Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Micrins Surgical went out of business in 2009, without paying all of its taxes. Eriem Surgical was incorporated the same day, purchased Micrins’ inventory, took over its office space, hired its employees, used its website and phone number, and pursued the same line of business, selling surgical instruments. Teitz, the president and 40% owner of Micrins, continued to play a leading role in Eriem, though its sole stockholder is Teitz’s wife. Eriem uses “Micrins” as a trademark. The IRS treated Eriem as a continuation of Micrins and collected almost $400,000 of Micrins’ taxes from Eriem’s bank accounts and receivables. Eriem filed wrongful levy suit, 26 U.S.C. 7426(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the IRS, concluding that Eriem is a continuation of Micrins. The Supreme Court has never decided whether state or federal law governs corporate successorship when the dispute concerns debts to the national government; the Internal Revenue Code says nothing about corporate successorship. Illinois law uses a multi‐factor balancing standard to determine successorship. Rejecting an argument that the change in ownership should be dispositive, the court upheld the district court’s conclusion that Mrs. Teitz serves is proxy for her husband, so that there has not been a complete change of ownership. View "Eriem Surgical, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

HMC was a shipping and shipyard services company, whose president was Hannah. HMC had a collective bargaining agreement with the mechanics union that required it to make contributions to the union’s pension fund to finance pensions for HMC’s employees. Hannah’s son, Mark, formed FCG, which bought the assets of HMC. No significant liabilities of HMC were explicitly transferred to FCG, which tried to negotiate its own collective bargaining agreement with the union. When HMC employees voted to decertify the union in 2009. the pension fund assessed withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381. HMC had become insolvent, so the fund sought to impose HMC’s liability to the fund on FCG as HMC’s successor. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of FCG. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that lack of evidence that Mark knew about the pension fund and the possibility of withdrawal liability cannot excuse that liability. The court stated that fraudulent intent, while a factor in deciding whether there is alter ego liability, is not necessarily an essential factor, so summary judgment on a theory of successor liability was premature. View "Bd. of Trs. of the Auto. Mechs' Local v. Full Circle Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1998 IGF bought Continental’s crop-insurance business at a price to be determined at either side’s option by the exercise of a put or call. In 2001 Continental exercised its put option; under the contractual formula, IGF owed Continental $25.4 million. Around that same time, IGF sold its business to Acceptance for $40 million. The Symons, who controlled IGF, structured the purchase price: $16.5 million to IGF; $9 million to IGF's parent companies Symons International and Goran in exchange for noncompetition agreements; and $15 million to Granite, an affiliated Symons-controlled company, for a reinsurance treaty. Continental, still unpaid, sued for breach of contract and fraudulent transfer. The court found for Continental and pierced the corporate veil to impose liability on the controlling companies and individuals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Symons International liable for breach of the 1998 sale agreement; Symons International, Goran, Granite, and the Symons liable as transferees under the Indiana Uniform False Transfer Act; and the Symons liable under an alter-ego theory. The Symons businesses observed corporate formalities only in their most basic sense. The noncompetes only made sense as a fraudulent diversion of the purchase money, not as legitimate protection from competition. The reinsurance treaty. which was suggested bySymons and outside industry norms, was unjustified and overpriced. View "Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons" on Justia Law

Two shareholders brought a shareholder derivative suit against the directors of an Indiana company, Biglari Holdings, that owns two restaurant chains, Western Sizzlin’ and Steak ‘n Shake, which operate some restaurants, and franchise others. They claimed that the board approved “entrenchment transactions,” intended to cement CEO Biglari’s control of the company and enrich him at the expense of other shareholders: the sale of an investment company to CEO Biglari and a stock offering. The plaintiffs characterized the board’s members as Biglari’s puppets and alleged demand futility: that it was a forgone conclusion that the board would not respond to their demands. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the claim. Given the stringency of the Indiana standard of demand futility and the lack of strong support for the plaintiffs’ claims to demonstrate that futility, the challenged transactions, individually or together, cannot be deemed so oppressive to shareholders as to create a substantial doubt that the transactions were the product of a valid exercise of business judgment by an unbiased and independent board. View "Taylor v. Biglari" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a stockholder in DeVry, which operates for-profit colleges and universities, filed a shareholders’ derivative suit against DeVry’s board of directors. A 2005 incentive plan authorized awards of stock options to key employees, including the CEO. The plan limited awards to 150,000 shares per employee per year. Nonetheless, the company granted Hamburger, who became its CEO in 2006, options on 184,100 shares in 2010, 170,200 in 2011, and 255,425 in 2012. DeVry, discovering its mistake, reduced each grant under the 2005 plan to 150,000 shares, but allocated Hamburger 87,910 shares available under the company’s 2003 incentive plan, which held shares that had not been allocated. Only the company’s Plan Committee, not the Compensation Committee, was authorized to grant stock options under the 2003 plan; there was no Plan Committee in 2012. The grant of 87,910 stock options was approved by the Compensation Committee, and then by the independent directors as a whole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The directors who approved the Compensation Committee’s recommendation were disinterested: the recommendation was a valid exercise of business judgment. Administration of the 2003 plan by the Compensation Committee, given the nonexistence of the Plan Committee, was not “a clear or intentional violation of a compensation plan,” View "Donnawell v. Hamburger" on Justia Law

