Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taylor was fired from his job as a Cook County Sheriff’s officer. He sued the Sheriff’s Office under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ways, Whittler, and Ernst under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants maintain that Taylor was terminated for having fired pellets with an air rifle at his neighbor, a charge that Taylor denies. Ernst was the lead investigator assigned to Taylor’s case. Taylor offered evidence that Ernst engineered his firing based on racial animosity. Taylor also asserted that Ways and Whittler, Sheriff’s Office officials, are liable because they reviewed Ernst’s final report and endorsed his recommendation of termination.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of qualified immunity as to Ernst. Taylor presented evidence of Ernst’s significant role in the investigative and disciplinary proceedings that brought about Taylor’s termination. Any reasonable official in Ernst’s position would have known that intentional racial discrimination toward another employee was unconstitutional and what Taylor alleges against Ernst is textbook racial discrimination: the word “n****r,” used by Ernst, a white man, aimed at Taylor on several occasions. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity to Ways and Whittler; evidence that they played key roles in approving Ernst’s termination does not signal that either harbored any racial animus or that they knew or suspected that Ernst was motivated by race. Taylor’s Title VII claim remains pending. View "Taylor v. Ernst" on Justia Law

Ademiju immigrated to the U.S. in 2001 and had a green card. In 2011, he became involved in a scheme to defraud Medicare. He pled guilty to healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and stipulated to a $1.5 million loss amount, acknowledging that “pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status” and that he “affirms that he wants to plead guilty … even if the consequence is his automatic removal.” At sentencing, Ademiju personally acknowledged that his ability to stay in this country was not assured. His counsel told the court, “I’m not an immigration specialist … But it’s my understanding that … any sentence of less than one year … he would be at least eligible for a waiver.” Apparently, no one knew that statement was incorrect. The district court sentenced Ademiju to 11 months’ imprisonment plus $1.5 million in restitution.Ademiju was released from federal prison and transferred into ICE custody; he retained an immigration attorney who informed him that his offense of conviction and the stipulated loss amount subjected him to mandatory deportation. Ademiju filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he received incorrect advice from an attorney about his options for recourse within the limitations period and could not have discovered the problem himself due to the inadequacy of his prison’s law library. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his motion; Ademiju has not met the high standard for equitable tolling. View "Ademiju v. United States" on Justia Law

Jones spent more than 10 years in prison before the Seventh Circuit granted his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, finding that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. After Jones was freed, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Madison County, Indiana deputy prosecutors Koester and Kopp, in their individual capacities, arguing that they maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his due process rights when they filed an untimely amendment to his charges and secured a conviction. He also alleged that Madison County Prosecutor Cummings, an elected official, adopted and followed an official policy of flouting state-law limitations on amendments to charges. He requested $50 million in general damages for his confinement, compensatory damages for past and future physical and emotional injuries, and attorneys’ fees.The district court dismissed the action, finding that Cummings was a state official, so the suit against him was in substance one against the state. The state is not a “person” that can be sued under section 1983. Jones’s suit against the prosecutors failed because of the absolute immunity prosecutors enjoy when they are acting as advocates. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Jones was undoubtedly injured by his wrongful imprisonment but that does not mean that he has a remedy against any particular actor. View "Jones v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 1982, Thompson was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary for his role in the home invasion and killing of the Hilborns. After a remand for resentencing, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his sentence of two consecutive 60-year terms for the murders and a consecutive 30-year term for the conspiracy to commit burglary. Thompson filed a post-conviction petition that languished until 2015; the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief.Thompson filed a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress Thompson’s request for a lawyer and his post-request statements, failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument remarks referencing Thompson’s request for a lawyer, and failing to present the prosecutor’s remarks in Thompson’s direct appeal. Following a remand, the district court dismissed the petition.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not “substantially” likely that the result of Thompson’s trial or appeal would have been different but for his counsel’s actions. The physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were consistent with testimony by his co-conspirator, Dillon, implicating Thompson, including blood on Thompson’s jeans and gloves that law enforcement recovered from his closet shortly after the murders; the hunting knife found in Thompson’s trunk, freshly cleaned and oiled; Thompson’s presence with Dillon at a laundromat just after the murders; and the forensic pathologist’s testimony about the Hillborns's stab wounds. The evidence against Thompson was “overwhelming.” View "Thompson v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In 2006, Reyes was convicted of several federal crimes stemming from the armed robbery of a credit union, including brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), He was sentenced as a career offender based on his prior convictions for burglary, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted murder under Illinois state law. After Reyes was convicted, the Supreme Court issued decisions interpreting statutory definitions of “crime of violence,” holding that “residual clauses” in several statutes are unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Reyes brought a second collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting that this emerging case law rendered his conviction and sentence unconstitutional. The district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability concerning the conviction for brandishing a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury was properly instructed. The instruction did not treat Reyes’ conspiracy conviction as a predicate for his colleagues’ brandishing of the firearm. That the brandishing (and robbery) occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Reyes’ conviction under section 924(c). The instruction explained that the government still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes’ colleague brandished the gun in furtherance of a crime of violence--the robbery. View "Reyes v. United States" on Justia Law

