Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dash-cam video footage and testimony from Illinois State Trooper Payton indicated that Payton, specially trained in drug interdiction, made observations about Ambriz-Villa’s car which led him to suspect drug trafficking. When Ambriz-Villa’s car crossed onto the road’s shoulder, Payton executed a traffic stop. While processing a warning ticket, Payton questioned Ambriz-Villa. Ambriz-Villa’s unusual responses and excessively nervous and evasive reactions raised Payton’s suspicion. Payton handed Ambriz-Villa the warning ticket. Ambriz-Villa opened the door and began to exit the patrol car. With Ambriz-Villa “halfway out the door,” Payton asked, “Do you mind if I ask you a few more questions?” Ambriz-Villa agreed. Payton then asked whether he was involved in any drug activity (which Ambriz-Villa denied) and if he would consent to a search of his car. Ambriz-Villa said yes. Payton asked, “for clarification.” Ambriz-Villa confirmed that he consented to the search of his car. The search uncovered 13 packages of methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Ambriz-Villa’s motion to suppress, his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A) and within-Guidelines 168-month sentence. The scope of the stop was not unreasonable and did not violate Ambriz-Villa’s Fourth Amendment rights. Payton’s tone and behavior did not suggest coercion; Ambriz-Villa’s consent was voluntary because a reasonable person in his position would feel at liberty to disregard the questions and walk away.” View "United States v. Ambriz-Villa" on Justia Law

Garcia was convicted of attempted homicide, recklessly endangering safety, and aggravated battery based on a drive-by shooting that left one victim seriously injured. Garcia’s post-conviction counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial claiming that trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses amounted to ineffective assistance. Garcia filed a consolidated appeal and post-conviction order. In the meantime, the state acknowledged that the reckless endangerment counts were lesser-included offenses; the judge modified the judgment, which was affirmed as modified.Garcia filed another post-conviction motion, raising new claims of ineffective assistance. Wisconsin rules require a defendant to raise all available claims for relief in his first post-conviction motion or on direct appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate a “sufficient reason.” Garcia needed to allege specific facts that would establish his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, including allegations showing that the defaulted claims were “clearly stronger” than the issues post-conviction counsel chose to present.After Wisconsin courts rejected his petition, Garcia sought federal habeas relief. The district judge rejected the state’s procedural objection but agreed that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the mistakes were not prejudicial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The state appellate court rejected Garcia’s second post-conviction motion based on failure to satisfy the pleading standard for overcoming procedural default. That independent and adequate state procedural basis barred federal review unless Garcia can establish cause for and prejudice from his default. He has not done so. View "Garcia v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas, fraudulently promised victims that they could save their homes from foreclosure or lower their mortgage payments. They targeted monolingual Spanish‐speakers. They charged a $5,000-$10,000 "membership fee" and spent the fees on personal expenses. Their fraudulent entity never prevented a foreclosure. More than 60 homeowners joined, losing almost $260,000.Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas were charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Although Bell consistently refused legal representation, the district court assigned an experienced stand-by attorney. On the eve of trial, Bell moved to retain Joyce, who was newly admitted to the Illinois bar, had never tried a case, and had met Bell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center days earlier, at the behest of Eliades, co‐defendant Rayas’s counsel. Later, Eliades and Joyce denied that Eliades asked Joyce to visit Bell. Conflict attorneys from the Federal Public Defender’s Office discussed the situation with Bell and Rayas separately and held a conflict hearing for Hernandez. Rayas and Hernandez chose new attorneys. Bell insisted on Joyce, signing a waiver in which he acknowledged his right to conflict‐free counsel and the potential conflicts associated with Joyce.Convicted, Bell was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $259,211 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bell’s waiver was knowing and voluntary; he has not demonstrated actual or serious potential for conflict that would have obliged the court to disregard his waiver. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Correction places offenders in restrictive housing when their continued presence in the general population would pose a serious threat to life, property, and others, or the security and orderly operation of a correctional facility. Crouch has been an Indiana inmate for about a decade. In February 2016, Crouch was assigned to disciplinary restrictive status housing due to disciplinary code violations. Crouch spent almost four years in solitary confinement. Throughout this period, Crouch received dozens of classification and status reports. Crouch did not appeal any of these reports; before entering solitary confinement he was aware of the process to appeal and had done so. Crouch also received regular 30-day reviews. Crouch did not appeal those reviews. Inmates also may raise concerns through an offender grievance or a disciplinary appeal; both processes are explained to inmates during orientation and copies of the policies are available at the facilities’ law libraries.Crouch sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Due Process rights because of his “prolonged placement in solitary confinement” which “did not receive meaningful review.” The district court dismissed because Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal claim about prison conditions. View "Crouch v. Brown" on Justia Law

