Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bourgeois was convicted of murder on federal property, 18 U.S.C. 7 and 1111, and sentenced to death after he brutally abused and murdered his two-year-old daughter in 2002. Bourgeois collaterally attacked his death sentence on the ground that he is intellectually disabled, citing the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. 3596(c), and the Supreme Court’s “Atkins” decision (2002). He fully litigated that claim under 28 U.S.C. 2255, then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. To invoke that statute, Bourgeois had to show that his case fit within the “savings clause,” 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). In the district court, Bourgeois accompanied his section 2241 petition with a motion to stay his execution—which the district court granted. The court found that the government had waived its argument that Bourgeois could not channel his FDPA claim through the savings clause.The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Bourgeois does not meet the stringent savings-clause eligibility requirements and that his 2241 petition is procedurally barred. The district court’s factual determination that the government waived its argument was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Even if the government had forfeited its FDPA argument, that forfeiture would not prevent consideration of the savings-clause issue. .The savings clause is not simply another avenue for appeal. Bourgeois had the chance to appeal the court’s denial of his intellectual-disability claim; there was nothing “structurally inadequate or ineffective about section 2255 as a vehicle.” View "Bourgeois v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 1996, Webster was sentenced to death for the murder of a 16-year-old girl. Webster has repeatedly sought relief from that sentence on the ground he advanced at trial—that he is intellectually disabled. In 2009, his lawyers came upon records dating to 1994 from the Social Security Administration showing that three different doctors found him intellectually disabled. In 2015, the Seventh Circuit held that Webster was not barred by the limitations imposed on successive requests for post-conviction relief from seeking to show that he is ineligible for the death penalty based on newly discovered evidence. The court remanded for a determination of whether the Social Security records constituted newly discovered evidence that counsel did not uncover despite diligent efforts.The district court found that Webster’s defense counsel did not discover the Social Security records despite reasonable diligence at the time of trial, held a five-day hearing, and determined that Webster had carried his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision to vacate Webster’s death sentence. Documentary evidence established that defense counsel focused on the possible existence of Social Security records and repeatedly requested them. Having demonstrated substantial deficits in intellectual functioning and adaptive functioning and onset of the deficiencies before the age of 18, Webster has carried his burden of proving that he is intellectually disabled and constitutionally ineligible to remain under a death sentence. View "Webster v. Watson" on Justia Law

Vialva was sentenced to death for murders he committed in 1999. Vialva argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer had a conflict of interest and conducted an inadequate investigation. Vialva maintained that the district judge suffered from alcoholism and should not have been allowed to preside at trial or sentencing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, seeking a stay of his scheduled September 24 execution; 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) provides: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Fifth Circuit resolved Vialva’s contentions under section 2255 by denying his requests for certificates of appealability. The Supreme Court denied Vialva’s petitions for certiorari. He received effective merits decisions. A section 2241 proceeding is not an authorized way to contest the Fifth Circuit's procedures. Vialva does not rely on a new, retroactive legal rule; he does not point to facts that came to light after that decision. The Suspension Clause does not entitle anyone to successive collateral attacks. View "Vialva v. Watson" on Justia Law

Green was visiting a friend at a Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) public housing unit. Hudson, a security guard employed by AGB, attempted to stop and search Green. Hudson subdued Green outside the CHA unit and recovered a handgun before calling the police Green, charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), moved to suppress the gun. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, limiting the issue to whether Hudson had reasonable suspicion to justify the search. The court ruled there was no reasonable suspicion but denied Green’s motion to suppress, reasoning that Green failed to establish that the private security guard was a government agent. Green entered a conditional guilty plea.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hudson was not a state actor who is subject to the Fourth Amendment. Illinois law expressly categorizes CHA’s police powers as distinct from its power to employ security personnel. The CHA-AGB contract labels AGB as an independent contractor to perform security services including ensuring unauthorized people do not enter and reporting incidents to the property manager. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Patrick was convicted of double murder in 1995 and sentenced to life in prison. The convictions were vacated in 2014. The Cook County Circuit Court issued a certificate of innocence. Patrick filed suit for wrongful conviction against seven Chicago police officers and two prosecutors, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. Chicago, also a defendant, stipulated to liability if any of its officers were found responsible for violating Patrick’s rights. A jury exonerated the prosecutors and one officer but found six officers liable and awarded more than $13 million in compensatory damages plus punitive damages.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district judge should have dismissed the case as a sanction for Patrick’s acknowledged perjury during discovery. The judge’s ruling was a reasonable exercise of his discretion. Patrick’s lies concerned peripheral matters and were fully exposed during a rigorous attack on his credibility that emphasized his criminal history and gang affiliation. The admission of the certificate of innocence was not unfairly prejudicial, even in combination with closing argument statements by Patrick’s lawyer. The jury instructions, which failed to explain that Patrick had the burden to prove that the fabricated evidence was used against him at his criminal trial and was material, contained a harmless error. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cook County Jail detainees filed suit after the Jail reported an outbreak of COVID-19, arguing that the Sheriff violated their due process rights by failing to provide them with reasonably safe living conditions. They sought an injunction requiring the Sheriff to implement procedures related to social distancing, sanitation, diagnostic testing, and personal protective equipment for the duration of the pandemic. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, requiring the Sheriff to provide hand sanitizer and soap to all detainees and face masks to detainees in quarantine, and prohibiting the use of a “bullpen” for new detainees. Dismissing the Sheriff’s contention that he faced feasibility limitations on further social distancing, the court later concluded that the detainees were reasonably likely to succeed on their contention that group housing and double-celling is objectively unreasonable, except in certain situations.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in analyzing the issue of group housing and double-celling by failing to consider the Sheriff’s conduct in its totality, failing to afford proper deference to the Sheriff’s judgment in adopting policies necessary to ensure safety and security, and citing an incorrect legal standard when evaluating the likelihood that the claims will succeed on their merits. Regarding the remaining relief, the court made detailed factual findings, properly considered the Sheriff’s conduct in its totality, and closely tailored the relief to CDC guidelines. View "Mays v. Dart" on Justia Law

