Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jackson was charged with throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in front of their children, and later, threatening her from prison. Jackson asked the judge to remove his appointed counsel. The court granted the motion and barred Jackson from communicating with anyone but his attorney of record because of his threatening phone calls. A second appointed lawyer reported that Jackson asked him to withdraw. The court ruled that Jackson’s reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint another lawyer but allowed Jackson to seek a private attorney in compliance with the restrictions on his outside communications. The court denied Jackson’s request to represent himself. Months later, the court returned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of the case and stated that Jackson “can’t do this.” The court denied Jackson’s request. Jackson pleaded guilty to felony intimidation of a witness, first-degree reckless injury, and aggravated battery and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Jackson filed an unsuccessful post-conviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In his federal habeas action, Jackson argued that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he was competent to represent himself at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of that petition. Although the Wisconsin appeals court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent on the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial, Jackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. View "Jackson v. Bartow" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Donelson was moved to Stateville, where a prison nurse screened him for medical issues. Donelson is asthmatic and stated that he needed a new inhaler. The nurse responded that he could get one from a doctor. Donelson had to wait 16 days to see a doctor but apparently could have gone to the commissary at any time for an inhaler. Donelson received an inhaler 20 days after arriving at Stateville. He sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (deliberate indifference to his asthma) and the First Amendment (delaying his care to retaliate for prior lawsuits). During discovery, the court encountered several problems: Donelson’s conflict with his recruited lawyer and that lawyer’s withdrawal; Donelson’s false assertion that Wexford refused to respond to his document requests; and Donelson’s obstructive behavior during his deposition. Donelson professed not to understand simple questions, no matter how often rephrased, then refused to answer. Donelson accused opposing counsel of bringing contraband (an inhaler) into Stateville. The judge described Donelson’s responses as “evasive and argumentative,” then ruled that dismissal with prejudice and an award of costs was a proper sanction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the sanction reasonable. Donelson acted willfully and in bad faith; the dismissal was proportional and appropriate given Donelson’s grossly unacceptable conduct, the need to convey the seriousness of his violations, the obvious insufficiency of any warning, and his inability to pay any meaningful monetary sanction. View "Donelson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Schmidt was camping in a national forest in Wisconsin when a Forest Service Officer approached and discovered that Schmidt, who had three felony convictions, had a handgun in his tent. Schmidt agreed to pay $1,600 in restitution to the Forest Service for having cut down trees in the national forest without authorization and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). During a presentence interview, Schmidt told his probation officer of his belief in white supremacy, his hatred for minority races, and his desire to relocate to Germany to embrace his Nazi roots. Schmidt had 17 adult criminal convictions for bail jumping, child abuse, taking and driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent, unlawful use of the phone to threaten harm, criminal damage to property, carrying a concealed weapon, and disorderly conduct and resisting an officer. His Guidelines range was 51-63 months imprisonment. The district court sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Schmidt’s argument that consideration of his beliefs at sentencing violated his First Amendment rights. Schmidt’s statements, in light of his criminal history and his continued disrespect for the law, raised a serious question in the sentencing judge’s mind as to whether he posed a threat of violent or anti-social conduct; Schmidt’s beliefs were reasonably related to a legitimate sentencing purpose. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

In 2005 Paramount leased a parcel of highway-adjacent property in Bellwood, Illinois, planning to erect a billboard. Paramount never applied for a local permit. When Bellwood enacted a ban on new billboard permits in 2009, Paramount lost the opportunity to build its sign. Paramount later sought to take advantage of an exception to the ban for village-owned property, offering to lease a different parcel of highway-adjacent property directly from Bellwood. Bellwood accepted an offer from Image, one of Paramount’s competitors. Paramount sued Bellwood and Image, alleging First Amendment, equal-protection, due-process, Sherman Act, and state-law violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Paramount lost its lease while the suit was pending, which mooted its claim for injunctive relief from the sign ban. The claim for damages was time-barred, except for an alleged equal-protection violation. That claim failed because Paramount was not similarly situated to Image; Paramount offered Bellwood $1,140,000 in increasing installments over 40 years while Image offered a lump sum of $800,000. Bellwood and Image are immune from Paramount’s antitrust claims. The court did not consider whether a market-participant exception to that immunity exists because Paramount failed to support its antitrust claims. View "Paramount Media Group, Inc. v. Village of Bellwood" on Justia Law

A certified class claimed that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet guards; the inmates were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder with other inmates in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their sanitary protection in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies, clothing, and the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough. The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment theory, because Seventh Circuit precedent holds that a visual inspection of a convicted prisoner is not subject to analysis under that amendment. The jury returned a defense verdict on the Eighth Amendment claim. Because analysis under the Fourth Amendment is objective, while a successful claim under the Eighth Amendment depends on proof of a culpable mental state, the plaintiffs argued on appeal that they could succeed on a Fourth Amendment theory despite the jury’s verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasserting that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual inspections of prisoners. Their convictions allow wardens to control and monitor prisoners’ lives, extinguishing the rights of secrecy and seclusion. View "Henry v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