Price had been convicted of felony aggravated battery. A gunshop employee ran a background check after Price placed an order, then contacted ATF Agent Clancy, and gave Price an inoperable magazine shell. Price purchased ammunition. Price later complained the magazine did not fit “his firearm.” Clancy impersonated a store employee for Price’s return and contacted the Indiana Department of Correction. Parole officers arrived at the store and searched Price's vehicle, as authorized by his parole agreement. They found a (stolen) loaded pistol. Clancy and the parole officers drove Price to his residence. The officers searched, discovered ammunition, and notified Clancy. Clancy obtained and executed a search warrant for the home, a van parked in the driveway, and an outbuilding. Officers found a firearm and ammunition. A rifle was found in the van.Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Price unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrantless parole searches violated the Fourth Amendment because the parole officers acted as a “stalking horse” for the ATF, allowing Clancy to circumvent typical warrant and probable cause requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parole officers complied with the parole agreement; they had reasonable cause to believe Price had violated his parole conditions. The court also rejected arguments that there was insufficient evidence that Price had constructively possessed the guns and challenges to sentencing enhancements for multiple firearms, a stolen firearm, and obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law

Captain Van Lanen saw apparent contraband in Jackson’s cell and ordered a search, which uncovered prohibited items: bottles of unknown liquids, a hair pick, and documents containing the names and health information of other inmates. Van Lanen ordered the confiscation of the records, some of which belonged to inmate Jones. Jackson had the records because he was helping Jones prepare a civil rights lawsuit against Van Lanen and others. Jones sought to retrieve the paperwork, claiming the documents were privileged, confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones claims Van Lanen said: “you won’t get to use it to sue me with!” Jackson declined to support Jones’s claim. Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records, constituting contraband under prison policy, and ordered most of them destroyed. Jones invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents in an effort to retaliate against Jones for filing administrative grievances and taking steps to sue Van Lanen and that the document destruction deprived him of his right to access the courts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, agreeing that Jones had not identified any harm. Jones identified enough facts to get part of his remaining retaliation claim to trial. View "Jones v. Van Lanen" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Antonio and his brother guilty of first-degree homicide and a related firearms charge. The charges arose from the 2006 shooting death of a rival gang member. Antonio was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, without the possibility of release. Wisconsin courts affirmed Antonio’s conviction and denied his post-conviction petitions. Antonio sought federal habeas relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his claim of self-defense, in advising him not to testify in support of that defense, and in neglecting to prepare him to testify, and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the ineffective assistance claim on appeal.The district court denied Antonio’s petition, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting these claims was not an unreasonable application of “Strickland.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Antonio made the decision not to testify; his attorney warned Antonio that testifying could undermine his self-defense argument by allowing exploration of his actions that indicated guilt, including setting fire to his vehicle and fleeing the state, and would place in his hand the gun that was responsible for the fatal shooting. The court noted that Antonio’s testimony was not essential to his claim of self-defense. View "Shannon v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Rucker is serving a 240-month sentence. While awaiting a jail transfer in 2012, Rucker attacked another prisoner who had testified against him, slamming the man’s head against a concrete wall. In 2020, Rucker sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that he had an extraordinary and compelling reason for release—his medical conditions (obesity, hypertension, pre-diabetes, poor eyesight, possible sickle cell trait, and his then-current COVID-19 infection) and the spread of COVID-19 throughout the prison. He argued that early release was supported by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, specifically his traumatic childhood during which his mother died and his father abused drugs, and his successful completion of anger management and drug abuse courses while in prison. Rucker’s criminal history included prior convictions for damage to property, battery, home invasion, and drug trafficking.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court’s assessment of Rucker’s COVID-19 risk was cursory but any error was harmless because the court acted within its broad discretion in finding that the 3553(a) factors did not favor release. The court highlighted the need to protect the public from further crimes and the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment for the offense. "Recent events underscore the need for ... individualized arguments and evidence." View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainees Kemp, Dearborn, Galvez, and Lind-Enriquez had lived together in the cellblock without incident for several months when a fight broke out, with Kemp throwing the first punch. Officer Burget was patrolling the jail but, to avoid being considered a “snitch,” Kemp did not tell Burget about threats made before the fight. The fight ended with Kemp lying motionless on the floor. Officer Williams, conducting her rounds, saw Kemp lying on the floor and called for emergency medical services. The medics responded about eight minutes later. Kemp suffered severe injuries.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Kemp’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on summary judgment. Although Burget had about 60% hearing loss in one ear and about 40% hearing loss in the other and was not wearing his prescribed hearing aid, the evidence did not indicate that his impaired hearing made any difference in the response to the beating. Nothing in the record would have put a reasonable guard on notice of a substantial risk of harm to Kemp. The court also rejected wrongful hiring and wrongful retention claims. View "Kemp v. Fulton County" on Justia Law