Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officer Pearson and other Chicago police officers executed a search warrant for “apartment 1.” There was a problem with the warrant. Apartment 1 did not exist. The building contained apartment 1A and apartment 1B. The officers searched apartment 1A but did not find the drugs and related items they were seeking. Pearson nonetheless arrested an occupant, Muhammed. The occupants filed sued Pearson under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful entry and false arrest. The district court granted Pearson summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on narrow grounds. Law enforcement officers who discover that a search warrant does not clearly specify the premises to be searched must ordinarily stop and clear up the ambiguity before they conduct or continue the search. If they do not, they may lose the legal protection the warrant provides for an invasion of privacy and accompanying restraints on liberty. Pearson, however, testified that he did not know there were two apartments and offered undisputed, reliable, and contemporaneous documents confirming his after-the-fact testimony that the address searched was actually the correct target of the search authorized by the ambiguous warrant. Pearson had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff Muhammad for suspected drug trafficking, though Pearson quickly confirmed that Muhammad was not the right suspect and released him within 15 minutes, so summary judgment based on qualified immunity was also correct on that unlawful arrest claim. View "Muhammad v. Pearson" on Justia Law

The police received an anonymous 911 call from a 14‐year‐old who borrowed a stranger’s phone and reported seeing “boys” “playing with guns” by a “gray and greenish Charger” in a nearby parking lot. A police officer drove to the lot, blocked a car matching the caller’s description, ordered the car’s occupants to get out of the car, and found that a passenger in the car, Watson, had a gun. He later conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction. The police did not have reasonable suspicion to block the car. The anonymous tip did not justify an immediate stop because the caller’s report was not sufficiently reliable. The caller used a borrowed phone, which would make it difficult to find him, and his sighting of guns did not describe a likely emergency or crime—he reported gun possession, which is lawful. View "United States v. Watson" on Justia Law

An Illinois jury convicted McGhee of murder and attempted murder. McGhee’s defense attorney asked the judge to poll the jury after the verdict was read. The judge said, “[a]ll right,” but did not conduct the poll; he simply thanked and dismissed the jurors. An Illinois criminal defendant “has the absolute right to poll the jury after it returns its verdict.” Defense counsel did not object when the judge moved directly to closing remarks, nor did he raise the issue in a post-trial motion. McGhee’s appellate lawyer failed to challenge the error on direct review. McGhee’s conviction was affirmed on appeal and in state collateral review. He sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. McGhee’s "Strickland" claims, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the judge’s jury-polling error and his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the judge’s error on appeal, were waived because he did not present them in his section 2254 petition. McGhee procedurally defaulted his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel’s failure to preserve the polling error. McGhee failed to present the claim through one complete round of state-court review. View "McGhee v. Watson" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers attempted to make a traffic stop after Alberto Martinez ran a stop sign. Alberto fled, discarding a gun. Officer Nunez followed Alberto into a residence, did not immediately see Alberto, and began searching the home. Meanwhile, Daniel Martinez arrived home from shopping and entered the duplex. Officer Weber believed that Daniel matched the description of the fleeing suspect. Daniel ordered the officer to leave and refused orders to put his hands behind his back. Two officers took Daniel down and handcuffed him. Outside the house, other officers indicated that Daniel was not Alberto, the fleeing suspect. The officers nonetheless charged Daniel with resisting arrest and obstruction of justice, but a jury acquitted him. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers had violated the First and Fourth Amendments and had committed the state tort of malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for the defendants as supported by sufficient evidence. The objective facts known to Officer Weber clearly support the existence of exigent circumstances to enter the home; Daniel’s assertions essentially amount to attacks on the credibility of the law enforcement witnesses. Daniel’s actions provided the officers with probable cause to arrest him. View "Martinez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Through a Department of Energy grant, Naperville received $11 million to update its grid and began replacing its residential, analog energy meters with digital “smart meters.” Traditional energy meters typically collect monthly energy consumption in a single lump figure once per month. Smart meters often collect thousands of readings every month, showing the amount of electricity being used inside a home and when it is used. This data reveals information about the happenings inside a home because individual appliances have distinct energy-consumption patterns; researchers can predict the appliances that are present in a home and when they are used. While some cities allow residents to decide whether to adopt smart meters, Naperville’s residents cannot opt out of the smart-meter program. Naperville stores the data for up to three years. Concerned citizens sued, alleging that Naperville’s smart meters reveal “intimate personal details and that collection of this data constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search and invasion of privacy under the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The data collection constitutes a search but, given the significant government interests in the program and the diminished privacy interests at stake, the search is reasonable. View "Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville" on Justia Law

