Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Thompson's 1982 murder and conspiracy to commit burglary convictions. Thompson filed a state post-conviction petition in 1992. In 1997, the final of several public defenders withdrew. Thompson’s petition languished until 2001 when he requested a copy of the record. The public defender would not represent Thompson because his prior attorneys had “found no meritorious issues.” In 2005, Thompson requested leave to proceed pro se then hired an attorney. Court-ordered DNA tests were completed, but apparently, no hearing was held. The proceedings again fell into limbo. In 2012, Thompson retained a new attorney, who filed another amended petition. The state again raised the defense of laches. The parties stipulated that the delay had prejudiced the state. Thompson argued that the delay was the fault of attorneys who had abandoned him. Indiana courts rejected Thompson’s petition. Thompson sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court dismissed, finding that Thompson’s claims were procedurally defaulted, without addressing the potential distinction between laches based on a prefiling delay and laches based on delays in prosecuting an action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. When the state court dismissed the petition there was not yet a firmly established rule in Indiana that laches applies to delays to an already-filed action; precedents dealt only with delays in filing a post-conviction petition. Thompson’s petition is not barred by an adequate and independent state ground. View "Thompson v. Brown" on Justia Law

Curtis led a crew that robbed cell-phone stores in suburban Chicago. He was arrested after the last of the heists and stood trial for four counts of robbery, four counts of aiding in the brandishing of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, a count for conspiracy, and a count for being a felon in possession of a firearm. A jury convicted him on all counts except one for robbery and one for aiding in the brandishing of a firearm-- each related to a robbery of a store in Joliet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court should have excluded evidence of cell-site location information, which Curtis alleges was obtained under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the district court prohibited him from cross-examining witnesses about a potential source of bias, violating the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Although it is now established that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for the type of cell-phone data present here, exclusion of that information was not required because it was collected in good faith. Because Curtis made his desired arguments and impeached his co-conspirators, any error in denying the cross-examination was harmless. View "United States v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Wisconsin officials arrested Scott for attempting to have sexual relations with a boy who Scott (age 58) believed was 14 years old. The “boy” was a state Department of Justice agent, impersonating a teenager in response to an ad that Scott placed on Craigslist. Scott sent Kyle sexually explicit emails and sexually graphic photos and asked Kyle to reciprocate. Executing the warrant issued by a state judge, agents found child pornography in Scott's home. A federal judge denied a motion to suppress and sentenced Scott to 178 months in prison; he had an 11-year state sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The decision of the judge who issued the warrant receives “great deference”. Scott offered to host a sexual encounter and sent Kyle a picture of a man on a bedspread; it does not stretch credulity to infer that the picture had been taken at Scott’s home and that other pictures also could be found there. Many cell phones are set up to transmit the pictures they take to home computers, which have larger screens and access to file-sharing software. Scott argued that there is no reason to think that pedophiles create or acquire child pornography but Scott asked Kyle to send a picture of himself with an erection. The state judge did not exceed the bounds of “great deference.” View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Arnold was convicted of repeated sexual assault his son, M.A., who testified that in 2004-2005, when M.A. was 13-14 years old, Arnold engaged in mutual masturbation with him. Arnold had five prior convictions, including for two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child. M.A. (17 at the time of trial) had six prior convictions and/or juvenile adjudications of delinquency. Arnold was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. After the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Arnold’s conviction, M.A. signed a notarized, witnessed affidavit, recanting his testimony. At the time that M.A. reported the assaults, M.A. was under the supervision of a juvenile court and participating in a treatment program, based on adjudications that M.A. himself had sexually assaulted children. M.A. represented that he had falsely accused his father to ensure his successful discharge from the program. Arnold sought a new trial. A federal district court dismissed, as untimely, his habeas corpus petition, filed beyond the one‐year deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1); Arnold alleged that his actual innocence supported an equitable exception. The Seventh Circuit granted relief, rejecting an argument that M.A.’s recantation could not meet the standard for relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence, however credible a factfinder might determine it to be. The court remanded for a hearing at which the credibility of M.A.’s recantation can be assessed with the probable impact that the recantation would have had on reasonable jurors. View "Arnold v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Thompson pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C 922(g)(1). He admitted he possessed the firearm and initially conceded he was a felon based on his prior conviction of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), an Illinois state‐law offense. Later, he moved to set aside his plea on the basis that the AUUW conviction was invalid and he should not have been considered a felon. The Seventh Circuit (2012) and the Illinois Supreme Court (2013) had deemed the AUUW statute unconstitutional before Thompson was charged but Thompson never moved to have the conviction vacated or expunged. The district court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. United States (1980), denied his motion and sentenced him to 16 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Thompson’s argument that a conviction for violating a state statute later ruled unconstitutional and void ab initio cannot serve as a predicate offense for the federal felon in possession statute. The plain meaning of section 922(g)(1) “is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes [a] firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action. … No exception ... is made for a person whose outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid for any reason.” View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Beley and Montgomery represent a class of sex offenders who allege that Chicago refused to register them under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) because they could not produce proof of address. If true, that might have violated SORA, because the Act provides a mechanism for registering the homeless. Beley and Montgomery, however, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their right to procedural due process because the city used constitutionally inadequate procedures to determine whether they had satisfied SORA’s registration requirements. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claim. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process only when the state deprives someone of life, liberty, or property. Beley and Montgomery insist that the City deprived them of liberty: they assert a right to register under SORA. This is not a cognizable liberty interest, so the plaintiffs have no due process claim. The court noted they do not complain that the city incarcerated them; nor do they seek to enjoin the city from incarcerating them in the future. The state action relevant here—the intake officers’ refusal to register the plaintiffs—did not deprive the plaintiffs of their interest in freedom from bodily restraint, View "Beley v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2013, while Koger was serving a 300-day sentence in the Cook County Jail, Lyons sent him at least 10 books, plus magazines and newspapers. More than 30 books were seized from Koger’s cell for violation of Jail policy. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Lyons and Koger claimed that limiting inmates to three pieces of reading material violated the First Amendment. The district court rejected the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to Lyons, who lacked standing because Koger received everything she sent, but vacated as to Koger. The court noted that Koger challenged the policy, rather than the particular seizure, and that the policy provides for no pre-deprivation process. View "Lyons v. Dart" on Justia Law

