Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wilborn was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2004 murder of a rival gang member in Chicago and was sentenced to 30 years, plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm. After exhausting state remedies, he sought federal habeas relief. He claimed that trial counsel’s promises during opening arguments amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel indicated multiple times that Wilborn’s co-defendant, Jenkins, would testify to shooting the victim. During the trial, however, Jenkins changed his proposed testimony and defense counsel determined Jenkins would no longer be credible. Wilborn agreed with this recommendation on the record.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Wilborn’s representation did not contain serious errors amounting to a deprivation of a fair trial; unforeseen situations may arise during trial. Counsel’s failure to present Jenkins to the jury or present testimonial evidence does not rise to the level of prejudice under Strickland. Promising the jury it will hear testimony that Wilborn did not participate in the crime does not necessarily create prejudice. View "Wilborn v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1998, Long, age 16, got into Purkey’s truck. Purkey, 46, threatened her with a knife and drove her across the state line to his home, where he raped her and ultimately killed her. Purkey dismembered Long’s body and burned the pieces. He dumped the remains into a septic lagoon. Later in 1998, he killed 80-year-old Bales. He was caught. While awaiting trial, Purkey contacted Detective Howard about Long and insisted that an FBI agent come along because he thought that if he were convicted on federal charges, he could serve a life sentence in a federal facility. Purkey confessed to killing Long, took them to the crime scene, and gave handwritten confessions. Howard and Tarpley denied that any deal was on the table. After Purkey pleaded guilty to the Bales murder, he was indicted for Long's kidnapping, rape, and murder. Purkey had repeatedly confessed to kidnapping Long; his defense was that he thought she was a prostitute who willingly accompanied him and that he had fabricated the kidnapping claim to be prosecuted in federal court. Defense counsel did not object to the use of his confessions to refute that story. A jury voted for a death sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and several alleged violations of his due process rights--government misconduct during the trial, insufficient evidence to find kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, and error in the jury’s failure to address the question of mitigating evidence. View "Purkey v. United States" on Justia Law

Police dispatch reported three black males armed with guns selling drugs in front of a residence in Chicago’s Lawndale neighborhood, a high-crime area; one of the men was wearing a white shirt, another wearing a red shirt, and the third wearing a boot-style leg cast. Officers Mukite and Collins responded. Passing Douglas Park, about one block from the reported address, they saw multiple black males wearing red and white shirts. The officers approached the group. Collins saw Wilson grab a bulge in the front pocket of his athletic/mesh shorts and sit down facing away from them, on the fringe of the group. Wilson wore a blue shirt. Collins walked around to see if Wilson was wearing a cast (he was not). Collins asked Wilson to stand up and made a corresponding hand gesture. Wilson rose and sprinted away instantly. Mukite chased and tackled him. While on the ground, Wilson indicated that he had a gun on his person. The officers searched him and found a loaded revolver. Wilson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of his motion to suppress the gun. Considering the totality of the circumstances—and Wilson’s flight especially—Wilson’s seizure was supported by the officers’ reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

An Indiana prison disciplinary board concluded that Crawford had participated in an “unauthorized financial transaction” by telling Wolf, a fellow inmate, to send $400 to his mother, Crawford. Wolf sent the check, which Crawford cashed. Wolf told prison officials that the payment covered the cost of drugs that Crawford had supplied. The prison’s Code B-220 bans possessing materials for, or engaging in, “unauthorized financial transactions”. Section IX of the Inmate Trust Fund Policy supplies this definition of unauthorized financial transactions: “attempting or completing financial transactions, including the sending of monies from one offender to another or the sending of monies from the family/friends of one offender to another.” Crawford claimed that the payment was for a car that Wolf’s aunt and Wolf’s daughter were buying. The prison penalized Crawford by the loss of 30 days’ good-time credit. The district judge directed Indiana to restore the 30-day credit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The phrase “financial transactions” is broad, but broad differs from inscrutable. The rule is sweeping, not vague. View "Crawford v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

Wisconsin previously had registration deputies, who registered voters at places such as high schools. Municipalities could require landlords to distribute registration forms to new tenants. The state replaced these mechanisms with an electronic registration system that requires proof of residence in either electronic or hard-copy format, with special provisions for students in dormitories. To vote for an office other than President or Vice President, voters must have been residents for at least 28 days. Absentee ballots may be picked up in person, or the state will mail one; email and fax can be used to obtain a ballot in only a few circumstances. Wisconsin will reject an absentee ballot for spoilage, damage, or defective certification that is visible without opening the ballot. Voting a straight ticket is no longer possible. Photographic identification is necessary for in-person voting. People who lack the documents required to receive a photo ID may petition the state for assistance and a temporary receipt.After consolidating challenges, the Seventh Circuit held that the adjustments to the number of days and hours for in-person absentee voting, the state’s durational residence requirement, and the prohibition on sending absentee ballots by email or fax do not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. The court vacated orders related to the one-location rule and the ID petition process. Wisconsin’s studentID provision is invalid. The court reversed an injunction requiring Wisconsin to implement an affidavit option. View "Frank v. Evers" on Justia Law

