Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Seldrick Carpenter, who was serving a six-year term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for distributing fentanyl. After the death of his mother, Carpenter began using drugs and acting out against his probation officer. When behavioral therapy failed to address these issues, his probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervised release. Carpenter was then suspected of setting a car on fire. The Probation Office alleged that Carpenter committed several supervised release violations, including arson, criminal damage to property, intimidation, and aggravated battery. Before the revocation hearing, Carpenter requested a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment and Article III, § 2, cl. 3. The district court denied the motion and presided over Carpenter’s revocation hearing without a jury. The court found Carpenter guilty of several violations and revoked his supervised release, imposing a revocation sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether a supervised release revocation proceeding held under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) constitutes the “trial of [a] crime” or a “criminal prosecution” within the meaning of either clause. The court agreed with the district court's decision that it does not. The court concluded that neither the Sixth Amendment nor Section 2 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution guarantee a jury trial in a revocation hearing like Carpenter’s. A defendant in Carpenter's situation is entitled only to those procedures dictated by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court also rejected Carpenter's argument that Article III, § 2 can apply to proceedings outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Marcos Mendez was stopped for inspection at O'Hare International Airport after returning from a trip abroad. Customs agents, who had been alerted to Mendez due to his arrest record and travel history, searched his cell phone and found child pornography. Mendez was subsequently indicted on multiple counts related to child pornography. He moved to suppress the evidence found on his phone, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights as it was conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.The district court denied Mendez's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment as customs agents had reasonable suspicion to look through Mendez's phone. Mendez pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography but preserved his right to appeal the district court's ruling on the suppression motion.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Mendez argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States required a warrant, probable cause, or at least reasonable suspicion for the searches of his phone. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that searches at borders do not require a warrant or probable cause. The court held that the routine, manual search of Mendez's phone required no individualized suspicion. The court affirmed the district court's decision, joining the uniform view of other circuits that searches of electronics at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause. View "United States v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Kevin Shibilski was charged with environmental and wire-fraud crimes and conspiracy to defraud the United States, related to his operation of three Wisconsin-based companies involved in recycling electronic equipment. Shibilski pleaded guilty to a single felony count of willful failure to pay employment taxes, and in exchange, the government dropped the other charges. During the sentencing hearing, Shibilski objected to the presentence report’s recommendations regarding relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly the recommendation to hold him responsible for the total amount of unpaid employment taxes for all three companies. The district judge held a seven-hour sentencing hearing, most of which was consumed by the presentation of documents and testimony, including testimony from Shibilski himself.The district judge found Shibilski responsible for the full amount of unpaid taxes. The judge also declined to award credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), finding that Shibilski had falsely denied responsibility for relevant conduct. After weighing the statutory sentencing factors, the judge imposed a sentence of 33 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.Shibilski appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the judge violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by unduly curtailing his attorney’s presentation of evidence, that the judge improperly denied credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), and that the judge committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully address the statutory sentencing factors. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Shibilski" on Justia Law

The case involves Taiwo Onamuti, who was charged with 23 crimes related to his involvement in a tax-fraud scheme. He pleaded guilty to one count each of identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and presenting false claims for tax refunds. After several changes in defense counsel and an unsuccessful motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Onamuti was sentenced to 204 months in prison. Later, Onamuti moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charge and for advising him to plead guilty. The judge vacated the aggravated identity theft conviction, reduced Onamuti’s prison sentence by 24 months, and denied all other relief.Onamuti filed a motion in his criminal case seeking attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment for the legal expenses he had incurred to fight the charges of aggravated identity theft. He argued that the government had pursued those charges vexatiously and in bad faith. The government objected on procedural grounds, arguing that the Hyde Amendment does not apply in a § 2255 proceeding. The judge denied the motion for fees, concluding that the motion was procedurally deficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Onamuti did not show that the government’s position was frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith. The court also held that the civil deadline applies to a motion for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment because it is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case. Therefore, Onamuti was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment. View "United States v. Onamuti" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gerald Sewell, who responded to a post on Craigslist, seeking a sexual encounter. The post was made by an undercover FBI agent posing as a 15-year-old girl. The conversation between Sewell and the agent quickly turned sexual, with plans to meet later the same day. Sewell drove from Missouri to Illinois to meet the supposed minor, only to be arrested upon arrival.Sewell was indicted for attempted enticement of a minor and for traveling across state lines with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. He pleaded not guilty and requested a jury instruction on entrapment. The district court denied this request, finding no evidence of persistent persuasion by the undercover agent or reluctance by Sewell. The court concluded that the government had used the sting operation to solicit the crime without inducing Sewell. Sewell was convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent ten-year sentences.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Sewell appealed the district court's denial of an entrapment instruction. The court, after reviewing the case, found no evidence of inducement, only solicitation of the crime, which is insufficient to put the entrapment defense before the jury. The court noted that it was Sewell who encouraged the supposed minor to meet for a sexual rendezvous, and he set aside any misgivings he may have had to drive across state lines to meet her. The court concluded that the government had furnished Sewell the ordinary opportunity to commit the charged crime, and he eagerly took it. The court affirmed the district court's decision, denying Sewell's requested entrapment instruction. View "USA v. Sewell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Echo Scheidt, who was convicted for knowingly providing false information on a Firearms Transaction Record (ATF Form 4473) during five separate gun purchases. Scheidt resold the firearms, two of which were later used in shootings, including a murder. The false statements pertained to her residential address, which she misrepresented in the forms. The authorities traced the firearms back to her after the shootings.The district court indicted Scheidt on five counts of knowingly making a false written statement likely to deceive a firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and one count of knowingly making a false statement to a government agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Scheidt moved to dismiss the five § 922(a)(6) counts, arguing that the statute criminalized conduct protected by the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, stating that the conduct prohibited by § 922(a)(6) does not enjoy Second Amendment protection. Scheidt pleaded guilty to all counts and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Scheidt appealed her conviction, arguing that § 922(a)(6) violates the Second Amendment. She contended that her right to purchase a firearm was conditioned on completing ATF Form 4473 and that § 922(a)(6) further conditioned her right to possess a firearm by demanding honesty. However, the court disagreed, stating that ordinary information-providing requirements, like those imposed by ATF Form 4473 and enforced through criminal statutes like § 922(a)(6), do not infringe the right to keep and bear arms. The court affirmed her conviction, concluding that the Second Amendment does not immunize purchasers from knowingly providing misstatements in ATF Form 4473. View "USA v. Scheidt" on Justia Law

