Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During heavy snow, Lieutenant McAuly approached a car that was far off the roadway. Lao lowered the driver's window and stated that a tow truck was on its way. According to McAuly, Lao displayed nervousness and was acting as though he wanted McAuly to leave while speaking sharply to his passenger, Chang. Their driver’s licenses revealed extensive recent felony criminal histories. Both were under supervised release for methamphetamine convictions.Both consented to pat-down searches. McAuly discovered that under her shirt Chang was carrying a locked, portable gun safe. Chang denied both ownership of the safe and knowledge of its contents. Through the car windows, McAuly saw a razor blade and a piece of cardboard that he associated with dividing drugs. Wisconsin Act 79 authorizes an officer, without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, to search any property under the control of a person who is under court supervision if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McAuly found the key, opened the gun safe, and found what was determined to be 75.6 grams of methamphetamine and a digital scale. A later search revealed a firearm and ammunition. After receiving Miranda warnings, Chang declared that everything in the safe belonged to her, although she was unable to describe its contents. Both were charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Lao was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of the defendants’ motion to suppress. Although the officer’s hunch alone was not sufficient justification for the seizure, other factors provided the reasonable suspicion necessary. Chang’s statements did not fall within any hearsay exception and could not be admitted if Chang chose to invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. View "United States v. Lao" on Justia Law

Danville Officer Crawley sought a warrant to search Woodfork’s home. Crawley testified under oath, identifying Woodfork as the target of the request, stating that Woodfork had sold crystal methamphetamine in a controlled buy to a confidential source (CS) that day. Officers had searched the SC before and after that buy and surveilled the transaction, which was recorded. Crawley had relied on the CS “multiple times” and found him “reliable.” The officers attempted to set up a second controlled buy, using another reliable CS. Woodfork had insisted that the CS come to Woodfork’s home, which was described by naming an intersection, understood to be 1220 North Franklin Street.The judge issued a search warrant for Woodfork’s North Franklin home. Officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm. Woodfork moved to quash the warrant and or to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was entitled to a "Franks" hearing and suppression because Crawley misled the county judge regarding the identification of his home and by omitting details about the CS's criminal histories.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Woodfork’s motion. Crawley and the judge were not simply relying on the uncorroborated word of the CS; a controlled buy, properly executed, is generally a reliable indicator of the presence of illegal drug activity. The omission of information about the sources’ backgrounds, criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable cause determination. Crawley testified; the court could assess his credibility and ask questions. View "United States v. Woodfork" on Justia Law

Huerta was shot and killed in a parking lot in 2009. Huerta had been drinking with his uncle, Rojas, when a car pulled up, an occupant fired at Huerta, and the car sped away. Officers focused on Villavicencio‐Serna; his girlfriend’s father had reported her missing the morning of Huerta’s murder. The girlfriend eventually stated that she was with Villavicencio‐Serna on that night, that when she woke up, Villavicencio‐Serna stated that he “took care of business,” and that Villavicencio‐Serna had previously stated that he was prepared to shoot Huerta. She later changed her story, claiming that she was in the car with Villavicencio‐Serna’s friends, Daddio and Rogers, when Villavicencio‐Serna leaned out the window and shot Huerta. She later said that Villavicencio‐Serna reached over her to shoot. Daddio recounted that the four drove around the parking lot before Villavicencio‐Serna shouted at Huerta then fired shots. Rogers repeatedly stated that he knew nothing about the shooting, then changed his story, stating that Villavicencio‐Serna shot Huerta. Their stories were somewhat inconsistent.All three recanted at trial, insisting that the officers scared them into implicating Villavicencio‐Serna; the officers’ version of the events was fed to them while the recording equipment was off. Allegedly unprompted, Rojas had identified Daddio’s car, a silver Cadillac, although his original story referred to a dark car.Villavicencio‐Serna was convicted of first‐degree murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal petition for habeas corpus relief while expressing concerns about the “troubling” inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence. View "Villavicencio-Serna v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Taylor was fired from his job as a Cook County Sheriff’s officer. He sued the Sheriff’s Office under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ways, Whittler, and Ernst under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants maintain that Taylor was terminated for having fired pellets with an air rifle at his neighbor, a charge that Taylor denies. Ernst was the lead investigator assigned to Taylor’s case. Taylor offered evidence that Ernst engineered his firing based on racial animosity. Taylor also asserted that Ways and Whittler, Sheriff’s Office officials, are liable because they reviewed Ernst’s final report and endorsed his recommendation of termination.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of qualified immunity as to Ernst. Taylor presented evidence of Ernst’s significant role in the investigative and disciplinary proceedings that brought about Taylor’s termination. Any reasonable official in Ernst’s position would have known that intentional racial discrimination toward another employee was unconstitutional and what Taylor alleges against Ernst is textbook racial discrimination: the word “n****r,” used by Ernst, a white man, aimed at Taylor on several occasions. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity to Ways and Whittler; evidence that they played key roles in approving Ernst’s termination does not signal that either harbored any racial animus or that they knew or suspected that Ernst was motivated by race. Taylor’s Title VII claim remains pending. View "Taylor v. Ernst" on Justia Law

Ademiju immigrated to the U.S. in 2001 and had a green card. In 2011, he became involved in a scheme to defraud Medicare. He pled guilty to healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and stipulated to a $1.5 million loss amount, acknowledging that “pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status” and that he “affirms that he wants to plead guilty … even if the consequence is his automatic removal.” At sentencing, Ademiju personally acknowledged that his ability to stay in this country was not assured. His counsel told the court, “I’m not an immigration specialist … But it’s my understanding that … any sentence of less than one year … he would be at least eligible for a waiver.” Apparently, no one knew that statement was incorrect. The district court sentenced Ademiju to 11 months’ imprisonment plus $1.5 million in restitution.Ademiju was released from federal prison and transferred into ICE custody; he retained an immigration attorney who informed him that his offense of conviction and the stipulated loss amount subjected him to mandatory deportation. Ademiju filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he received incorrect advice from an attorney about his options for recourse within the limitations period and could not have discovered the problem himself due to the inadequacy of his prison’s law library. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his motion; Ademiju has not met the high standard for equitable tolling. View "Ademiju v. United States" on Justia Law