Alkhalidi was convicted of murder, robbery, and theft. He appealed, claiming that his attorney failed to advise him of a plea offer. The Indiana state court denied relief, holding Alkhalidi’s innocence claim strongly indicated he would not have accepted the plea deal. The state court also held that Indiana requires a defendant to admit a plea deal’s factual basis otherwise the trial court would be prevented from entering the plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Alkhalidi’s petition for habeas corpus relief. Alkhalidi is unable to show prejudice; he failed to show the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or that the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). View "Alkhalidi v. Neal" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Department of Corrections policy requires that transgender prisoners taking cross-gender hormones, like Balsewicz, shower separately from inmates who are not transgender or intersex. Balsewicz complained that inmates who were not transgender or intersex were allowed to shower with those who were and identified Rivers as one of those inmates, believing Rivers falsely claimed to be transgender to receive single-cell housing. Rivers and Balsewicz were in a shower house with other inmates. Rivers made threats. Balsewicz reported the incident to Sergeant Pawlyk and repeatedly asked Pawlyk to report her concerns for her personal safety. Other inmates witnessed this interaction. Pawlyk took no action. Two days later, when Rivers and Balsewicz were leaving a dining hall, Rivers without any provocation or warning, punched Balsewicz multiple times in the head. Balsewicz collapsed, lost consciousness, and experienced dizziness and numbness in her face.Balsewicz filed suit against Pawlyk under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment favoring Pawlyk. When a prison official knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm, the Eighth Amendment requires that official to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. A reasonable juror could conclude that the threat Balsewicz reported would not expire once the inmates left the shower and that Pawlyk knew Balsewicz faced an ongoing risk of serious harm. Pawlyk is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Balsewicz v. Pawlyk" on Justia Law

During Ramirez’s 2001 Wisconsin state court trial, the prevailing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was that a defendant had no confrontation right to cross-examine an unavailable declarant if the declarant’s statements were adequately reliable, which could be established where the statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Applying hearsay exceptions, the court admitted several out-of-court statements accusing Ramirez of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter. The jury convicted Ramirez of multiple counts relating to the sexual assaults.In 2004, while Ramirez’s conviction was pending on direct review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a declarant if the declarant’s statements were “testimonial”—e.g., were statements that the declarant “would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Ramirez urged his lawyer, Hackbarth, to raise a confrontation claim under Crawford. Hackbarth instead raised other claims, each of which Wisconsin state courts rejected. Ramirez filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that Hackbarth’s representation was ineffective based on her omission of the confrontation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in granting relief. An attorney exercising reasonable professional judgment would have recognized that the confrontation claim was clearly stronger than the claims Hackbarth raised. Raising a confrontation claim while Ramirez’s conviction was pending on direct review would have given him a reasonable chance of prevailing. View "Ramirez v. Tegels" on Justia Law

Detective Mings submitted an affidavit relating that an informant had been inside PaWon’s home and seen him take a retail quantity of methamphetamine from his safe. The affidavit did not discuss the informant’s criminal history, his likely motivation for cooperation (lenience on pending charges), or his reliability. It contained some facts that corroborated his story, though many of those facts could have been learned by someone who had not been inside PaWon’s home. The informant’s statements were not recorded or transcribed. The state judge issued a warrant. The police found what they went looking for. At a hearing on PaWon’s motion to suppress, the informant did not appear and Mings had little memory of what was said in state court. The federal judge proceeded as if the informant had not testified and deemed the affidavit alone insufficient to establish probable cause but concluded that the police were entitled to rely on the warrant. After pleading guilty, PaWon was sentenced to 76 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It would not have been impossible for an officer to have “an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Nor would every reasonable officer believe that unrecorded oral presentations to a judge must be ignored. A federal court must assume the state judge was doing his job, absent contrary evidence, and would have issued a warrant only after finding that probable cause existed under the governing precedents. View "United States v. Patton" on Justia Law

In 2003, McNair was sentenced for drug crimes. The court placed his Criminal History at Category II based on an Indiana conviction for driving without a license, calculated his Guidelines range at 324-405 months, and imposed a 360-month sentence, declining to consider McNair’s argument that his conviction was invalid. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2005 McNair sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, again disputing the state conviction. The court denied relief, reasoning that he needed to contest that conviction in state court. McNair's subsequent motions were dismissed as unauthorized successive collateral attacks. In 2017 McNair’s Indiana conviction was vacated.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of McNair’s subsequent federal petition. A section 2255 petition based on the vacatur of a state conviction may be maintained as an “initial” section 2255 motion on the theory that the claim was unripe until the state court acted. Such a petition must be brought within a year of “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” McNair's judgment date was 2003. He first asked the state judiciary for relief in 2007. McNair did not appeal the denial of that motion. For nine years he did nothing in state court. When McNair returned to federal court in 2017, 14 years had passed since the event that requires diligent action. Ignorance of the law does not justify tolling the limitations period. View "McNair v. United States" on Justia Law