Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two female Polk County Jail inmates endured repeated sexual assaults by correctional officer Christensen. The County’s written policy prohibited sexual contact between inmates and guards but failed to address the prevention and detection of such conduct. The County did not provide meaningful training on the topic. Near the beginning of the relevant period, the County learned that another guard made predatory sexual advances toward a different female inmate. The County imposed minor discipline on the guard but made no institutional response—no review of its policy, no training, and no communication with inmates on how to report such abuse. In a civil rights suit, the jury returned verdicts for the inmates. A Seventh Circuit panel overturned the verdict against Polk County, determining that the evidence failed to meet the “Monell” standard for municipal liability.On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the verdicts against both Christensen and Polk County. While the standard for municipal liability is demanding, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The evidence did not require the jury to accept as inevitable that Christensen’s conduct was unpreventable, undetectable, and incapable of giving rise to Monell liability. Nor was the jury compelled to conclude that the sexual abuse had only one cause. The law allowed the jury to consider the evidence in its entirety, use its common sense, and draw inferences to decide for itself. View "J.K.J. v. Christensen" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that Chicago is entitled to limit sales on the streets adjacent to Wrigley Field, home of the Chicago Cubs, but remanded a magazine seller’s contention that an ordinance requiring all peddlers to be licensed was invalid because of an exception for newspapers. Before the judge acted on remand, Chicago amended its ordinance to provide: It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of a peddler without first having obtained a street peddler license under this chapter. Provided, however, a street peddler license is not required for selling, … only newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, or other similar written materials on the public way. There is no distinction between newspapers and magazines. Left Field Media withdrew its request for an injunction but sought damages to compensate for injury before the amendment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for want of a justiciable controversy. Left Field did not show any injury. It did not assert other costs, such as overtime wages or legal fees incurred to attempt to get a license. Because Left Field has not offered details, it would not be possible to conclude that it suffered even a dollar in marginal costs. View "Left Field Media LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hoglund and Mallot's daughter, A.H., was born in 1998. A.H. twice told her mother her father was molesting her. Mallot went to the police after Hoglund admitted he committed adultery. Detective Holliday interviewed A.H. in 2006. She said her father had her perform oral sex on him. Dr. Butler examined A.H. Hoglund denied the allegations but made strange and incriminating statements. Indiana charged him with child molesting. A.H. met with Counselor Shestak in 2007 and Dr. Mayle in 2009. At trial in 2010, A.H. testified; Butler, Shestak, and Mayle relayed what A.H. told them and essentially said they believed her. A jury found Hoglund guilty.After exhausting state proceedings, Hoglund filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object properly to hearsay when the prosecutor asked the experts to say what A.H. said. The prosecutor invoked the medical exception under Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(4); defense counsel failed to assert the lack of a foundation that A.H. thought she was speaking to the experts for diagnosis or treatment. He also claimed the admission of the experts’ vouching violated due process. Indiana precedent at that time allowed limited, indirect vouching. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Defense counsel was deficient but did not prejudice Hoglund. Even without the objectionable hearsay, the case against Hoglund was strong. The vouching did not produce a significant likelihood an innocent person was convicted. View "Hoglund v. Neal" on Justia Law

James, a pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail, was assaulted by another inmate and suffered severe facial injuries. James filed a pro se civil-rights lawsuit against Hale, the jail infirmary's administrator, accusing her of inadequately treating his medical needs. He later acquired counsel. Significant discovery followed, including the production of jail infirmary and outside medical records that contradicted allegations in his complaint. James obtained leave to file an amended complaint, but the factual section simply repeated the allegations in the original version. In a subsequent deposition, James contradicted those factual assertions.When Hale moved for summary judgment, James responded by swearing out an affidavit incorporating by reference the allegations in the amended complaint. The magistrate disregarded the affidavit and an affidavit submitted by James’s mother and recommended that the court grant the motion. The district judge excluded the affidavits under the sham-affidavit rule and entered summary judgment for Hale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. James’s affidavit was a sham and an improper attempt to convert the complaint's allegations into sworn testimony to avert summary judgment. The exclusion of his mother’s affidavit was harmless error because she added nothing of substance. The constitutional claim lacks factual support, so summary judgment in Hale’s favor was proper. View "James v. Hale" on Justia Law

Fredrickson, in pre-trial federal custody, unsuccessfully sought release under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142 asserting that conditions existed to ensure that he would not be a flight risk or a threat to the public. Five months later Fredrickson filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Fredrickson then sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that the court wrongly denied him release on bond and that he was denied effective assistance by counsel who allowed his bail hearing to be delayed and then failed to appeal. He also challenged the determination that his notice of appeal was untimely, arguing that the Bail Reform Act permits him to appeal his detention at any time.The district court dismissed the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that in January 2020 Fredrickson was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 2020; he faces a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The district court appropriately refused to entertain the request for pretrial release in his section 2241 petition. A federal detainee’s request for release pending trial can be considered under only the Bail Reform Act, which created a comprehensive scheme to control pretrial release or detention decisions. No authority allows a detainee to contest pretrial detention through a section 2241 petition simply because he missed the deadline to appeal. View "Fredrickson v. Terrill" on Justia Law

