Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin inmate Glover sued prison medical staff and Department of Corrections officials for deliberate indifference and for violating his right to equal protection after they denied him medicine prescribed for post‐surgical erectile dysfunction, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Glover alleges that treatment of his erectile dysfunction following his prostate cancer surgery was necessary for penile rehabilitation and time-sensitive because he was at risk of suffering permanent loss of erectile function if his condition was left untreated for too long following surgery. Glover unsuccessfully moved to substitute the Department’s new medical director, Dr. Holzmacher, as a defendant. The court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court abused its discretion by not allowing Glover to amend his complaint: “It is difficult to see why, under these circumstances, it would not be in the interest of justice for Glover to be able to sue the person that all agree is responsible for denying him access to Cialis.” The defendants argued that, absent precedent specifically recognizing that erectile dysfunction is a serious medical need, it would not have been clear to Holzmacher that the prison was obligated to heed the advice of Glover’s off‐site urologist and prison physician and approve a Cialis prescription; the court declined to resolve the matter of qualified immunity. The answer to the question is not so obvious that permitting Glover to bring Holzmacher into the case would necessarily constitute a futile act. View "Glover v. Carr" on Justia Law

Pontiac inmate Robertson was held in isolation, allegedly in deplorable conditions, for several days before he attempted suicide. He filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a motion, seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). He claimed he had no assets other than $219 in his prison account and no income except an occasional allowance from his mother. The court granted the motion. Years later, days before trial, the state moved to dismiss his case because he had failed to disclose in his IFP affidavit that the state had agreed to pay him $4,000 to settle previous cases. Robertson actually received the money about a year after filing the affidavit. In addition, the prison never sent the required filing fee. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), requires only disclosure of assets that may currently be used to pay the filing fee, and in the alternative, even if expected payments should have been included, the affidavit is “untrue” only if the prisoner’s statement was a deliberate misrepresentation. View "Robertson v. French" on Justia Law

In 2011, Dotson was indicted for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The indictment listed six prior felony convictions and alleged that Dotson qualified for the 15-year minimum sentence mandated in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR identified three convictions as qualifying for ACCA enhancement (Indiana armed robbery, dealing in cocaine, and attempted robbery) but was silent on whether any of Dotson’s other convictions (Indiana burglary, marijuana possession, and theft and receipt of stolen property) qualified. Nobody raised the issue. The district court sentenced Dotson as a career offender to 188 months and denied his subsequent post-conviction petition, finding that Dotson had four qualifying ACCA predicates—the three originally designated as such in the PSR plus one for burglary. After the district court’s decision, one of the predicates the PSR originally determined qualified under ACCA (attempted robbery) was eliminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government can save the enhanced sentence by substituting another of Dotson’s convictions—one listed in the PSR as part of Dotson’s criminal history but not designated as or found to be an ACCA predicate at sentencing. The court reasoned that the substituted conviction included in the indictment and the PSR and Dotson recognized in legal filings and apparently believed that his burglary conviction had served as an ACCA predicate at his sentencing. View "Dotson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Martinez was shot dead. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Hartsfield's convictions for first-degree murder and home invasion. Hartsfield claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, insisting that he repeatedly told counsel that he wished to testify, that counsel asked his mother to “convince” him not to testify, and counsel told Hartsfield that he would “get his chance” when the judge admonished him about his right to testify, but the judge never did that. Hartsfield claims counsel “shushed” him. Hartsfield’s mother supported his statements. The Illinois court affirmed the dismissal of Hartsfield’s postconviction petition, applying the “Strickland” standard and finding that counsel made “a tactical decision,” that Hartsfield was aware that testifying was ultimately his decision, and that Hartsfield’s failure to contemporaneously assert his right barred his claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Hartsfield’s federal habeas petition, first agreeing that the “Strickland” standard applied to the allegation. Without clearly established federal law, it is not clear that the Illinois court unreasonably decided that Hartsfield did not meet his burden of proving that his attorney actually prohibited his testimony. It is not reasonably probable that his proposed testimony would have affected the verdict. Two eyewitnesses placed Hartsfield at the scene of the crime, armed with a weapon and a motive. Hartsfield’s comments later that night further implicated him. Hartsfield’s uncorroborated story, that he was alone, driving around during the time of the murder, is “little more than a generic denial of guilt," insufficient to establish prejudice. View "Hartsfield v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

The defendants each pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and supervised release. Before their hearings, both received PSRs that proposed a supervised release condition providing that they “not patronize any taverns, bars, liquor stores, nightclubs or other establishments where the primary item of sale is alcohol.” Both objected in writing to certain supervised release conditions, one contending that an alcohol condition was unnecessary; neither raised a concern that the alcohol condition was unconstitutionally vague. At their sentencings, both defendants confirmed that they had read their PSRs, reviewed the reports with their counsel, and waived an oral reading of the proposed conditions. Neither challenged the alcohol condition as vague. The Seventh Circuit upheld the condition, finding the argument waived. A defendant waives an objection to a condition of supervised release when he has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and asserts (through counsel or directly) that he does not object to the proposed conditions, waives reading of those conditions and their justifications, challenges certain conditions but not those challenged on appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic decision not to object. This is not the “rare and limited instance” when a court may overlook a waiver because the challenged condition concerns activity protected by the First Amendment. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

