Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On November 6, 2011, Lovelace and another inmate fought over pencils. Officers handcuffed Lovelace and walked him to a van to be taken to the segregation unit. Lovelace kicked through the van window. Lovelace claims that officers carried him out of the van and slammed his face into the ground. Lovelace was then placed inside another van, where officers continued to beat him. At the segregation unit, Officer Smith punched him in the ribs. In a cell, correctional officers removed Lovelace's clothes and continued the assault, leaving Lovelace for several hours without clothing or bedding. Lovelace testified that his eye was swollen shut, that his ribs were bruised, and that he had back pain. He presented evidence from his medical providers. Dr. Bochenek—a psychologist who treated Lovelace at Dixon on January 4, 2012—testified that that Lovelace “discussed his frustration with, what he perceives of as, the lack of attention to the grievance he filed ‘when the C/O’s [correctional officers] kicked my ass.’” The district court redacted the statement—“the C/O’s kicked my ass”—as inadmissible hearsay. Sullivan, a fellow inmate and Lovelace’s only witness to the alleged beating, was unavailable for trial, so designated portions from his deposition were read to the jury. The court excluded Sullivan’s deposition statements that elaborated on his ability to testify truthfully. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the defendants, upholding those evidentiary rulings. View "Lovelace v. McKenna" on Justia Law

Indiana uses “drug courts” to tackle substance-abuse problems more flexibly than traditional sentencing regimes, Ind. Code 33-23-16-5. These non-traditional court programs have been shown to reduce recidivism rates in some jurisdictions. The Clark County Drug Treatment Court (DTC) was not a success. Under the stewardship of Judge Jacobi, participants frequently languished in jail for weeks and even months as “sanctions” for noncompliance with program conditions, without the procedural protections required by Indiana law, such as written notice, a right to counsel, or a right to present evidence. DTC staff made arrests despite a clear lack of authority to do so. After these abuses were revealed, program participants filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Judicial Center shut down the program. The district court denied class certification, dismissed some claims, and resolved most others on summary judgment. A final claim was settled. The plaintiffs failed to win relief. On appeal of due process claims against three defendants and Fourth Amendment claims against two defendants, the Seventh Circuit stated that it had “no doubt that the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated,” but plaintiffs did not establish that these defendants were personally responsible for the systemic breakdown. View "Hoffman v. Knoebel" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Perales (Hispanic) asked Officer Robinson (biracial) why he did not shave his facial hair in compliance with Department policy. Robinson’s doctor’s note was deemed inadequate. Robinson has folliculitis, a painful skin condition that most often occurs in black men who shave. Weeks later, Robinson revived the issue. Lieutenant Hersey (African‐American) was present. Perales told Robinson that his inquiry was not racially based and recounted that Chicago police used to say that “We don’t back n‐‐‐‐rs up” and Perales claimed, “That’s not me.” Hersey told Perales that this was inappropriate but did not report the incident. Weeks later, Robinson told Perales that he had scheduled another doctor’s appointment and invited Perales to look at his scars, caused by shaving. Perales responded, “it must be the n‐‐‐‐r in you.” Robinson's partner, Pawlik, overheard. Robinson submitted a grievance. Chief Richardson (African-American) imposed a 20‐day suspension. Robinson, Pawlik, and watch commander Spangler noticed that Perales was subjecting Robinson to particular scrutiny. Perales and Hersey directed Spangler to “go against” Robinson and Pawlik. Spangler refused. Another officer reported that Perales had stated that Robinson and Pawlik needed to “watch [their] asses.” Following Robinson's second grievance. Perales was found not to have engaged in any wrongdoing and was reassigned to Internal Affairs. Robinson was passed over for promotion. Spangler received two unwarranted notices of infraction, then was bumped from his watch commander position. In Robinson and Spangler's suit, the court granted the defendants judgment on all claims except for Robinson’s retaliation claim against Perales and the Board. A jury found against Perales and in favor of the Board, awarding Robinson one dollar. The court declined to award Robinson attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit vacated the defendants' judgment on Robinson’s claim for racial harassment and Spangler’s claim for retaliation and otherwise affirmed. View "Spangler v. Perales" on Justia Law