Hodkiewicz’s pregnant wife, S.P., reported that Hodkiewicz was abusing her. Hodkiewicz filed for divorce. For the next three years, S.P. endured vandalism, ominous notes. and assaults that resulted in emergency room visits. Hodkiewicz denied involvement and little evidence implicated him other than S.P.’s word. S.P. received 146 calls and harassing text messages. She testified to recognizing Hodkiewicz’s voice. The phone number used to activate the TracFone from which the calls originated belonged to Hodkiewicz's employer. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement. In 2013, Hodkiewicz was charged with stalking, placed on probation, and told to have no contact with S.P. S.P. later walked into her bathroom and was suddenly choked from behind and lost consciousness. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement.A jury convicted Hodkiewicz, who was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. A Wisconsin trial court denied his post-conviction motions, finding that Hodkiewicz failed to prove that his trial attorney was ineffective. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed his convictions for unlawful use of a telephone and disorderly conduct “because his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to hearsay testimony that S.P. received a particular call on her work phone but affirmed his remaining convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, agreeing that Hodkiewicz could not show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome. The jury heard 35 witnesses and had ample evidence to assess S.P.’s credibility. View "Hodkiewicz v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

Elgin met Garbutt at an international convention. Garbutt, who holds dual citizenship, moved from Belize into Elgin’s Gary, Indiana home and worked on her successful campaign to become Trustee of Calumet Township. Elgin hired Garbutt to work at the Trustee’s Office as her “executive aide” at a salary of $60,000 per year. Garbutt’s unofficial duties included Elgin’s political campaign work. He understood that he should not perform political work at the Township Office but began to do so. Elgin also hired her friend Shelton, who also worked on Elgin’s campaign. Elgin and Garbutt had a falling out. Elgin demoted Garbutt, docked his salary barred him from attending meetings, and took away his government car. Garbutt eventually began a partnership with an FBI agent who directed him to conduct warrantless searches of his co‐workers’ offices.Elgin took a plea deal, Shelton was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, after learning, mid‐trial, about the warrantless searches. The district court denied Shelton's post‐trial motion for relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that Shelton lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in her office. Garbutt’s document collection, undertaken at the direction of the FBI, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. No warrant would have issued without the information gathered as a result of the unlawful searches; the evidence obtained from the search authorized by that warrant should have been suppressed. View "United States v. Shelton" on Justia Law

In 2012, Grzegorczyk hired two men to kill his ex-wife and others whom he deemed responsible for his divorce and the loss of custody of his son. The men he hired were undercover law enforcement officers. During a final meeting, Grzegorczyk gave the undercover officers $3,000 in cash, and showed them pictures, $45,000 in cash that he intended to pay upon completion of the murders, a semi-automatic handgun, and ammunition. Grzegorczyk was arrested.In 2014, Grzegorczyk pled guilty to murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)., Grzegorczyk waived the right to “all appellate issues that might have been available if he had exercised his right to trial”; he could only appeal the validity of his guilty plea and the sentence imposed. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 151 months, with consecutive 60 months for the firearm offense, which was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court then invalidated the definition of a “violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (Johnson decision), later extending the holding to section 924(c)'s residual clause definition of “crime of violence.”Grzegorczyk sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 from his 924(c) conviction. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Grzegorczyk has long unconditionally waived his right to contest the validity of his plea agreement and the legal sufficiency of the 924(c) charge. View "Grzegorczyk v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Guenther was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the penalty for that offense to a 15-year minimum and a maximum of life in prison if the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” Guenther’s PSR identified two convictions for first-degree burglary (1990 and 1992), second-degree burglary (1986), and kidnapping (1990), all under Minnesota law. The judge applied ACCA and sentenced him to 327 months. His Eighth Circuit direct appeal failed as did his petition for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2017, incarcerated in Wisconsin, Guenther sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that his Minnesota burglary convictions are not “violent felonies”The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief. A section 2255 motion in the sentencing court is normally the exclusive method to collaterally attack a federal sentence, but the “saving clause,” 2255(e) provides a limited exception, allowing a prisoner to seek section 2241 relief in the district of confinement if “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit applies the exception when the prisoner relies on an intervening statutory decision announcing a new, retroactive rule that could not have been invoked in his first section 2255 motion and the error is serious enough to amount to a miscarriage of justice. Guenther’s Minnesota burglary convictions are not ACCA predicates under Seventh Circuit law. View "Guenther v. Marske" on Justia Law

Triplett pleaded guilty to three charges of human trafficking, pimping and pandering, and possession of a firearm by a felon, in exchange for the dismissal of 17 charges (including attempted first-degree homicide and kidnapping), which were to be “read-in” at sentencing (essentially allowing the judge to consider them as relevant conduct), Triplett’s total sentencing exposure was reduced from 354 years to a maximum of 47.5 years. The judge confirmed with defense counsel that the dismissed charges would be read-in. Defense counsel noted that Triplett did not admit the truth of the charges. In signing his plea agreement, Triplett acknowledged that “although the judge may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, the maximum penalty will not be increased.” The judge ordered Triplett to serve 11 years in prison followed by nine years of supervision.Triplett unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea. Without conducting a hearing, the court determined that even if Triplett was given incorrect advice about the read-charges, Triplett was not prejudiced. The plea questionnaire and waiver of rights warned Triplett that the court could consider those charges. The court also represented that it had not considered the read-in charges at sentencing. Wisconsin's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The Wisconsin court’s rejection of Triplett's ineffectiveness claim rests on an adequate, independent state ground--Triplett’s failure to allege objective facts in support of his claim of prejudice. View "Triplett v. McDermott" on Justia Law