Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kizart was driving alone when Officer Russell stopped him for speeding. As they talked, Russell smelled burnt marijuana coming from Kizart’s car. Kizart explained that his brother had smoked marijuana in the car earlier. Russell stated he would search the vehicle, had Kizart step out of the car, patted him down, and found no drugs or weapons. Russell searched the passenger compartment, including areas not in plain view, for several minutes. Russell asked Kizart how to open the trunk. Kizart did not respond and “looked sort of shocked” for about five seconds, making Russell “suspicious.” Russell removed the keys from the ignition and used them to open the trunk. Toward the back of the trunk, he found a backpack with a garbage bag inside, which contained three smaller bags of what appeared to be raw marijuana and a “white, vacuum-packed brick ” that turned out to be methamphetamine. The backpack contained approximately three pounds of marijuana and three pounds of methamphetamine.Charged with possessing marijuana and methamphetamine, each with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(D). Kizart unsuccessfully moved to suppress the drugs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the circumstances, including the smell of burnt marijuana and Kizart’s reaction and behavior when Russell asked Kizart about the trunk, provided probable cause to search his car’s trunk. View "United States v. Kizart" on Justia Law

For nearly a week Lentz feigned ignorance as she pretended to help investigators locate her missing father. Officers soon discovered the father’s decaying body hidden at the office building the two shared. All signs pointed to Lentz as the murderer. Lentz, with her young daughter, voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station under the pretense of follow-up questioning for the investigation. For the first hour and a half, officers asked general questions, like when and where she last saw her father, to commit Lentz to her story. They then took a cigarette break. When the interview resumed, officers read Lentz her Miranda rights and confronted her with the mounting evidence against her. Over the next four hours, Lentz slowly confessed to shooting her father. In the state trial court, Lentz unsuccessfully moved to suppress her videotaped confession. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed her first-degree murder conviction; state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decisions that Lentz was not in custody during the pre-Miranda portion of the questioning and that her confession was not involuntary, despite officers’ comments about her daughter, were not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Lentz v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Cook County, Illinois revised its policies in favor of broader access to pretrial release. The plaintiffs are nine black Chicago residents, arrested and charged with felonies, whom the county trial courts admitted to bail subject to electronic monitoring supervised by the Sheriff. They allege that Cook County Sheriff Dart disagreed with the revised policies, independently reviewed their bail orders, and decided they should not be released on those conditions. They were neither released on monitoring nor left at liberty but remained in jail for about two weeks. Motions for rules to show cause were filed. Two plaintiffs were released in the dead of night, hours before the motion hearings. The district court dismissed most of the plaintiff's civil rights claims.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to proceed on federal constitutional claims for wrongful pretrial detention and denial of equal protection, and on state-law claims for contempt of court. A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to put neutral decision-makers between unchecked official discretion and invasions of private liberty by search or seizure. Once the plaintiffs appeared before the court, probable cause ceased to be a justification for the Sheriff’s unilateral seizure. View "Williams v. Dart" on Justia Law

Sommerfield was born in Germany, where some of his family members had died in concentration camps. He emigrated, settled in Chicago, and joined the police department. His supervisor was Sergeant Knasiak. For years, Sommerfield endured vicious anti-Semitic abuse from Knasiak. After Knasiak insulted the Mexican ethnicity of Sommerfield’s girlfriend, Sommerfield filed a formal complaint register (CR). Two days later, Knasiak accused Sommerfield of insubordination for an unrelated incident, recommending suspension. This was the only CR Knasiak had ever issued. Sommerfield’s five-day suspension was unprecedented for the minor infraction of “failure to report location.” Later Sommerfield was denied a promotion, although he was rated “well-qualified.” Sommerfield sued. The court dismissed Knasiak. Sommerfield won a jury verdict of $30,000 against Chicago.Sommerfield again sued Knasiak and the city in 2008, alleging harassment, discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation based on protected activities. The district court dismissed the claims against the city but awarded Sommerfield $540,000 in punitive damages, $8,703.96 in pre-judgment interest, plus another $54,315.24 in economic damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the evidence was not “overwhelming,” there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Knasiak filed the CR out of discriminatory animus and that Knasiak was the real decision-maker with respect to the adverse actions taken against Sommerfield. Upholding the award of punitive damages, the court stated that, although Knasiak’s harassment never turned physically violent, his conduct was “extremely reprehensible.” View "Sommerfield v. Knasiak" on Justia Law

Wells was sentenced for two drug offenses: two years’ imprisonment for the first and one year for the second, to run consecutively, with credit for pretrial detention: 255 days for the first sentence and 97 days for the second. Wells calculated his term as 734 days: three years (1095 days) less 255 days less 97 days. The Department of Corrections calculated 1095 less 255, disregarding the 97-day credit because it believed that, after his arrest for the second offense (which occurred while he was on bail) Wells had been in custody on both charges simultaneously. Wells filed grievances but was held until the expiration of the 840-day term (less good-time credits). Wells filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. After a trial to determine whether the prison’s records supervisor (Caudill) acted with the mental state required to violate the Eighth Amendment, the court ruled in Caudill’s favor.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument based on Wells’ pro se status. Wells did not seek legal assistance. The district judge did not make a clearly erroneous finding when concluding that Wells had not shown that Caudill acted with the necessary state of mind. The court also noted that Wells received a sentence calculation early in his term. He protested within the prison hierarchy but did not ask a state court to determine the proper release date. View "Wells v. Caudill" on Justia Law

