Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth
FKFJ was established to operate Saraya Restaurant & Banquet and Zaman Café in Worth, Illinois. Werner, the Village President at the time, decided to run for reelection the year Saraya opened. FKFJ supported Werner’s political opponent in the election. Around the same time, FKFJ had various disputes with the Village of Worth.FKFJ filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment, equal protection, and due process violations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the “tapestry of colorful factual threads.” Whatever occurred between FKFJ and the Village, FKFJ has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could find the disputes are of constitutional import. FKFJ has not presented sufficient argument about any similarly situated entities and cannot satisfy the rational basis prong of a class-of-one equal protection claim. FKFJ had a mere unilateral expectation its license would be renewed. FkFJ failed to establish causation between the protected activity and adverse action for its First Amendment claim. View "FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth" on Justia Law
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Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Ebmeyer v. Brock
Inmate Ebmeyer alleged that when the Illinois Department of Corrections Special Operations Response Team, “Orange Crush” performed a facility-wide shakedown, they subjected him to a humiliating, unconstitutional strip search and excessive force, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. 1983. He asserted that an unidentified “John Doe” placed him in extremely tight handcuffs that caused him injuries; Sergeant Oelberg struck him with a baton, squeezed his testicles, and forced him to stand handcuffed and facing a wall in a stress position for more than three hours; and prison officials Yurkovich and Akpore promulgated policies that encouraged the challenged unconstitutional conduct.The court granted summary judgment in favor of Yurkovich, Akpore, and Oelberg for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. After Ebmeyer identified the unnamed defendant as Adam Brock, the court became aware that Ebmeyer had known from the beginning that John Doe’s first name was “Adam,” and issued an Order to Show Cause why it should not dismiss the case with prejudice for Ebmeyer’s failure to disclose that information sooner. The court rejected Ebmeyer’s ensuing explanation and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Brock but otherwise affirmed. Ebmeyer did not establish that the grievance process was unavailable. The court failed to make the necessary findings to support the dismissal sanction. View "Ebmeyer v. Brock" on Justia Law
Taylor v. City of Milford
Gloria called 911 seeking medical care for her husband, Steven (age 61), who was experiencing a diabetic emergency at their Milford, Illinois home. Officer Garrett responded and restrained Steven in a prone position, face down on his bed, for several minutes. Steven vomited and lost consciousness. He did not regain consciousness before he died at a hospital 10 days later. Steven had been released from the hospital one week before the 911 call, having suffered a heart attack. Garrett had previously volunteered as an EMT for another city and had earned his certification as a paramedic. Garrett prevented Steven’s niece from giving him orange juice for his blood sugar and used a hold that inflicted pain in an effort to restrain Steven, despite the pleas of family members and Steven’s statement that he could not breathe. Garrett later testified that he believed that Steven was a danger to himself and was acting aggressively and that he did not know Steven had vomited or lost consciousness before EMTs arrived. Steven’s relatives and his treating physician explained that hypoglycemic patients may act confused, “tired[,] sluggish, lethargic,” and possibly “rowdy defensively because they don’t understand what’s going on.”In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Garrett at the summary judgment stage. View "Taylor v. City of Milford" on Justia Law
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Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Flint v. Carr
Four men robbed a liquor store. Hours later, three of them also robbed a gas station. Surveillance video captured these robberies. Five days later, three of the perpetrators (Cooper, Holliman, and Williams) committed another robbery. Holliman and Williams died from a car crash during a high-speed pursuit. Cooper spoke to officers from his hospital bed and signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth man from the liquor store robbery.At Flint’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement described the testimony that Cooper would provide. Flint’s counsel described Flint's interview, stating: “My client, thinking that he’s being cooperative, talks to them, says, yes, I know Kenneth Cooper; he and I have been childhood friends. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, citing inadmissible hearsay. Flint’s counsel contended that a mistrial was inappropriate because multiple witnesses would testify about the friendship between the men. The judge granted a mistrial. During preparations for Flint’s second trial, a different judge raised the issue of double jeopardy but, after looking at a transcript, found that the statement "sufficient to cause a mistrial. A jury found Flint guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the manifest necessity standard to find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to move for dismissal based on double jeopardy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Expressing some reservations about whether a mistrial should have been declared, the court cited deference to the discretion of a trial judge. View "Flint v. Carr" on Justia Law
Carter v. Buesgen
In 2016, Wisconsin charged Carter with drug and firearm offenses. Mid-trial, Carter pleaded guilty to heroin and firearm charges; the state agreed to recommend a six-year sentence. The prosecutor backtracked at sentencing. The court sentenced Carter to nine years’ imprisonment in July 2017. Carter sought to appeal his sentence, contending that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sentencing and that the court imposed the sentence based on inaccurate information. In Wisconsin, a defendant must file, within 20 days of sentencing, a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief. Carter filed such a notice five days after sentencing. The public defender’s office assigned him counsel but the clerk and court reporter took 10 months to locate and share the trial transcripts, a step that should have been completed within 60 days. Carter’s counsel successfully filed a new extension request on each day the prior request was due to expire. Over four years Carter had three different public defenders and 14 extension requests by counsel and the court without a ruling on the merits.Carter filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the petition. The “extreme and tragic” delay experienced by Carter excuses him from otherwise applicable statutory exhaustion requirements and shows that Wisconsin’s appellate process, at least with respect to Carter, is ineffective to protect rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. View "Carter v. Buesgen" on Justia Law
