Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Unifund purchased Choice's defaulted consumer debt and hired the Kohn Law Firm, which sued Choice in state court on behalf of Unifund, seeking judgment in the amount of the debt plus “statutory attorney fees.” An attached affidavit by Unifund’s agent indicated that the company was not seeking additional amounts after the charge-off date, including attorney’s fees. Choice believed that because the affidavit contradicted the complaint's request for judgment, one of the statements was false; he claimed that no applicable statute permitted the recovery of such attorney’s fees.Choice sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, alleging injury from the receipt of false, misleading, and deceptive communications. Choice alleged “he hired an attorney to help him ascertain the amount of the alleged debt owed, whether attorney fees could be imposed, and in what amount” and paid an appearance fee to a lawyer in the state court action. Despite his allegation that, but for the statements, he would have paid or settled the debt, during discovery Choice denied owing any debt. He later said he lost sleep due to concern over the extent of his liability.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Choice did not establish Article III standing; neither confusion, lost sleep, nor hiring a lawyer are concrete harms. Choice admitted in discovery that he did not suffer any actual damages. View "Choice v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C." on Justia Law

FSSolutions faxed Dr. Thalman several times to ask him to join its network of preferred medical providers and administer various employment screening and testing services to its clients. Thalman declined the invitation and instead invoked the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), to sue FSSolutions for sending him unsolicited advertisements. The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that the faxes were not “unsolicited advertisements” within the meaning of the TCPA because they merely asked to purchase Thalman’s own services rather than inviting him to buy something from FSSolutions.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While a fax must directly or indirectly encourage recipients to buy goods, services, or property to qualify as an unsolicited advertisement, Thalman plausibly alleged that FSSolutions’s faxes did just that by promoting the company’s network of preferred medical providers, a network that would bring Thalman new business in exchange for a portion of the underlying client fees. “[M]indful that many plaintiffs’ attorneys view the TCPA opportunistically, the court cautioned against overreading its opinion, which applies to unsolicited faxes that an objective recipient would construe as urging the purchase of a good, service, or property by emphasizing its availability or desirability. View "Smith v. First Hospital Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

Camarena defaulted on a debt, then married Ross. Ross and Camarena share a phone plan. FAMS, a debt collector, mailed Camarena a letter. Camarena never followed the letter’s instructions but learned FAMS’s employee email address format and sent emails disputing his debt to FAMS’s CEO and Vice President. The CEO had no recollection of seeing Camarena’s email and could not locate it, while the VP found it in his deleted folder but could not recall ever seeing it. Had Camarena properly submitted his dispute, FAMS could have followed its policy of stopping collection activity until the account was validated. FAMS called Ross concerning Camarena’s debt. Ross initially informed FAMS that it had called her personal cell phone, not an appropriate number for Camarena. The FAMS collector failed to follow procedures to prevent her from receiving future calls, despite his training. FAMS continued to call Ross.Ross sued FAMS, alleging that the calls violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 by continuing debt collection activities after Camarena disputed the debt without first providing verification of the debt; calling Ross after Camarena disputed the debt; calling Ross after she notified FAMS that Camarena does not use her phone; and disconnecting calls with Ross. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of FAMS based on the “bona fide error” defense. FAMS had policies and procedures that should have prevented the calls from going out to Ross. View "Ross v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Google and the University of Chicago Medical Center collaborated to develop software capable of anticipating patients’ future healthcare needs. The University delivered several years of anonymized patient medical records to Google, to “train” the software’s algorithms. An agreement restricted Google’s use of the records to specific research-related activities and prohibited Google from attempting to identify any patient whose records were disclosed. Dinerstein sued on behalf of himself and a class of other patients whose anonymized records were disclosed, claiming that the University had breached either an express or an implied contract traceable to a privacy notice he received and an authorization he signed upon each admission to the Medical Center. Alternatively, he asserted unjust enrichment. Citing the same notice and authorization, he alleged that the University had breached its promise of patient confidentiality, violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Against Google, he claimed unjust enrichment and tortious interference with his contract with the University. He brought a privacy claim based on intrusion upon seclusion.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (and later prove) that he has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and traceable to the defendant’s conduct. The injuries Dinerstein alleges lack plausibility, concreteness, or imminence (or some combination of the three). View "Dinerstein v. Google, LLC" on Justia Law

