Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Lee and Kehoe, members of a white supremacist organization, traveled from Washington to the Arkansas home of Mueller, a firearms dealer. After stealing about $30,000 worth of weapons and $50,000 in cash and coins, the two stunned Mueller, his wife, and his eight-year-old daughter and sealed plastic bags over their heads, then threw them into the Illinois Bayou. The bodies were discovered months later. The two were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1). Kehoe’s jury returned a verdict of life in prison. At Lee’s sentencing, prosecutors introduced evidence of his involvement in a 1990 Oklahoma murder; the government’s expert testified that Lee had a test score in the psychopathy range. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Lee’s death sentence. Lee pursued collateral review. The government scheduled Lee’s execution for December 2019. He again sought relief. The district court stayed Lee’s execution.The Seventh Circuit vacated the stay, stating that Lee’s likelihood of success on the merits was “slim” because both claims—Brady claims alleging suppression of exculpatory evidence and Strickland claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel—are “regularly made and resolved under section 2255,” so the remedy cannot be called “inadequate or ineffective” for purposes of the Savings Clause in section 2241. The evidence Lee claims is “newly discovered” was known to him and publicly available in the court record of his Oklahoma murder case. Lee’s execution was rescheduled for July 13, 2020. The judge denied Lee’s Rule 59 motion. The Seventh Circuit denied relief, finding Lee’s arguments frivolous. View "Lee v. Watson" on Justia Law

Illinois permits voters to place initiatives and referenda on both local and statewide ballots but requires proponents to collect a specific number of signatures during a period of 18 months. That period ended for the state on May 3, 2020, and will end for the city on August 3. Plaintiffs filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the state’s requirements are unconstitutional, given the social-distancing requirements adopted by Illinois' Governor during the COVID-19 pandemic. A district judge denied relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that at least one plaintiff (Morgan) had standing because began his petition campaign before filing suit. During most of the time available to seek signatures, Morgan did nothing. The other plaintiffs did not do anything of substance until the suit was filed. They had plenty of time to gather signatures before the pandemic began and are not entitled to emergency relief. The Governor’s orders did not limit their speech. The orders concern conduct, not what anyone may write or say. Although the orders make it hard to obtain signatures, so would the reluctance of people to approach strangers during a pandemic. The federal Constitution does not require any state or local government to put referenda or initiatives on the ballot; if the Governor’s orders, coupled with the signature requirements, amount to a decision to skip all referenda for the 2020 election cycle, there is no federal problem. View "Morgan v. White" on Justia Law

A nurse accused Indiana prisoner Douglas of threatening her in the infirmary. Based on this accusation, Douglas was convicted of a disciplinary offense. Douglas appealed. The prison’s superintendent overturned the conviction about 18 days later for lack of evidence. In the meantime, Douglas was placed in “segregation” housing, lost his job as a “wheelchair pusher,” and stopped receiving wages. After his successful appeal, Douglas was returned to the normal cell block but not to his original cell. Douglas sought return to his old cell, reinstatement to his old job or a better one, and back pay. Douglas eventually received a new job and back pay but he lodged several more grievances. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The district court screened the complaint, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b), and allowed only the First Amendment claim against his casework manager, Reeves, to proceed. Douglas asserted that Reeves punished him for taking his appeal by refusing to restore his benefits. Later, the court granted summary judgment, rejecting that claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could conclude that Reeves inflicted deprivations on Douglas likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in First Amendment activity. View "Douglas v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted in Illinois state court in two separate cases for raping two women and received sentences totaling 66 years’ imprisonment. Williams contends that his defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not only advising him to reject a 41-year plea offer but also failing to inform him of his maximum sentencing exposure if he proceeded to trial in both cases and lost. An Illinois court rejected these claims, concluding that Williams failed to provide any information pertinent to one of the two cases that gave rise to the 41-year plea offer. Without knowing anything about that case, the Illinois court reasoned, there was no way to assess defense counsel’s performance and no way to conclude that Williams received ineffective assistance.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, finding the Illinois court’s conclusion reasonable. The Illinois Appellate Court sensibly concluded that it had too little information to judge the advice Williams received in connection with the 41-year plea offer. Without even a superficial familiarity with one of the cases, a court could not know with confidence that Williams would have accepted a combined 41- year plea. View "Williams v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Wilborn was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2004 murder of a rival gang member in Chicago and was sentenced to 30 years, plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm. After exhausting state remedies, he sought federal habeas relief. He claimed that trial counsel’s promises during opening arguments amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel indicated multiple times that Wilborn’s co-defendant, Jenkins, would testify to shooting the victim. During the trial, however, Jenkins changed his proposed testimony and defense counsel determined Jenkins would no longer be credible. Wilborn agreed with this recommendation on the record.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Wilborn’s representation did not contain serious errors amounting to a deprivation of a fair trial; unforeseen situations may arise during trial. Counsel’s failure to present Jenkins to the jury or present testimonial evidence does not rise to the level of prejudice under Strickland. Promising the jury it will hear testimony that Wilborn did not participate in the crime does not necessarily create prejudice. View "Wilborn v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1998, Long, age 16, got into Purkey’s truck. Purkey, 46, threatened her with a knife and drove her across the state line to his home, where he raped her and ultimately killed her. Purkey dismembered Long’s body and burned the pieces. He dumped the remains into a septic lagoon. Later in 1998, he killed 80-year-old Bales. He was caught. While awaiting trial, Purkey contacted Detective Howard about Long and insisted that an FBI agent come along because he thought that if he were convicted on federal charges, he could serve a life sentence in a federal facility. Purkey confessed to killing Long, took them to the crime scene, and gave handwritten confessions. Howard and Tarpley denied that any deal was on the table. After Purkey pleaded guilty to the Bales murder, he was indicted for Long's kidnapping, rape, and murder. Purkey had repeatedly confessed to kidnapping Long; his defense was that he thought she was a prostitute who willingly accompanied him and that he had fabricated the kidnapping claim to be prosecuted in federal court. Defense counsel did not object to the use of his confessions to refute that story. A jury voted for a death sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and several alleged violations of his due process rights--government misconduct during the trial, insufficient evidence to find kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, and error in the jury’s failure to address the question of mitigating evidence. View "Purkey v. United States" on Justia Law

