Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Wades live in a second-floor apartment; the first-floor unit is a short flight of stairs up from ground level. Chicago Police officers were seeking Johnson, a purported heroin dealer. A confidential informant had identified the “second floor” of the Wades’ building as Johnson’s place of operations. Johnson actually lived on the first floor. No officer confirmed Johnson’s address, surveilled the building, or checked whether anybody else was living in the second-floor unit. Officers obtained a warrant for that unit, ascended both staircases, and kicked in the door. Wade was out. A family friend, Dotson, was at the apartment. Dotson’s account differs from police accounts. Dotson alleges that an officer planted narcotics on his person The officers say that upon entering the apartment they found Dotson and Nero inside. Both fled. Officers caught them on the back porch. Video evidence of the events was lost. A thorough search of the Wades’ apartment turned up no drugs. Large quantities of narcotics were discovered in the downstairs unit.The district court rejected the Wades' suit on summary judgment. Dotson’s claims were settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Wades have not identified evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to decide in their favor, Given the facially valid warrant and the lack of immediately self-evident ambiguity, the officers were entitled to enter the Wades’ apartment to search. View "Wade v. Ramos" on Justia Law

A John Doe informant stated that Taylor had showed the informant a gun inside Taylor’s apartment. Taylor was a felon. Chicago police officer Hughes secured a warrant to search Taylor’s apartment. On the record, no one knows Doe’s real name, contact information, or why he came forward Doe knew how to get to Taylor’s apartment, but not his address. Hughes made an incorrect guess. Officers entered Taylor’s apartment, which was not the apartment listed on the warrant. Officers found mail addressed in his name from which they learned the correct address. They found a different gun than was described by Doe. Officers found no evidence directly connecting Taylor to the bedroom in which the gun was found. Hughes initiated an alert for Taylor’s arrest. Taylor turned himself in and spent four months in jail before a court found the warrant invalid based on the address error and quashed his arrest. Despite Taylor’s acquittal, the arrest alert remained active. A month later, Taylor was again arrested.Taylor filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendant summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to officers who were not involved in procuring the warrant and affirmed summary judgment for the city on Taylor’s Monell claims relating to the investigative alerts policy and policy with respect to John Doe informants. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Hughes and remanded for a determination of damages. Hughes is entitled to good-faith immunity only if he could have “reasonably believed" that the search was authorized by a valid warrant. Hughes told the judge that he knew Taylor’s address; he did not. Hughes stated that there was probable cause to believe drugs would be found in the apartment; there was not. View "Taylor v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In 2003, Gamboa was convicted of seven counts of drug and firearm crimes. The court found that Gamboa had two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses and was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). After an unsuccessful direct appeal and multiple 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions and 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions, Gamboa sought habeas corpus relief under section 2241, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision, his prior state drug convictions did not constitute felony drug offenses for the purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A)'s sentencing enhancement, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(44). Mathis narrowed the range of state statutes that qualify as violent-felony predicates under the Armed Career Criminal Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Gamboa cannot seek relief under the saving clause gateway to section 2241 because, whether under the categorical approach or a comparison of the straightforward federal definition to the state statute of conviction, the law was not squarely against Gamboa and it would not have been futile for him to raise his arguments in his initial 2255 motion. Precedent did not prevent Gamboa from making an argument that an alternatively phrased statute could be indivisible under the categorical approach at the time of his initial 2255 motion. View "Gamboa v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USS on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, concluding that USS carried its burden to show that plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at its Midwest Plant. In this case, USS's judgment was premised on the consideration of adequate evidence, as contemplated by the ADA and supporting regulations. Furthermore, USS's imposition of restrictions was based on information pertinent to plaintiff's personal experience with his seizure disorder. Therefore, the assessment USS conducted was sufficiently individualized. The court agreed with the district court that whether plaintiff's seizure disorder was controlled is a material fact about which there is no genuine dispute.Applying the direct threat analysis and weighing factors such as duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm that will occur, and imminence of harm, the court concluded that all the factors weigh in favor of finding that there is a direct threat. Therefore, USS has shown through undisputed evidence that, if hired for the Utility Person position, plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at the Midwest Plant. View "Pontinen v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Barbee sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. Barbee suffers from Type II diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, and is serving his sentence at a facility that experienced a large outbreak of COVID-19 infections around the time that Barbee filed his motions. He argued that his medical conditions placed him at significant risk of contracting COVID-19 and contended that he had used his time in prison productively, completing a drug abuse program, passing two parts of the GED test, and taking classes. He had one disciplinary incident two years earlier.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Barbee had the burden of establishing extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release and the request must be consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing considerations. The court noted Barbee’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness of his most recent offense, the relatively small portion of his sentence that he had served, and that Barbee had received two doses of the Moderna vaccine. Although Barbee argued that he remains at risk as the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve, he did not present any evidence establishing that he is more at risk for an adverse outcome in prison than he would be if released. View "United States v. Barbee" on Justia Law

