Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gilbreath was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child for repeatedly molesting his step-granddaughter, S.L., beginning when she was nine years old. Gilbreath argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to investigate S.L.’s claims that she disclosed the assaults to others in the household; impeach S.L.’s testimony denying her motive to lie with her prior statements discussing her behavioral problems and Gilbreath’s interference with her dating life; impeach S.L. with inconsistencies between her various statements; present testimony from family members corroborating Gilbreath’s version of events and establishing S.L.’s character for dishonesty; and present evidence regarding S.L.’s motive to lie. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus relief.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The attorney’s explanation of his pre-trial decisions and his strategy as the case unfolded was worthy of being “required reading in every law school trial practice class.” His defense was that S.L. fabricated the allegations; fully aware that a young accuser in a sexual abuse case can be perceived sympathetically by the jury, he sought to demonstrate not that she was a liar but that she was not a reliable witness. Gilbreath failed to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of a claim of deficient performance was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. View "Gilbreath v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

Cory died in her bed in 2006. Although young, Cory was severely alcoholic, bulimic, and had been sick with flu-like symptoms. An autopsy revealed “marked steatosis of the liver” and no signs of trauma. Investigators verified her husband, Curt’s, timeline and interviewed their three children, who had seen Cory alive before Curt took them to school. Dr. Bowman, who conducted the autopsy, indicated that the cause of death was inconclusive and did not suggest foul play.Seven years later, Detective Gibson, reviewing old files, noticed a photo of Cory’s body and concluded that Curt had suffocated Cory with a pillow the evening before her death was reported. The photos had been taken after Cory’s arms were repositioned. Gibson launched a murder investigation. Coroner Keller joined Gibson’s effort, claiming without corroboration, that Cory’s body had been in full rigor and that the room had smelled bad. The two “searched” for experts until finding Dr. Turner, to whom they provided limited information. Turner prepared a report supporting the suffocation hypothesis. Curt was arrested and spent 21 months in jail, followed by nine months under house arrest. After a mistrial, FOIA requests revealed undisclosed evidence. In 2017, a jury acquitted Curt. Curt sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on fabrication and manipulation of evidence and on violations of his “Brady” right to be provided with exculpatory evidence, and a Fourth Amendment “malicious prosecution” claim premised on Curt’s detention, without probable cause. The district court denied the officials’ motions, seeking qualified immunity . The Seventh Circuit dismissed in part, citing lack of jurisdiction over the Fourth Amendment claim. Curt withdrew his Fourteenth Amendment claim as precluded by circuit precedent. View "Lovelace v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff on drug-interdiction duty in central Illinois observed an RV with a dirty license plate traveling on I-72 and followed it, exiting the freeway and pulling into a truck-stop parking lot. The driver, Ahmad, entered the convenience store with one of his passengers. A store employee informed the deputy that the men were acting strangely. The officer asked to speak with them. They agreed. After a few preliminary questions, the deputy asked for Ahmad’s driver’s license and the vehicle's rental agreement. Ahmad produced the documents. The deputy then asked for consent to search the RV. Ahmad agreed. The deputy did not immediately conduct a search but called for a K-9 unit, which arrived minutes later. Ahmad agreed to a dog sniff of the RV. The dog alerted about 15 minutes into the encounter. The deputy searched the RV, where a large quantity of marijuana was discovered.Ahmad moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that his consent to search was involuntary because he had already been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the deputy retained his driver’s license and the RV rental agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The deputy’s brief possession of Ahmad’s license and rental agreement did not transform this otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. Ahmad voluntarily consented to both the external dog sniff and the search of the RV. View "United States v. Ahmad" on Justia Law

Based on his perception that Cole was following another vehicle too closely, Illinois Trooper Chapman stopped Cole. The initial stop lasted 10 minutes. Chapman spent about six minutes questioning Cole, then told Cole that he would get a warning but that, for safety reasons, they had to go to a gas station to complete the paperwork. Chapman testified later that he had already decided that he was not going to release Cole before searching the car. Chapman requested a drug-sniffing dog and learned that Cole had been arrested for drug crimes 15 years earlier. At the gas station, Cole’s answers became contradictory; 30 minutes after the stop, Chapman told Cole that he could not leave because he suspected Cole was transporting drugs. The dog arrived 10 minutes later and alerted. Chapman found several kilograms of methamphetamine and heroin in a hidden compartment. The Seventh Circuit initially reversed the denial of Cole’s motion to suppress. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial. Travel-plan questions ordinarily fall within the mission of a traffic stop but, like other police inquiries during a traffic stop, must be reasonable under the circumstances. Here they were reasonable. The trooper inquired about the basic details of Cole’s travel, and his follow-up questions were justified given Cole’s less-than-forthright answers. The stop itself was lawfully initiated, and the trooper developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity before moving to the gas station for the dog sniff. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

