Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Marcos Mendez was stopped for inspection at O'Hare International Airport after returning from a trip abroad. Customs agents, who had been alerted to Mendez due to his arrest record and travel history, searched his cell phone and found child pornography. Mendez was subsequently indicted on multiple counts related to child pornography. He moved to suppress the evidence found on his phone, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights as it was conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.The district court denied Mendez's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment as customs agents had reasonable suspicion to look through Mendez's phone. Mendez pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography but preserved his right to appeal the district court's ruling on the suppression motion.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Mendez argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States required a warrant, probable cause, or at least reasonable suspicion for the searches of his phone. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that searches at borders do not require a warrant or probable cause. The court held that the routine, manual search of Mendez's phone required no individualized suspicion. The court affirmed the district court's decision, joining the uniform view of other circuits that searches of electronics at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause. View "United States v. Mendez" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Echo Scheidt, who was convicted for knowingly providing false information on a Firearms Transaction Record (ATF Form 4473) during five separate gun purchases. Scheidt resold the firearms, two of which were later used in shootings, including a murder. The false statements pertained to her residential address, which she misrepresented in the forms. The authorities traced the firearms back to her after the shootings.The district court indicted Scheidt on five counts of knowingly making a false written statement likely to deceive a firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and one count of knowingly making a false statement to a government agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Scheidt moved to dismiss the five § 922(a)(6) counts, arguing that the statute criminalized conduct protected by the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, stating that the conduct prohibited by § 922(a)(6) does not enjoy Second Amendment protection. Scheidt pleaded guilty to all counts and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Scheidt appealed her conviction, arguing that § 922(a)(6) violates the Second Amendment. She contended that her right to purchase a firearm was conditioned on completing ATF Form 4473 and that § 922(a)(6) further conditioned her right to possess a firearm by demanding honesty. However, the court disagreed, stating that ordinary information-providing requirements, like those imposed by ATF Form 4473 and enforced through criminal statutes like § 922(a)(6), do not infringe the right to keep and bear arms. The court affirmed her conviction, concluding that the Second Amendment does not immunize purchasers from knowingly providing misstatements in ATF Form 4473. View "USA v. Scheidt" on Justia Law

The case involves Patrick Hancock, who pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. His federal sentence was enhanced on the grounds that he also violated Indiana Code § 35-44.1-2-6, which makes it a felony for a civilian to impersonate a law enforcement officer. Hancock appealed his sentence, challenging the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement. The evidence supported the district court’s findings that Hancock represented himself as a police officer by wearing various law enforcement paraphernalia.The district court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that Hancock's attire was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied. The court sentenced Hancock to 48 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. The district court varied upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range because it found that Hancock’s crime involved “extreme conduct” and that greater punishment was needed to deter future criminal conduct.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court rejected Hancock’s argument that he did not intend to deceive anyone at Costco into thinking he was a law enforcement officer. The court also rejected Hancock’s argument that Indiana’s false impersonation statute violates the First Amendment. The court held that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling public interest in preserving public safety and protecting the reputation of law enforcement. View "USA v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Maria Elvia Smith, a Mexican citizen, was denied legal status in the U.S. by immigration authorities. Smith had been married to a U.S. citizen, Arlo Henry Smith, Sr., who filed a Form I-130 petition to classify her as his immediate-relative spouse. However, Arlo died while the petition was pending, and it automatically converted to an I-360, Widow(er) Petition. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Smith's I-360 petition, concluding that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her marriage to Arlo was bona fide for immigration purposes. This conclusion was based on evidence of Smith's continued relationship with her ex-husband and her inconsistent statements to immigration officials.Smith sued the United States Attorney General, USCIS, and the Board, alleging that they improperly denied her I-360 petition and violated her Fifth Amendment right to due process. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed her complaint, finding that she did not plausibly allege that USCIS and the Board acted improperly in denying her petition, acted without observance of the procedure required by law, or substantively violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agencies had considered the evidence, applied the proper standards and burden of proof, and validly elected not to credit Smith’s statements in light of her past untruthfulness. The court also found that the agencies had complied with the procedures required by law and that Smith had received all the process due to her. Finally, the court rejected Smith's claim that the agencies violated her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. View "Smith v. Garland" on Justia Law

