Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three-month-old J.J. was left in the care of his father, Felton, for the first time. Others visited during the day. That night, J.J. was rushed to the hospital. Doctors discovered that J.J. had a skull fracture, bleeding in his brain, and retinal hemorrhages. J.J. died. Felton was taken to jail on a probation hold. Felton told police that J.J. had hit his head in the bathtub. Another inmate, House, testified that Felton said he had swung J.J. into a bathroom door. Two treating physicians testified that J.J.’s death was, in part, due to shaking. The medical examiner concluded that blunt force trauma was the cause of death. Felton was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Felton unsuccessfully sought post‐conviction relief in Wisconsin state courts based on ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument statement that House could not receive a sentence modification for his testimony, and the attorney’s failure to secure medical expert testimony. At the post‐conviction hearing, three medical experts testified J.J. had not been shaken and J.J.’s injuries were consistent with a fall of two to four feet. The district court and Seventh Circuit denied Felton’s petition for habeas relief. The state court was not unreasonable in concluding that Felton was not prejudiced; there was no substantial likelihood of a different result had counsel objected to the closing argument statement. The habeas medical testimony would not have supported the claim that J.J.’s death was caused by his bathtub fall. View "Felton v. Bartow" on Justia Law

While serving a prison sentence at the Lawrence Correctional Center in Illinois, Gabb experienced severe back pain whenever he stood too long (15-20 minutes). After treatments he received did not relieve his pain, Gabb sued two members of Lawrence’s medical staff, Dr. Coe and Nurse Kimmel, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his back pain in violation of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Gabb also sued Wexford, the private company that provided medical services at Lawrence. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gabb has not presented any evidence showing the defendants caused him any harm. The lack of evidence of what the “better” treatments were and whether they would have been effective would leave a jury entirely to its own imagination about what could have been done. View "Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Williams sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing inadequate nutrition through a “brunch” program that served only two meals a day. Williams had filed multiple grievances complaining that the prison’s food was making him ill. He mainly objected to the use of soy protein, asserting that it caused him stomach pain, constipation, diarrhea, migraine headaches, and excessive gas; he sometimes claimed that he received only 1600 calories per day or fewer than 2800 calories per day, and requested that he be served breakfast. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record establishes without dispute that the brunch program was adequate as designed by a licensed dietician to provide 2200-2400 calories per day, including a minimum of six ounces of protein per day. Williams lacks evidence that any of the defendants knew that he was allegedly not receiving adequate nutrition. For persons having special dietary needs, the Department allows therapeutic dietary trays as prescribed by physicians. View "Williams v. Shah" on Justia Law

A person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is forbidden to possess a firearm, 18 U.S.C.922(g)(1). Kanter was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, for bilking the Medicare program, and was sentenced to 366 days in prison. After release, he contended that section 922(g)(1) was invalid, as applied to him because fraud is not a violent crime. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit upheld section 922(g)(1), The Supreme Court has specifically upheld “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and fraud is a thought‐out crime that demonstrates disdain for the rights of others and disrespect for the law. Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a felon convicted of fraud, whose maximum sentence exceeded a year, even if the actual punishment was less. The court noted that it is not possible to separate persons with felony convictions into two categories: dangerous and harmless and rejected an argument that the section was invalid because Congress has declined to fund a statutory (18 U.S.C. 925(c)) program that would permit the Attorney General to lift the prohibition for persons who demonstrate that they would not present a danger to others. View "Hatfield v. Barr" on Justia Law

Arrested on drug conspiracy charges, Hardy led DEA agents to his drugs and guns and provided information that Hardy purchased methamphetamine from Huskisson six times over the preceding five months, for $8,000 per pound, at Huskisson’s house and at his car lot. Huskisson had stated that Huskisson’s source expected a shipment of methamphetamine the next day. Hardy called Huskisson. Agents recorded that conversation. Huskisson agreed to deliver 10-12 pounds of methamphetamine. The next day, the two agreed during additional recorded calls that the deal was to occur at Huskisson’s home that night. Agent Cline followed Hardy to Huskisson’s house; watched Hardy enter, with an entry team on standby; and saw a car pull into the driveway. Two men exited the car with a cooler and entered the house. Minutes later, Hardy walked outside and gave a prearranged signal to indicate he had seen methamphetamine in the house. No search warrant had yet been issued.The entry team entered the house and arrested Huskisson, who refused to consent to a search of his residence, and the other men. Officers saw in plain sight an open cooler with 10 saran-wrapped packages of a substance which field tested positive for methamphetamine. DEA agents then filed the warrant application, which stated: “The law enforcement officers observed an open cooler with ten saran wrapped packages that contained suspected methamphetamine. The suspected methamphetamine later field tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.” The warrant issued four hours after the initial entry. The Seventh Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress. The entry was unlawful. Ordinarily, the evidence would be excluded but because the government had so much other evidence of probable cause, and had already planned to apply for a warrant, the evidence is admissible. Though the government should not profit from its bad behavior, neither should it be placed in a worse position. View "United States v. Huskisson" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, potential candidates for public office must file a nominating petition to gain a place on a political party’s primary ballot. Within a 90-day window, candidates for statewide offices must collect 5,000 signatures from voters in the jurisdiction where the candidate seeks election. Candidates for Cook County offices must collect a number of signatures equal to 0.5% of the qualified voters of the candidate’s party who voted in the most recent general election in Cook County. Applying that formula, Acevedo had to gather 8,236 signatures to appear on the 2018 Democratic primary ballot for Cook County Sheriff. He gathered only 5,654 and was denied a place on the ballot. Acevedo filed suit, alleging violations of his freedom of association and equal protection rights, arguing that the statewide requirement reflects Illinois’s judgment that making candidates collect 5,000 signatures is sufficient to protect the state’s interest in ballot management. Acevedo argued that Illinois could not impose a heightened burden unless doing so furthered a compelling state interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Strict scrutiny is not triggered by the existence of a less burdensome restriction—it is triggered only when the challenged regulation itself imposes a severe burden. Acevedo failed to allege that requiring candidates to gather 8,236 signatures is a constitutionally significant burden. View "Acevedo v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board" on Justia Law

