Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gaetjens bred cats in her Loves Park home.. Her doctor told her to go to the hospital because of high blood pressure. Later that day, the doctor couldn’t locate Gaetjens and phoned Eads, Gaetjens’s neighbor. Eads could not locate Gaetjens. The next day, Gaetjens was still missing. Eads called the police, stating that Gaetjens might be experiencing a medical emergency. Officers went to Gaetjens’s home but could not see anyone inside. They saw packages on the porch, untended garbage, and a full mailbox. . Eads provided a key. The police went into the home but immediately left because of intense odors, "urine, feces, and maybe a decomposing body." The police called the Fire Department to enter with breathing devices. The Fire Chief temporarily condemned the home as not fit for habitation. Firefighters went inside to look for Gaetjens but found 37 cats. They summoned Animal Services to round up the cats because Gaetjens was not allowed inside the condemned house. The cats were impounded for nine days. Four cats died.Gaetjens, who had been in the hospital, sued under section 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits such conduct without a warrant but emergencies breed exceptions. The defendants had reason to believe that Gaetjens was experiencing a medical emergency and found her home so noxious that it posed a public safety risk. View "Gaetjens v. Winnebago County" on Justia Law

Coscia used electronic exchanges for futures trading and implemented high-frequency trading programs. High-frequency trading, called “spoofing,” and defined as bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution, became illegal in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5). Coscia was convicted of commodities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, and spoofing, After an unsuccessful appeal, Coscia sought a new trial, citing new evidence that data discovered after trial establishes that there were errors in the data presented to the jury and that subsequent indictments for similar spoofing activities undercut the government’s characterization of Coscia as a trading “outlier.” He also claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, having an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that Coscia’s new evidence could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence, Coscia failed to explain how that evidence or the subsequent indictments seriously called the verdict into question. Coscia has not established that his attorneys learned of relevant and confidential information from its cited unrelated representations. Coscia’s counsel faced “the common situation” where the client stands a better chance of success by admitting the underlying actions and arguing that the actions do not constitute a crime. That the jury did not accept his defense does not render it constitutionally deficient. View "Coscia v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago officers responded to a 911 call and found Jones bleeding from a gunshot wound. Jones stated, “Damon shot me” and that Damon was wearing a “black hoodie.” About 90 seconds later, officers encountered Damon Goodloe, wearing a black hoodie but unarmed. They took Goodloe to the scene, where Jones stated, “he’s the one that shot me.” Jones died at a hospital.The prosecution introduced Jones’s statements to the officers. Goodloe’s hands tested positive for gunshot residue. Lovett testified that she saw Goodloe (whom she knew) and another man, both in black hoodies, heard several gunshots but ducked before she could see who fired a gun, called 911, and identified Goodloe in a line-up. Loggins testified that he was purchasing cocaine from Jones when he observed two men in black hoodies. When the shots were fired, he fled. A jury convicted Goodloe of first-degree murder without finding that he personally discharged a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Goodloe’s habeas petition, first upholding the admission of Jones’s identification of Goodloe. Statements are nontestimonial when made during police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to meet an ongoing emergency. The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that the emergency was ongoing when Goodloe was taken to the ambulance in handcuffs. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses who could have provided an innocent explanation for Goodloe's presence near the shooting; their testimony was unlikely to create a reasonable probability of a different result. View "Goodloe v. Brannon" on Justia Law

In 2012, Demkovich was hired as the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic Church. Demkovich is gay, overweight, and suffers from diabetes and metabolic syndrome. Demkovich claims Reverend Dada subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation and his disabilities. After Demkovich married his partner, Reverend Dada demanded Demkovich’s resignation because his marriage violated Church teachings. Demkovich refused. Reverend Dada fired him. Demkovich filed hostile environment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.The Seventh Circuit initially declined to extend the constitutional "ministerial" exemption to categorically bar all hostile environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees where there is no challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing. On rehearing, the court ordered the dismissal of all of Demkovich’s claims. The First Amendment ministerial exception protects a religious organization’s employment relationship with its ministers, from hiring to firing and the supervising in between. Adjudicating a minister’s hostile work environment claims based on the interaction between ministers would undermine this constitutionally protected relationship. It would also result in civil intrusion upon, and excessive entanglement with, the religious realm. View "Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish," on Justia Law

Schenck and Davis have a young child, ABC. Schenck took sexually explicit photos of ABC and sent them to Schneibel, who told Davis, who told Schenck’s mother, who told Detective Bauman. Detective Enget interviewed Schneibel, who described the images she received from Schenck. Bauman obtained, from a Wisconsin state judge, a warrant to search Schenck’s apartment for child pornography. Police executed the warrant, seized Schenck’s computer and iPhone, and found four pornographic images of ABC when she was under two years old.Schenck was charged with three counts of production of child pornography and one count of distribution. Schenck moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause because it failed to demonstrate ABC was a child, and it failed to demonstrate the images were sexually explicit. . The district judge denied the motion and sentenced Schenk to 240 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and applying common sense, it is clear that there were good reasons for the state judge to think ABC was a child at the relevant times. The complete content and context of the affidavit also gave the issuing judge ample grounds to find probable cause that a search would produce evidence of a crime. View "United States v. Schenck" on Justia Law