Smith v. Finkley
Smith reportedly left a fight and returned with a gun. After a citizen complained, two Milwaukee police officers on patrol came upon Smith and saw that he matched the description relayed by dispatch. When the officers approached Smith, he fled. The officers followed, believing Smith was armed. Smith was found hiding on a rooftop one block away. When the pursuing officers discovered him, an intense and dangerous standoff took place. After Smith refused numerous orders to cooperate, two other officers (defendants) approached Smith, and believing he was armed, drew their guns. The officers thought Smith was reaching behind an air conditioning unit for a gun; Smith said he was responding to an earlier command to get down on the ground. The defendants shot Smith three times. He survived with serious injuries. Video from the officers’ body cameras captured these events.Smith sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers’ motion, seeking summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Some of the circumstances weighed in favor of the police using deadly force to seize Smith, but in the short time frame before and when the officers shot Smith, factual disputes exist about how much of a threat Smith posed and how actively he was resisting. The qualified immunity decision cannot be separated from those factual disputes. View "Smith v. Finkley" on Justia Law
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Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Conyers v. City of Chicago
Chicago requires its police officers to seize, inventory, and store property belonging to an arrested person if that property is not permitted in the Cook County Jail. After 30 days, any property unclaimed by the owner or her authorized representative is deemed abandoned and is sold or destroyed. The plaintiffs brought a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Chicago’s right to seize and inventory the property upon arrest is not at issue and the plaintiffs do not contend that municipalities are not permitted to manage the seized property. The plaintiffs alleged that the notice Chicago furnished was not adequate to alert them to the fact that the police would destroy their personal property if they did not claim it within 30 days.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Chicago did not seize the plaintiffs’ property with an intent to keep it permanently; its motive for the seizures related to safety at the jail, not punishment, The 30-day limit reflected the practical constraints on storage capacity. The detainee knows exactly what has been taken from him and when that confiscation occurred and is told both how to get his property back and how quickly he must do so. The plaintiffs did not show that they were unable to find out the details of the property-recovery process that were disclosed on the police webpage. View "Conyers v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law
Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction
Plaintiffs challenged Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as it applies to offenders who have relocated to Indiana from other states. A 2006 SORA amendment applied its requirements to any “person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” Indiana does not require any person to register if the offense occurred prior to SORA, provided that person remains a resident of Indiana. Under the amendment, persons with pre-SORA convictions who relocate to Indiana from another state where registration was required must register in Indiana, even if Indiana would not have required them to register had they committed their offenses in Indiana and never left.The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. SORA does not violate the right to travel because it does not expressly discriminate based on residency, as consistently required by the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs’ ex post facto claim is likewise precluded by precedent. SORA is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to surmount Indiana’s nonpunitive intent for the law. Because the district court did not address whether SORA passes rational basis scrutiny under an equal protection analysis, the court remanded for consideration of the equal protection claim. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law
United States v. McGill
McGill was convicted of possessing child pornography. He completed his prison sentence and began serving supervised release. McGill has a history of violating the terms of his supervised release. McGill failed two polygraph tests, administered as part of his sex offender treatment program, when he was asked whether he had sexual contact with a minor.Probation Officer Williams conducted a home visit, entered McGill’s bedroom, and observed a black cell phone that he recognized as McGill’s monitored phone and an unknown white cell phone. McGill attempted to block the officer’s view of the second cell phone, stating that it was an old phone that no longer worked. At Williams’s request, McGill handed over the white phone. Williams claims that he was able to power on the phone, saw that the background photo was of a young boy’s face, and then powered it off. Williams delivered the phone to the FBI, which obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search of the phone revealed thousands of images of child pornography. McGill was again charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B).The district court denied McGill’s motion to suppress, accepted a conditional plea, and sentenced McGill to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams was lawfully present in McGill’s house, the unmonitored phone was in plain view, and, under the circumstances, the phone’s incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Williams had reasonable suspicion to believe that the cell phone was evidence a criminal act. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law
Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
Fredrickson spent time at several Illinois penal institutions, where he received services to manage his serious mental health problems, which included anxiety, depression, and the effects of long-term drug dependence. While in custody at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center, he died by suicide.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of Fredrickson’s Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to his risk of harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Individual defendants (a social worker and a corrections officer) may have been negligent but there was no evidence that they were subjectively aware that Fredrickson was experiencing a mental health crisis and at risk of suicide. Wexford (the provider of prison health services) employees could have done more to ensure better continuity of care for Frederickson, as he transferred across three facilities but there was not sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to find “systemic and gross deficiencies” in Wexford’s procedures or lack thereof. View "Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law
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Civil Rights, Constitutional Law