Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Angela Flowers, who had a car loan with Kia Motors Finance. One morning, Flowers and her son were followed by a truck, which she suspected was an attempt by Kia to repossess her car due to late payments. Flowers sued Kia, alleging unlawful collection practices. However, she was unable to provide any evidence linking Kia to the truck that followed her and her son.Previously, the district court granted Kia summary judgment. Flowers had attempted to include an earlier repossession in her amended complaint, but the court found that she had unduly delayed this attempt. Furthermore, she could not provide any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Kia was involved in the incident with the truck.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Flowers argued that she did not need the district court's approval to file an amended complaint, as Kia had consented in writing to the amendment. However, the court found that Flowers had unduly delayed her attempt to amend the complaint and had not provided a sound excuse for this delay. Therefore, the court denied her motion to amend the complaint.The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Kia. Flowers had failed to present any evidence linking Kia to the unidentified truck and driver. Her theory of liability was based on speculation and conjecture, which are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that Kia was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Flowers v. Kia Motors Finance" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a potential class of consumers who purchased infant formula manufactured by Abbott Laboratories at a plant later found to be unsanitary lacked standing to sue for economic harm. This was due to their inability to demonstrate a concrete injury-in-fact, one of the three elements required for Article III standing. The plaintiffs argued that they suffered economic harm because they would not have paid the purchase price had they known the products were at a substantial risk of being contaminated. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' alleged injury was not particularized as they did not claim that the specific products they purchased were contaminated.The court compared the case to previous decisions, notably "In re Aqua Dots," where a universal defect in a product that rendered it valueless conferred standing, and "Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.," where the plaintiffs' risk of harm was considered mere speculation. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were more similar to the latter case, as there was only a potential risk of contamination, not a universal defect. As such, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed for lack of standing.This decision reaffirms that plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact to establish standing in federal court. Speculative or hypothetical injuries, or injuries that are not particularized because they do not affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way, do not meet the threshold for standing. View "Economic Loss Plaintiffs v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

This case concerns a lawsuit filed by Mark A. Patterson against attorney Howard Howe in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Patterson had been sued by Howe in Indiana state court over an unpaid educational debt. Along with the complaint and summons, Howe served Patterson with four requests for admission under Indiana law, but failed to warn Patterson about the consequences of not responding within thirty days. Patterson answered the complaint but did not respond to the requests for admission. Concurrently, Patterson filed a federal lawsuit alleging that Howe's practice of serving requests for admission without warning him of the consequences violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).The district court granted summary judgment to Patterson, awarding him statutory damages of $1,000 and more than $58,000 in attorney fees and costs. Howe appealed both the merits judgment and the award of fees and costs.The Court of Appeals vacated both judgments and ordered the dismissal of the case. The court held that Patterson lacked standing to bring his claim because he was not concretely harmed by Howe’s alleged statutory violation. Patterson's argument that he would have denied the requests for admission if he had been warned was insufficient to establish a concrete injury. Additionally, his claim that he lost negotiating leverage and was forced to settle for the full amount he allegedly owed was speculative and occurred after he filed his complaint, which meant it could not provide the basis for standing in this case. View "Patterson v. Howe" on Justia Law

Randall Ewing and Yasmany Gomez entered into a contract with 1645 W. Farragut LLC (Farragut) to purchase a house. The house was in need of substantial renovations, but Ewing and Gomez proceeded with the contract based on Farragut's assurance that the house would be renovated and ready by closing time. Unbeknownst to Ewing and Gomez, the house was under a stop work order, which hindered their ability to secure a mortgage. When they requested their earnest money back, Farragut refused. They subsequently sued Farragut for breach of contract, common law fraud, and fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found Farragut liable for fraud and breach of contract and awarded Ewing and Gomez $905,000 in damages. Farragut appealed the decision and Ewing and Gomez cross-appealed, seeking to add Farragut's principal, Erik Carrier, to the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions, finding that the record supported the damages awarded and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and the motions to amend. View "Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC" on Justia Law

Nabozny received a letter at her Wisconsin home, offering to settle an unpaid credit-card debt. The letter summarized basic information about her debt: the creditor, the outstanding balance, the account number, and her name and address. The letter was from Optio under its operating name of Qualia, but it was printed and mailed by RevSpring, a third-party printing and mail vendor. Nabozny did not give Optio consent to share the information about her debt with RevSpring.Nabozny filed a purported class action, alleging that Optio’s communication with RevSpring violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, which provides that “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer” without the consumer’s consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Nabozny’s suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Nabozny lacks standing to sue because she “suffered no concrete injury.” The court noted recent decisions in other circuits that sharing a debtor’s data with a third-party mail vendor to populate and send a form collection letter “causes no harm that our legal tradition recognizes as sufficient to support a suit in federal court under Article III of the Constitution.” View "Nabozny v. Optio Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

