Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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About 50 businesses that offer live adult entertainment (nude or nearly nude dancing) sought loans under the second round of the Paycheck Protection Program enacted to address the economic disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Congress excluded plaintiffs and other categories of businesses from the second round of the Program, 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(III)(aa), incorporating 13 C.F.R. 120.110. Plaintiffs asserted that their exclusion violated their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The district court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Small Business Administration (SBA) from denying the plaintiffs eligibility for the loan program based on the statutory exclusion. The Seventh Circuit granted the government’s stay of the preliminary injunction and expedited briefing on the merits of the appeal. The SBA satisfied the demanding standard for a stay of an injunction pending appeal, having shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Congress is not trying to regulate or suppress plaintiffs’ adult entertainment. It has simply chosen not to subsidize it. Such selective, categorical exclusions from a government subsidy do not offend the First Amendment. Plaintiffs were not singled out for this exclusion, even among businesses primarily engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. Congress also excluded businesses “primarily engaged in political or lobbying activities.” View "Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel was ineffective by not challenging whether his prior drug convictions were predicates, as Indiana law defined cocaine isomers more broadly than federal law.The Seventh Circuit concluded that, although petitioner forfeited his theory of ineffectiveness in the district court, it is subject to plain error review. The court also concluded that, because it was objectively reasonable for petitioner's counsel not to advise risking a mandatory life sentence to pursue the isomer argument, the district court did not plainly err in ruling that counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Seventh Circuit stayed an injunction barring Indiana from enforcing Ind. Code 16-34-2-1(a)(1), (2), 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1), (4), (b)(1), and 25-1-9.5-8(a)(4). The provisions subject to the injunction include a “physician-only law” applicable to medication abortions, a second-trimester hospital/ambulatory surgical center requirement, an in-person counseling requirement, an in-person physical examination requirement, and a telemedicine ban applicable to medication abortions. The court noted that all of the contested provisions have been in force for years, so a stay would preserve the status quo pending appellate resolution. Indiana has made the “strong showing” on the merits necessary to receive a stay. View "Whole Woman's Health Alliance v. Rokita" on Justia Law

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Grainger, the victim of cyberattacks against its computer systems, isolated the source of the intrusions to a single internet protocol (IP) address, coming from a high-rise apartment building where disgruntled former employee Soybel lived. Grainger reported the attacks to the FBI, which obtained a court order under the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. 3121, authorizing the installation of pen registers and “trap and trace” devices to monitor internet traffic in and out of the building generally and Soybel’s unit specifically. The pen registers were instrumental in confirming that Soybel unlawfully accessed Grainger’s system. The district court denied Soybel’s motion to suppress the pen-register evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Soybel’s convictions under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The use of a pen register to identify IP addresses visited by a criminal suspect is not a Fourth Amendment “search” that requires a warrant. IP pen registers are analogous in all material respects to the telephone pen registers that the Supreme Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in 1979. The connection between Soybel’s IP address and external IP addresses was routed through a third party, an internet service provider. Soybel has no expectation of privacy in the captured routing information. The court distinguished historical cell-site location information, which implicates unique privacy interests that are absent here. The IP pen register had no ability to track Soybel’s past movements. View "United States v. Soybel" on Justia Law

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Kenosha officers McDonough and Kinzer responded to a 911 call from an apartment building’s manager who reported that there was a woman inside Ferguson’s apartment who was “causing problems” and did not live there. McDonough spoke with Rupp-Kent who was alone inside Ferguson’s apartment and who reported that Ferguson had been violent with her. McDonough observed bruises on Rupp-Kent’s leg and neck and saw the knife Ferguson purportedly pointed at her. McDonough learned that Ferguson was on probation for robbery, had his driving privileges revoked, and drove a Chrysler. He reviewed Ferguson’s booking photo. McDonough, in his squad completing the paperwork, saw Ferguson drive past and followed. The parties dispute the events that occurred as McDonough attempted to arrest Ferguson. McDonough ultimately deployed his taser for five seconds.Ferguson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. McDonough moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained for a jury to decide. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. McDonough and Ferguson offered competing accounts and the dashcam video of the incident did not conclusively support either party’s account. Under one version of the events, Ferguson was not resisting and a reasonable officer would have known that an officer’s substantial escalation of force in response to an individual’s passive resistance violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force. View "Ferguson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Vega, a Hispanic woman, sued the Park District based on its investigation and termination of her employment for allegedly falsifying her timesheets, citing national origin discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title VII. A jury returned a verdict for Vega on the discrimination claims, but not the retaliation claims, and awarded $750,000. The judge reduced the award to Title VII’s statutory maximum of $300,000, ordered the District to reinstate Vega, pay backpay, provide her with the cash value of lost benefits, and pay prejudgment interest and a tax component. The Seventh Circuit affirmed except for the tax-component award,Vega submitted a fee petition totaling $1,073,901.25, with a 200-page document listing details. Vega’s counsel submitted evidence to support her current hourly rate of $425 for general tasks and $450 for in-court work. The district court granted Vega’s petition in the amount of $1,006,592, noting the District’s “scorched-earth litigation approach.” Vega filed a second fee petition totaling $254,635.69 for work following the first petition. The district court awarded $218,221.69 and granted Vega a tax-component award of $49,224.30. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the award was “rather high for the type of litigation and monetary and equitable relief that Vega achieved,” but that the district court’s analysis and reasoning demonstrate an appropriate exercise of its discretion. View "Vega v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law