Officer Garrison encountered Gibson, a suspected drug trafficker, walking with a companion. Although initially a consensual encounter, Garrison questioned Gibson and his companion and briefly detained Gibson. After Gibson and his companion departed, Garrison spotted a methamphetamine pipe under his patrol vehicle. Local law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of Gibson’s vehicle in the curtilage of his driveway. A drug detection dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in the vehicle, though nothing was found. Earlier that day, Gibson’s wife had met with DEA agents to tell them about methamphetamine inside the home. Police used information Mrs. Gibson had provided to obtain a search warrant. The search of the home uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, currency, and AK-47 rifles, which led to Gibson’s arrest. Gibson moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search, alleging he was detained without reasonable suspicion, unlawfully frisked, arrested without probable cause, stopped without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop exceeded a permissible scope. Upon learning of his wife’s cooperation, Gibson also argued her statement was insufficiently attenuated to justify the search warrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Mrs. Gibson’s voluntary statement with DEA agents was independently sufficient to sustain findings of probable cause and sufficiently attenuated from subsequent events to preclude suppression. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Following a 1992 fight that involved Johnson, Herron, and Walker, two shooters shot the three men. Johnson survived. In the hospital, Johnson described a shooter by the street name “Duke,” where Duke lived, and Duke's car. Johnson identified Duke and his accomplice from a photo array. Police pulled over a vehicle matching Johnson’s description and arrested the driver, Kirkman, and the passenger, who matched the general description of the second shooter. Kirkman had a tattoo of Duke on his arm. Police took additional photos and presented a second photo array to Johnson, who identified them as the shooters. At trial, Johnson identified Kirkman and his passenger as the shooters. There was disputed testimony about the cause of the fight. Convicted of murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, Kirkman was sentenced to life in prison.Johnson had a change of heart and submitted an affidavit, identifying Ford and an unknown man as the shooters. At Kirkman’s post-conviction hearing, Johnson testified that he and his family had been threatened. Other testimony was inconsistent with Johnson’s. Illinois courts denied post-conviction relief, finding that Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. Johnson later pleaded guilty for perjury but failed to specify which statement was false. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Illinois courts found Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. An evidentiary hearing satisfied Kirkman’s due process rights. The Illinois trial court’s determination defeated Kirkman’s innocence and perjured testimony claims. View "Kirkman v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In December 2012, Chicago Police officers responded to an anonymous call reporting a Hispanic man in a black sweater and black hat, carrying a bag, and climbing under a warehouse fence. They found someone who matched the description. After stopping and frisking him, they determined he was not engaged in any crime. Howell, walking toward the police, was white and wearing a black jacket and dark hat. When an officer approached to speak to him, Howell did not answer, looked panicked, and put his hands in his pockets. The officer patted Howell down and found a gun in his jacket. A federal gun charge followed. Howell unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of his suppression motion and vacated his conviction for possessing that gun. The court noted that the facts in the pretrial record differed significantly from those presented at trial, where the arresting officer testified that he decided to proceed with the pat-down only after Howell ignored a directive to remove his hands from his pockets. Viewing the pretrial record as a whole, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Howell. The court did not reverse Howell’s conviction on a second gun charge that resulted from the execution of a warrant to search Howell’s apartment three months after the initial stop and the ensuing discovery of more guns and ammunition. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Tuduj, having received extensive dental treatment, filed a “deliberate indifference” suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his dentists and prison officials. The court recruited counsel to assist Tuduj in filing an amended complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel defended against two summary judgment motions, one arguing that Tuduj had not exhausted his administrative remedies and another on the meritsWhile the motions were pending, Tuduj moved “for leave to represent himself,” stating that he was “concerned that his counsel has filed a structurally, technically and legally insufficient response doomed to be denied.” He asked to file his own brief, except “in the event this Honorable Court deems counsel’s response … legally sufficient and Grants same[,] Plaintiff would be open to continued effective representation.” A magistrate denied Tuduj’s motion, stating that Tuduj “varie[d] between saying he would like to" represent himself and "indicating that he is happy with counselʹs representation as long as he prevails.” The district judge granted the motions for summary judgment, citing professional judgment and finding “no competent evidence” of any policy that unlawfully influenced dental‐treatment decisions. The Seventh Circuit rejected Tuduj’s argument that the court wrongly denied his “unqualified” right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. 1654, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the Seventh Amendment. The district court permissibly denied his equivocal request. View "Tuduj v. Newbold" on Justia Law

In 2011, Illinois prisoner Williams was diagnosed with a left-eye cataract. He became completely blind in that eye and experienced dizziness, acute pain, photophobia, and the feeling that some foreign substance was in his eye. His doctors recommended cataract extraction surgery; without this common operation, they would be unable to detect other vision-threatening conditions. Wexford, which provides prison health services, refused to authorize the surgery, based on its “one good eye” policy. In February 2016, an optometrist diagnosed a right-eye cataract and a possible macular hole and vitreomacular traction. Weeks later, a specialist recommended cataract extraction. Doctors found no vision in Williams’s left eye and cataracts in both eyes. Still, he did not qualify for surgery.In February 2016, Williams filed a grievance form, checking a box indicating an emergency. Pontiac’s warden responded by checking a box: “an emergency is not substantiated. Offender should submit this grievance in the normal manner.” Williams asserts that the Administrative Review Board (ARB). denied his grievance. Williams filed a second grievance in August; the warden denied emergency status. The ARB returned the grievance to Williams without addressing the merits. It checked boxes indicating that Williams had not satisfied the requirements of the standard procedure; he was required to provide responses from his counselor and others. Williams filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, stating that Williams “did not file a standard grievance" after the denials of emergency status, thereby failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Williams did enough to satisfy the PLRA. View "Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law