Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

D.D.B., then under 18 years of age, with an adult accomplice robbed a pharmacy and was charged with acts of juvenile delinquency that, if committed by an adult, would be robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and carrying, using, and brandishing a firearm during a robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Transfer to adult proceedings is mandatory if the juvenile committed the underlying act after his sixteenth birthday; the charged offense is a felony that “has as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”; and the juvenile has previously been found guilty of a crime that “has as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 5032. The government alleged that D.D.B. had convictions for Indiana attempted robbery and burglary, Class B felonies, and for conspiracy to commit robbery. The district court addressed only the attempted robbery offense and concluded that it required transfer. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court erred by assuming that any attempted violent felony is itself a violent felony and failed to consider the lack of an intent requirement in Indiana’s crime of attempted robbery. No finder-of-fact found that D.D.B. had an intent to use, attempt to use, or threatened the use of physical force against a person. On remand, the government may raise the other predicate crimes of burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery. View "United States v. D. D. B." on Justia Law

On March 18, 2011, Manuel was arrested charged with possessing unlawful drugs. He was held in jail pending trial; on May 4, 2011 the prosecutor dismissed all charges after concluding that the pills Manuel had been carrying were legal. On April 22, 2013, Manuel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The next day he was released. In 2017, the Supreme Court held that Manuel is entitled to seek damages on the ground that detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and remanded the question whether Manuel sued in time. Illinois law gave Manuel two years from the claim’s accrual but federal law defines when a claim accrues. The Seventh Circuit determined that the claim was timely. Manuel’s claim accrued on May 5, when he was released from custody. While many Fourth Amendment cases concern pre-custody events that can be litigated without awaiting vindication on the criminal charges, Manuel contests the propriety of his detention. When a wrong is ongoing rather than discrete, the limitations period does not commence until the wrong ends. Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution is the wrong characterization of Manuel’s case; the problem is wrongful custody. A claim cannot accrue until the would-be plaintiff is entitled to sue, yet the existence of detention forbids a suit for damages contesting that detention’s validity. View "Manuel v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

Rhodes was convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide and first‐degree recklessly endangering safety for shooting two victims, killing Davis. The prosecution’s theory was that Rhodes and his brother shot Davis, who was an ex‐boyfriend of their sister, Nari, and that the other victim was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Nari had suffered a severe beating the day before Davis was murdered. Nari’s direct testimony focused on her injuries from the beating the day before. When Rhodes tried to cross‐examine Nari to rebut the motive theory, the judge limited the questioning and did not allow evidence of prior beatings. In 2010, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed Rhodes’s conviction, finding that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated and that the violation was not harmless. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction in 2011. Rhodes then sought federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The district court agreed that Rhodes had shown a clear Confrontation Clause violation but found that the violation was harmless. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state courts violated clearly established federal law in violating Rhodes’s Confrontation Clause rights. Given the importance of the motive issue and the overall balance of evidence in the trial, the constitutional error was not harmless. View "Rhodes v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