Police dispatch reported three black males armed with guns selling drugs in front of a residence in Chicago’s Lawndale neighborhood, a high-crime area; one of the men was wearing a white shirt, another wearing a red shirt, and the third wearing a boot-style leg cast. Officers Mukite and Collins responded. Passing Douglas Park, about one block from the reported address, they saw multiple black males wearing red and white shirts. The officers approached the group. Collins saw Wilson grab a bulge in the front pocket of his athletic/mesh shorts and sit down facing away from them, on the fringe of the group. Wilson wore a blue shirt. Collins walked around to see if Wilson was wearing a cast (he was not). Collins asked Wilson to stand up and made a corresponding hand gesture. Wilson rose and sprinted away instantly. Mukite chased and tackled him. While on the ground, Wilson indicated that he had a gun on his person. The officers searched him and found a loaded revolver. Wilson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of his motion to suppress the gun. Considering the totality of the circumstances—and Wilson’s flight especially—Wilson’s seizure was supported by the officers’ reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

An Indiana prison disciplinary board concluded that Crawford had participated in an “unauthorized financial transaction” by telling Wolf, a fellow inmate, to send $400 to his mother, Crawford. Wolf sent the check, which Crawford cashed. Wolf told prison officials that the payment covered the cost of drugs that Crawford had supplied. The prison’s Code B-220 bans possessing materials for, or engaging in, “unauthorized financial transactions”. Section IX of the Inmate Trust Fund Policy supplies this definition of unauthorized financial transactions: “attempting or completing financial transactions, including the sending of monies from one offender to another or the sending of monies from the family/friends of one offender to another.” Crawford claimed that the payment was for a car that Wolf’s aunt and Wolf’s daughter were buying. The prison penalized Crawford by the loss of 30 days’ good-time credit. The district judge directed Indiana to restore the 30-day credit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The phrase “financial transactions” is broad, but broad differs from inscrutable. The rule is sweeping, not vague. View "Crawford v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

Wisconsin previously had registration deputies, who registered voters at places such as high schools. Municipalities could require landlords to distribute registration forms to new tenants. The state replaced these mechanisms with an electronic registration system that requires proof of residence in either electronic or hard-copy format, with special provisions for students in dormitories. To vote for an office other than President or Vice President, voters must have been residents for at least 28 days. Absentee ballots may be picked up in person, or the state will mail one; email and fax can be used to obtain a ballot in only a few circumstances. Wisconsin will reject an absentee ballot for spoilage, damage, or defective certification that is visible without opening the ballot. Voting a straight ticket is no longer possible. Photographic identification is necessary for in-person voting. People who lack the documents required to receive a photo ID may petition the state for assistance and a temporary receipt.After consolidating challenges, the Seventh Circuit held that the adjustments to the number of days and hours for in-person absentee voting, the state’s durational residence requirement, and the prohibition on sending absentee ballots by email or fax do not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. The court vacated orders related to the one-location rule and the ID petition process. Wisconsin’s studentID provision is invalid. The court reversed an injunction requiring Wisconsin to implement an affidavit option. View "Frank v. Evers" on Justia Law

Alkhalidi was convicted of murder, robbery, and theft. He appealed, claiming that his attorney failed to advise him of a plea offer. The Indiana state court denied relief, holding Alkhalidi’s innocence claim strongly indicated he would not have accepted the plea deal. The state court also held that Indiana requires a defendant to admit a plea deal’s factual basis otherwise the trial court would be prevented from entering the plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Alkhalidi’s petition for habeas corpus relief. Alkhalidi is unable to show prejudice; he failed to show the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or that the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). View "Alkhalidi v. Neal" on Justia Law