Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Green was walking through the parking lot of a Chicago gas station. An unmarked police vehicle turned into the lot. Green began to run as the vehicle approached, arousing the suspicion of the four officers inside. One officer chased him on foot and saw him drop and pick up a handgun. Green fled into a residential neighborhood, where another officer caught up with him in the backyard of a home. The officer claims Green began to raise a gun in his direction; the officer fired five shots, wounding Green in the hand and chest. Green denied that he had a gun at any time on the night in question. Green was on probation for a felony drug conviction. A state judge revoked his probation, finding that Green possessed a gun during this encounter. Green sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A Fourth Amendment excessive‐force claim against the officer who shot him was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the officer. Green argued that the district judge improperly instructed the jury that the state court’s gun‐possession finding was conclusive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Green’s excessive‐force claim was premised on his contention that he was unarmed during this encounter but the state judge found that he had a gun; that finding has preclusive effect. View "Green v. Junious" on Justia Law

Indiana statutes provided a fast and confidential judicial bypass procedure that is supposed to allow a small fraction of pregnant, unemancipated minors seeking abortions to obtain them without the consent of or notice to their parents, guardians, or custodians, Ind. Code 16-34-2-4(b). In 2017, Act 404 added a parental notification requirement: Parents must be given prior notice of the planned abortion unless the judge also finds such notice is not in the minor’s “best interests” unlike the judicial bypass of parental consent, which may be based on either maturity or best interests. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new notice requirements, finding it likely to “create an undue burden for a sufficiently large fraction of mature, abortion-seeking minors in Indiana.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana’s notice law creates a substantial risk of a practical veto over a mature yet unemancipated minor’s right to an abortion. This practical veto appears likely to impose an undue burden for the unemancipated minors who seek to obtain an abortion without parental involvement via the judicial bypass. Indiana has made no effort to support with evidence its claimed justifications or to undermine with evidence Planned Parenthood’s showing about the likely effects of the law. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Williams, a Racine County Jail pre-trial detainee, suffers from osteoarthritis, for which he has received Social Security disability insurance since 1982. Although the Jail typically provides inmates with a single mattress to sleep on, when the jail places inmates in disciplinary segregation it does not allow them to keep their mattresses in their cells during the daytime hours. Medical staff provided Williams with double mattresses to sleep on as an accommodation for his osteoarthritis and allowed him to keep a single mattress in his cell during the day. Months later, the medical staff concluded that Williams’s medical condition no longer required a second mattress. During the following months, Williams had several disciplinary issues and served time in segregation without a mattress accommodation. The jail staff conducted hearings to evaluate Williams’s write-ups. Williams refused to participate. The jail’s medical staff continued to address Williams’s medical complaints and Williams continued to correspond with officers concerning his grievances. Williams appealed one of the disciplinary determinations. The district court screened Williams’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint and allowed claims alleging retaliation, harassment, conspiracy to fabricate disciplinary tickets, and medical deliberate indifference to proceed but later granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams never made a timely appeal of his grievances; the defendants did not provide him with objectively unreasonable medical care. View "Williams v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Janusiak called 911 to report that Payten, a friend’s baby in her care, was not breathing. Paramedics took Payten to the hospital while officers talked to Janusiak. The police returned about eight hours later, and Janusiak, then eight months pregnant, agreed to go to the police station for an interview. Police questioned her about Payten’s death for about seven hours. Toward the end of the interrogation, Janusiak made statements about what happened to Payten that were used to impeach her testimony at trial. After Peyten died Janusiak was convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide. On direct appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected her argument that statements she made during the interrogation were involuntary and should have been suppressed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of her petition for habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court rejected Janusiak’s arguments that her statements were coerced by comments that law enforcement made to her about keeping access to her children, the length and other features of the interrogation, and her vulnerability as a pregnant woman and mother. The state appellate court reasonably applied the correct standard to determine that Janusiak’s statements were voluntary. View "Janusiak v. Cooper" on Justia Law