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Mahran, an Egyptian Muslim, sued Advocate Christ Medical Center, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Mahran, a pharmacist, alleged that Advocate failed to accommodate his need for prayer breaks; disciplined and later fired him based on his race, religion, and national origin; retaliated against him for reporting racial and religious discrimination; and subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race, religion, and national origin. The district judge rejected all of the claims on summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge wrongly required Mahran to show that Advocate’s failure to accommodate his prayer breaks resulted in an adverse employment action and that the judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence in evaluating his hostile-workplace claim. Mahran expressly agreed at trial that an adverse employment action is an element of a prima facie Title VII claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s religious practice. He cannot take the opposite position. While the judge should have considered all the evidence Mahran adduced in support of his hostile workplace claim, there was not enough evidence for a jury to find that Advocate subjected him to a hostile work environment. View "Mahran v. Advocate Christ Medical Center" on Justia Law

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On August 9, 2005, a group of men fired bullets into a crowd of rival gang members gathered outside a Wisconsin garage. There were no fatalities; three of the victims suffered gunshot wounds. The shooters wanted to prevent retaliation against members of their own gang, including Adeyanju’s brother, who had robbed members of the rival gang. Adeyanju was convicted of three counts each of attempted first‐degree intentional homicide and of endangering safety by use of a firearm. His primary defense was that he was not involved, as no physical evidence connected him to the crime, and that the state’s witnesses could not be trusted. Adeyanju’s counsel contended that the shooters—whoever they were—intended to scare but not to kill their rivals, so they were guilty of endangering safety but not attempted homicide.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Adeyanju’s habeas petition, rejecting an argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on a lesser‐included offense to attempted homicide—first‐degree recklessly endangering safety--so that the jury could have found that he was among the shooters but did not intend to kill anyone. The jury already had that option with the endangering safety by use of a firearm charge, which it chose not to take. Adeyanju failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purported error. View "Adeyanju v. Wiersma" on Justia Law

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Schutt, her children, and her boyfriend were driving into her Fort Wayne apartment complex when the car was hit with bullets; one grazed her boyfriend's scalp. Schutt saw her ex-boyfriend, Parker, shooting, wearing a red hooded sweatshirt. Other witnesses agreed about the hoodie and seeing a long gun. The police found ammunition and a spent shell casing. A Ford Fusion in the parking lot had a red hoodie lying inside. Parker appeared with the keys to the Ford, which contained Parker’s debit card and paperwork and a rifle in the trunk with ammunition in the chamber.Parker was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The owner of the Ford testified that on the day of the shooting she loaned the car to Parker, among others; the keys in Parker's possession were the only keys to the vehicle. She had never before seen the gun. Parker’s counsel asked the crime scene investigator if he collected DNA samples from the gun. The district court prohibited the question under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, noting that Parker was not challenging the reliability of any specific investigative steps but was impermissibly arguing generally that the investigation was shoddy because it did not attempt DNA testing. The police department’s latent fingerprint examiner testified that he found no prints of value on the gun or magazine.After his conviction, the court sentenced Parker to 114 months in prison. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected a Confrontation Clause argument. It is beyond reasonable doubt that any exclusion of cross-examination about the DNA evidence did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The evidence of Parker’s guilt was overwhelming. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

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A store employee overheard his coworker talking with Matthews about a pipe bomb that they had detonated the previous day; they discussed where to place another bomb that Matthews apparently had with him. Long called the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and told Sergeant Becherer that Matthews was a frequent customer and that he knew Matthews owned a “highly modified” AR-15 with a silencer, lived in a trailer behind “the old Fin & Feather Restaurant,” worked on cars in the shed, and had “free reign of the property.” Someone living near the restaurant had called the Sheriff's Office about an explosion. Matthews’s social media posts showed that he possessed explosives. Nothing in the warrant complaint or affidavit explained why Becherer or the State’s Attorney believed Matthews had access to all structures and buildings. The judge heard their testimony and signed the warrant covering all buildings and structures on the former restaurant property. An hour later, a team searched the property and found multiple firearms, silencers, a pipe bomb, and more explosive materials.Matthews, present during the search, was charged with possessing a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), an unregistered silencer, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and an unregistered short-barreled rifle. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a motion to suppress. An objectively reasonable officer, having consulted with the State’s Attorney in preparing the complaint and affidavit, could have relied in good faith on the search warrant, which, although incomplete, was not utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law