In 2006 Conway contracted to sell land in Broadview to Donahue, who assigned the contract to Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC. Chicago Joe’s sole manager applied for the required special-use permit. Broadview denied the application in 2007. The land sale contract never closed and the planned strip club never opened. The LLC and Conway filed suit in 2007 alleging that Broadview violated the First Amendment. Broadview amended its ordinances multiple times during the lawsuit. One amendment led District Judge Gottschall, to conclude that Broadview’s amendment to its adult-use setback ordinance was “aimed solely at Chicago Joe’s.” After the case was transferred to Judge Lee, the parties litigated renewed summary judgment motions. Judge Lee granted Broadview summary judgment on Chicago Joe’s declaratory judgment and injunction claims, but denied summary judgment on the damages claim. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the claim for injunctive relief that established interlocutory appellate jurisdiction is actually moot, and affirmed its dismissal. At every stage of the process, Chicago Joe’s has proposed a use of property prohibited by then-current local law, so it has no vested rights. Since 2007, Chicago Joe’s has proposed to use the property in a way prohibited by Illinois statute, without challenging that statute. View "Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview" on Justia Law

McCaa suffers from mental illnesses, with a history of suicide attempts. In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, he alleged that prison officials and staff were deliberately indifferent to his self‐harm on four occasions. After screening McCaa’s pro se complaint, the court allowed some claims to proceed, relating to officials’ failure to prevent McCaa’s self‐harm and failure to obtain medical assistance after self‐harm. McCaa’s unsuccessful motion to recruit counsel posited that the issues were complex, that he has serious mental illnesses, a fifth‐grade reading level, little legal knowledge, and extremely limited access—as a segregation inmate—to the law library and witnesses. McCaa's second unsuccessful motion added that he has a learning disability, had been transferred to a new prison, and did not know where his witness was located. After discovery began, McCaa's third unsuccessful motion noted that another attorney had joined the defense and that he previously relied on other prisoners for assistance but was having difficulty getting help. McCaa continued through discovery pro se. He did not conduct depositions. Defendants moved for summary judgment, McCaa filed his fourth unsuccessful motion, stating that he was having difficulty contacting witnesses who were no longer incarcerated and that his case was worthy for a jury. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. When denying McCaa’s third motion, the court did not specifically address circumstances that bore on McCaa’s ability to competently litigate his case. View "McCaa v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging that several state judges and officials have been unfair to him in divorce and child custody proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action and held that, to the extent plaintiff's suit implicated its own subject matter jurisdiction, the court was free to entertain his appeal; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar this case; even if Rooker‐Feldman applied to interlocutory orders, the doctrine still would have no bearing on plaintiff's appeal because he has not asked the court to reject any such order; and the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction was not applicable. The court held that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's complaint before the date it had set for him to respond to the sheriff's motion to dismiss the claims against them, but the error was harmless. On the merits, the court held that Judge Boliker could not claim the protection of judicial immunity where she acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction, but that Judge Dickler's alleged actions fell within its scope; plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any adverse consequences to his parental (or other) rights as a result of his allegedly prejudiced judge and thus his section 1983 claim failed; and section 1985 did not apply to plaintiff's case. View "Kowalski v. Boliker" on Justia Law

