Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McIntosh sued Wexford, a private company that provides prison health care, and jail officials for acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. McIntosh alleged that a nurse funneled him unprescribed medication and that staff members failed to prevent him from attempting suicide after he became addicted to the painkillers and suffered from acute mental illness. McIntosh was then a pretrial detainee; his claim arose not under the Eighth Amendment,, but under the Due Process Clause. McIntosh was required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act to exhaust all available administrative remedies. McIntosh claims he timely filed grievances as prescribed by the jail’s procedures but that Sergeant Strubberg told him that the internal administrative process was on hold pending the outcome of a criminal investigation into how he had obtained large quantities of unprescribed pain medication. Wexford and the jail officials claim that McIntosh submitted no grievances. The district court referred the case to a magistrate, who heard testimony from McIntosh and Sergeant Strubberg of the St. Clair County Jail. McIntosh supported his testimony with two affidavits from fellow inmates. The magistrate accepted McIntosh’s version of events. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court erred in rejecting the magistrate’s recommended finding without holding a new hearing upon which to base its own credibility determinations, given that witness credibility weighed heavily in the exhaustion-of-remedies inquiry. View "McIntosh v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

While incarcerated, Howell tore his medial meniscus cartilage and his anterior cruciate ligament (ACL). Five months later, he had surgery to repair the meniscus. It was another 20 months before Howell had surgery to reconstruct his ACL, despite Howell’s continuing pain and efforts to have the surgery sooner. While his requests for the ACL surgery were still being rejected, Howell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment violations. A jury ruled in favor of the physician but against Wexford, a private company that provides medical services at the prison. The court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Wexford.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence about Wexford’s treatment of other incarcerated people. Howell did not show that their situations were fairly comparable to his. The court also did not err in granting Wexford’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. Howell blamed his pain and delayed surgery on Wexford’s “collegial review process,” which requires an off-site Wexford physician to review and approve an on‐site Wexford physician’s recommendation that an incarcerated person be referred to an off‐site healthcare provider. The collegial review process is not unconstitutional on its face, and Howell did not offer evidence that would let a reasonable jury find that the collegial review process caused any violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. View "Larry Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Young drove Hughes to get a haircut. Hughes stated that he had a gun that he was returning to its owner at the barbershop. Young came back hours later. Young did not ask about the gun but believed that Hughes had left it. Chicago police received an anonymous tip that the two were driving around with a gun. Officers spotted the vehicle and saw that Hughes was not wearing a seatbelt. They lawfully stopped the car and approached with guns drawn. Hughes told Young, “take this.” Young replied, “hell no.” Hughes wiped the gun and placed it on the center console. The officers saw this, arrested both men, and learned both were convicted felons. The officers' reports listed Hughes as the gun's possessor and owner. Young was charged as an armed habitual criminal. A judge found probable cause to detain him. Young could not pay the $100,000 bond. Young stayed in pretrial detention for a year before being acquitted. Young sued Chicago and several officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for holding him in pretrial detention without probable cause and ignoring and fabricating evidence to detain him.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of all of his claims. “It does not matter that Young said the gun wasn’t his—protesting innocence is not a get-out-of-pretrial-detention-free card." Nor does it matter that the police allegedly later falsified evidence. They had all the probable cause they needed from the arrest scene. View "Young v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

East Troy police, conducting a “sting” operation, used a confidential informant to lure Juarez-Nieves into delivering cocaine at Roma’s restaurant. Nieves showed up with Davis and Lara, who parked their car in the restaurant lot, next to an empty vehicle. The police arrived in their marked squad car and started to park behind the empty car, Lara began slowly to pull out of his parking spot. Officer Knox had to step aside to avoid the car. As Lara headed for the exit, Deputy Ortiz, standing 50 feet away, fired shots into the car. A shot hit Davis. Lara kept driving for a brief time but crashed the car. The police apprehend Lara and Nieves as they fled on foot. Medical personnel pronounced Davis dead. Davis’s Estate argued that Ortiz’s use of deadly force was unreasonable.The district court found that Ortiz’s testimony was not enough to establish as a matter of law that Ortiz was aiming exclusively for the driver. Instead, Ortiz said that his “intent was to stop the threat that was coming at [him].” The district court found that a jury could conclude that Ortiz was shooting at the car generally and that deadly force was excessive in those circumstances. The court denied Ortiz’s motion for qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Disputes of material fact on which immunity depend must be resolved by the trier of fact. View "Estate of Christopher J. Davis v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

On September 28, 2018, Cheli, a computer system administrative assistant for the District, since 2014, was taken into a meeting with about 25 minutes’ notice. The District’s superintendent and Director of Computer Services terminated Cheli because a female student had alleged that Cheli had sexually harassed her three weeks prior. Cheli denied the allegations. The Board retroactively memorialized Cheli’s termination on October 9, 2018. Cheli never received notice of the Board meeting and did not receive written notice of the charges or the evidence against him but received a notice of termination via certified mail stating that “[t]he basis or grounds for discharge include incompetence.” That notice informed Cheli that he could request the written report. The District did not provide the report upon Cheli’s request.A collective bargaining agreement governed Cheli’s employment and provides for discipline for reasonable cause. An employee is entitled to a conference, attended by a representative of his choice, and a written explanation for the discipline. The District’s Policy Manual, however, contains a provision titled “Employment At-Will.”Cheli sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his procedural due process rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The collective bargaining agreement established that Cheli could not be terminated except “for reasonable cause,” which created a protected property interest for which he was entitled to due process View "Cheli v. Taylorville Community School District" on Justia Law