Jan Kowalski, an attorney, was accused of using her position to hide her brother's assets during his bankruptcy proceedings. She allegedly concealed around $357,000 in her attorney trust account and made false statements under oath to cover up the concealment. Kowalski was charged with four counts of bankruptcy fraud and one count of concealing assets from the bankruptcy trustee. She pleaded guilty to the charge of concealing assets.Prior to her trial, Kowalski had been involved in her brother's bankruptcy proceedings, where she used her attorney trust account to hide her brother's assets from his creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. She also made false statements under oath and fabricated documents to cover up her actions. The bankruptcy trustee confronted Kowalski with inconsistencies between her personal bank records and her earlier testimony, but she continued to lie under oath.Kowalski was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) sophisticated-means enhancement, and the § 3B1.3 abuse of position of trust enhancement. Kowalski appealed her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Kowalski had indeed used sophisticated means to commit the offense and had abused her position of trust. The court also found her sentence to be substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The case involves Patrick Hancock, who pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. His federal sentence was enhanced on the grounds that he also violated Indiana Code § 35-44.1-2-6, which makes it a felony for a civilian to impersonate a law enforcement officer. Hancock appealed his sentence, challenging the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement. The evidence supported the district court’s findings that Hancock represented himself as a police officer by wearing various law enforcement paraphernalia.The district court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that Hancock's attire was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied. The court sentenced Hancock to 48 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. The district court varied upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range because it found that Hancock’s crime involved “extreme conduct” and that greater punishment was needed to deter future criminal conduct.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court rejected Hancock’s argument that he did not intend to deceive anyone at Costco into thinking he was a law enforcement officer. The court also rejected Hancock’s argument that Indiana’s false impersonation statute violates the First Amendment. The court held that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling public interest in preserving public safety and protecting the reputation of law enforcement. View "USA v. Hancock" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop in Urbana, Illinois, where a police officer pulled over a car driven by Prentiss Jackson due to unlit head and taillights. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled unburnt marijuana. Jackson was asked to exit the car and was informed that he and the vehicle would be searched. However, Jackson fled the scene, and during his escape, a gun fell from his waistband. Jackson, a felon, was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence of the gun, arguing that it was the product of an unlawful search.The district court denied Jackson's motion to suppress the evidence. Jackson had conditionally pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was convicted and sentenced to 72 months' imprisonment. In another case, his supervised release was revoked for unlawfully possessing a firearm, among other things.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Jackson argued that the officer did not have probable cause to search him or the car, contending that the smell of unburnt marijuana does not provide probable cause under Illinois law. The court disagreed, affirming the district court's decision. It held that the officer had probable cause to search Jackson and the vehicle, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the smell of unburnt marijuana. The court also noted that while possession of marijuana is legal in Illinois under certain circumstances, the state retains laws restricting the packaging and use of marijuana. The smell of unburnt marijuana, therefore, provided probable cause for a violation of state law. View "USA v. Jackson" on Justia Law

David Lewicki was part of a group that attempted to rob Humberto Pelayo, resulting in Pelayo suffering permanent injuries. Lewicki claimed he did not inflict the injuries and had tried to protect Pelayo. However, the jury found him guilty of attempted robbery causing serious bodily injury, and he was sentenced to 65 years in prison as a habitual offender. Lewicki's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state courts.Lewicki then sought federal relief, arguing that his appellate lawyer had been ineffective for not arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court agreed, issuing a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The court found that Lewicki's lawyer's failure to raise the speedy trial argument amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court did not find that Indiana had violated the Speedy Trial Clause. Instead, it ordered Indiana to release Lewicki unless it provided him with a new appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court had erred in granting relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel without finding that Lewicki had been prejudiced by his lawyer's failure to raise the speedy trial argument. The court explained that ineffective assistance of counsel requires both deficient performance and prejudice. The court also found that Lewicki did not have a strong speedy-trial claim. Despite a nearly three-year delay between his charge and trial, the court found that Lewicki had not shown prejudice from the delay. The court noted that Lewicki's own lawyer had proposed multiple continuances, and Lewicki had not shown that evidence was lost or memories faded due to the delay. The court also noted that little of Lewicki's time in custody could be attributed to the delayed trial of the attempted-robbery charge. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and upheld Lewicki's conviction and sentence. View "Lewicki v. Emerson" on Justia Law