Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vargas rented a parking place for his truck in a Chicago lot without assigned spaces. Agents in Ohio arrested Hueter as he transported cocaine that, Hueter asserted, he had purchased from Vargas the previous day at his parked truck. Hueter described Vargas, the truck, and the lot. Illinois agents then entered the lot by following someone through the gate. Approaching a truck that met Hueter’s description, they sent a photo to the Ohio agents. Hueter identified the truck. A dog alerted to the odor of drugs. Agents then broke a window, opened the truck's door, and found eight kilos of cocaine. Convicted of cocaine offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Vargas was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit rejected his argument that the judge should have suppressed drugs seized from his truck. By the time the agents broke into the truck they had probable cause, based on Hueter’s statements plus confirmation from the photo and the dog. Vargas neither owned the parking lot nor had a leasehold interest in any particular spot. Vargas was entitled to park his truck in any open space but not to exclude anyone else. Agents did not need probable cause or a warrant to enter the lot. The court also rejected Vargas’s remaining arguments; the judge did not violate the Due Process Clause, which deals with only egregious transgressions of trial rules and decorum. View "United States v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Fernandez’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and his 27-month sentence. Voecks, the driver of the car in which Fernandez was found with a firearm, gave the arresting officer, Frusti, contradictory (recorded) accounts about the gun’s ownership and who had placed it in the center console of the car. When the defense attempted to ask Voecks about what Frusti had said to him and vice-versa, the district court sustained the government’s hearsay objections, essentially confining the cross-examination of each witness to his own statements. The Seventh Circuit upheld that ruling. Fernandez has not shown that any of the omitted details of the interrogations mattered enough to demonstrate reversible error; Fernandez’s failure to invoke his Confrontation Clause rights below and his ability to raise the essential points as to Voecks’ change of story defeated any claim of plain error. The court also upheld the district court’s ruling precluding Fernandez from questioning defense witness Stramowski, another passenger in the car, about the content of the texts she had purportedly received from Voecks before the trial and upheld a ruling permitting the government to establish that Fernandez was arrested during the traffic stop on an outstanding warrant for a probation violation. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

An FBI task force identified Brewer as being present at banks just before robberies, determined that Brewer lived with Pawlak, in Gary, Indiana, and observed a Toyota matching the one from the robberies parked outside their residence. An officer obtained a state court warrant, which permitted the use of a “tracking device … in any public or private area ... within the State of Indiana.” An officer monitored Brewer's car until it arrived in Los Angeles, unaware of the limitation, saw it circling a Los Angeles bank, and notified local officers, who observed Brewer and Pawlak near the bank. When they returned, Pawlak got out of the car, approached the tellers, held up a robbery note, and ran out of the bank with about $1,000. Officers stopped their car, arrested Brewer and Pawlak, and found a bag of cash. Brewer was charged in Indiana with three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and lost a motion to suppress regarding the tracking device. The government presented evidence of the Ohio and California robberies, eyewitness testimony identifying Brewer as present before the robberies, and surveillance footage. Convicted, Brewer was sentenced to 137 months in prison. He had been convicted in California; the Indiana sentence added 12 months in custody. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The in-state limitation did not reflect a probable-cause finding or a particularity requirement; the Fourth Amendment is unconcerned with state borders. The evidence of the unindicted robberies was directly probative of Brewer’s identity, modus operandi, and intent, and fell within the bounds of Federal Rule 404(b)(2). View "United States v. Brewer" on Justia Law

In 1993, Carey was a security guard at a night school. Carey arrived for his shift, traversed the premises, then returned to his car to read. The parking lot was not well lit. Around 7:00 p.m., Carey saw three black men walking toward his vehicle. About two feet from Carey’s car one man grabbed a gun from his coat and fired it through the window. Carey, shot in the face, made his way into the school. Help was summoned; 15-20 minutes after the shooting, the Elkhart police found Sims near about 20 feet from Carey's car. Carey’s identification of Sims in the photographic lineup was not unequivocal but Carey identified him at trial as the shooter. The police never found the gun. Sims was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment. In 2012, during a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Sims learned the prosecution withheld evidence that Carey, the only identification witness, was hypnotized before trial to enhance his recollection. After the Indiana courts denied habeas relief, Sims filed a federal petition. The district court held that the Indiana court did not unreasonably apply established federal law. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court recognizes that suppression of strong, non-cumulative evidence related to the credibility of a witness who is critical to the prosecution's case, is material under Brady. The fact that Carey had been hypnotized would have undermined his credibility and changed his cross-examination dramatically. View "Sims v. Hyatte" on Justia Law

