is a reasonable basis for a sentencing disparity. View "United States v. Solomon" on Justia Law