Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fincher lived in a one‐bedroom apartment with his uncle, a drug dealer, and began selling drugs. Both were arrested after selling heroin to undercover police officers. Police searched the apartment. In the bedroom closet, they found more than 100 grams of heroin, cash, and .40 caliber bullets. A loaded .40 caliber handgun was found in the kitchen. Fincher, whose criminal record was clean, was charged with conspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and six counts of distribution of and intent to distribute heroin. Fincher pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. The safety‐valve provision, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), however, provides that a court is precluded from applying the mandatory minimum if it finds that the defendant has a minimal criminal history; the defendant did not use or threaten violence or possess a firearm in connection with the offense; the offense did not result in death or injury; the defendant was not an organizer or leader; and the defendant truthfully provided all information and evidence related to the offense before the sentencing hearing. Fincher’s DNA was found on the firearm. The district court found that Fincher possessed the firearm in connection with his offense, and was ineligible for safety‐valve relief and subject to a two‐level firearm enhancement, and imposed a five-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The safety‐valve potentially allows for relief from a mandatory minimum, but it does not increase or trigger it. Judicial fact-finding precluding safety‐valve relief does not violate the Sixth Amendment under the Supreme Court's Alleyne holding. Fincher failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence his possession of the handgun was not in connection with his offense. View "United States v. Fincher" on Justia Law

Police responded to a reported residential burglary in progress. M.G. met officers at the property and stated that he owned the home as a rental property with no current tenants and that no one should be inside. M.G. spotted a window cracked open and, peering inside, he saw someone in the house. Officers banged on the door and ordered all the occupants outside. Sawyer and three others came out and stood with the officers on the porch. M.G. asked the officers to “check my house.” Inside, officers found a backpack; they opened it and discovered four guns. Outside, officers placed the four men in custody. The backpack was brought outside. An officer opened it, found a cell phone, gave Miranda warnings, and asked the arrestees who owned the phone. Sawyer responded that it was his phone and bag. Sawyer later denied it was his bag. Sawyer moved to suppress the contents of the backpack and his statements. The government successfully argued that Sawyer failed to provide evidence that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack and that, as a trespasser, Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy; officers had obtained the owner's consent to search the home. Sawyer conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of their ongoing investigation of a burglary; Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he unlawfully entered the premises. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

While Flores was on supervision for a state conviction, Flores and her co-defendant were found with more than 300 pounds of marijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million. Flores, who had a prior felony drug conviction, pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At her sentencing hearing, Flores did not object to standard condition 3, which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful employment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of study or vocational training that will equip defendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the probation officer or the Court.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that condition 3’s use of the word “suitable” was unconstitutionally vague. Flores had notice and opportunity to make the challenge in the district court, she submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirmatively waived reading of the conditions and their justifications at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, precluding appellate review. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

A jury found that Morgan possessed the 86.5 grams of methamphetamine that he tossed past law enforcement officers in the Peoria airport. Morgan had testified that all of it was for his personal use. The jury could not agree on whether the government proved that he possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A). They declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine. At a second trial, the court read the jury a limiting instruction several times: you’re going to hear testimony that the defendant committed a wrong other than the one charged in the indictment. Before using this evidence, you must decide whether it’s more likely than not that the defendant committed the wrong that is not charged in the indictment. If you decide that he did, then you may consider this evidence to help you decide whether the defendant intended to distribute methamphetamine …. You may not consider it for any other purpose ... the defendant is on trial here for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute ... not for the other wrong. Morgan was sentenced to 240 months for possession with intent to distribute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding only harmless errors and no violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Purdue students John and Jane had consensual sexual intercourse 15-20 times. Jane’s behavior became erratic. Jane attempted suicide. Weeks later, John reported Jane’s suicide attempt to an advisor. Jane was upset and distanced herself from John. Months later, during Sexual Assault Awareness Month, Jane alleged that while sleeping with John, she woke to him groping her over her clothes. Jane says she reprimanded John. John then purportedly confessed that he had digitally penetrated her while she was sleeping weeks earlier. Jane told the university that John had gone through her underwear drawer, chased her through a hallway while joking about tasering her, gone to her room unannounced, and lost his temper in front of her. Purdue pursued Jane’s allegations although Jane did not file a formal complaint. John was suspended from Navy ROTC, banned from buildings where Jane had classes and from his dining hall. John submitted a denial, noting that after the alleged incidents, Jane texted him over the holidays, sent his family cookies, and invited him to her room. Investigators neither gave him a copy of the report nor shared its contents. Moments before his committee appearance, he learned that it falsely claimed that he had confessed and failed to describe Jane’s suicide attempt. Jane neither appeared nor submitted a written statement. The panel refused John permission to present witnesses. John was found guilty by a preponderance of the evidence. Purdue suspended him for a year and imposed conditions on his readmission. The ROTC program terminated his scholarship. John sued, asserting Purdue used flawed procedures and violated Title IX by imposing a punishment infected by sex bias. A magistrate dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. John adequately alleged violations of both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. View "Doe v. Purdue University" on Justia Law

