Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). His plea agreement contemplated an offense level of 31, which reflected a two-level reduction because Taylor had not sought to distribute child pornography. In preparing the PSR, the probation officer concluded that this two-level reduction was not available under the Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the parties stated that they had no objection to the PSR. The district court accepted the probation officer’s offense level calculation of 33 and sentenced Taylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the guidelines range for a level 33 offense. On appeal, Taylor argued that the government was bound to advocate for a sentence within the lower range contemplated by the plea agreement and that its advocacy for a within-Guidelines sentence based on the corrected calculation constitutes a breach of the plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the plea agreement, the government was bound to advocate for a within-Guidelines sentence; it fulfilled that obligation. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Hatch illegally brought handguns into Chicago three times. Over the next year, Chicago police recovered five of these guns—some from felons and one from a minor. Hatch told his friend Driver, who had used her identification to purchase some of the guns in Indiana, not to divulge any information, but she admitted that she purchased guns for him. Hatch told a probation officer that he was a straw buyer for Kemp: he bought the guns for Kemp and did not know why Kemp wanted them. Hatch pleaded guilty to unlawfully transporting firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D). The judge calculated a Guidelines range of 30-37 months, then applied the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a 55-month sentence. The judge said that Hatch’s family, job, and lack of prior felonies “appear to be in his favor,” but the nature of the offense was “troubling,” and Hatch failed to accept responsibility fully because he denied knowing what the guns were for. The judge gave statistics, attributing the spike in Chicago’s homicides to guns from Indiana, and discussed the effect of gun violence in the city, concluding that the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Hatch’s offense or sufficiently deter firearm trafficking. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A judge may depart from the Guidelines based on locality-specific factors. View "United States v. Hatch" on Justia Law

In 1988, Huber pleaded guilty to making fraudulent credit card charges of $800. He spent the next 25 years either on probation or in prison for violating his probation, although Wisconsin had no lawful basis for extending his sentence beyond November 1995. It took the state until 2014 to recognize this problem and to vacate his ongoing sentence. Huber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that Huber had failed to bring most claims within six years of their accrual, as required under Wisconsin’s statute of limitations. Some of Huber’s claims were timely, but the court granted the defendants summary judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Huber’s claims were timely and summary judgment was premature on those claims that the district court reached. Huber’s claim did not accrue until the court invalidated his sentence. Huber filed this action in 2016, within Wisconsin’s six-year statute of limitations. He did not sit on his rights under the Heck doctrine, which ensures that civil litigation does not undermine the basis of criminal convictions and sentences. A reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference here. Construing facts and inferences in Huber’s favor, Huber’s Eighth Amendment claims are not suitable for summary judgment. View "Huber v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted, based on a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders, of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and was sentenced to 112 months’ imprisonment on each of three counts, to be served concurrently, plus concurrent three‐year terms of supervised release, a $300 special assessment, and restitution of $8,515,570. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the court erroneously applied the obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement. At resentencing, the court removed that enhancement and imposed a sentence of 100 months’ imprisonment. It did not change the remaining elements of the sentence. Jackson appealed the terms of her supervised release. The parties agreed that certain conditions were impermissibly vague in light of recent Seventh Circuit decisions. At her third sentencing, Jackson received a sentence of 76 months’ imprisonment, with the same special assessment and restitution, and terms of supervised release that complied with precedent. The district court orally announced the conditions of supervised release and explained why each condition was imposed but did not orally announce any condition requiring that Jackson notify a probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer. The district court’s written judgment included that discretionary condition. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence with a corrective instruction. When “an inconsistency exists between an oral and the later written sentence, the sentence pronounced from the bench controls.” View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