For two years, Alliance was unable to obtain a license from the Indiana State Department of Health to open a South Bend clinic to provide medication abortion care. After two unsuccessful applications, a statutory amendment, and a “moving target of wide-ranging requests for information,” Alliance concluded that its attempts were futile and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court granted preliminary relief, holding that Alliance has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that Indiana’s requirement of licensure for clinics that provide only medication abortions (induced exclusively by taking pills), as applied to Alliance's clinic, violates the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses.The Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s broad condemnation of Indiana’s licensing scheme runs contrary to Supreme Court precedent. While this litigation is pending, the state may, for the most part, administer that system. The court expressed concerns about the handling of Alliance’s application. Indiana may use licensing as a legitimate means of vetting and monitoring providers, but, to the extent that Indiana is using its licensing scheme to prevent the South Bend clinic from opening simply to block access to pre-viability abortions, it is acting unconstitutionally. The district court must modify the injunction to instruct Indiana to treat the Alliance’s South Bend facility as though it were provisionally licensed. View "Whole Woman's Health Alliance v. Hill" on Justia Law

Simon was stopped for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A drug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car. Officers searched it. They did not find drugs, but found a gun. The government charged Simon as a felon-in-possession. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Simon’s motions for recusal, suppression, and supplementation. The court rejected an argument that the judge should have recused himself because, before he was a judge, he supervised a prior prosecution of Simon. The district court properly assessed credibility and found that the officers had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and did not prolong the stop to allow for the dog sniff. The mere absence of drugs does not undermine the probable cause to search for drugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place. The judge conducted the proper Harris evaluation and concluded the dog’s satisfactory certification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his alert. The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion to supplement the record, after the denial of the suppression motion, with a nighttime video. The nighttime video would not capture the actual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified about how close Simon was to the intersection when he signaled. View "United States v. Simon" on Justia Law

Adams, his girlfriend, Brandon, and another person were stopped for speeding. Adams was the subject of anonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house and had a previous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The third person was also the subject of anonymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding arrest warrants. During the traffic stop, the deputy smelled marijuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found a meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and marijuana. Brandon, after receiving Miranda warnings, told the deputy that additional drug paraphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine pipes were at Adams’ house; that she also stayed in the house; and that she had been there earlier that day. She described the house’s layout, Adams’ bedroom, the gun, and paraphernalia. The police obtained a state-court search warrant, which they executed the same day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a locked plastic gun case that Brandon had described, a handgun, and loaded magazines. Adams later admitted that Brandon bought the gun for him. Charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Adams unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The issuing judge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause” and, if “it didn’t ... there is good faith.” The district court properly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into account his prior drug conspiracy conviction. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 2007, Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 34 years in prison. Campbell has gender dysphoria; she is biologically male but identifies as female. Department of Corrections (DOC) medical staff treat Campbell’s condition with hormone therapy. Beginning in 2013, Campbell repeatedly requested sex-reassignment surgery. National standards of care recommend that patients undertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of their self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible surgery, which presents challenges in sex-segregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside expert, who determined that Campbell was a potential surgical candidate if DOC officials developed a safe, workable solution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these concerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s request. After exhausting administrative remedies, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields public officials from suits for damages unless precedent clearly puts them on notice that an action is unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare professionals to exercise medical judgment when making decisions about an inmate’s treatment; they cannot completely deny care for a serious medical condition. Those broad principles could not have warned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender dysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring consideration of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution. The defendants followed accepted medical standards and are immune from damages liability. View "Campbell v. Kallas" on Justia Law

Landlords challenged a Hammond ordinance that they either obtain a city license or hire licensed contractors to perform repairs and renovations to their properties. Obtaining a license involves a test, payment of a fee, and a criminal background check. The ordinance does not apply to individual homeowners working on the properties in which they reside. On summary judgment, the district court rejected their argument that the ordinance impermissibly burdens owners who do not reside in Hammond. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ordinance does not discriminate against non-residents and is supported by a rational basis. The court noted the significant differences between resident owners and landlords and the city’s interests in safety and the habitability of dwellings. View "Regan v. City of Hammond" on Justia Law

Clark was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), having been found in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture of heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags. He appealed the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challenging the search warrant; the denial of his motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing; the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug distribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his Wisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit vacated Clark’s conviction and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his Franks challenge. Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant need only make a substantial preliminary showing that the warrant application contained a material falsity or omission that would alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination and that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted information intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Clark asserted that the police investigator who applied for the warrant deliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affecting the credibility of the unidentified informant who told police about drug distribution at the hotel. Here, the foundation for probable cause independent of the credibility of the informant was so meager that the informant's credibility was material for Franks purposes. The police had provided no information about the informant’s credibility. The court rejected Clark's other claims. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law