Kenosha used Comsys as its information-technology department. Comsys had its offices inside City Hall and stored its electronic information on the City’s servers. Their contract automatically renewed from year to year unless terminated, and provided that either party “shall have the right, with or without cause, to terminate the Agreement by written notice delivered to the other party at least twelve (12) calendar months prior to the specified effective date of such termination.” In 2014, hostilities broke out between the parties: a Comsys employee because a city employee with plans to bring the IT department in-house and there were allegations of stolen email and a search of the servers. The City’s Common Council voted to end the contract. The Mayor delivered formal notice days later. The contract ended a year later. Comsys sued, alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed several claims on the pleadings and dismissed the Council’s members on the ground of legislative immunity but denied motions for summary judgment on the First and Fourth Amendment claim and official immunity claims by the Mayor, City Administrator, and the City Manager. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to those officials, finding that they did not violate clearly established law and cannot be ordered to pay damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and noting that trying to isolate contract administration from speech may be impossible in this situation. View "Comsys Inc. v. Pacetti" on Justia Law

Norton was part of a cocaine and heroin distribution conspiracy, driving to Chicago and Akron to move drugs and proceeds, and distributing drugs at his Indiana home. Law enforcement recruited a conspiracy member to record conversations; the informant stated that Norton planned to move $400,000 of drug proceeds. Federal officers contacted Indiana State Police Officer Shultz for a traffic stop. Federal officers trailed Norton for 20 miles, identified Norton’s vehicle to Shultz, told Shultz that Norton was driving 72 mph in a 55 mph construction zone, and instructed Shultz to make the stop. Shultz testified that he used radar to confirm Norton's speed. Shultz pulled Norton over. Norton allowed Shultz to search his car. Shultz found an unusual wire near the gas pedal and a shell casing. His drug-sniffing dog signaled to the vehicle. Shultz did not arrest Norton, but impounded the vehicle. After obtaining a warrant, officers conducted a thorough search, discovering $400,000 in cash. Months later, officers arrested Norton in a house near the Mexican border, where they found $179,000 in cash. At a hearing on Norton’s motion to suppress evidence collected from his vehicle, an Indiana Department of Transportation employee testified that the speed limit in the construction zone was 70 mph at the time of the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Norton’s conviction and sentence to a mandatory life term of imprisonment, upholding the denial of his motion to suppress and the admission of recorded statements made by the confidential informant. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law

Milliman, then a McHenry County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) deputy, gave a deposition in which he accused Sheriff Nygren of corruption, bribery, securing fraudulent loans, trafficking illegal aliens, and soliciting two murders. Nygren and his subordinates referred Milliman to a psychologist to evaluate whether he was fit for duty. The psychologist determined that Milliman suffered from cognitive and psychological problems from a previous brain tumor that rendered him unfit to perform his duties. MCSD terminated Milliman based upon the results of that examination, the false allegations against Nygren, and violations of MCSD General Orders. Milliman sued Nygren, Nygren’s subordinates, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the fitness‐for‐ duty examination provided an independent, non‐retaliatory, non‐pretextual basis for Milliman’s termination. The court rejected Milliman’s argument that a jury could question whether Milliman’s fitness examination was ordered in good faith because he received a “standard” rating in his last annual performance review, citing the importance of such precautionary measures in the law enforcement context due to “the risks posed by an officer who is not well enough to work.” View "Milliman v. Prim" on Justia Law

The University fired Carmody, an information technology manager, after printed copies of a professor’s privileged emails suspiciously ended up in Carmody’s home newspaper box. The emails allegedly exposed inconsistencies in the professor’s testimony in Carmody's separate lawsuit against a different professor. The University learned about the mysterious delivery because Carmody’s lawyer filed the emails with the court. The University concluded that it was “more probable than not” that Carmody improperly obtained the emails himself. Carmody sued the board of trustees and officials alleging that he was fired without due process of law both and that his firing violated an Illinois whistleblower statute. The district court dismissed the case. In an earlier appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Carmody had pleaded a plausible claim that he was fired without pre-termination due process, but that his decision to withdraw from the post-termination hearing foreclosed his due process claim based on the post-termination procedures and affirmed the dismissal of the state-law claim. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for some defendants and Carmody lost at trial on his claim against three remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carmody did not establish that the individual defendants bore responsibility for his alleged deprivations. The Eleventh Amendment bars the claims against the board and 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not authorize such claims. View "Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois" on Justia Law