From 2004-2007, CUNA purchased residential mortgage-backed securities from RBS. The housing market crashed and the securities declined in value. CUNA commissioned a forensic study of the loan pools underlying the securities and found that 40.8 percent of the loans were materially defective: “they violated applicable underwriting guidelines in a manner that materially increased the credit risk of the loan and that was not justified by sufficient compensating factors.” CUNA alleged that RBS induced it to purchase the securities by materially misrepresenting that the underlying loans complied with underwriting guidelines by repeatedly assuring CUNA that extensive due diligence was conducted on the loan pools and that the relevant prospectuses represented that the loans complied with guidelines related to borrower ability to pay and sufficiency of collateral. The court granted summary judgment in RBS’s favor on all but one of CUNA’s rescission claims, finding claims with regard to nine of the securities time-barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, finding that rescission claims were not time-barred. A reasonable factfinder could find that CUNA actually relied on the prospectuses' representations and that the representations were material. CUNA was entitled to a trial on the claims and with respect to the claims of due diligence. View "CMFG Life Ins. Co. v. RBS Sec., Inc." on Justia Law

Northbound generates and sells life insurance leads, using the brand name “Leadbot,” but ran out of cash with a frozen line of credit and revenue that did not support its overhead. Norvax generates and sells health insurance leads. An asset purchase agreement was signed in 2009, “by and between” Northbound and Leadbot LLC, a subsidiary of Norvax that was formed to purchase the assets of Northbound. Under the agreement, Leadbot LLC was obligated to use the assets it acquired from Northbound in furtherance of the Leadbot brand. The purchase price was not paid in cash. Instead Northbound would receive an “earn-out” calculated as a percentage of the monthly net revenue of Leadbot LLC. The agreement also contained an Illinois choice-of-law clause. Northbound claims that Leadbot LLC and Norvax violated the agreement. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for defendants on the remainder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Norvax was not actually a party to the contract that was allegedly breached, nor is there any basis for holding Norvax liable for any breach by a subsidiary. View "Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc." on Justia Law

ManWeb, an Indianapolis engineering and installation company, entered into an asset purchase agreement with Tiernan, another Indianapolis electrical contractor. Unlike ManWeb, Tiernan was party to a collective bargaining agreement with a union, under which it contributed to a multiemployer pension fund. After the asset purchase, Tiernan ceased operations. Although ManWeb continued to do the same type of work in the jurisdiction, ManWeb did not make contributions. Counsel for the Plan sent a letter to Tiernan’s former address, stating that the company had effectuated a complete withdrawal from the Plan and, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, the Plan had assessed withdrawal liability against Tiernan of $661,978.00. The letter was forwarded to ManWeb’s address and signed for by a ManWeb employee. No payments were made, nor was review or arbitration requested, despite the availability of both under the statute. The Plan filed a collection action, adding ManWeb as a defendant under a theory of successor liability. The district court granted the Plan partial summary judgment, finding that Tiernanr had waived its right to dispute the assessment of withdrawal liability, but rejected the claim of successor liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed to allow the district court to address the successor liability continuity requirement. View "Tsareff v. Manweb Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Because a 1999 issue of cumulative preferred stock was impairing the company’s ability to raise capital, Emmis signed holders of 60% of the preferred shares to swaps. Emmis purchased shares; the owners delivered their shares to an escrow. Closing was deferred for five years, during which the sellers agreed to vote their shares as Emmis instructed. Emmis did this because, once it purchased any share outright, it would be retired and lose voting rights, Ind. Code 23-1-25-3(a). Emmis repurchased addition preferred stock in a tender offer and reissued it to a trust for bonuses to workers who stuck with the firm through the financial downturn. The trustee was to vote this stock at management’s direction. Senior managers and members of the board were excluded, leaving them free to propose and vote without a conflict of interest. The plans allowed Emmis to control more than 2/3 of the votes. Emmis then called on owners of common and preferred stock to vote on whether the terms of the preferred stock should be changed. The cumulative feature of the stock’s dividends and other rights were eliminated. Plaintiffs, who own remaining preferred stock, sued. The district court rejected claims under federal and Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana, apparently alone among the states, allows a corporation to vote its own shares, which may be good, or may be bad, but the ability to negotiate better terms, or invest elsewhere, rather than judicially imposed “best practices,” is how corporate law protects investors View "Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Carhart and Halaska own CHI. CHI terminated its sales agent, MRO, which filed a federal suit for breach of contract. Carhart bought MRO’s claim for $150,000 and became the plaintiff in a suit against a company of which he was a half owner. Halaska then sued Carhart in Wisconsin state court for breach of fiduciary duties to CHI and Halaska by becoming the plaintiff and by writing checks on CHI bank accounts without approval, depositing payments owed CHI into Carhart’s own account, and withholding accounting and other financial information from Halaska. A receiver was appointed, informed the federal court that CHI had no assets out of which to pay a lawyer, and consented to entry of a $242,000 default judgment (the amount sought by Carhart), giving Carhart a potential profit of $92,000 on his purchase of MRO’s claim. In Carhart’s suit to execute that judgment, CHI’s only asset was its Wisconsin suit against Carhart. The court ordered the sale of CHI’s lawsuit at public auction; Carhart, the only bidder, bought it for $10,000, ending all possibility that CHI could proceed against him for his alleged plundering of the company. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Auctioning off the lawsuit placed Carhart ahead of CHI’s other creditors. Carhart was not a purchaser in good faith. No valid interest is impaired by rescinding the sale, enabling CHI to prosecute its suit against Carhart. View "Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law