University Park’s mayor and board fired police chief Bradley without any notice of good cause or any form of hearing, in violation of his employment contract. Bradley sued the village and mayor under 42 U.S.C.1983 for violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Bradley’s due process claim on the pleadings. The parties agreed that Bradley had a protected property interest in his continued employment; that the mayor and the village board are the policymakers for their municipality; and that although there was ample opportunity for a hearing, Bradley received no pre-termination notice or hearing. Those points of agreement suffice to prove a section 1983 due process claim against the individual officials and the village, where the village acted through high-ranking officials with policymaking authority. The court rejected the defense’s argument, based on cases that excuse liability for the absence of pre-deprivation due process if the deprivation is the result of a “random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than an established state procedure,” and “if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” The court reasoned that such a broad reading of precedent would effectively impose an “exhaustion of remedies” requirement that has been rejected by the Supreme Court. View "Bradley v. Village of University Park" on Justia Law

American, a Cincinnati-based title insurance company, is owned by attorneys Yonas and Rink. The Indiana Department of Insurance randomly audited American and found hundreds of code violations, none of which American denies. Examiners recommended a fine of $70,082 plus $42,202 in consumer reimbursements after deviating upward from the guidelines recommendation. After negotiation, the examiners refused to adjust the fines and added a new sanction: the owners would lose their licenses to do business in Indiana. The Department’s attorney informed American that it could seek administrative review but could face the maximum fine of $9.5 million. American agreed to the recommended sanctions, “voluntarily and freely waive[d] the right to judicial review,” and paid the fees. Yonas and Rink gave up their licenses. Months later, American sued the Department’s Commissioner, Robertson, alleging that the Department imposed higher penalties because American is based in Ohio, not Indiana. American’s equal-protection case rested on expert testimony based on a statistical analysis that found that when the Department audits out-of-state companies, it tends to deviate more from its guidelines than when it audits in-state companies; a comment by a Department examiner made during a recorded phone call; and that Robertson was unable to say definitively during his deposition that no one in his department was motivated by in-state bias. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Robertson without reaching the equal protection claim. American offered no meaningful reason to ignore the agreed order. View "American Homeland Title Agency, Inc. v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Schaumburg’s 2016 ordinance requires commercial buildings to send fire‐alarm signals directly to the local 911 dispatch center, NWCDS, which has an exclusive arrangement with Tyco. To send signals to NWCDS, local buildings must use Tyco equipment. Schaumburg’s notice of the ordinance referred to connection through Tyco and stated that accounts would be charged $81 per month to rent Tyco’s radio transmitters and for the monitoring service. Tyco pays NWCDS an administrative fee of $23 per month for each account it connects to the NWCDS equipment. Tyco’s competitors filed suit charging violations of constitutional, antitrust, and state tort law. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Contracts Clause claim against Schaumburg. The complaint alleges a potentially significant impairment, the early cancellation of the competitors’ contracts, and Schaumburg’s self‐interest, $300,000 it stands to gain. The court otherwise affirmed, noting that entities not alleged to have taken legislative action cannot be liable under the Contracts Clause. WIth respect to constitutional claims, the court noted the government’s important interest in fire safety. Rejecting antitrust claims, the court stated that the complaint did not allege a prohibited agreement, as opposed to an independent, legislative decision. View "Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg" on Justia Law

Four Illinois Villages passed ordinances that require commercial buildings to send fire-alarm signals directly to the local 911 dispatch center through one alarm-system provider, Tyco, which services the area pursuant to an exclusive agreement with the dispatch center. An alarm-system competitor, ADS, sued, citing the Illinois Fire Protection District Act, the Sherman Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Sherman Act claims fail because they are premised on the unilateral actions of the Villages, which ADS did not sue. The court noted that ADS can compete for the contract now held by Tyco. ADS’s substantive due process claim asserted that the district acted arbitrarily and irrationally by going with an exclusive provider rather than entertaining ADS’s efforts at alternative, methods. The ordinances effectively require the district to work with an exclusive provider and there was thus a rational basis to choose an exclusive provider. View "Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Orland Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

In 2004, Conroy was charged with solicitation of murder, solicitation of murder for hire, and attempted first‐degree murder. The court determined that Conroy was fit to stand trial. In 2007, Conroy pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He did not appeal. Conroy received mental health services through the Illinois Department of Corrections and, in 2007, was diagnosed with depressive and schizoaffective disorders. In 2008, Conroy’s evaluations indicated that he was “alert and oriented,” and his “[t]hought processes were logical, coherent and goal-directed.” Conroy “denied any auditory [or] visual hallucinations or delusions.” In 2009, Conroy filed an unsuccessful state court post-conviction petition, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by coercing him into pleading guilty. In 2014, Conroy filed other unsuccessful state court post-conviction motions. In 2016, Conroy filed a federal court petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging ineffective assistance. Conroy argued that the limitations period for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because his mental limitations prevented him from understanding his legal rights. The district court determined that Conroy’s mental limitations were not an extraordinary circumstance and that he failed to show that he had been reasonably diligent in pursuing his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting evidence of Conroy’s competency in prior years. Conroy did not meet the “high bar” for equitable tolling. View "Conroy v. Thompson" on Justia Law