Brown’s credit-monitoring business used a “negative option feature” on its websites, offering visitors a free credit report but automatically enrolling them in a $29.94 monthly subscription when they applied for that report. Information about the monthly membership was buried . Brown’s contractors created website traffic by posting Craigslist advertisements for fake rental properties and directing applicants to the websites for a “free” credit score. The FTC sued under Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) section 13(b), which authorizes restraining orders and permanent injunctions to enjoin conduct that violates its prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices. On its face, section 13(b) authorizes only injunctive relief but the Commission long interpreted it to permit restitution awards—an interpretation adopted by the Seventh Circuit and others.The district court entered a permanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than $5 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit overruled its precedent and held that section 13(b) does not authorize restitution awards.The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary relief. On remand, the Commission argued that the Court’s decision had significantly changed the law and successfully requested the reimposition of the restitution award under the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act and FTCA section 19. The Seventh Circuit modified the new judgment. Its direction that any funds remaining after providing consumer redress shall be “deposited to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement” exceeds the remedial scope of section 19, which is limited to redressing consumer injuries. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Cothron works at an Illinois White Castle restaurant where she must scan her fingerprint to access the computer system. With each scan, her fingerprint is collected and transmitted to a third-party vendor for authentication. Cothron alleges that White Castle did not obtain her written consent before implementing the fingerprint-scanning system, violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, arguing that every unauthorized fingerprint scan amounted to a separate violation of the statute, so a new claim accrued with each scan. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit certified a question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which responded that claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, not only upon the first scan and first transmission.The Seventh Circuit then lifted a stay and affirmed the denial of White Castle’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court rejected White Castle’s request to expand the interlocutory appeal to include new questions concerning the scope of a possible damages award and Due Process and Excessive Fines Clause claims. The order before the court concerned only the timeliness of Cothron’s suit. View "Latrina Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

Chaitoff sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, alleging that Experian made a mistake when it omitted a fact from his credit report, then failed to correct its error. Chaitoff had signed an agreement with his mortgage lender that allowed him to make lower payments and avoid foreclosure. Rather than report the agreement, Chaitoff’s credit report said that he was delinquent. The district court granted Experian summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that the omission of material information is actionable under the FCRA; reporting the existence of the agreement did not involve the application of law to facts. Experian’s initial reporting efforts were reasonable but, concerning Experian’s investigations after Chaitoff alerted it to the discrepancy, a reasonable jury could find that there was a cost-effective step Experian could have taken that would have discovered the agreement’s existence. Experian failed to note Chaitoff’s dispute in later reports, as the FCRA requires. View "Chaitoff v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Unifund purchased Choice's defaulted consumer debt and hired the Kohn Law Firm, which sued Choice in state court on behalf of Unifund, seeking judgment in the amount of the debt plus “statutory attorney fees.” An attached affidavit by Unifund’s agent indicated that the company was not seeking additional amounts after the charge-off date, including attorney’s fees. Choice believed that because the affidavit contradicted the complaint's request for judgment, one of the statements was false; he claimed that no applicable statute permitted the recovery of such attorney’s fees.Choice sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, alleging injury from the receipt of false, misleading, and deceptive communications. Choice alleged “he hired an attorney to help him ascertain the amount of the alleged debt owed, whether attorney fees could be imposed, and in what amount” and paid an appearance fee to a lawyer in the state court action. Despite his allegation that, but for the statements, he would have paid or settled the debt, during discovery Choice denied owing any debt. He later said he lost sleep due to concern over the extent of his liability.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Choice did not establish Article III standing; neither confusion, lost sleep, nor hiring a lawyer are concrete harms. Choice admitted in discovery that he did not suffer any actual damages. View "Choice v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C." on Justia Law

FSSolutions faxed Dr. Thalman several times to ask him to join its network of preferred medical providers and administer various employment screening and testing services to its clients. Thalman declined the invitation and instead invoked the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), to sue FSSolutions for sending him unsolicited advertisements. The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that the faxes were not “unsolicited advertisements” within the meaning of the TCPA because they merely asked to purchase Thalman’s own services rather than inviting him to buy something from FSSolutions.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While a fax must directly or indirectly encourage recipients to buy goods, services, or property to qualify as an unsolicited advertisement, Thalman plausibly alleged that FSSolutions’s faxes did just that by promoting the company’s network of preferred medical providers, a network that would bring Thalman new business in exchange for a portion of the underlying client fees. “[M]indful that many plaintiffs’ attorneys view the TCPA opportunistically, the court cautioned against overreading its opinion, which applies to unsolicited faxes that an objective recipient would construe as urging the purchase of a good, service, or property by emphasizing its availability or desirability. View "Smith v. First Hospital Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law