Thomas moved to a cell at Pontiac Correctional Center. Thomas claimed there were feces, urine, and mold smeared on the walls, sink, and cell door; the mattress was soiled with feces and reeked of urine; there were dead flies on the bunk bed; and the sink emitted only cold, black, oily water. After Thomas complained about his mattress, prison officials got him a new one within two weeks. Thomas used his sheets and blanket to avoid contact with the soiled mattress. Thomas received gloves to remove the dead flies; he had a towel for cleaning and received a disinfectant solution several times during his eight-week stay in the cell. Thomas refused to clean the walls. While awaiting a plumbing repair, officials allowed Thomas three hot showers per week. Pontiac’s water supply underwent regular testing and met all environmental requirements. Thomas sought treatment for dry skin and a rash on his back. A health worker noted “a small clogged pore,” recommended warm moist compresses, and told Thomas to return as needed. Thomas obtained hot water for the compresses from another inmate. Thomas sought no further medical care at Pontiac.Thomas later invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his suit. Had the officials done nothing in response to Thomas’s complaints, they would have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but the prison responded to Thomas’s concerns and medical needs. View "Thomas v. Blackard" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago Police Officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. According to Smith, the officers fabricated a story that, during this stop, he made a “furtive movement” and that the officers found a bullet in the car. Smith was arrested and detained for seven months in the Cook County Jail. Smith was released on bond “on or about” March 29, 2014. While on bond, Smith was required to appear in court once per month and to request permission before leaving Illinois. Smith contends his bond conditions diminished his employment prospects and that he experienced financial stress and emotional anxiety. He was acquitted on July 21, 2016. On July 18, 2018, Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit as untimely under a two-year limitations period, rejecting Smith’s argument that his claim accrued when he was acquitted at trial. A Fourth Amendment claim such as Smith’s accrues when he is released from detention. The court also rejected Smith’s contention that his bond conditions constituted an ongoing Fourth Amendment seizure, so he was not released from custody until he was acquitted. Requirements to appear in court for a hearing and to request permission before leaving the state, taken together or separately, do not amount to Fourth Amendment seizures. View "Smith v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Olvera’s conviction stems from the 2000, death of Stropes during a gang-related drive-by shooting in East Moline. Olvera’s codefendant, Delgado, fired the shot. Olvera was the driver of the vehicle and did not fire any shots that evening. Delgado pleaded guilty to murder. At Olvera’s trial, his girlfriend and others testified that the shooting arose out of an incident at a party. Olvera unsuccessfully sought state court post-conviction review, claiming that his trial counsel had failed to “contact or call” several witnesses “whose testimony would have been of significant benefit to him.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Olvera’s petition for federal habeas relief. The state court’s articulation of the Strickland standard was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established law. The state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it concluded that affidavits submitted by the potential witnesses identified by Olvera failed to demonstrate prejudice or failed to demonstrate deficient performance. The court noted the overwhelming evidence supporting the state’s accountability theory and precluding Olvera’s claim of self-defense that was “left untouched.” View "Olvera v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In 1984, Kidd stabbed four people to death in a Chicago apartment. The building was then set on fire. Officers arrested Kidd and Kidd’s half-brother, Orange. Kidd made statements that implicated himself and identified Orange as the primary perpetrator and led the police to a knife stained with a victim’s blood. At Orange’s trial, Kidd voluntarily testified that he alone committed the murders. Months later, Kidd pled guilty to the murders. He testified at his sentencing hearing that he stabbed all four victims.On remand in 1992, Kidd moved to suppress his statements from the night of the murders as an unlawfully coerced confession, claiming various acts of torture by the police, that he was under the influence of drugs when he made the statement .and that the police refused to let him contact a lawyer. At a hearing, Kidd did not testify, but the officers denied Kidd’s allegations. The court denied his motion. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Kidd filed an unsuccessful state postconviction petition alleging that he was abused by the police, including former Chicago Officer Burge, who was found in other cases to have abused many people around the time of Kidd’s arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kidd’s federal habeas petition. Even if the allegedly coerced confession was improperly admitted at Kidd’s trial, the admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. View "Kidd v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Leal used an online dating application to contact a user who was an undercover FBI agent, posing as a teenage boy. Despite learning that the user was underage, Leal engaged in sexually explicit conversations and solicited oral sex. The agent provided Leal an address. Under surveillance, Leal arrived at the house. When a surveillance officer drove an unmarked vehicle up the alley, Leal sped off. Leal was quickly pulled over. Three officers were present, wearing clothes that identified them as officers. Leal was told that he was not under arrest and agreed to speak with other agents in the house. Leal consented to a pat-down and surrendered his cell phone and his car keys. The recorded interview proceeded with the door closed. The agents neither handcuffed nor restrained Leal. Leal quickly confessed and confirmed he had sent the messages. After the 18-minute interview, the FBI arrested Leal for knowingly attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of Leal’s motion to suppress his statements. The agents did not conduct a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Fifth Amendment rights. The custody inquiry is not whether the defendant was under a subjective belief that his movements were restricted, but whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that he was free to leave. That Leal believed he was in a precarious position says nothing about the officers' behavior or whether a reasonable person would have felt bound to stay. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law