During a Rock Island, Illinois traffic stop, two officers were arresting the driver of a vehicle on an outstanding warrant, when they recognized defendant Yancey, the passenger. Based on their past interactions with Yancey, and their familiarity with a contact sheet labeling him as potentially armed, the officers decided to pat him down for weapons. Before they could do so, Yancey ran. The officers tackled him and saw a handgun sticking out of his waistband. Yancey was subsequently convicted of felony possession of a firearm. Yancey claimed that police lacked justification to keep him from leaving the scene. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, Under Supreme Court precedent, police officers can detain passengers in a car while a stop is ongoing if they have a lawful reason to seize the driver. The officers lawfully stopped the car in which Yancey rode as a passenger and that stop was still lawfully ongoing when Yancey tried to flee; it was not unreasonable for the officers to detain him. View "United States v. Yancey" on Justia Law

M.J.J. and J.K.J. were inmates at Polk County Jail at various times between 2011 and 2014. Christensen admits he engaged in sexual acts with the women individually. He urged the women not to discuss his sexual advances; his assaults were kept hidden from jail officials until a former inmate reported her own sexual encounters with Christensen to an investigator in a neighboring county. An investigation led to Christensen pleading guilty to several counts of sexual assault. He is serving a 30‐year prison sentence. J.K.J. and M.J.J. sued Christensen and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, with a state law negligence claim against the county. A jury found Christensen and the county liable and awarded each woman $2 million in compensatory damages. The jury also levied punitive damages against Christensen, $3,750,000 to each plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Christensen. His assaults were predatory and knowingly criminal. The court reversed as to the county. To impose liability against the county for Christensen’s crimes, there must be evidence of an offending county policy, culpability, and causation. Christensen’s acts were reprehensible, but the evidence shows no connection between the assaults and any county policy. View "J.K.J. v. Polk County" on Justia Law

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) inmate Palmer has a nub which terminates at his left wrist and does not have functional fingers. Before arriving at NRC, Palmer was at Shawnee Correctional Center, where the medical director issued Palmer a low bunk pass. When Palmer arrived at NRC, Franz conducted a routine intake screening. Franz noted his missing hand but ignored Palmer’s request for a low bunk permit and took no other steps in conjunction with Palmer’s deformity. Palmer had to use the top bunk. Palmer made two requests to see a doctor to get a low bunk pass; neither was acknowledged. Palmer fell while attempting to climb down from the upper bunk. He landed on his knee, sustaining a severe injury. Palmer then received a low bunk permit. Palmer filed grievances with IDOC based on the incident. With no response to his grievances, Palmer appealed to the Administrative Review Board, which also went unanswered. Palmer filed suit, alleging that Franz was deliberately indifferent to Palmer’s serious medical need. The district court granted Franz summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The evidence is enough to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that: Palmer suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, Franz knew of the heightened risk of harm, and Franz deliberately failed to act in the face of that harm. View "Palmer v. Franz" on Justia Law

In 2009, Beason pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a 15‐year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his Wisconsin juvenile adjudication for armed robbery and two Wisconsin drug offenses. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Beason’s appeal in 2012, reasoning that it was enough that his drug offense carried a maximum penalty of at least 10 years and that Beason’s juvenile adjudication was a “violent felony” although Wisconsin armed robbery could be committed without a gun, knife, or explosive. In 2013 he unsuccessfully challenged his juvenile adjudication as a qualifying violent felony (28 U.S.C. 2255), making no arguments about the drug offenses. Four years later, Beason filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that neither of his drug offenses carried a sentence long enough to qualify as a “serious drug offense” and that his juvenile adjudication could not count as a “violent felony.” The district court agreed with Beason on the merits but concluded that Beason's section 2255 petition precluded section 2241 relief because he could have raised the exact arguments in his earlier petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Beason’s argument about his drug convictions was foreclosed to him at the time of his section 2255 motion; the Seventh Circuit subsequently addressed Wisconsin’s bifurcated sentencing system and held that only the term of initial confinement—not the term of extended supervision—counted towards ACCA’s threshold of 10‐years’ imprisonment for a “serious drug offense.” View "Beason v. Marske" on Justia Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), provides for an enhanced sentence for an ex-felon who possesses a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), if that person has “three previous convictions … for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both … .” ACCA defines a “violent felony” to include a federal or state crime punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” In 2019, the Supreme Court decided in "Stokeling," that a prior conviction could qualify if the statute of conviction requires “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” In six cases, the Seventh Circuit previously concluded that the ACCA enhancement applied, On remand, for reconsideration in light of Stokeling, the Seventh Circuit examined Illinois statutes prohibiting robbery and armed robbery, 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a), 5/18-2, which provide that a person commits robbery when he takes property “from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” and again concluded that the defendants qualified for the enhancement. Illinois cases require that force be used as part of the action of taking or immediately leaving the scene. This can reasonably be characterized as force necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance, and is compatible with Stokeling’s definition of force. View "Van Sach v. United States" on Justia Law