DEA obtained a search warrant for Perryman’s Indianapolis home. Agents arrived at the property, read Perryman his Miranda rights, then searched the home. In the master suite, they found fentanyl, baggies, a digital scale, and a loaded AR-15 rifle, three to four steps away from the fentanyl, along with men’s shoes and clothes. Perryman’s girlfriend, Moore, lived elsewhere but had signed the lease for the home. Moore said that the drugs, money, and gun were not hers. The agents read Perryman his Miranda rights for a second time. He agreed to talk. He admitted that the drugs were his, then provided the agents with the name of his drug supplier but said the rifle “belonged to a girlfriend.”Perryman was indicted for possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), and possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, 922(g)(1). The court excluded questioning concerning the disciplinary record of Sergeant Jones, who participated in the search of Perryman’s home. Jones’ 15-year-old disciplinary offense resulted in a reprimand and stemmed from an unrelated investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Perryman’s convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and, under the Confrontation Clause, to the exclusion of evidence relating to Jones’ disciplinary record. View "United States v. Perryman" on Justia Law

Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, would leave her van parked on the street near her home for extended periods of time. In 2018, pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code, her van was towed, impounded, and destroyed. She sued the city on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the ordinance. The district court granted, in part, her motion to certify her suit as a class action. With respect to the “Tow Class,” the court concluded that Santiago “is asserting only a facial challenge: the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to require adequate notice before a vehicle has been towed.” Concerning the Vehicle Disposal Class, the court rejected Chicago’s assertion that state law requires the class to show prejudice from the city’s failure to strictly follow its ordinance.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The class certification order does not fully demonstrate the “rigorous analysis” required by FRCP 23 and constituted an abuse of discretion. Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The district court did not discuss any of the elements of the underlying causes of action or what the causes of action are. View "Santiago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Von Kahl is serving a life sentence, plus consecutive terms of 10 and five years’ imprisonment, for murdering two deputy U.S. Marshals and related crimes. The Bureau of Prisons originally calculated his release date as February 2013. In 1994, the Bureau recalculated his release date as February 2023. Von Kahl contested the calculation of his release date 28 U.S.C. 2241. Von Kahl, whose crime predates the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act, is subject to the 1976 Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. 4201–28, and was eligible for parole as soon as he was sentenced. The Parole Commission denied him release. He contends that he is now entitled to mandatory release under section 4206(d), which caps how long anyone must serve unless the inmate has seriously or frequently violated institutional rules or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any crime.The Seventh Circuit upheld the 2023 release date. The statute says that a life term is treated the same as a 45-year term, so anyone sentenced to life is presumptively released after 30 years but, unless paroled earlier, a prisoner must serve two-thirds or 30 years of “each consecutive term or terms.” Von Kahl is serving three consecutive terms: life, ten years, and five years. Thirty years for the life term, plus two-thirds of each term of years, adds to 40 years, running through February 2023. View "Von Kahl v. Segal" on Justia Law

Police were called when a highly-inebriated Gupta became belligerent while trying to enter a hotel at which he was not a guest. Surveillance video shows Gupta stumbling around and knocking over a brochure rack. A police officer, attempting to move Gupta outside, tugged on his handcuffed arm causing him to fall on his head and chest and fracture a vertebra in his neck. The officer then picked Gupta up by the arms and dragged him to the sidewalk. The officer asserts that he used a reasonable amount of force because Gupta was resisting arrest. Gupta asserts that he was not resisting the arrest, and was intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The video does not show Gupta stiffening or jerking himself away from the officer.The Seventh Circuit reversed an order granting the defendant summary judgment on Gupta’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claim. There are material disputes of fact that make resolution of this case on summary judgment inappropriate. View "Gupta v. Melloh" on Justia Law

Chambers appealed the denial of two petitions for habeas corpus, asserting that he was denied due process in prison disciplinary hearings. Chambers lost good-time credit for one incident of refusing a prison guard’s instructions to provide a urine sample, disobeying a staff member’s order, and acting with insolence towards the staff member and another incident of interfering with a security device (he had activated a cell alarm by forcibly kicking his cell door). The hearing officers discounted Chambers’s claim that the guard never asked for a sample, noting video evidence that the guard was carrying a sample bottle and found Chambers guilty based on his undisputed statement to the guard that he was not in distress or having a medical emergency when he kicked his cell door.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The disciplinary determinations were supported by sufficient evidence. Chambers had no due-process right to call witnesses whose testimony would be repetitive and irrelevant. The record lacked any evidence of bias and the initial reviews of Chambers’s cases by a one-member Unit Disciplinary Committee complied with BOP rules. Federal courts must affirm prison disciplinary decisions if they are supported by “some evidence,” and the incident reports cleared that low bar. “Chambers, a frequent litigant, is warned that he risks monetary sanctions if he continues to repeat in future cases these arguments that we have found to be frivolous.” View "Chambers v. Ciolli" on Justia Law

Anderson rode with Cooper and Jackson to a Chicago sandwich shop. The trio entered the shop. Inside were customers Hazziez and Hart and several cooks, behind a glass wall. While waiting for food, Jackson sold two dime bags of crack cocaine to an unknown person outside the shop. Hart confronted Anderson’s group, stating it wasn’t their turf and they shouldn’t be selling drugs there. The argument moved outside. Anderson shot Hart three times. Hazziez, having witnessed the shooting, jumped in his car and took off. As Hazziez drove away, he heard three more shots.Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder of Hart, attempted first-degree murder of Hazziez, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by Hazziez. His first-degree murder conviction was affirmed. Because of an erroneous jury instruction, the attempted murder conviction was reversed. The court entered judgment on the aggravated discharge of a firearm count. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Anderson then sought federal habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated-discharge conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent in upholding Anderson’s conviction by pointing to trial testimony supporting an inference that Anderson was shooting at Hazziez. View "Anderson v. Brookhart" on Justia Law