On trial for bank robbery, Books chose not to testify in his own defense. He was found guilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He challenged the district court’s decision to allow eyewitness testimony from two bank tellers; Books alleged they based their identification of him as the robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on information improperly supplied by a police detective. He also challenged a ruling that would have allowed the government, had Books chosen to testify, to impeach him with physical evidence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police learned of (and recovered) only as a result of a confession the district court separately had determined was unlawfully coerced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. The district court did not err in finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’ firsthand knowledge of Books; allowing their testimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor does the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling, even if wrong on the law, mandate reversal in light of the overwhelming weight of evidence against Books. View "United States v. Books" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Giles suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to protect him from other inmates. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of his claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical officials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Giles cannot establish the defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Giles received regular medical attention from psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals; several of his grievances were subjected to emergency review. Giles has not presented evidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled not was there an indication from his medical records that he was not receiving adequate care. The non-medical officials relied on the medical professionals to provide proper treatment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a need to intervene. View "Giles v. Godinez" on Justia Law

In 2010 Phillips began serving an eight-year term of supervised release stemming from a 2003 conviction for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. In October 2017, Quincy police officers stopped him as he drove out of the parking lot of the Amtrak station. A dog alerted that drugs might be present in the car. The officer conducted a search, discovered approximately 196 grams of heroin, and arrested Phillips for possession with intent to distribute. Phillips moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that there was no violation of any traffic law, so the police lacked probable cause for the stop. The district court concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply to supervised-release-revocation hearings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Two of the Supreme Court’s rationales for declining to extend the exclusionary rule to the parole context equally apply to hearings for the revocation of supervised release. The exclusionary rule would “alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings.” View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Police conducted a traffic stop of Cook's car, approached the car and noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Cook was driving on a suspended license and without a license plate on the front of his vehicle, so the officers ordered him to step out of the vehicle and removed a loaded, .40-caliber pistol from a holster under Cook’s shoulder. The gun had an extended 22-round capacity magazine with 19 bullets remaining. In purchasing the firearm, Cook completed an ATF form, answering “no” to the question, “Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance?” During a recorded interview, Cook acknowledged that he had used marijuana almost daily for nearly 10 years and had smoked two “blunts” that day. Cook ultimately produced a small packet containing a half ounce of marijuana. Cook was convicted of being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot make a facial vagueness challenge. There is a substantial relationship between the government’s legitimate interest in preventing violent crime and the statute’s ban on gun possession by unlawful drug users. The court also rejected a challenge to the jury instructions. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago police officers searched an apartment where they encountered Lewis and two others and discovered a handgun. Lewis alleges that the officers had no basis to believe the gun was his; that he didn’t live at the apartment and never told the officers otherwise; and that the officers never found anything in the apartment indicating that he lived there. Lewis spent more than two years in pretrial detention on charges of unlawfully possessing a firearm. After the charges were dropped, Lewis sued the city and police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages. The district court dismissed the suit, ruling that both claims were time-barred. Days later the Supreme Court decided Manuel v. City of Joliet, clarifying that detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment “when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case.” The Court declined to decide when such claims accrue, remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit, which held that a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful pretrial detention accrues on the date the detention ends. The Seventh Circuit then held that Lewis had filed a viable, timely Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention. Lewis filed it within two years of his release from detention. The court affirmed the dismissal of the due-process claim. View "Lewis v. Chicago" on Justia Law

Under Wisconsin’s open-enrollment program, a public-school student can apply to transfer from his resident school district to a nonresident district that has available space. The program distinguishes between regular education and special education spaces. If a student with a disability requires special services, a nonresident district may deny the student’s transfer application if it lacks the services or space necessary to meet those special needs. Disabled school children, whose transfer applications were denied because nonresident districts determined that they could not meet the students’ special needs, sued the school districts and state actors under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a); and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Differential treatment of special-needs students does not make the program unlawful. Federal law forbids discrimination based on stereotypes about a handicap but does not forbid decisions based on the actual attributes of the handicap. The program makes decisions based on the actual needs of disabled students, so it complies with federal law. Even analyzing the case as a request for an accommodation, the requested change would fundamentally alter the program; neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act requires fundamental alterations. View "P.F., a minor, by A.F., v. Taylor" on Justia Law