In 2002, officers seized $100,120 in U.S. currency from an Amtrak train passenger. The federal government initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding against the currency. The passenger and the owner of the funds, neither of whom were charged with committing any crime related to the funds, joined the suit as claimants. After 14 years and two appeals, a jury found the currency was substantially connected to a drug transaction and entered a verdict for the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the claimants’ motion to have dog-sniff evidence excluded on spoliation grounds based on claimants' argument that the government intentionally converted the currency to a cashier’s check, depriving them of the opportunity to perform chemical tests to determine the presence or absence of drugs. The judge accepted the government’s contention that the officers deposited the currency in conformity with a Justice Department policy not to hold large amounts of cash and found no bad faith. The jury instructions were not confusing; they told the jury to determine whether the money was substantially connected to some unlawful drug transaction and fit within certain statutory categories, regardless of the claimants’ personal participation in any such drug transaction. The verdict was supported by evidence concerning the drug-courier profile, the drug dog’s alert, and the claimants' implausible explanations for being on the train and having the cash. View "Marrocco v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand and One Hundred Twenty Dollars" on Justia Law

In 2009, Scott pleaded guilty to engaging in two schemes to defraud investors and potential investors, 18 U.S.C. 1341. One of the supervised release conditions the district court imposed at sentencing was that he could not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer. After his release, Scott violated his supervised release conditions several times. At the revocation hearing for one of these violations, the district court found Scott violated one of his probation conditions and sentenced him to an additional 36 months of supervised release. The district court declined to impose further custody due to Scott’s regular restitution payments. Defense counsel stated, “we have no objection to extending the period of mandatory supervised release.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Scott’s argument that the district court committed procedural errors at the revocation hearing in failing to calculate or discuss the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and in failing to afford him an opportunity to allocute, finding that Scott waived both issues. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Tounisi decided to join Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria after learning about its violent operations and its links to al-Qaida. His parents attempted to stop him by taking away his passport. Tounisi applied for an expedited passport, reporting that his passport was lost and he intended to travel to Jordan. He visited a purported Jabhat al-Nusrah recruitment website and emailed the listed contact person, actually an FBI agent, about his travel strategy, stating that he would seize the opportunity to attain martyrdom. Tounisi, then 18 years old, bought a ticket for a flight to Istanbul. The “recruiter” sent him a bus ticket to Gaziantep and promised that “brothers” would be waiting to take him to a training camp in Syria. Tounisi responded by describing what he would be wearing. At O’Hare Airport, federal agents questioned and arrested him for knowingly attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), and making false statements in connection with an offense involving international terrorism, section 1001(a)(2). He pleaded guilty to the first charge in exchange for dismissal of the second and was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 15 years in prison and a lifetime of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge did not sufficiently address Tounisi’s mitigating arguments or adequately explain the length of imprisonment or supervised relief and failed to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Tounisi" on Justia Law