Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lumpkin was convicted of various drug crimes. Wisconsin courts denied his appeal and post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his federal habeas corpus petition, in which Lumpkin argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The Wisconsin court’s determination that he suffered no prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s deficient performance in cross-examining a key witness was not an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, Even if Lumpkin’s trial counsel had impeached the witness so thoroughly that she could be deemed completely unreliable and her testimony could be set aside entirely, there existed overwhelming other evidence incriminating Lumpkin. During his arrest, officers uncovered from Lumpkin’s pockets three different types of drugs, separated into nearly thirty individual plastic bags plus more than $1100 in cash, all in small bills. The testimony of another witness and text messages provided overwhelming evidence proving that Lumpkin possessed drugs with an intent to deliver them. View "Lumpkin v. Hermans" on Justia Law

Under rules adopted and enforced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wisconsin lawyers must join and pay dues to the State Bar of Wisconsin. Active membership in the association is “a condition precedent to the right to practice law” in the state. This regulatory regime, often called an “integrated, mandatory[,] or unified bar,” authorizes the State Bar to use membership dues to aid the courts in the administration of justice, conduct a program of continuing legal education, and maintain “high ideals of integrity, learning, competence… public service[,] and high standards of conduct” in the bar of the state.Attorney File contends that requiring him to join and subsidize the State Bar violates his First Amendment free speech and associational rights. Recognizing that Supreme Court precedent forecloses this claim (Keller v. State Bar of Cal. (1990)), File argued that the Court’s more recent cases—particularly “Janus” (2018)--implicitly overruled Keller. The district court rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Keller “may be difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s more recent First Amendment caselaw, but on multiple occasions and in no uncertain terms, the Court has instructed lower courts to resist invitations to find its decisions overruled by implication.” View "File v. Kastner" on Justia Law

Smith was a passenger in Naylor’s car. Chicago police officers pulled them over for running a red light. Smith was “shaking.” Officer Holden asked Smith to step outside. Smith complied but immediately rested the front of his pelvis against the car. Holden asked Smith to step back, then performed an initial pat-down focused on Smith’s waistband, pockets, and lower leg. Holden did not find any contraband but placed Smith in handcuffs. Holden asked Smith to walk several steps. Smith “had that side-to-side walk, as if he was holding something in his crotch area.” Smith then rested his pelvis against the front of the police car. Holden performed the second pat-down by jiggling Smith’s pant legs. Nothing fell out. Holden then asked Smith to walk again and observed an exaggerated limp. About one minute later, Holden conducted the final pat-down, focusing on Smith’s groin area, and removed a loaded handgun from Smith’s underwear. Approximately 11 minutes elapsed between the initiation of the stop and the discovery of the gun.Smith was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court granted Smith’s motion to suppress certain statements but denied his motion to suppress the gun. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the totality of the circumstances—a nighttime traffic stop of an individual who appeared very nervous, walked strangely, and repeatedly rested his pelvis against cars as if to prop something up— reasonable suspicion supported the final pat-down. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The FBI conducted extensive surveillance, made more than 10 controlled purchases of heroin from Lottie, and secured court orders authorizing the interception of Lottie’s cellphone communications. Agents learned that Lottie agreed to a large heroin purchase. The supplier, who had recently suffered a leg injury, planned to arrive at a Rockford location to complete the transaction. To prepare for the deal, Lottie went to houses where he stashed drugs and money before returning to his residence. Shortly after, a white Corolla pulled into his driveway for 10-15 minutes before leaving. Law-enforcement officers followed the car and pulled it over after observing two traffic violations. Ochoa-Lopez was the driver; the suspected supplier was the passenger. One officer noticed that the passenger had a leg injury that required the use of an assistive device. Ochoa-Lopez claimed the two men were transporting the car for a company. Agents searched the vehicle and discovered a backpack containing $47,000 in cash.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence recovered during the warrantless search of the car. The agents had probable cause to search the car; based on the totality of the circumstances, there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found there. View "United States v. Ochoa-Lopez" on Justia Law

Gmoser ran an operation that distributed child pornography over the dark web. A jury rejected Gmoser’s insanity defense and convicted him under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g). Judge Bruce conducted the trial. While the case was on remand to deal with the lesser included offenses, the private bar learned that for several years Judge Bruce had been sending emails to the U.S. Attorney’s office without copying counsel for the defense. Judge Bruce was removed from criminal cases. Judge Shadid, to whom Gmoser’s case was transferred concluded that a single ex parte email sent during the Gmoser proceedings did not evince any actual or potential bias. Gmoser was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected arguments that a psychiatrist who testified for the prosecution should not have been allowed to do so because he did not personally examine Gmoser and that evidence supplied by Carnegie Mellon University in response to a subpoena should not have been admitted. The University produced the evidence without protest. Gmoser is not entitled to enforce the University’s rights. Gmoser was not entitled to a new trial based on Judge Bruce’s involvement. Gmoser’s trial was not even arguably affected by any improper communication or any material discretionary decision. View "United States v. Gmoser" on Justia Law