Marshall worked at the Indiana Department of Corrections for over 20 years. He received good reviews and promotions. He identified as homosexual. He reached the rank of Internal Affairs Investigator. In 2015, he was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Warden Brown issued a written reprimand. In 2016, he attended a law enforcement conference in Indianapolis. A sheriff from another county complained that Marshall became intoxicated at the conference and behaved inappropriately. Marshall denies the allegations. Later that month, Marshall and others confronted Storm—a subordinate directly under Marshall’s supervision—about Storm’s unethical disclosure of confidential investigation materials. The next day, Storm accused Marshall of sexually harassing him twice outside of work. Regional Director Osburn decided to terminate Marshall. At a meeting before the termination, someone said they should be prepared for Marshall to file a complaint with the EEOC. Osburn terminated Marshall and demoted Storm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Marshall’s claims of discrimination based on sexual-orientation discrimination and retaliation. Marshall’s case falters for lack of a similarly situated comparator; there were legitimate issues about whether he was meeting expectations. Marshall’s exposure of Storm’s breach of confidentiality is not protected by Title VII; retaliation for the exposure cannot be Title VII retaliation. View "Marshall v. Indiana Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

During the coronavirus pandemic, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued executive orders designed to limit the virus’s opportunities to spread, similar to orders in other states. Executive Order 2020‐43 (EO43, June 26, 2020), imposing a 50-person cap on gatherings, states: This Executive Order does not limit the free exercise of religion. To protect the health and safety of faith leaders, staff, congregants, and visitors, religious organizations and houses of worship are encouraged to consult and follow the recommended practices and guidelines from the Illinois Department of Public Health.... the safest practices ... are to provide services online, in a drive‐in format, or outdoors (and consistent with social distancing requirements and guidance regarding wearing face coverings), and to limit indoor services to 10 people. Religious organizations are encouraged to take steps to ensure social distancing, the use of face coverings, and implementation of other public health measures. Emergency and governmental functions enjoy the same exemption.The Republican Party challenged the “favored” treatment of religion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Because the exercise of religion involves more than simple speech, the equivalency urged by the Republicans between political speech and religious exercise is a false one. If there were a problem with the religious exercise carve‐out, the state would be entitled to return to a regime in which even religious gatherings are subject to the mandatory cap. View "Illinois Republican Party v. J. B. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Pulliam was arrested after fleeing from two Chicago police officers. During the chase, both officers saw a gun in Pulliam’s hand. Pulliam had previously been convicted of multiple felonies, making it a federal crime for him to possess a gun. Pulliam was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After Pulliam was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (2019), which clarified the elements of section 922(g) convictions; in addition to proving that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, the government must also prove the defendant knew he belonged to “the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” This knowledge-of-status element was not mentioned in the jury instructions at Pulliam’s trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The jury instructions, missing an essential element, constituted plain error, but the error did not seriously affect “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court noted that Pulliam stipulated to his prior felony conviction, has had many convictions, has served prison sentences of more than a year, and ran from police, indicating knowledge of his status. The only potential evidentiary error would be harmless. View "United States v. Pulliam" on Justia Law

Officers Cates and Hannah responded to a call by Lemons. While Lemons was alone with Cates in her home, he sexually assaulted her. Lemons was arrested, then taken to a hospital. A nurse documented swelling on Lemons’ neck and her bloodshot eyes, as evidence that she had been choked. She did not show signs of vaginal trauma or injury. Cates initially denied having sex with Lemons but later admitted to having oral and vaginal sex with Lemons, claiming it was consensual. Cates was charged under 18 U.S.C. 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law) and 18 U.S.C. 942(c) (use of a weapon during a crime of violence). The jury found Cates guilty on the first count and not guilty on the firearm count. By special verdict, the jury found Cates committed aggravated sexual abuse but found Lemons did not suffer bodily injury. Cates was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that the district court had instructed the jury incorrectly on the elements of aggravated sexual abuse by defining “force” to include not just force, but also psychological coercion.Cates was then charged with violation of civil rights under color of law, which again alleged his actions constituted aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a “double jeopardy” motion to dismiss. Cates failed to show the jury decided he did not use force to cause Lemons to engage in sexual acts. A rational jury could conclude that Cates forcibly grabbed Lemons’ neck and continued to squeeze it during the assault without causing her bodily injury, consistent with the jury’s findings. View "United States v. Cates" on Justia Law