Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fort Wayne officers received tips about Bacon, who had previously been arrested for selling cocaine from his home. They conducted two controlled buys using confidential informants who had proven reliable in past cases. In both cases, the informant was searched before and after the buy but the actual purchases were conducted by acquaintances of the informants. Each acquaintance acquired drugs and stated that Bacon had weapons all over his apartment. The officers heard these conversations; the informant was wearing a wire. A state-court judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of the apartment. Officers found guns, ammunition, a bulletproof vest, suspected bombs, large quantities of meth, cocaine, and fentanyl, a digital scale, and a drug ledger. Officers stopped Bacon and searched his car; they found drugs and several guns. Both "acquaintances" were later arrested on drug charges,The district court denied a motion to suppress and a motion for a Franks hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While these controlled buys present novel risks, they were reliable indicators that Bacon was selling drugs from his home. By all appearances, the middlemen did not know that they were participating in controlled buys and had no apparent motive for deception. That the officers did not know or search the middlemen and that neither they nor the confidential informants saw or heard the actual purchases was “clear from the face of the affidavit” so a Franks hearing was not required. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

More than two years after being denied tenure at Columbia College of Chicago, Monroe sued the College, citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, for being subject to race discrimination in a federally-funded program or activity. The statute does not specify a limitations period.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit as untimely. Monroe argued that the correct period is the Illinois five-year catch-all limitations period for civil claims, while the College cited the two-year period for personal injuries. The court noted that other Circuits have emphasized that a Title VI claim, although aimed at the discriminatory use of federal funds, is one that ultimately seeks to vindicate personal rights, “closely analogous to [42 U.S.C.] sections 1983 and 1981.” Title VI specifically refers to discrimination against a “person” and should be governed by the limitations period that a state has specified for personal injury claims. View "Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

Now in his sixties, Bridges has been in and out of prison since he was a teenager. After staying out of trouble for eight years, Bridges got involved in drugs again and committed four robberies in two days in 2017. He netted scarcely $700. Charged with four counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, Bridges agreed to plead guilty, stipulating that he was subject to the career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which could apply only if his crimes of conviction were “crimes of violence” under the Guidelines. The enhancement more than doubled his sentencing range. The court imposed a below-guideline sentence of 140 months.Bridges sought postconviction relief, alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to argue that Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a “crime of violence.” At the time, there was no Seventh Circuit precedent on that issue. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed for an evidentiary hearing on defense counsel’s performance, joining other circuits that have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery is not a Guidelines “crime of violence.” When Bridges pleaded guilty, the building blocks for a successful legal argument were in place. Effective counsel would have considered this important question; minimal research would have uncovered a Tenth Circuit decision holding that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence under a 2016 amendment to the Guideline definition of a crime of violence. View "Bridges v. United States" on Justia Law

Charged in Wisconsin state court with armed robbery and false imprisonment, Saechao retained attorney Kronenwetter. The state charged Alonso-Bermudez and others, based on the same crimes. Those cases proceeded separately. The public defender did not know that Kronenweer was representing Saechao when it appointed him to represent Alonso-Bermudez. Kronenwetter told the judge in Saechao’s prosecution that he was concerned about a potential conflict of interests. After six weeks, he withdrew as Alonso-Bermudez’s lawyer. The public defender named Bachman as his replacement. The Saechao judge wanted an unconditional waiver of any conflict from both defendants. Saechao provided one; Alonso-Bermudez declined. The prosecutor listed Alonso-Bermudez as a potential witness in Saechao’s case; the judge disqualified Kronenwetter. By then Bachman had indicated that Alonso-Bermudez was willing to sign a general waiver but Alonso-Bermudez fired him; the judge thought that Bachman no longer could speak for Alonso-Bermudez. Saechao went to trial with a new lawyer and was convicted. Wisconsin’s appellate court affirmed, rejecting his argument that the judge had violated the Constitution by depriving him of his chosen lawyer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Wisconsin’s Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. The judge had the discretion to disqualify counsel to avoid a serious risk of conflict. and had at least one good reason for disqualification, the fact that Alonso-Bermudez appeared on the prosecution’s witness list. View "Saechao v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The underlying class action alleged that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) unlawfully denied hearing-impaired inmates “the assistance they need to communicate effectively and participate in IDOC programs and services.” A 2018 Settlement required IDOC to screen inmates for hearing problems, refer inmates in need to a licensed audiologist for a more thorough audiological evaluation, maintain records of inmates’ evaluations, and provide inmates with care according to the results of their evaluations. For about a year after the court approved the Settlement, IDOC incorrectly referred about 700 inmates to licensed hearing instrument dispensers (LHIDs)—hearing-aid salesmen—instead of audiologists for evaluations. IDOC discontinued the practice in July 2019, based on an out-of-court agreement.In 2020, Plaintiffs moved to enforce the Settlement arguing that IDOC is not ensuring that the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable time period and sought attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of the LHID violations. The district court concluded that IDOC was in substantial non-compliance with the Settlement through the LHID violations,, ordered IDOC to pay about $54,000 in attorney fees, and held that the Settlement requires IDOC to ensure the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable timeframe, which it defined as 90 days after a referral. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to attorneys’ fees. The district court incorrectly determined that IDOC was obligated to ensure that its inmates receive audiological evaluations within a set timeframe; the Settlement contains no such requirement. View "Holmes v. Godinez" on Justia Law

