Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Regional transmission organizations manage the interstate grid for electricity, conduct auctions through which many large generators of electricity sell most or all of their power, and are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Illinois subsidizes nuclear generation facilities by granting “zero emission credits,” which generators that use coal or gas to produce power must purchase from the recipients at a price set by the state. Electricity producers and municipalities sued, contending that the price‐adjustment aspect of the system is preempted by the Federal Power Act because it impinges on the FERC’s regulatory authority. They acknowledge that a state may levy a tax on carbon emissions; tax the assets and incomes of power producers; tax revenues to subsidize generators; or create a cap‐and‐trade system requiring every firm that emits carbon to buy credits from firms that emit less carbon. They argued that the zero‐emission‐credit system indirectly regulates the auction by using average auction prices as a component in a formula that affects the credits' cost. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Illinois has not engaged in discrimination beyond that required to regulate within its borders. All Illinois carbon‐emitting plants need to buy credits. The subsidy’s recipients are in Illinois. The price effect of the statute is felt wherever the power is used. All power (from inside and outside Illinois) goes for the same price in an interstate auction. The cross‐subsidy among producers may injure investors in carbon‐ releasing plants, but only plants in Illinois. View "Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star" on Justia Law

Liberty PAC sued Illinois officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that campaign contribution limits set by the Illinois Disclosure and Regulation of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act, violated the First Amendment. Invoking the intermediate-scrutiny framework, Liberty PAC challenged specific provisions as not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The Act sets lower contribution limits for individuals than for corporations, unions, and other associations; allows political parties to make unlimited contributions to candidates during a general election; lifts the contribution limits for all candidates in a race if one candidate’s self-funding or support from independent expenditure groups exceeds $250,000 in a statewide race or $100,000 in any other election; and allows certain legislators to form “legislative caucus committees,” which, like political party committees, are permitted to make unlimited contributions during a general election. The district judge dismissed the first three claims as foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. After a bench trial, the judge held that legislative caucus committees are sufficiently similar to political party committees to justify their identical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Supreme Court campaign-finance cases plainly foreclose any argument that the contribution limits for individual donors are too low or that the limits for other donors are too high. The court rejected an argument that the Act is fatally underinclusive by favoring certain classes of donors. View "Illinois Liberty PAC v. Madigan" on Justia Law

On March 18, 2011, Manuel was arrested charged with possessing unlawful drugs. He was held in jail pending trial; on May 4, 2011 the prosecutor dismissed all charges after concluding that the pills Manuel had been carrying were legal. On April 22, 2013, Manuel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The next day he was released. In 2017, the Supreme Court held that Manuel is entitled to seek damages on the ground that detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and remanded the question whether Manuel sued in time. Illinois law gave Manuel two years from the claim’s accrual but federal law defines when a claim accrues. The Seventh Circuit determined that the claim was timely. Manuel’s claim accrued on May 5, when he was released from custody. While many Fourth Amendment cases concern pre-custody events that can be litigated without awaiting vindication on the criminal charges, Manuel contests the propriety of his detention. When a wrong is ongoing rather than discrete, the limitations period does not commence until the wrong ends. Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution is the wrong characterization of Manuel’s case; the problem is wrongful custody. A claim cannot accrue until the would-be plaintiff is entitled to sue, yet the existence of detention forbids a suit for damages contesting that detention’s validity. View "Manuel v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