Emerson, a Cook County Department of Corrections corrections officer, alleged that County employees unlawfully discriminated against her during her “tumultuous” tenure at a County detention facility. During that time, she twice filed formal personnel grievances. She claims that she was subsequently the victim of retaliation. She was on paid medical leave from September 2012 until March 2014, and she has remained on unpaid leave ever since. While her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, were pending, Emerson took to Facebook to threaten potential witnesses with legal action if they testified against her. The district judge sanctioned Emerson ($17,000) for the threat and eventually entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Emerson’s grievance regarding scheduling did not qualify as protected activity under Title VII because it did not allege that Grochowski (who made the schedule) targeted her because of her race, sex, or other protected characteristic. Emerson had no proof that Grochowski ever knew of her earlier grievance, so she cannot establish that they harbored the retaliatory motive necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim. View "Emerson v. Dart" on Justia Law

In December 2003, Chicago detectives separately questioned Johnson about a shooting death. Johnson admitted that he drove the shooter to the scene but claimed not to know anything about the plan. Johnson was charged with murder under an accountability theory. Johnson unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements based on noncompliance with Miranda. At a 2007 trial, the detectives testified about Johnson’s statements. The jury found him guilty. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed in 2010. At a second trial in 2012, the detectives repeated their testimony. Johnson was convicted. The appellate court reversed in 2014, citing insufficient evidence. In 2015, Johnson sued the detectives under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that they violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by interrogating him without Miranda warnings and giving testimony about his unwarned statements. The district court found the claims untimely because Johnson filed suit more than two years after his statements were introduced at trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Precedent (Heck) blocks a section 1983 claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has been invalidated; if a claim is Heck-barred, accrual is deferred until the conviction is overturned. Claims of this kind necessarily imply the invalidity of the convictions, so Heck’s deferred accrual rule applies. The first conviction was reversed in 2010, so those claims are untimely. Claims relating to the second trial are timely. View "Johnson v. Winstead" on Justia Law

Heishman was high on amphetamines and running naked in the street. Indianapolis police tried to subdue him. A paramedic administered a sedative to Heishman so he could be moved to an ambulance to be taken to a hospital. Soon, Heishman’s heart and breathing stopped. Despite efforts to revive him, he died days later. Heishman’s estate sued, asserting federal Fourth Amendment claims and state-law tort claims. The district court denied the paramedic qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and allowed all but one of the state-law claims to proceed against the paramedic and the hospital without requiring the plaintiff to comply with the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed as to both issues. Case law does not clearly establish that a paramedic can violate a patient-arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights by exercising medical judgment to administer a sedative in a medical emergency. All of the state-law claims are subject to the substantive terms of Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, including damage caps and the requirement to submit the claim to a medical review panel before suit is filed. The undisputed facts show that the paramedic was exercising medical judgment in dealing with a patient in a medical emergency. View "Thompson v. Cope" on Justia Law

Portalatin allegedly owed $1,330.75 in consumer debt. The Blatt law firm, on behalf of Midland, filed a debt‐collection suit against Portalatin in the Circuit Court of Cook County’s First Municipal District (Chicago). Seventh Circuit precedent under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) then allowed Blatt to sue Portalatin in that forum even though she lived in the Fourth Municipal District (15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2)). The Seventh Circuit subsequently overruled that precedent and held the FDCPA requires debt collectors to file suits in the smallest venue‐relevant geographic unit where the debtor signed the contract or resides. Blatt complied, but the ruling was retroactive. Portalatin sued Blatt and Midland for violating the FDCPA. Portalatin settled with Midland and expressly abandoned all claims against Blatt except her claim for FDCPA statutory damages. Blatt argued that Portalatin’s settlement with Midland mooted her claim for FDCPA statutory damages against Blatt. The district court denied Blatt's motions. The jury awarded Portalatin $200 in statutory damages against Blatt; the court awarded Portalatin $69,393.75 in attorney’s fees and $772.95 in costs against Blatt. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The settlement with Midland mooted Portalatin’s claim for FDCPA statutory damages against Blatt. Portalatin is not entitled to attorney’s fees or costs from Blatt. View "Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC" on Justia Law

The warrant application was supported by statements from “Doe,” that for the previous six months she regularly bought heroin from T (Doe only knew him by sight and street name) in a house, which she identified while driving with the police. A judge questioned Doe under oath and issued the warrant. Executing the warrant, officers found Walker in a house that looked like a drug house. Walker stated that she had a gun but could not remember where it was. The search took 90-120 minutes. Officers left without drugs or evidence of T’s whereabouts. Walker sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted defendants summary judgment; more than 16 months passed before the judge released her opinion. Walker appealed that day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), a judgment is deemed to be entered on the earlier of the Rule 58 judgment or 150 days after a dispositive order is entered. “Deferring the opinion until after the time allowed by Rule. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) is never appropriate, as it can spell disaster for a litigant not versed in the appellate rules.” Addressing the merits, the court stated that Walker’s goal was to have a jury decide whether the state judge should have issued the warrant but with the benefit of “great deference” the state judge’s probable-cause evaluation must prevail. Nothing was concealed from the judge and, under the circumstances, a two-hour search was not unreasonable. View "Walker v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law