Shipman pleaded guilty in 2003 to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. His presentence report used the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines, which then required courts to increase the offense level of a “career offender.” Shipman had three prior Arkansas convictions for residential burglary in 1986 and 1987. The district court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment as a “career offender.” Neither the presentence report nor the court explained whether Shipman’s career-offender designation rested on the enumerated-offenses clause or the residual clause. In 2005, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” In 2015, the Court’s Johnson decision struck down the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, subsequently holding that the change applied retroactively on collateral review. Within one year of the Johnson decision, Shipman sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit remanded the denial of his petition. While the Guidelines’ residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, the record does not conclusively show whether Shipman was sentenced under the residual clause or the enumerated-offenses clause. All viable bases for Shipman to attack a career-offender designation under the enumerated-offenses clause were available at sentencing and within the one-year limitations period of section 2255(f)(1); there has been no change in the law since then. View "Shipman v. United States" on Justia Law

Bloomington Illinois Officer Squires received a crime-in-progress notification. The 911 operator informed him that a caller from the Tracy Drive Apartments reported a group of persons outside her apartment engaged in suspicious activity and that a short black male wearing a hoodie had a gun in his front pocket. Arriving two minutes later, Squires saw the group, approached, and observed that Adair roughly fit the 911 caller’s description (he did not have a hoodie) and had a large bulge in his front pants’ pocket. Adair sought to evade Squires by moving through the larger group. Squires then stopped and patted down Adair, finding a gun in his front pocket. The district court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the totality of circumstances facing Squires at the Apartments, he had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Adair under the Terry v. Ohio standard. Squires reasonably believed that he was responding to an emergency 911 call in a high-crime area. Squires testified he had previously encountered Adair many times and immediately recognized him as not living at the Apartments, and the only person wearing clothing resembling the 911 caller’s description. Squires knew Adair had a prior felony conviction and Adair acted evasively. View "United States v. Adair" on Justia Law

Turner persuaded Bell to help him sell several stolen firearms. Turner later cooperated with law enforcement, provided information about the sale, and aided the government in targeting Bell. Upon Bell’s arrest, an officer opened Bell’s flip phone and viewed a photograph of a firearm on the home screen in what was likely an unconstitutional search. The district court declined to suppress the evidence obtained from the phone because the government subsequently obtained valid search warrants for it. The Seventh Circuit upheld the suppression decision and rejected a speedy trial argument that was based continuances granted by the district court and the nearly two‐year delay between his indictment and trial. There was an independent source for admitting the photo and the police later obtained a valid warrant. Before the search, Turner had stated that Bell had texted him a photo of a stolen AK‐47 and provided officers with the photo. Bell did not point to any time that was improperly excluded from the speedy-trial clock. The delays were attributable primarily to the defense and Bell was not prejudiced by the continuances. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Pierson was convicted of possessing drugs with intent to distribute and two related firearm crimes. Because of Pierson’s prior criminal record, his mandatory sentence was life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. While the admission of evidence of a gun found in Pierson’s kitchen may have amounted to a constructive amendment of the two firearm charges in his indictment, which charged him with possession of one particular gun found in Pierson’s car, it was not a “plain error” that would warrant reversal. Given the “ample evidence,” the error did not affect Pierson’s substantial rights. Pierson’s argument that the court erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey, by imposing the mandatory life sentence without having the jury find that he had two prior felony drug convictions is foreclosed by controlling Supreme Court precedent that recognizes an exception to that rule for evidence of prior convictions, Almendarez‐Torres v. United States. The First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115‐391, 401(a)(2)(A)(ii), which was enacted while Pierson’s appeal was pending and which lowered the mandatory minimum sentence, does not apply to Pierson, whose sentence was imposed before the Act took effect. View "United States v. Pierson" on Justia Law