David Lewicki was part of a group that attempted to rob Humberto Pelayo, resulting in Pelayo suffering permanent injuries. Lewicki claimed he did not inflict the injuries and had tried to protect Pelayo. However, the jury found him guilty of attempted robbery causing serious bodily injury, and he was sentenced to 65 years in prison as a habitual offender. Lewicki's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state courts.Lewicki then sought federal relief, arguing that his appellate lawyer had been ineffective for not arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court agreed, issuing a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The court found that Lewicki's lawyer's failure to raise the speedy trial argument amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court did not find that Indiana had violated the Speedy Trial Clause. Instead, it ordered Indiana to release Lewicki unless it provided him with a new appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court had erred in granting relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel without finding that Lewicki had been prejudiced by his lawyer's failure to raise the speedy trial argument. The court explained that ineffective assistance of counsel requires both deficient performance and prejudice. The court also found that Lewicki did not have a strong speedy-trial claim. Despite a nearly three-year delay between his charge and trial, the court found that Lewicki had not shown prejudice from the delay. The court noted that Lewicki's own lawyer had proposed multiple continuances, and Lewicki had not shown that evidence was lost or memories faded due to the delay. The court also noted that little of Lewicki's time in custody could be attributed to the delayed trial of the attempted-robbery charge. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and upheld Lewicki's conviction and sentence. View "Lewicki v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Emanuel Dameron was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon after police officers spotted him on a live video feed from a pole camera, observed an "L-shaped object" resembling a gun in his waistband, and subsequently found a gun on him during a frisk search on a public bus in Chicago. Dameron moved to suppress the firearm and other evidence gathered during the stop, arguing that the police's search violated the Fourth Amendment and the standards set in Terry v. Ohio. The district court denied Dameron's motion, and he was found guilty at trial.The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the officer operating the pole camera testified about his familiarity with the neighborhood, its history of gang and narcotic activity, and his observation of the "L-shaped object" in Dameron's waistband. The court concluded that the visible bulge in Dameron's waistband and his presence in a high-crime area generated reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop. Dameron was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 110 months' imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Dameron renewed his contention that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. He argued that Illinois permits the concealed carrying of firearms and that the police had no way of knowing whether he was an authorized license holder. The court declined to address this argument as it was not presented to the district court. Instead, the court focused on the fact that Dameron was on a public bus when the search occurred, noting that the Illinois Concealed Carry Act prohibits carrying a firearm on public transportation. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Dameron had violated the law and that their pat-down search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Dameron" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Denis Navratil, his wife Dimple Navratil, and their business, Dimple’s LLC, who filed a lawsuit against the City of Racine and Mayor Cory Mason. The lawsuit was based on several constitutional claims and a defamation claim against Mason. The core of the claims was the city's decision not to grant an emergency grant to Dimple’s LLC because Denis had attended a rally protesting the statewide “Safer at Home Order” that limited public gatherings, travel, and business operations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The rally was a violation of the Safer at Home Order and a permit required for holding rallies at the State Capitol had been denied due to the pandemic.The case was initially heard by a magistrate judge who granted summary judgment for both defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Denis's attendance at the rally was not protected First Amendment activity because the rally was prohibited by two valid time, place, and manner restrictions—the Safer at Home Order and the state permit requirement. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, finding no evidence of political animus or similarly situated comparators. The court further dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claims, finding no deprivation of any constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Lastly, the court found that Mayor Mason's statements were substantially true or pure opinion and thus not actionable under defamation law. View "Denis Navratil v. City of Racine" on Justia Law

Shamar Betts was indicted for inciting a riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101, after he posted a flyer on Facebook calling for a riot at a mall in Champaign, Illinois. The riot resulted in damage to several businesses. Betts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Anti-Riot Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment, but the district court denied his motion. Betts then pled guilty and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $1,686,170.30 in restitution to 35 businesses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.On appeal, Betts challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, the application of a sentencing guideline by analogy, and the district court's order of restitution. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, finding no compelling reason to overrule its previous decision in United States v. Dellinger, which upheld the Act. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing guideline by analogy to the Anti-Riot Act.However, the court agreed with Betts's argument that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that he directly and proximately caused damages to all businesses included in the restitution order. The court vacated the sentence with regard to the amount of restitution ordered and remanded the case for the limited purpose of reconsidering the amount of restitution. View "United States v. Betts" on Justia Law

The Greenwald Family Limited Partnership, a landowner in the Village of Mukwonago, Wisconsin, had a longstanding positive relationship with the Village, collaborating on several development projects. However, this relationship soured after a failed land deal in 2014 and several other conflicts. The Partnership sued the Village, alleging that it had been irrationally singled out for unfavorable treatment, violating its Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Partnership pointed to several adverse municipal decisions, focusing primarily on the failed land deal and a new road that was rerouted from the Partnership’s property.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. The district court concluded that the Village had a rational basis for its actions regarding the failed land deal, the new road, and other decisions affecting the Partnership’s properties. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the Partnership had failed to show that the Village’s actions lacked any conceivable rational basis. The court found that the Village’s decisions were rationally related to its legitimate interests in promoting its land-use objectives and protecting public funds. The court concluded that the Partnership was a disappointed landowner, but not a victim of unconstitutional discrimination. View "Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical student at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, referred to as John Doe, who was accused of physical abuse by a fellow student, Jane Roe. The University’s Office of Student Conduct found Doe culpable and suspended him for one year. Doe applied to the University’s MBA program and described his suspension as an exoneration. This led to an investigation by the University’s Prior Misconduct Review Committee, which concluded that Doe had withheld pertinent information and gave false or incomplete information to the business school. Dean Hess of the medical school, without inviting further response from Doe, expelled him from the medical school. Doe accused the University of violating both the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court found that the record did not support an inference of sex discrimination. The court also found that the University’s delay in launching an investigation into Doe’s complaint that Roe hit him on occasion did not contribute to the ultimate decision, and it was justified by the fact that Doe elected not to pursue this charge against Roe.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Doe’s constitutional argument was stronger. The court held that Doe had a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain a student unless he transgressed a norm, which is a property interest in constitutional lingo and requires some kind of hearing. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court. If Doe elects to continue with the suit, his true name must be disclosed to the public, and the district court must decide what remedy is appropriate for Dean Hess’s failure to allow Doe an opportunity to present his position before expelling him. If Doe elects not to reveal his name, the complaint must be dismissed. View "Doe v. Trustees of Indiana University" on Justia Law