Rhodes was convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide and first‐degree recklessly endangering safety for shooting two victims, killing Davis. The prosecution’s theory was that Rhodes and his brother shot Davis, who was an ex‐boyfriend of their sister, Nari, and that the other victim was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Nari had suffered a severe beating the day before Davis was murdered. Nari’s direct testimony focused on her injuries from the beating the day before. When Rhodes tried to cross‐examine Nari to rebut the motive theory, the judge limited the questioning and did not allow evidence of prior beatings. In 2010, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed Rhodes’s conviction, finding that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated and that the violation was not harmless. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction in 2011. Rhodes then sought federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The district court agreed that Rhodes had shown a clear Confrontation Clause violation but found that the violation was harmless. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state courts violated clearly established federal law in violating Rhodes’s Confrontation Clause rights. Given the importance of the motive issue and the overall balance of evidence in the trial, the constitutional error was not harmless. View "Rhodes v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Cleven worked as a City of Madison stagehand, classified as an independent contractor and not enrolled in the Wisconsin Retirement System. In 2006, a union sought to represent the stagehands. The Employment Relations Commission found that they were not independent contractors and ordered an election. The city agreed to review the stagehands’ hours to determine whether they qualified for enrollment in the System, determined that Cleven qualified as of December 2009, and agreed to pay the stagehands’ share of the required contribution starting in 2010. There was no agreement concerning the period before the labor agreement. The state Employee Trust Funds Board concluded that Cleven was eligible to enroll in 1983, but declined to decide who was responsible for paying the past‐due employee contribution. State courts declined his efforts to seek judicial review. In the meantime, the city did not report his hours and earnings. Cleven sought mandamus relief. In 2016, the state court ordered the city to “immediately” report his enrollment as a participating employee as of 1983. The city complied; the System invoiced the city for the employer and employee contributions. After the city paid, it joined parallel litigation about whether the stagehands owed the past‐due employee contribution; its appeal is pending. Cleven sued the city and city employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his due process rights because he wanted to retire in 2011, but the delay in reporting his hours forced him to wait until 2016, holding his benefits "hostage” without a pre-deprivation hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the city. If there was a deprivation of property, Cleven’s ability to seek a writ of mandamus was adequate post-deprivation process. View "Cleven v. Soglin" on Justia Law

A cocaine courier arrested by Indianapolis police stated that a major customer of his distributor, Colon, lived in a certain apartment complex; he had seen Colon deliver drugs to the customer there and at Colon’s store and provided a general physical description. Officers saw Stewart visit Colon's store, making no purchase. Stewart lived in the apartment complex and had felony drug convictions. Officers followed Stewart to a gas station. Another man exited a parked car and got into Stewart’s car. Minutes later, the man left. Officers, believing that they had witnessed a drug sale, called Detective Ball, who traveled with Josie, a dog trained to detect illegal drugs. Three detectives saw Stewart fail to stop at a red light. Ball pulled Stewart over. Stewart declined to allow a search. Stewart identified a bulge in his pocket as $700 in cash. Five minutes into the stop, Ball requested backup, continuing to work on the traffic violation. Approximately eight minutes later, backup arrived. Ball then walked Josie around Stewart’s car. Josie alerted after 105 seconds. An officer was still working on the ticket. Ball inspected the car's interior, immediately finding a handgun close to the driver’s seat. Stewart was a convicted felon, so Ball arrested Stewart and gave him Miranda warnings, then continued his search. The trunk contained crack cocaine, powder cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, a digital scale, and $7,420 in cash, plus $1,904 in Stewart’s pocket. Given his Miranda warnings again at the station, Stewart signed a waiver and made incriminating statements that were recorded. A warranted search of Stewart’s home yielded additional cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, four handguns, and $487,542 in cash. Convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 851; 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. 924(c); 18 U.S.C. 1957; and 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), Stewart’s sentence was life imprisonment without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence obtained during and as a result of the traffic stop and the confession and to limit the use of evidence of Stewart's visits to Colon’s store. There was reasonable suspicion to support any delay in obtaining a dog sniff. The money laundering convictions were supported by substantial evidence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After a chase and takedown, a Milwaukee Police Department (MPD officer remained on top of Williams after he was handcuffed. Williams stated, repeatedly that he could not breathe, even after the officer shifted his weight. The officer’s radio transmission was recorded, and Williams can be heard complaining that he could not breathe. Williams, a 22-year-old African American man in good physical shape, went limp when the officers lifted him up. Williams subsequently began sweating and breathing heavily and, when he regained consciousness, would complain of being unable to breathe. Officers did not call for help until several minutes after he was discovered to have no pulse and to have stopped breathing. Williams apparently died in the squad car, leaving three children. The cause of death is disputed. The estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court denied a defense motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an individual analysis of each officer’s claim of qualified immunity. The court noted material issues of fact concerning whether the officers were on notice of Williams’s serious medical condition; each officer had a different degree of contact with Williams and had different assigned responsibilities with respect to the apprehension of Williams and investigation of the alleged armed robbery. View "Estate of Williams, v. Cline" on Justia Law