An FBI investigation into Indianapolis drug‐trafficking included judicial authorization to intercept calls from 10 cell phones. During its authorized surveillance, the government intercepted calls between the apparent head of the drug‐trafficking conspiracy and his brother, Zamudio. The government obtained a search warrant to search 34 locations, including Zamudio’s residence. Agent Bates prepared the application and 84‐page affidavit, including three specific instances of Zamudio’s participation in the drug‐trafficking conspiracy. The affidavit identified Zamudio’s address, that he paid utilities at this address, and that his vehicle was routinely parked there overnight, but did not include information that drug‐trafficking activity actually took place at Zamudio’s residence. Bates stated that based on his experience and training, drug traffickers generally store their drug‐related paraphernalia and maintain records relating to drug-trafficking in the residences or the curtilage of their residences, and typically possess dangerous weapons at their residence to protect their profits, supply of drugs, and themselves. The search yielded approximately 11 kilograms of methamphetamine, a loaded gun, and a cell phone used to make intercepted calls. Zamudio was charged with participating in a drug‐trafficking conspiracy. The district court granted Zamudio’s motion to suppress the seized items. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The issuing judge reasonably drew the inference that indicia of drug‐trafficking would be found at Zamudio’s home; the evidence was enough to create a fair probability that Zamudio’s home contained evidence of a crime. View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Hudson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Seventh Circuit corrected two conditions of supervised release, holding that resentencing was not required. Hudson's presentence investigation report included several potential conditions of supervised release, with radio buttons recommending conditions: “you shall refrain from any or excessive use of alcohol (defined as having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%).” Hudson’s attorney did not object. The corresponding condition in the subsequent written judgment differed from the PSR, failing to check the definitional box. A condition prohibiting “excessive” alcohol use, without definition, is impermissibly vague. The Seventh Circuit described the situation as “an obvious scrivener’s error” because nothing indicated the judge intended to deviate from that definition. The district court also stated, “Once Mr. Hudson is released from custody, he will be directed to remain within the jurisdiction in which he is being supervised, unless he is granted permission to leave.” Hudson’s attorney requested the condition include Indiana, where Hudson’s wife lives. The court agreed, but the written judgment simply states, “you shall remain within the jurisdiction where you are being supervised unless granted permission to leave.” The Seventh Circuit stated that the better term to use in this condition is “judicial district,” rather than “jurisdiction” and that the failure to include the district in which Hudson’s wife resides was another obvious technical oversight. An oral sentence controls over a written one whenever the two conflict. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Bolin was charged with possession of sexually explicit material involving minors, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(b)(2). The court approved Bolin's financial affidavit and appointed him counsel. Bolin pleaded guilty. His plea agreement included a “Waiver of Right to Appeal,” with a paragraph stating: The defendant understands that the defendant has a statutory right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed and the manner in which the sentence was determined. Acknowledging this right, and in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Plea Agreement, the defendant expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal the conviction imposed in this case on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. 3742.… This blanket waiver of appeal specifically includes all provisions of the guilty plea and sentence imposed, including the length and conditions [of] supervised release and the amount of any fine. The court determined that Bolin was competent and capable of entering into an informed plea. The PSR explained that Bolin faced fines but recommended that the court not impose any fine but impose $100 for the mandatory special assessment and $5,000 for the additional special assessment. It did not elaborate as to its reasoning. The court sentenced Bolin to 120 months of imprisonment plus 15 years of supervised release with the mandatory and additional special assessments (18 U.S.C. 3013, 3014). Bolin argued that he is indigent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Bolin has waived this claim. View "United States v. Bolin" on Justia Law

Snapchat user “Snappyschrader” identified himself as a 31-year-old male and agreed to assist a 14-year-old female in purchasing undergarments. He was actually communicating with Altoona Detective Baumgarten. After agreeing to meet at a supermarket, officers identified “Snappyschrader,” actually, Brixen, arrested him, and seized his phone. To illustrate to Brixen that he had been communicating with an undercover detective, Baumgarten sent a message to Brixen’s phone from the undercover Snapchat account. Brixen witnessed the notification appear on his phone screen. Brixen moved to suppress this evidence arguing it constituted an unreasonable search of his cell phone. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, noting that Brixen conceded that evidence recovered under a subsequent search warrant remains admissible because even after excision of the tainted evidence from the supporting affidavit, it still establishes probable cause. Upon arrest, Brixen no longer had a right to keep his phone in his pocket; once the phone was seized the notification projected on the screen was plain to see. Disabling notifications that automatically appear on the phone would have preserved the message as private but Brixen simply had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conspicuous notification once his phone was seized. View "United States v. Brixen" on Justia Law

Two armed men robbed three Indianapolis area check cashing stores while wearing 1970s-themed disguises. An anonymous tip led law enforcement to Jett and McKissick, and a third man, Walker, who officers believed was involved in planning a fourth robbery. The government charged all three men with conspiracy in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). and attempted bank robbery, with respect to the planned fourth robbery. A jury convicted them on both counts. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding error with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence on the attempted-robbery count but otherwise affirmed. Law enforcement arrested McKissick and Walker before they had an opportunity to approach the Credit Union they planned to rob, and Jett never neared the Credit Union that day. With respect to the conspiracy convictions, the judge’s decision not to instruct the jury on an overt-act requirement was proper. The government presented sufficient evidence to convict Walker of conspiracy. He was caught with a coconspirator circling a cash-and-check store, in a stolen car, with a duffle bag and ski mask in the car. When law enforcement attempted to pull Walker over, he evidenced guilt by leading them on a high-speed and dangerous chase. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law

Young enlisted in the Army in 1977. During a 1978 training exercise, he suffered a back injury when his jeep crashed. Young later took part in a parachute training exercise. Years later, he claimed that he was traumatized when he witnessed a fellow soldier’s death in the jump. After his 1981 discharge, Young worked in various manufacturing positions. After denying having any medical or mental health conditions, Young enlisted in the Wisconsin Army National Guard. In 1990, Young first sought VA compensation for his back injuries; he later claimed Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder. He was eventually found to be unemployable, was assigned a combined 100% compensation rate, and obtained additional compensation, to adapt his house to accommodate his allegedly increasing disability. Young pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for defrauding the VA regarding the extent of his injuries. The district court sentenced Young to 21 months in prison, in the middle of the Sentencing Guideline range calculated based on the loss amount stipulated by the parties--$201,521.41. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Young waived any objection to the loss amount. This was not merely a forfeiture—an inadvertent failure to raise an issue—but an intentional waiver that was part of a broad compromise of potentially disputed sentencing issues. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law