Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves fourteen members of the Bomb Squad, a street gang, who were charged with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), among other crimes. One member pleaded guilty, while the remaining defendants were convicted by a jury. The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the district judge violated Batson v. Kentucky when selecting the jury. The court of appeals retained jurisdiction of the appeal and ordered a limited remand to allow the district court to make supplemental findings on this issue. The court of appeals found no reversible error in the remaining arguments raised by the defendants and affirmed their convictions.The Bomb Squad was a street gang that used violence to protect its reputation, territory, and drug sales. The gang members were charged with numerous crimes, including murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking, and multiple robberies. The defendants argued that the district judge violated Batson v. Kentucky when selecting the jury, which prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror because of their race.The court of appeals ordered a limited remand to allow the district court to make supplemental findings on the Batson issue. The court of appeals found no reversible error in the remaining arguments raised by the defendants and affirmed their convictions. The court of appeals also noted that if the district court orders a new trial, much of its opinion would become moot. However, it addressed the remaining issues raised by the defendants in the interest of judicial economy. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Robert Townsend was convicted for attempted enticement of a minor, under 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), and was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. Townsend argued that the district judge erred by allowing the seriousness of his crime to influence the length of his supervised release.The district court had considered the seriousness of Townsend's crime in determining the length of his supervised release. Townsend argued that this was an error, citing United States v. Wilcher, a Seventh Circuit case that held the duration of supervised release cannot rest solely on the seriousness of the crime. Townsend sought to extend this ruling to argue that the seriousness of an offense should not be considered at all in determining the length of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Townsend's interpretation of the Wilcher ruling. The court noted that while the seriousness of the crime cannot be the sole factor in determining the length of supervised release, it can be one of several factors considered. The court pointed out that the nature of the offense, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public all correlate with the seriousness of the offense. The district judge had considered these factors, emphasizing the danger Townsend posed to the public and the nature and circumstances of his offense.The court held that the district judge had not erred in considering the seriousness of Townsend's crime as one of several factors in determining the length of his supervised release. The court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Townsend's sentence of 10 years in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. View "United States v. Townsend" on Justia Law

The case involves Millard Williams, who was convicted for orchestrating the shipment of a package containing furanyl fentanyl, a Schedule I controlled substance, while in a Georgia jail. Williams was found guilty of conspiring to possess and possessing at least 100 grams of furanyl fentanyl. The jury also determined that furanyl fentanyl is an “analogue of fentanyl,” triggering a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). Williams appealed, arguing that furanyl fentanyl is not an “analogue of fentanyl” as defined in the statute, and that the district court’s definition of “analogue” renders the provision unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Williams. The court held that the term “controlled substance analogue” is distinct from the term “analogue of fentanyl,” and therefore, the court must look to the ordinary meaning of the word “analogue.” The court found nothing problematically vague about the definition that emerges as applied to furanyl fentanyl. The court also rejected Williams’s other challenges to his conviction and sentence, including his argument that the district court should have suppressed the evidence found inside the intercepted package. The court concluded that the district court made no errors requiring resentencing. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Jerome Ford was sentenced to 96 months in prison for possessing a firearm despite his felony conviction, followed by three years of supervised release. The judgment included a condition that Ford must pay a fine of $250 immediately, even though this condition was not mentioned during sentencing or in the presentence report.Ford appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the payment condition was unauthorized because it was not mentioned during sentencing or in the presentence report. He requested that the payment condition be removed from the judgment. The court noted that when there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment in a criminal case, the oral pronouncement usually prevails. However, there is an exception for conditions of supervision required by law, which do not need to be announced orally.The court found that the payment condition was not required by law, but was included in a list of mandatory conditions in the Sentencing Guidelines. Ford argued that these guidelines ceased being mandatory after a previous case, United States v. Booker, declared them to be advisory. The court noted that this argument was not necessarily true, as the conditions of supervised release were not affected by the Booker decision.However, the court accepted the prosecutor's implied concession that the payment condition may not be mandatory. As a result, the court decided that the payment condition must be vacated. The court noted that this decision may not benefit Ford, as a statute provides that people who do not pay their fines may be returned to prison. The court also noted that the district judge could add the payment condition to the judgment at any time. The court modified the district court's judgment to delete the payment condition. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