Jones spent more than 10 years in prison before the Seventh Circuit granted his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, finding that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. After Jones was freed, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Madison County, Indiana deputy prosecutors Koester and Kopp, in their individual capacities, arguing that they maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his due process rights when they filed an untimely amendment to his charges and secured a conviction. He also alleged that Madison County Prosecutor Cummings, an elected official, adopted and followed an official policy of flouting state-law limitations on amendments to charges. He requested $50 million in general damages for his confinement, compensatory damages for past and future physical and emotional injuries, and attorneys’ fees.The district court dismissed the action, finding that Cummings was a state official, so the suit against him was in substance one against the state. The state is not a “person” that can be sued under section 1983. Jones’s suit against the prosecutors failed because of the absolute immunity prosecutors enjoy when they are acting as advocates. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Jones was undoubtedly injured by his wrongful imprisonment but that does not mean that he has a remedy against any particular actor. View "Jones v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 1982, Thompson was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary for his role in the home invasion and killing of the Hilborns. After a remand for resentencing, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his sentence of two consecutive 60-year terms for the murders and a consecutive 30-year term for the conspiracy to commit burglary. Thompson filed a post-conviction petition that languished until 2015; the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief.Thompson filed a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress Thompson’s request for a lawyer and his post-request statements, failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument remarks referencing Thompson’s request for a lawyer, and failing to present the prosecutor’s remarks in Thompson’s direct appeal. Following a remand, the district court dismissed the petition.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not “substantially” likely that the result of Thompson’s trial or appeal would have been different but for his counsel’s actions. The physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were consistent with testimony by his co-conspirator, Dillon, implicating Thompson, including blood on Thompson’s jeans and gloves that law enforcement recovered from his closet shortly after the murders; the hunting knife found in Thompson’s trunk, freshly cleaned and oiled; Thompson’s presence with Dillon at a laundromat just after the murders; and the forensic pathologist’s testimony about the Hillborns's stab wounds. The evidence against Thompson was “overwhelming.” View "Thompson v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In 2006, Reyes was convicted of several federal crimes stemming from the armed robbery of a credit union, including brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), He was sentenced as a career offender based on his prior convictions for burglary, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted murder under Illinois state law. After Reyes was convicted, the Supreme Court issued decisions interpreting statutory definitions of “crime of violence,” holding that “residual clauses” in several statutes are unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Reyes brought a second collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting that this emerging case law rendered his conviction and sentence unconstitutional. The district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability concerning the conviction for brandishing a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury was properly instructed. The instruction did not treat Reyes’ conspiracy conviction as a predicate for his colleagues’ brandishing of the firearm. That the brandishing (and robbery) occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Reyes’ conviction under section 924(c). The instruction explained that the government still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes’ colleague brandished the gun in furtherance of a crime of violence--the robbery. View "Reyes v. United States" on Justia Law

Hodkiewicz’s pregnant wife, S.P., reported that Hodkiewicz was abusing her. Hodkiewicz filed for divorce. For the next three years, S.P. endured vandalism, ominous notes. and assaults that resulted in emergency room visits. Hodkiewicz denied involvement and little evidence implicated him other than S.P.’s word. S.P. received 146 calls and harassing text messages. She testified to recognizing Hodkiewicz’s voice. The phone number used to activate the TracFone from which the calls originated belonged to Hodkiewicz's employer. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement. In 2013, Hodkiewicz was charged with stalking, placed on probation, and told to have no contact with S.P. S.P. later walked into her bathroom and was suddenly choked from behind and lost consciousness. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement.A jury convicted Hodkiewicz, who was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. A Wisconsin trial court denied his post-conviction motions, finding that Hodkiewicz failed to prove that his trial attorney was ineffective. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed his convictions for unlawful use of a telephone and disorderly conduct “because his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to hearsay testimony that S.P. received a particular call on her work phone but affirmed his remaining convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, agreeing that Hodkiewicz could not show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome. The jury heard 35 witnesses and had ample evidence to assess S.P.’s credibility. View "Hodkiewicz v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

Elgin met Garbutt at an international convention. Garbutt, who holds dual citizenship, moved from Belize into Elgin’s Gary, Indiana home and worked on her successful campaign to become Trustee of Calumet Township. Elgin hired Garbutt to work at the Trustee’s Office as her “executive aide” at a salary of $60,000 per year. Garbutt’s unofficial duties included Elgin’s political campaign work. He understood that he should not perform political work at the Township Office but began to do so. Elgin also hired her friend Shelton, who also worked on Elgin’s campaign. Elgin and Garbutt had a falling out. Elgin demoted Garbutt, docked his salary barred him from attending meetings, and took away his government car. Garbutt eventually began a partnership with an FBI agent who directed him to conduct warrantless searches of his co‐workers’ offices.Elgin took a plea deal, Shelton was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, after learning, mid‐trial, about the warrantless searches. The district court denied Shelton's post‐trial motion for relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that Shelton lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in her office. Garbutt’s document collection, undertaken at the direction of the FBI, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. No warrant would have issued without the information gathered as a result of the unlawful searches; the evidence obtained from the search authorized by that warrant should have been suppressed. View "United States v. Shelton" on Justia Law