In 2014, Franklin was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on six prior convictions, including three for Minnesota burglary and two for Illinois residential burglary. Franklin neither appealed nor pursued 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral relief within a year. He sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 after the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision clarified that the Minnesota convictions did not qualify as ACCA predicates. Because three qualifying convictions remained, the district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that Illinois residential burglary convictions do not qualify as ACCA predicates. The government conceded that Franklin’s sentence is unlawful but opposed section 2241 relief, arguing that Franklin could have challenged the use of his Illinois burglary convictions as ACCA predicates on direct appeal or in a timely section 2255 motion.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of relief, citing its “Davenport” holding that a federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus "if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion.” Before the Mathis decision, any challenge to the use of his Minnesota or his Illinois burglaries as ACCA predicates was destined to fail given Eighth Circuit precedent. The limitations period in section 2255(f) blocked a Mathis-based motion in the sentencing court. View "Franklin v. Keyes" on Justia Law

Gaddis cut branches from McCombs’s tree that extended into his yard and threw them into McCombs’s yard. McCombs asked Gaddis to pick up the branches but he ignored her. Upon learning that a neighbor, Winstead, had spoken to McCombs about the branches Gaddis went to Winstead’s home and told Winstead to mind his own business. McCombs called the police. Officers arrived. After talking to neighbors, they told Gaddis through the door that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct. Gaddis refused to come out of his home. He stepped outside after officers stated he could also be charged with resisting arrest. Gaddis was arrested for disorderly conduct. Neighbors claimed that Gaddis was erratic and threatening. Gaddis brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, the city of Marion, and the neighbors, asserting false arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The police report provides ample information from which officers could have reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct. The consensual discussions between the officers and Gaddis did not amount to a “seizure.” At the time of Gaddis’s arrest, it was not clearly established that the officers’ statements that he would be charged with resisting arrest, followed by his choice to come out and face arrest, would violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on routine warrantless arrests inside the home. View "Gaddis v. DeMattei" on Justia Law

An ATF agent was shot. An arrest warrant was issued for Godinez. Agents obtained cellphone location data that placed a known telephone of Godinez at or near Segoviano’s apartment building. Agents entered the building to find Godinez. One occupant, Segoviano, stated that there was no one else in his apartment and consented to a search. The agents removed Segoviano, handcuffed him, and conducted a limited search. For 20‐30 minutes of questioning, Segoviano remained handcuffed; the agents then removed the handcuffs but continued the questioning. When Segoviano asked whether he was under arrest, they responded that he was “detained.” Segoviano acknowledged possessing marijuana and cocaine and the presence of firearms for which he possessed a FOID card. The agents informed Segoviano that based on that admission they could obtain a search warrant, Segoviano then signed a consent to search. The agents never provided Miranda warnings. The search yielded four firearms, marijuana, and cocaine. Segoviano was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Segoviano’s motion to suppress. The agents had no objective basis to suspect Segoviano of criminal wrongdoing other than his presence in the same building with some potential connection to the fugitive; those facts are insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion and insufficient to support prolonging the detention. View "United States v. Segoviano" on Justia Law

Johnson entered state custody in 2007. His history of prison misconduct led to his transfer in 2013 to serve accumulated segregation (solitary confinement). Johnson suffers from serious mental illness, including depression and bipolar disorder, and he was on crisis watch nine times while in segregation. Mental health professionals regularly monitored his condition and treated him with medication, which was periodically adjusted. Johnson’s misconduct continued in segregation, especially when he refused to take his medication. Many of his violations were serious enough to trigger penalties of 30-90 days of no “yard” access.Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in his pro se complaint that the cumulative yard restrictions (totaling about three years, with 24 months consecutive) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He also complained of unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation, summertime heat in his cell, excessive noise, and inadequate mental health treatment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Johnson obtained counsel and cited research on the harmful effects of solitary confinement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson never sought relief for the time he spent in solitary confinement; he sued over his loss of yard access, unhealthy conditions in his cell, and his mental-health treatment. The record is entirely undeveloped on the issue of the effects of prolonged solitary confinement. Claims not raised in the district court are waived. View "Johnson v. Prentice" on Justia Law

Karr was convicted of rape and domestic battery for his assaults on A.P., his former girlfriend. Karr then fired his attorney, hired a new one, and pursued claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Those claims were rejected by the Indiana trial court and on direct appeal. Karr then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. The court rejected an argument that counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate A.P.’s history of medication use, and introduced no evidence about whether Karr used his cellphone during his second assault so that A.P.’s trial testimony could have been impeached. The jury had an ample basis on which to find A.P. credible. There is no reasonable probability that any evidence Karr references would have affected the trial’s outcome. Because Karr did not raise six additional claims in Indiana state court, he procedurally defaulted them. Those procedural defaults are not excusable under a narrow equitable exception delineated by the Supreme Court, which does not apply to “insubstantial defaulted claims such as the ones Karr presents” and does not apply in this procedural posture. View "Karr v. Sevier" on Justia Law