Anthony Day and Omarr Williams were charged with robbing a bank in Hammond, Indiana. Day was identified as the man who brandished a silver revolver during the robbery. After the robbery, the police tracked Day down using a GPS tracker embedded in the stolen cash. They found him in a wooded area, along with cash, an OGIO bag, parts of the robbers' disguises, and two firearms: a silver Smith & Wesson revolver and an American Tactical assault rifle. The police arrested Day and Williams, and a grand jury charged Day with bank robbery, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.In the district court, Day moved to exclude reference to the American Tactical assault rifle, arguing that there was no evidence he used it during the robbery. He also requested a unanimity instruction, meaning the jurors would have to agree on which gun he possessed for the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court denied both requests, citing a previous decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The jury found Day guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Day appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, challenging the district court's failure to give his requested jury instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Day's argument de novo. The court noted that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury, which requires jury unanimity for convictions for serious crimes. However, this requirement only applies to the elements of the offense, not the means used to commit an element of the crime. The court explained that the particular firearm possessed is not an element of the crime, but rather the means used to satisfy the element of "any firearm." Therefore, jurors do not need to agree on which weapon the defendant possessed. The court also noted that where a defendant possessed multiple firearms, the government may only bring one charge if the defendant's possession of the firearms was "simultaneous and undifferentiated." The court found that the evidence supported a single course of possession of the firearms, not two distinct instances of possession. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that no unanimity instruction was required. View "USA v. Day" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Zebulon Marzette, who was convicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. The incident occurred on September 20, 2019, when a 911 call reported people pounding on a door and waving guns at an apartment complex in South Bend, Indiana. Responding officers encountered a chaotic scene and eventually pulled over a car leaving the area. Marzette, who had walked to the location of the car stop, was handcuffed and placed in a squad car. A gun was found in a purse in the back seat of the stopped car, and subsequent DNA testing revealed Marzette's DNA on the trigger. Marzette was charged with felony possession of a firearm.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Marzette objected to the introduction of the DNA evidence, arguing that each custodian in the gun’s chain of custody needed to testify to prove that the gun and the DNA evidence were authentic and reliable. The district court disagreed and overruled Marzette’s objection, admitting the DNA-related testimony and testing results into evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict and Marzette was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Marzette challenged the district court’s admission of the DNA evidence and the hearsay testimony about the 911 call. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the DNA evidence, as the government had provided a substantially complete chain of custody. Regarding the 911 call, the court concluded that even if it was an error to admit the dispatch call, the government could have presented effectively the same case with its exclusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Marzette" on Justia Law

The case involves Bernell Brasher, who was convicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The case began when a confidential source informed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that Bacaree Oaks had a pound of meth for sale. The source suggested he would sell the meth on credit and pay Oaks and Brasher $5,000 afterward. Instead, the source turned the meth over to law enforcement. The meth was tested and found to be 99% pure methamphetamine. Brasher and Oaks were later arrested. During his arrest, Brasher admitted to owing money to his supplier in Mexico for about 100 pounds of meth he had on the street.Brasher was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and pleaded guilty. The presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded that Brasher's relevant conduct included four instances of past drug distribution activity. Brasher objected to the PSR's findings, but his objections are not part of this appeal. The district court sentenced Brasher to 200 months’ imprisonment, which fell within his Guidelines range.On appeal, Brasher argued that his past conduct was too dissimilar from his offense of conviction—and too long before it—to factor into his Guidelines calculation. The court disagreed, finding sufficient similarity between the offense of conviction and the uncharged conduct to satisfy the plain error standard. The court also rejected Brasher's argument that the district court failed to explain why the past conduct was relevant. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Brasher" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Huazhi Han, who was convicted on charges of money laundering and related offenses. Han used his electronic goods business to launder drug proceeds for Mexican drug traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Chicago Police Department (CPD) began investigating a money laundering organization in Chicago, in which Han played a key role. Han received cash proceeds from a drug trafficker, Rafiq Roman, on multiple occasions. After Roman's arrest, he cooperated with the authorities, leading to Han's arrest. The officers found a loaded firearm, approximately $200,000 in cash, and lookalike currency in Han's car. They also searched Han's home, where they found nearly $1.3 million in cash, a money counter, rubber bands, and firearms.Han was indicted on four charges, including conspiracy to commit money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Before trial, Han moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the officers searched his home without a warrant or consent. The district court denied the motion, finding that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Han was convicted on all counts.On appeal, Han argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, admitting threat evidence, and denying his motion for a mistrial based on the government’s closing argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no error and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search of their home, the threat evidence was admissible as it was directly related to Han's crimes, and the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not result in an unfair trial. View "United States v. Huazhi Han" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop in Wisconsin where police officers used a K-9 unit to sniff a car they suspected was involved in drug trafficking. The dog signaled the presence of drugs, leading to a search of the car and the discovery of almost eleven pounds of methamphetamine. The defendant, Juventino Plancarte, who was in the car during the stop, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.The lower courts had indicted Plancarte on two counts related to methamphetamine distribution. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the dog's sniff, arguing that the dog could identify both illegal marijuana products and legal products that come from cannabis plants. Therefore, he contended that the sniff violated the Fourth Amendment as it was a warrantless search unsupported by probable cause. However, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations denying Plancarte's suppression motion, leading to his guilty plea to both drug charges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dog sniff did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search as it did not disrupt any reasonable expectation of privacy. The court noted that the dog sniff occurred outside the home, in a public area, and during a lawful traffic stop, which generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. The court also pointed out that the dog's sniff was not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately denied Plancarte's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Plancarte" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jack Clayborne, who was convicted for crimes related to an attempted carjacking. Clayborne, along with two other men, attempted to carjack Michael Guster. During the incident, Clayborne fired five shots, one of which hit Guster. Clayborne was charged with attempted motor vehicle robbery, discharge of a firearm during an attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 234 months' imprisonment.Clayborne appealed his sentence, and the case was remanded for resentencing after the government agreed to dismiss his conviction for discharging a firearm during an attempted robbery. Before resentencing, Clayborne submitted a letter expressing regret for his actions. However, the district court found the letter insufficient to warrant a reduction in sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Clayborne was resentenced to 223 months in prison and appealed again.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Clayborne challenged two aspects of his sentence: the district court's decision not to award him an acceptance of responsibility reduction and the district court's comment that his criminal history included "a lot of" robberies when he had no prior robbery convictions. The court found no procedural error in the district court's decision not to award an acceptance of responsibility reduction. It also found no evidence that the district court relied on incorrect information about Clayborne's criminal history when determining his sentence. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Clayborne" on Justia Law