Cotton was visiting his sister, Kimberly when he scuffled with three men. Cotton was beaten and shot; he died from the gunshot wounds. Milton and another were tried separately as parties to first‐degree reckless homicide. Four eye‐witnesses testified: Kimberly, her son James (age 18), Howard, and Jones. James initially stated that he saw the scene after the shooting. At trial, James testified to having seen both the beating and the shooting. He identified Milton first in a photo array, in a post‐indictment lineup, and at trial. Howard testified that he saw the fight through a window. He identified Milton in a lineup but could not identify anyone from a photo array. Jones testified that he could hear the argument from his home, but changed his story about identifying the perpetrators. The prosecution also presented a bullet casing found outside Milton’s home that matched a casing found at the shooting and a bandana found in Milton’s bedroom that matched a bandana described by Jones and Howard. One expert testified that the bullet casings came from the same gun; a detective opined that the comparison would be inconclusive without the actual gun, which was never recovered. Milton had participated, without counsel, in a live lineup viewed by the witnesses, despite having invoked his right to counsel. Wisconsin courts rejected his claims on appeal, stating that Milton did not meet the “burden to show that he did not waive his right to counsel at the lineup.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The jury was aware of variations in witness testimony and still voted to convict. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), it lay within the bounds of reason to conclude that the evidence was so compelling that the probability of an acquittal if the lineup were suppressed, was negligible. View "Milton v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2002, a Wisconsin jury convicted Reynolds in a fatal carjacking. He unsuccessfully sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on alleged violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. He claims the state stopped paying his state‐appointed lawyer during his direct appeal and that he received ineffective assistance during his direct appeal and trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if his denial‐of‐counsel claim were not procedurally barred, his attorney did not abandon Reynolds. After being told by the State Public Defender that he would not be paid any more for working on Reynolds’s case, the attorney continued to represent Reynolds for free in the state court of appeals, completing the briefing there and seeking review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court rejected an alternative argument that Reynolds was denied the effective assistance of counsel when the Public Defender’s Office created a conflict of interest by ceasing to pay his lawyer while also informing him that he would no longer receive new case assignments. The state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in holding that a missed opportunity to raise an equal protection challenge to the state carjacking statute in an already-untimely fashion was not an “adverse effect”; Reynolds’s claim cannot meet the stringent standard of section 2254(d)(1). View "Reynolds v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Oshkosh inmate Lanaghan reported to Health Services on November 21 and was treated only for a rash. He received four further treatments but increasingly experienced problems with activities of daily living, and was rushed to the hospital on December 6. Diagnosed with a rare muscle disease, he returned a week later with medication. His conditions worsened. He was no longer eating or sleeping; he could not sit up, lay down, or move. On December 20, he attempted to prepare an inmate complaint form regarding inadequate treatment. In a wheelchair, he was transported to Oshkosh’s dayroom, for assistance, unable to write. All of the recreational tables were occupied. Denied permission to use a study table, Lanaghan was returned to his cell where no visitors were allowed. On December 28, he was hospitalized, for approximately two months. Lanaghan returned to Oshkosh in March 2012 but did not file any grievance. He later decided to file suit and learned that he had to first file an inmate complaint. His July 2 complaint was rejected as untimely. The institutional examiner testified that his condition would have been good cause to extend the filing period but not until July.His civil rights suit was rejected under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies within 14 days, as required by Wisconsin law. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Whether a grievance procedure is unavailable does not depend whether the defendants engaged in affirmative misconduct, but whether Lanaghan was not able to timely file the grievance through no fault of his own. Concluding that nothing prevented him from filing the grievance immediately after he returned to Oshkosh holds Lanaghan responsible for failing to follow a procedure of which he was not aware and which was not in the handbook. View "Lanaghan v. Koch" on Justia Law