Frazier obtained a home mortgage loan for which Dovenmuehle served as sub-servicer. Beginning in October 2015, Frazier failed to make her monthly payments. Frazier successfully negotiated and settled her debt through a short sale of her home, which closed in January 2016. Frazier was later denied a new mortgage loan because her Equifax credit report reflected late payments on her previous mortgage in months following the short sale. She disputed the information to several credit reporting agencies. To confirm the accuracy of its records, Equifax sent Dovenmuehle four Automated Consumer Dispute Verification forms in 2019-2020. Frazier contends the amended codes Dovenmuehle gave Equifax for Pay Rate and Account History were inaccurate, pointing to how Equifax interpreted and reported the amended data in her credit reports.Frazier sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, claiming that Dovenmuehle failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of disputed data and provided false and misleading information to credit reporting agencies. She relied on evidence about persisting inaccuracies in Equifax’s credit reports produced using the amended data. The district court granted Dovenmuehle summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the full record, no reasonable jury could find that Dovenmuehle provided patently incorrect or materially misleading information. View "Frazier v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the legal representatives and family members of two individuals killed using guns that had been listed on armslist.com, an online firearms marketplace. Plaintiffs each sued Armslist LLC and its member manager, Jonathan Gibbon, in separate diversity actions, alleging negligence and other Wisconsin state law claims. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants designed the website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state law regulating firearms. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because publishing third-party offers to sell firearms does not establish tort or other liability under Wisconsin law. The district court dismissed the negligence claim in both cases, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the website’s design caused the deaths. The remaining claims were also dismissed, and Gibbon was dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision in Webber that personal jurisdiction exists over Gibbon. Further, the court wrote that because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it affirmed the dismissal in each case. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not alleged an act or omission occurring within the state or solicitation or service activities outside of the state by Gibbon that would bring him within the grasp of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute. Moreover, the court wrote that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the deaths would not have occurred but for Armslist LLC’s failure to permit users to flag illegal conduct. View "Richard Webber v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law

Mack used a US Bank credit card to make household purchases. After she allegedly defaulted, LVNV purchased and Resurgent serviced the debt. Frontline was engaged to collect on the debt. In a letter, Frontline informed Mack that her account had been placed for collection and that she owed $7,179.87. Mack was uncertain about the amount and her obligations to LVNV, an entity she did not know. Within 30 days, Mack went to her library to type and print a validation request, then went to the post office where she paid $10 to send the letter. Mack did not receive a validation but received a letter from Resurgent, identifying LVNV as the “Current Owner,” and listing the balance of $7,179.87. Mack was "confused and alarmed" about who owned the debt. She returned to the library to type another validation request and mail it. Trips to the library and post office took her away from the family members who needed her assistance. Mack never received validation of the debt.Mack filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that Mack failed to demonstrate that she had suffered an injury in fact sufficient to support her standing to bring suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Mack adequately alleged an injury in fact and supported her allegations with evidence that violations of the statute caused her to suffer monetary damages, albeit of modest size. View "Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P." on Justia Law

Pucillo, an Indiana resident who formerly used the last name Lock, had previously leased an apartment from Main Street. He filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 201, and listed as a debt past‐due rent he allegedly owed Main. The bankruptcy court granted him a discharge in September 2017, including any debt to Main. That bankruptcy discharge is listed on Pucillo’s credit reports but Main was not notified of Pucillo’s bankruptcy. In July 2017, 10 weeks before the discharge, Main had placed Pucillo’s account with National Credit for collection. Over the next 18 months, National sent Pucillo two collection letters, stating that if payment was made, National “will update credit data it may have previously submitted regarding this debt.”The week before Pucillo received the second letter, he filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e (demanding payment of a debt not owed) and section 1692c(c) (failure to cease communications and cease collections). He alleged that National’s continued communications “confused and alarmed” him. National did not actually give information to a credit reporting agency—before or after his bankruptcy discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Pucillo lacked Article III standing to sue. Pucillo’s allegations of ʺconfusion,” “stress,” “concern,” and “fear” are not sufficiently concrete to result in an injury in fact that would give him standing to sue. View "Pucillo v. National Credit Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Huston, a Good Housekeeping magazine subscriber, filed a putative class action alleging that media conglomerate, Hearst, offered to sell and sold mailing lists containing her, and 9.1 million other subscribers’, identifying information. Huston sought statutory damages under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA) and an injunction requiring Hearst to obtain prior written consent before selling its subscribers’ information.The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To establish an IRPA violation, the plaintiff must allege an appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity, without the plaintiff’s written consent, and for the defendant’s commercial purpose. IRPA prohibits the use or holding out of a person’s identifying information to offer to sell or sell a product, piece of merchandise, good, or service; it contemplates a use or holding out of an individual’s identity with the aim of effectuating a sale. Any use or holding out must either accompany an offer to sell or precede the sale, but it cannot follow the sale. Huston failed to allege that Hearst used or held out her identity to effectuate the sale of the mailing lists or her Good Housekeeping subscription. View "Huston v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Gripum manufactures and distributes flavored liquids for use in e-cigarette devices. Gripum submitted a “premarket tobacco product application” to the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2021. The agency denied the application, reasoning that Gripum had failed to demonstrate public-health benefits as required by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 387j. The 2016 “Deeming Rule,” promulgated under the Act requires denial of an application to market a new tobacco product if the manufacturer fails to show that the product would be “appropriate for the protection of public health,” considering the risks and benefits to the population as a whole, including users and non-users, the “increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of tobacco products will stop using such products and those who do not use tobacco products will start using such products.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial. The FDA required Gripum to show that its flavored e-cigarette products were relatively better at reducing rates of tobacco use than products already on the market. It properly applied the comparative standard mandated by the statute. Gripum failed to provide evidence specific to its products; its studies of other products did not even compare tobacco-flavored e-cigarette products to flavored products resembling Gripum’s products. View "Gripum, LLC v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law