In 2012, Brown pled guilty in the Eastern District of Missouri to unlawfully possessing a firearm and admitted to eight prior state law felony convictions, leading to an enhanced, 262-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief in the Eighth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Brown used 28 U.S.C. 2241 to file a habeas petition in the Seventh Circuit, where he was then confined, contending that Supreme Court precedent leaves him without the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. Brown cited a Seventh Circuit holding (Davenport) that a federal prisoner may seek section 2241 relief in the circuit of confinement where section 2255’s limits on second or successive motions would deny that prisoner even one opportunity to seek habeas relief based on a newly-issued statutory interpretation decision.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Circuit of conviction law (here, the Eighth Circuit) generally applies to Davenport-based habeas petitions. Eighth Circuit precedent clearly leaves Brown with the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit has held that a weapons-exhibiting offense remains a violent felony under section 924(e)’s elements clause, which Supreme Court precedent left untouched. View "Brown v. Krueger" on Justia Law

DiDonato fell and seriously injured her head in the bathroom of Panatera’s home Panatera, a Chicago paramedic, found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding but allegedly only rinsed the blood from DiDonato’s head, wrapped it in a towel, moved her to his bed, and sexually assaulted her. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home. DiDonato went to an emergency room. She had sustained head trauma and a concussion.DiDonato filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Panatera violated her due process rights by failing to provide medical care, with state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DiDonato’s section 1983 claim. DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a “special relationship.” States and municipalities are not in a “special relationship” with all residents and do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. There was no allegation that DiDonato was ever in the city’s care or custody. DiDonato also failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted “under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens; an individual’s employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. DiDonato’s need for help and medical care arose during entirely private interaction. View "Didonato v. Panatera" on Justia Law

Skaggs was charged with 12 counts related to his production and possession of child pornography, based on evidence found in thumb drives seized from him during a warrantless border search at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. The district court denied a motion to suppress, convicted Skaggs of all counts. Believing a life sentence was mandatory because of his prior state conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor, the court sentenced him to life in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No court has ever required more than reasonable suspicion for a border search An investigation revealed that Skaggs had a prior sexual misconduct conviction; traveled abroad multiple times and was involved with overseas orphanages; posted suggestive pictures on Facebook of himself with young girls; was the director of Ukrainian Angels, whose name appeared to be borrowed from a well-known child pornography website; and was suspected of child sex tourism and traveling to Ukraine to meet minors. Skaggs lied during his customs interview, stating that he had no thumb drives with him. These facts, taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court said it would have imposed a life sentence in any event and discussed the section 3553(a) factors that supported the sentence, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate Zimmerman filed a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Though “far from clear and very abbreviated,” the complaint seemed to contend that Corrections Officer Bornick had it out for him because of grievances Zimmerman had filed concerning Bornick. Zimmerman also seemed to allege that he had received an undeserved warning from Bornick, who also confiscated about $100 worth of Zimmerman’s property and issued a conduct report that led to 16 days of disciplinary confinement.The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and determined that Zimmerman failed to state a claim; the complaint did not establish a causal relationship between Bornick’s actions and any protected speech. Deciding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Zimmerman’s allegations were thorough, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court was wrong not to dismiss the complaint but absent a clear indication of futility or some extraordinary circumstance, litigants, including prisoners, should have the opportunity to try again by filing an amended complaint. The district court may have held Zimmerman to a pleading standard beyond that required by the Federal Rules and, regardless, should have given him a second try. View "Zimmerman v. Bornick" on Justia Law

Sanders, a severely mentally ill inmate, has been in the custody of the Illinois Department of Correction since 2004. For eight years, he was in solitary confinement, where his mental health deteriorated. Sanders has attempted suicide and engaged in self-harm multiple times. He claims that self-mutilation was a pre-condition for solitary confinement inmates to speak with a mental health person. Sanders filed suit and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to bring suits without prepaying the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has three strikes—actions or appeals dismissed for being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim”—can only proceed without prepayment if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Sanders cited the “imminent danger exception.”The district court initially granted his IFP application but later revoked its grant, finding that none of Sanders’s allegations demonstrated that he was in imminent danger. The Seventh Circuit reinstated his IFP status. Sanders adequately alleged his belief that certain practices at the Pontiac Correctional Center would lead him to self-harm. The district court erroneously determined that the allegations were fraudulent and did so without explicitly considering whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law