In 2013, LeVan was elected to the office of Milton Township Assessor, displacing his political rival, Earl. Shortly after he took office, LeVan discharged a group of Deputy Assessors who had publicly supported Earl in his run for reelection. The dismissed employees sued LeVan under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Deputy Assessor position is not one for which political affiliation is a valid job requirement, as the position did not authorize the employees to have meaningful input in policy decisions.The district court concluded that LeVan is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Unless political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, the First Amendment forbids government officials from discharging employees based on their political affiliation. Taking as true the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations about the characteristics of the Deputy Assessor position, a reasonable actor in LeVan’s position would have known that dismissing the deputies based on their political affiliation violated their constitutional rights. View "Hanson v. LeVan" on Justia Law

Manuel's disabled cellmate requested a change of rooms and became hostile toward Manuel. Manuel reported this but no action was taken. The cellmate beat Manuel into unconsciousness. Officer Nalley investigated. Manuel submitted a grievance to Counselor Miller. Manuel later filed additional grievances and requested status updates. Miller failed to respond. Manuel filed a civil complaint. Later, an inmate informed prison personnel that Manuel asked him and another inmate to file fraudulent paperwork regarding the attack. The prison filed an incident report and shakedown slip.Two weeks later, Manuel again sought a status update The conversation ended when Miller asked Manuel if he was going to file a grievance against her; he responded “maybe.” Minutes later, Nalley searched Manuel’s cell following the shakedown slip and confiscated a note describing trading and trafficking, forged letters describing the cellmate incident, letters addressed to the court, and a contraband cassette tape. The prison committee found Manuel guilty of forging documents and possessing contraband.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, his 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Miller and Nalley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Manuel needed to furnish evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that his protected speech was at least a motivating factor for Nalley’s response. The suspicious timing of the shakedown shortly after the conversation with Miller is not enough to prove that Nalley was motivated by the protected activity and the shakedown was retaliation. View "Manuel v. Nalley" on Justia Law

Police investigating Vermilion County drug trafficking sent an informant to buy cocaine at Glenn’s home. The transaction was recorded on audio and video. About a month later a state judge put agent Alblinger under oath, took his testimony, and issued a warrant to search Glenn’s home. A search turned up cocaine and guns. Glenn unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant rested on the “controlled buy” plus Alblinger’s testimony that the informant had for more than a decade provided reliable information. Although Alblinger did not reveal whether agents had searched the informant before the transaction, that the informant had a long criminal record and was cooperating to earn lenience, and that the informant’s record of providing accurate information was with the local police rather than with Alblinger personally, the omissions do not negate probable cause. Given the audio and video evidence of the controlled buy, the informant’s reliability and motivations are not material to the existence of probable cause. The passage of time did not render the information stale. In an interview shortly before Alblinger applied for the warrant, Glenn conceded that he sold cocaine from his house, negating any possibility that Alblinger knew that information obtained after the controlled buy implied that Glenn’s house no longer contained cocaine. The delay was intended to prevent Glenn from inferring the informant’s identity. View "United States v. Glenn" on Justia Law

While in a hospital, Mintner entered a coma and seemed on the brink of death. Her blood and urine contained vastly more thallium than the natural concentration. Her fiancé, Fayemi had been providing some of her food, including in the hospital. Seven of Minter’s friends who occasionally ate with her also suffered from thallium poisoning. Her dog died of thallium poisoning after it ate table scraps. Fayemi had purchased enough thallium sulfate to kill about 50 people. Fayemi told the supplier that he needed the substance for research but later asserted that he and Minter wanted it to kill mice, a forbidden use, and that Minter had been careless with the poison. Fayemi often ate at Minter’s house without showing any traces of thallium poisoning. Thallium was found in a salt shaker in Fayemi’s kitchen. Fayemi had threatened to kill Minter if she left him. The jury convicted Fayemi of attempting to murder Minter plus seven counts of aggravated battery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal; a state court rejected a collateral attack.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Fayemi claimed that his lawyer was ineffective by telling the jurors, in his opening statement, that Fayemi would testify that Minter asked Fayemi to get the thallium for her. After the judge decided that some of his prior convictions, plus evidence that he had annotated a book about poisoning people, could come in on cross-examination, counsel persuaded Fayemi not to testify. Fayemi waived that right in open court. The state’s appellate judges reasonably concluded that there was no possibility of prejudice. View "Fayemi v. Roberson" on Justia Law

In 2018, Democrats were elected as the governor and attorney general of Wisconsin, replacing Republicans. Immediately after the election, the Republican-controlled legislature enacted Act 369 and Act 370, which strip the incoming governor and attorney general of various powers and vest legislative committees that remained under Republican control with formerly-executive authority. The changes include prohibiting the governor from re-nominating potential appointees who have been rejected once by the legislature; giving the legislature authority to suspend an administrative rule multiple times; removing the governor’s ability to appoint the CEO of the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation; adding legislative appointees to the Economic Development Corporation; requiring that the attorney general obtain legislative approval before withdrawing from a lawsuit filed by the state government or settling a lawsuit for injunctive relief; and granting the legislature unrestricted rights to intervene in litigation to defend the constitutionality or validity of state law.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs have not pointed to any concrete harms they have suffered or will suffer because of the Acts and are not entitled to any remedy under the Constitution. Any judicial remedy for the alleged harms must come from the courts of Wisconsin. View "Democratic Party of Wisconsin v. Vos" on Justia Law