After a 2005 home invasion, Cook and Egerson were charged with armed robbery, armed burglary, false imprisonment, battery, theft, and mistreatment of an animal causing death. Cook claimed that Hall, not Cook, was Egerson’s accomplice. He was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit granted Cook habeas relief. Applying the “Strickland” standard, Cook demonstrated that Wisconsin’s court of appeals unreasonably assessed his contention that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. In a trial that the presiding judge later characterized as unworthy of confidence, Cook’s attorney failed to locate or produce Hall, a long‐time friend of Egerson, friends with two women accomplices, and ex‐boyfriend of the victims’ daughter. Hall resembles Cook in appearance. The court also noted counsel’s failure to object to hearsay testimony, unsupported by a proper foundation, about cell phone records; failure to bring out the de facto immunity given the women accomplices in exchange for their testimony; failure to object to a victim’s unanticipated in‐court identification of Cook; withdrawal of question to an accomplice about Hall’s possession of a gun immediately before the crimes; and failure to object to testimony that Cook temporarily discontinued his police interrogation. To establish prejudice, Cook did not need to prove “that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case” but only had to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. View "Cook v. Foster" on Justia Law

Before 2008, Cook County ordinances required the Assessor to assess single-family residential property at 16%, commercial property at 38%, and industrial property at 36% of the market value. In 2000-2008, the Assessor actually assessed most property at rates significantly lower than the ordinance rates. In 2008, the Assessor proposed to “recalibrate” the system. The plaintiffs claim that their assessment rates may have been lawful but were significantly higher than the actual rates for most other property owners and that they paid millions of dollars more in taxes in 2000-2008 than they would have if they were assessed at the de facto rates. The taxpayers exhausted their remedies with the Board of Review, then filed suit in state court, citing the Equal Protection Clause, Illinois statutory law and the Illinois Constitution. Years later, their state suit remains in discovery.Claiming that Illinois law limits whom they can name as a defendant, what evidence they can present, and what arguments they can raise, the taxpayers filed suit in federal district court, which held that the Tax Injunction Act barred the suit. The Act provides that district courts may not “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State,” 28 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the County’s concession that Illinois’s tax-objection procedures do not allow the taxpayers to raise their constitutional claims in state court. This is the “rare case in which taxpayers lack an adequate state-court remedy.” View "A.F. Moore & Associates, Inc. v. Pappas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, credentialed election monitors in Chicago during the 2016 Illinois primary election and a citizen who voted in the election, alleged that during the statutorily mandated post-election audit of electronic voting machines, they witnessed rampant fraud and irregularities by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners’ employees conducting the audit. The Illinois Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/1-1, provides for electronic voting, with a permanent paper record. After an election, the Board randomly tests five percent of the electronic voting equipment in service during that election by manually counting the votes marked on the permanent paper record for comparison to the electronically-generated results. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the post-election audit fraud violated their right to vote. Illinois law expressly precludes the findings of the post-election audit from changing or altering the election results; no matter how improper the Board employees’ conduct was during the audit, it could not have affected the Plaintiffs’ right to vote. Plaintiffs did not plead a plausible claim that the Board violated their right to freely associate or right to petition the government View "Shipley v. Chicago Board of Elections" on Justia Law

LaBrec, an inmate at a maximum-security institution, with a history that included prior assaults on inmates and staff, was transferred to the Restricted Housing Unit and was placed in a cell with McNeely, who was in the Unit following an assault on his prior cellmate. LaBrec was designated a “pair with care” inmate; Psychological Services were supposed to be consulted prior to assigning a cellmate. LaBrec informed the staff repeatedly of that status and was allowed to see Dr. Persike in Psychological Services. LaBrec informed Persike that McNeely was talking about beating up his last cellmate and that LaBrec did not feel safe with McNeely. LaBrec continued to ask to be moved, complaining did not feel safe. At one point he had an anxiety attack and began crying and asking for help. LaBrec was not reassigned. Three days after the cell assignment, McNeely stabbed LaBrec with a pen behind his ear, in the back, and in his shoulder. The district court rejected LaBrec’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to some defendants who were unaware of surrounding circumstances that could render plausible LaBrec’s claim of a threat to his safety. The court reversed with respect to others; a jury could reasonably infer that those defendants possessed a subjective awareness of a serious risk to LaBrec and failed to take the minimal, reasonable action of inquiring further and investigating the situation. View "Labrec v. Walker" on Justia Law

Censke sought to bring a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit for injuries he says he suffered at the hands of Indiana federal prison guards. The FTCA required Censke to give notice in writing to the Bureau of Prisons within two years of the incident, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), by sending form SF-95 to the regional office in which the injury happened. The Bureau considers claims filed when first received by any of its offices. Censke moved prisons six times in the two years following the alleged incident and lost access to his legal materials. He contends that the prison staff ignored his requests for an SF-95 form. When he got the form, he was in Kentucky. Censke asked the staff for the address of the Bureau’s North Central Regional Office. He says they refused to help. Nine days before the end of the limitations period, Censke placed his SF-95 form in the outgoing mail, addressed to the Bureau's Central Office in Washington, D.C. The Bureau stamped it as received at the North Central Regional Office on February 16, 2016—over two months after Censke put it in the mail. The Bureau denied the claim on the merits, without mentioning timeliness. Censke filed suit under the FTCA. The court concluded that the mailbox rules apply and rejected Censke’s arguments for equitable tolling and delayed accrual. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The prison-mailbox rule applies to administrative filings under the FTCA. View "Censke v. United States" on Justia Law