A cocaine courier arrested by Indianapolis police stated that a major customer of his distributor, Colon, lived in a certain apartment complex; he had seen Colon deliver drugs to the customer there and at Colon’s store and provided a general physical description. Officers saw Stewart visit Colon's store, making no purchase. Stewart lived in the apartment complex and had felony drug convictions. Officers followed Stewart to a gas station. Another man exited a parked car and got into Stewart’s car. Minutes later, the man left. Officers, believing that they had witnessed a drug sale, called Detective Ball, who traveled with Josie, a dog trained to detect illegal drugs. Three detectives saw Stewart fail to stop at a red light. Ball pulled Stewart over. Stewart declined to allow a search. Stewart identified a bulge in his pocket as $700 in cash. Five minutes into the stop, Ball requested backup, continuing to work on the traffic violation. Approximately eight minutes later, backup arrived. Ball then walked Josie around Stewart’s car. Josie alerted after 105 seconds. An officer was still working on the ticket. Ball inspected the car's interior, immediately finding a handgun close to the driver’s seat. Stewart was a convicted felon, so Ball arrested Stewart and gave him Miranda warnings, then continued his search. The trunk contained crack cocaine, powder cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, a digital scale, and $7,420 in cash, plus $1,904 in Stewart’s pocket. Given his Miranda warnings again at the station, Stewart signed a waiver and made incriminating statements that were recorded. A warranted search of Stewart’s home yielded additional cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, four handguns, and $487,542 in cash. Convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 851; 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. 924(c); 18 U.S.C. 1957; and 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), Stewart’s sentence was life imprisonment without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence obtained during and as a result of the traffic stop and the confession and to limit the use of evidence of Stewart's visits to Colon’s store. There was reasonable suspicion to support any delay in obtaining a dog sniff. The money laundering convictions were supported by substantial evidence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Foster planned, with Hill and Anderson, to rob a credit union. Foster supplied the guns, drove the others to the location, and waited nearby while they entered. Hill directed a teller to empty the cash drawers and threatened to shoot her if she pressed any alarms. Anderson held another employee at gunpoint and ordered him to empty the vault. Anderson stated: “Nobody move for ten minutes. I got a bomb and I’ll blow this place up.” They took approximately $250,000 and met Foster to split the proceeds. Foster pocketed around $100,000. Foster was convicted of armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d); using a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possessing a firearm as a felon, section 922(g) and was sentenced to 284 months’ imprisonment. Foster later successfully moved to vacate his sentence, in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson (2015) decision. His prior conviction for burglary no longer qualified as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Applying a two‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) based on Hill’s threat to shoot and Anderson’s threat to detonate a bomb, his guidelines range was 97-121 months. Without that enhancement, the range was 78-97 months. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 121 months for the robbery and felon‐in‐possession convictions plus a 60‐month mandatory consecutive term for the 924(c) conviction. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. 2K2.4 prohibits any death‐threat enhancement where a defendant also received a sentence for a firearms offense under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Cotton was visiting his sister, Kimberly when he scuffled with three men. Cotton was beaten and shot; he died from the gunshot wounds. Milton and another were tried separately as parties to first‐degree reckless homicide. Four eye‐witnesses testified: Kimberly, her son James (age 18), Howard, and Jones. James initially stated that he saw the scene after the shooting. At trial, James testified to having seen both the beating and the shooting. He identified Milton first in a photo array, in a post‐indictment lineup, and at trial. Howard testified that he saw the fight through a window. He identified Milton in a lineup but could not identify anyone from a photo array. Jones testified that he could hear the argument from his home, but changed his story about identifying the perpetrators. The prosecution also presented a bullet casing found outside Milton’s home that matched a casing found at the shooting and a bandana found in Milton’s bedroom that matched a bandana described by Jones and Howard. One expert testified that the bullet casings came from the same gun; a detective opined that the comparison would be inconclusive without the actual gun, which was never recovered. Milton had participated, without counsel, in a live lineup viewed by the witnesses, despite having invoked his right to counsel. Wisconsin courts rejected his claims on appeal, stating that Milton did not meet the “burden to show that he did not waive his right to counsel at the lineup.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The jury was aware of variations in witness testimony and still voted to convict. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), it lay within the bounds of reason to conclude that the evidence was so compelling that the probability of an acquittal if the lineup were suppressed, was negligible. View "Milton v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2002, a Wisconsin jury convicted Reynolds in a fatal carjacking. He unsuccessfully sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on alleged violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. He claims the state stopped paying his state‐appointed lawyer during his direct appeal and that he received ineffective assistance during his direct appeal and trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if his denial‐of‐counsel claim were not procedurally barred, his attorney did not abandon Reynolds. After being told by the State Public Defender that he would not be paid any more for working on Reynolds’s case, the attorney continued to represent Reynolds for free in the state court of appeals, completing the briefing there and seeking review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court rejected an alternative argument that Reynolds was denied the effective assistance of counsel when the Public Defender’s Office created a conflict of interest by ceasing to pay his lawyer while also informing him that he would no longer receive new case assignments. The state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in holding that a missed opportunity to raise an equal protection challenge to the state carjacking statute in an already-untimely fashion was not an “adverse effect”; Reynolds’s claim cannot meet the stringent standard of section 2254(d)(1). View "Reynolds v. Hepp" on Justia Law

During child-custody proceedings, Nixon accused her ex-husband G.G. of physically and sexually assaulting their daughter, S. An Illinois judge limited G.G.’s parental rights to visitation in the presence of another adult while the allegations were being investigated. Nixon concluded that the judge would terminate her parental rights and give G.G. full custody of S. so she left for Canada with S. and remained there even after learning that the judge had given G.G. sole custody. Nixon was convicted of international parental kidnapping, 18 U.S.C.1204, and sentenced to 26 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is an affirmative defense that “the defendant was fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence.” Nixon presented evidence that G.G. physically and sexually abused S but S professed love for her father and fear of being alone with her mother. She expressed regret at allowing her mother to persuade her to accuse her father falsely. Nixon did not carry her burden on this defense. The court rejected claims of emotional abuse; the statute speaks of “domestic violence” and requires the defendant to show real domestic violence, not just a belief that violence occurred. Selling a beloved house, demeaning language, failing to provide adequate financial support do not constitute “violence.” View "United States v. Nixon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Rivera of aiding and abetting a pair of Hobbs Act robberies, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and his friend’s use of a firearm during them, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The same jury acquitted him of, or deadlocked on, counts related to three other robberies. Rivera moved for a judgment of acquittal on the four counts of conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew in advance that his friend, Thomas, would commit the armed robberies or to show that he assisted Thomas during them. Alternatively, he asked for a new trial on the ground that the jury should have disregarded Thomas’s testimony—the key evidence at trial—because Thomas was an unbelievable witness and the remaining evidence was too weak to support the convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient and that the district judge reasonably concluded that concerns about Thomas’s credibility did not warrant a new trial. The court noted testimony by Rivera’s girlfriend, with whom the two lived, and surveillance videos. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

An Indiana judge appointed Stochel as receiver for Tip Top Supermarkets, while its proprietors were embroiled in protracted litigation. Over several years Stochel stole more than $330,000 from the receivership. Stochel evaded detection by diverting funds from other sources to pay bills. As the litigation and receivership were winding down, the principals had suspicions and asked the court to appoint an independent auditor. The judge ordered Stochel to turn over the receivership’s files. To delay discovery, Stochel moved to vacate the order, falsely stating that the receivership had sufficient funds to pay the auditor and claiming that he needed more time to assemble the records. The judge removed Stochel as the receiver; the auditor uncovered the fraud. Stochel was charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, based on Stochel’s motion, which he had mailed to the court; the indictment alleged that the motion perpetuated the fraudulent scheme by delaying the detection of Stochel’s embezzlement. The district judge imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence’ the denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a); the loss-amount calculation, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(G); and the application of a two-level enhancement for violating a judicial order, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(9)(C). View "United States v. Stochel" on Justia Law