Thomas broke his hand at the Hill Correctional Center in March 2011. X-rays from May 9 showed that Thomas’s hand was still fractured. On May 11, Thomas was transferred to Stateville. Hill officials removed his cast, stating that Thomas would receive a new cast at Stateville. No one re-casted him. A Stateville doctor reviewed Thomas’s May 9 x-ray on June 19, finding the fracture “unresolved.” A physician’s assistant looked at that x-ray on June 30 and determined that Thomas required no further treatment. An August 2011 doctor’s note described the hand as “still healing.” In December 2011, a doctor referred Thomas to physical therapy, which Thomas received in October-December 2012. Dr. Obaisi then became Stateville’s medical director; In August 2014, Thomas's low-bunk permit expired. Thomas met with Stateville medical staff and submitted grievances, describing lingering complications. Thomas met with Dr. Obaisi in January 2015 and repeated his requests, then submitted another grievance. Five months later, Dr. Obaisi renewed Thomas’s low-bunk permit and referred Thomas to an orthopedic specialist. Five months later, a specialist reported that Thomas had suffered nerve damage and that he would not have suffered such significant complications if his hand had been properly treated.The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Triable issues of fact remain with respect to Dr. Obaisi. A reasonable jury could conclude that a person who had asked twice for a renewed permit and had submitted grievances still needed the permit and that the delay would expose him to pain by forcing him to use his poorly healed hand to climb. The evidence would also permit a jury to conclude that Obaisi acted with deliberate indifference by unnecessarily delaying the referral. View "Thomas v. Martija" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Patterson testified that his repeated requests to be moved from an unheated cell were ignored and, to get attention, he violated the rules. On February 7, officers repeatedly ordered Patterson to remove a paper covering from his cell window. Patterson testified that the officers returned later and beat him by punching him where bruising would go unnoticed, stripped him naked, paraded him around the cell block, and ignored his request for medical treatment. He claims he endured another beating two days later at the hands of different officers. The officers testified that after Patterson refused to remove the window covering, they found Patterson naked in his cell and moved him to another cell. They denied any other physical contact. On February 10, Patterson saw Licensed Practical Nurse Aldridge, who testified that Patterson reported scrapes, neck and ankle pain, and swelling of his wrists. She saw “no visible signs” of injury other than small scrapes on his wrists. She diagnosed Patterson with a “minor” “soft tissue injury.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the officers, rejecting Patterson’s argument that the district court never should have allowed Nurse Aldridge, who testified as a fact witness, to offer an expert opinion on recross about whether, based on Patterson’s account of the beatings he experienced, she would have anticipated seeing signs of injury during her examination of him on February 10. View "Patterson v. Baker" on Justia Law

Mandacina was sentenced to life imprisonment for paying to kill a potential witness in a criminal case. His conviction and sentence were affirmed in 1995. Mandacina filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral attack. While his appeal was pending, he attempted to add a contention that the prosecutor failed to produce information that a trial witness—FBI agent Craft—had committed misconduct in other cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed without discussing that contention. Mandacina requested permission to pursue a second 2255 collateral challenge based on information about Craft. The Eighth Circuit denied the request in 2005. Mandacina sought a 28 U.S.C. 2241 writ of habeas corpus, based on the same considerations presented to the Eighth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the petition is blocked by section 2255(e), which says that habeas relief is unavailable unless it appears that the remedy under 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention. Mandacina does not contend that Craft engaged in misconduct while investigating or testifying in his prosecution and did not contend that the prosecutors knew of Craft’s misconduct. Brady claims concerning potential impeachment evidence are routinely decided under section 2255. That Mandacina did not previously succeed does not make section 2255 inadequate or ineffective, nor is a prisoner entitled to section 2241 review just because the court did not write an opinion. “We do not use section 2241 to regulate how our colleagues in other circuits handle their business.” View "Mandacina v. Entzel" on Justia Law

Indiana statutes provided a fast and confidential judicial bypass procedure that is supposed to allow a small fraction of pregnant, unemancipated minors seeking abortions to obtain them without the consent of or notice to their parents, guardians, or custodians. In 2017, Act 404 added a requirement that parents be given prior notice of the planned abortion unless the judge also finds such notice is not in the minor’s “best interests” unlike the judicial bypass of parental consent, which may be based on either maturity or best interests. In 2019, the Seventh Circuit held that Act 404 created a substantial risk of a practical veto over a mature yet unemancipated minor’s right to an abortion, likely to impose an undue burden for the unemancipated minors who seek to obtain an abortion without parental involvement via the judicial bypass. On remand from the Supreme Court in light of its 2020 “June Medical” decision, which struck down a Louisiana law regulating abortion providers, but without a single majority opinion. “The opinions in June Medical show that constitutional standards for state regulations affecting a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy are not stable, but they have not been changed in a way that would change the outcome here.” The court again affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the challenged law pending full review. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Box" on Justia Law

When Bennett began working as a custodian for the School District, she had to either become a Union member and pay union dues or decline membership and pay “fair‐share” or “agency” fees. She joined the Union. Following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Janus” decision, she notified the Union and the School District that she wished to resign her membership and terminate all payments to the Union. The Union allowed Bennett to resign her membership and opt-out of payments, but only after the lapse of the window set forth in her union‐membership agreement.Bennett sued, asserting that the deduction of union dues from her wages violated her rights under the First Amendment as recognized in Janus and that the Union’s exclusive representation of her interests, even though she is no longer a member, violates her constitutional rights by allowing the Union to speak on her behalf. Bennett sought damages in an amount equal to the dues deducted from her paychecks up to the statute of limitations and declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bennett cannot establish that the deduction from her wages of union dues she voluntarily agreed to pay in consideration for the benefits of union membership violated her First Amendment rights under Janus. Nor can she establish that Janus rendered the long-standing exclusive‐bargaining‐representative system of labor relations unconstitutional. View "Bennett v. Council 31 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees" on Justia Law