Each holiday season, Jackson County, Indiana has a lighted Christmas display on the lawn of its historic courthouse. The display comprises a nativity scene, Santa Claus in his sleigh, a reindeer, carolers, and large candy-striped poles. The display has gone up each year since 2003 when the Ministerial Association purchased it; the secular Lion’s Club maintains and installs it. The County supplies electricity for the display. There is evidence that the courthouse had similar displays before 2003. Woodring, a Jackson County resident, sued, arguing that the nativity scene violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The district court permanently enjoined the County from displaying the nativity scene in its current arrangement.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Woodring has standing to sue, but the nativity scene complies with the Establishment Clause. The district court applied the “purpose” and “endorsement” tests that grew out of the Supreme Court’s 1971 "Lemon" decision but the Court’s 2019 "American Legion" decision requires the use of a different, more historical framework. The nativity scene fits within a long national tradition of using the nativity scene in broader holiday displays to celebrate the origins of Christmas—a public holiday. A governmental practice with historical support may be unconstitutional if it is intolerant or discriminatory toward differing views but Woodring supplied no good reason why the County’s nativity scene does not fit within the historical tradition outlined in Lynch. View "Woodring v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

Blake is serving a sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment for cocaine offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence. Five years later, the court rejected Blake’s effort to set aside his sentence on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255.Blake was sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and did not benefit from its changes to the statutes and Sentencing Guidelines for persons convicted of crack cocaine offenses. The First Step Act of 2018 made the 2010 Act retroactively applicable. The district judge concluded that Blake, who has a history of violence, does not deserve a benefit from the 2018 Act.Blake’s lawyer sought leave to withdraw, arguing that the appeal was frivolous. The court granted that motion, rejecting Blake’s opposition, but did not dismiss the appeal. Once the direct appeal is over, the Constitution no longer requires the government to ensure that the defendant has a lawyer. The statute authorizing many retroactive sentencing adjustments, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), is not part of the process of conviction or direct appellate review. Blake is entitled to represent himself or to seek the aid of another lawyer. View "United States v. Blake" on Justia Law

Fisk, an LLC formed in 2018, had two members; one is an attorney. Fisk collaborated with the City of DeKalb regarding the redevelopment of a dilapidated property. Under a Development Incentive Agreement, if Fisk met certain contingencies, DeKalb would provide $2,500,000 in Tax Increment Financing. In 2019, Nicklas became the City Manager and opened new inquiries into Fisk’s financial affairs and development plans. Nicklas concluded Fisk did not have the necessary financial capacity or experience, based on specified factors.Fisk's Attorney Member had represented a client in a 2017 state court lawsuit in which Nicklas was a witness. Nicklas considered funding incentives for other development projects with which, Fisk alleged, Nicklas had previous financial and personal ties.The City Council found Fisk’s financial documents “barren of any assurance that the LLC could afford ongoing preliminary planning and engineering fees,” cited “insufficient project details,” and terminated the agreement. Fisk sued Nicklas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Nicklas sought to retaliate against Fisk and favor other developers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Fisk did not exercise its First Amendment petition right in the 2017 lawsuit. That right ran to the client; Fisk did not yet exist. Fisk had no constitutionally protected property right in the agreement or in the city’s resolution, which did not bind or “substantively limit[]” the city “by mandating a particular result when certain clearly stated criteria are met.” Nicklas had a rational basis for blocking the project, so an Equal Protection claim failed. View "145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas" on Justia Law

E.F.L., a Mexican citizen, has lived in the U.S. for nearly 20 years. She has endured extreme domestic abuse. In 2018, DHS discovered E.F.L.’s undocumented presence, reinstated an earlier removal order, and scheduled her removal. E.F.L. applied for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Convention Against Torture and also filed a self‐petition under the Violence gainst Women Act (VAWA) with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). An IJ and the BIA denied E.F.L.’s application for withholding of removal. The Seventh Circuit declined to review that decision.Although E.F.L.’s VAWA petition remained pending, DHS sought to execute E.F.L.’s removal order. E.F.L. filed a habeas petition, seeking injunctive relief, arguing that DHS would violate the Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act by executing E.F.L.’s removal order while her VAWA petition remains pending. The district court dismissed E.F.L’s habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review DHS’s decision to execute a removal order. While her appeal was pending, USCIS approved E.F.L.’s VAWA petition. E.F.L. submitted adjustment of status and waiver applications. She has not yet received work authorization. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "E. F. L. v. Prim" on Justia Law

In 2015, inmate Peterson suffered from genital warts. Davida, a Stateville Correctional Center physician employed by Wexford, prescribed a topical medication (Podocon-25), which is caustic and should be applied sparingly, then removed thoroughly. PODOCON-25's packaging states that “PODOCON-25© IS TO BE APPLIED ONLY BY A PHYSICIAN” and warns of multiple potential “ADVERSE REACTIONS.” Davida did not apply the Podocon-25, nor did the nurses, who instructed Peterson to apply the treatment himself. He did so and suffered personal injuries.In 2016, Peterson filed a pro se complaint against Davida, the nurses, and Illinois Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He alleged that the officer-defendants destroyed his shower pass permits, issued as part of his treatment, or failed to intervene to correct the situation. The court granted Peterson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his claims except as to three correctional officers. After obtaining counsel, Peterson filed an amended complaint, adding Wexford. The parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice on January 25, 2018. On January 21, 2019, Peterson filed the operative complaint, claiming deliberate indifference under section 1983 and negligence under Illinois law against Davida, the nurses, and Wexford. The district court dismissed, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that the defendants had the requisite state of mind for deliberate indifference and that Peterson’s negligence claims were untimely because his 2016 complaint did not contain those allegations; the relation-back doctrine governs only amendments to a complaint, not a new filing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims but reversed as to the negligence claims. The court did not consider 735 ILCS 5/13-217, under which plaintiffs have an “absolute right to refile their complaint within one year” of its voluntary dismissal. View "Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law