Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Over three weeks in 2002, Santiago participated in a string of armed robberies at Pennsylvania hotels. When he was arrested, Santiago was holding the distinctive firearm that he and his co-defendants used in the robberies. Convicted of three Hobbs Act counts of interference with commerce by robbery, two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, (robbery), 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon (prior state felony convictions for criminal trespass and retail theft), Santiago was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months' imprisonment on the three Hobbs Act and two felon-in-possession counts. Under then-applicable law, Santiago also received mandatory consecutive 60-month and 300-month terms for the 924(c) counts. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit rejected Santiago’s section 2241 habeas petition in which he argued that the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, required that his convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon be set aside. Santiago cannot show he was actually innocent of those charges as required to invoke the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). In order to use section 2241 to avoid the restrictions on successive 2255 motions, he would need to show that no reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Santiago v. Streeval" on Justia Law

Illinois State University charges tuition and multiple fees; the Mandatory Fee covers the cost of on-campus facilities and programs. In 2020, after the Governor declared an emergency because of COVID-19 and issued an order forbidding many in-person gatherings, ISU shifted to distance learning over a video system. ISU remitted some but not all of the Mandatory Fee, telling students that the remainder includes the expense of facilities that must be supported no matter how educational services are provided. Two students filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Constitution does not ensure that states keep all of their promises, any more than it ensures that states observe all of their laws. A violation of a state law or a state contract is a violation of a state entitlement, for which the remedy lies under state law. . ISU lacked authority to violate the Governor’s orders. There was no due process violation because the students were not entitled to hearings. What the students want is substantive–a full refund. A breach of contract does not violate the Constitution. Suing ISU officials in their individual capacities makes no difference; there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. “Plaintiffs’ counsel should count themselves lucky that [those officials] did not seek sanctions for frivolous litigation. View "Thiele v. Board of Trustees of Illinois State University" on Justia Law

Officer Stringer and a confidential informant (Hinkle) appeared before a state court judge and obtained a warrant. Following the ensuing search, Sanford was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession of a firearm as a felon, 922(g)(1). Sanford sought to challenge the warranted search and sought a “Franks” hearing. Sanford presented Hinkle’s Declaration that officers told her that if she did not cooperate they would take away her one-year-old daughter, that she would not be charged with any new offenses, that an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in a misdemeanor case would be “taken care of,” and that she should state that she had not been promised anything for testifying. . The government informed the court that FBI agents had discussed Hinkle’s Declaration with her and that she told them she did not prepare the Declaration and that much of it was false or essentially untrue.After a "pre-Franks" hearing, the district court upheld the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Warrant-issuing judges are aware that confidential informants are likely to have criminal histories; Hinkle admitted to criminal conduct. The district court did not err in determining that a Franks hearing was not necessary based solely on the failure to discuss Hinkle’s “unremarkable” criminal history. View "United States v. Sanford" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state holds exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiffs, who own beachfront property on Lake Michigan’s Indiana shores, believed that their property extended to the low-water mark, and filed suit, alleging that the ruling amounted to a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment–a “judicial taking.” The defendants were Indiana officeholders in their official capacities: the Governor, the Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources Director, and the State Land Office Director.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. None of the named officials caused the plaintiffs’ asserted injury or is capable of redressing it, so the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Pavlock v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

While imprisoned in Indiana, Lauderdale-El petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the loss of good-time credits resulting from a prison disciplinary conviction. His petition asserts that prison officials violated his due process rights in applying an Indiana Department of Correction policy rescinding previously restored good-time credits.The district court concluded that Lauderdale-El could challenge the restoration policy in state court, so it dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). Lauderdale-El had exhausted administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that dismissal of a habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is a final and appealable judgment. Indiana law permits state-court review of Lauderdale-El’s claims. Because Lauderdale-El is still on parole, the court concluded that the matter was not moot. View "Lauderdale-El v. Indiana Parole Board" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued a series of executive orders that first required Illinois residents to shelter in place at their residences, compelled “non-essential” businesses temporarily to cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people (later increased to 50 people). Believing that these orders violated numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, several individuals joined with some Illinois businesses and sued the Governor in his official capacity. After granting the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court found that they lacked standing to sue. The court also concluded that it would be futile to allow a second amendment because, even if it had erred about the existence of a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. With respect to five out of six counts, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the criteria for Article III standing to sue. The remaining count attempts to state a claim under the Takings Clause. The business plaintiffs “may have squeaked by the standing bar” for that theory but have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nowlin v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Whyte was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide for killing his girlfriend, Weiland, during a 2006 altercation. In his habeas petition, Whyte argued his constitutional rights were violated when he was required to wear a stun belt in front of the jury. The parties dispute whether the jury ever saw the stun belt or understood the nature of the device but when Whyte took the stand to testify, he declined to reenact the altercation with Weiland for fear the jury would see the device and draw negative inferences. Whyte also claims the belt had a chilling effect on his testimony, rendering his account of the incident “stilted” and “emotionless,” which the state underscored in its closing argument. Whyte’s trial counsel did not object to the stun belt’s use. Whyte also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Whyte’s claims are procedurally defaulted under adequate and independent state grounds, so federal review is foreclosed. Whyte failed to challenge the stun belt or the effectiveness of his trial counsel, either on direct appeal or in a state court post-conviction motion. Whyte offered no external impediment that prevented him from complying with the state court pleading standards. View "Whyte v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

A fire consumed Jones’s house in 2013. York, a county sheriff’s investigator, initially blamed an electrical malfunction. When he learned that Jones’s friend, Onopa, claimed to have a recording of Jones admitting to arson, he reopened the investigation. York interviewed several witnesses, analyzed Jones’s telephone records, and secured Onopa’s recording, then referred the matter to the district attorney, After her conviction, Jones obtained new counsel and argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Onopa’s recording as created for the purpose of extortion. Before the court ruled on the matter, the district attorney dropped all charges against Jones. Jones then sued York and Adams County under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She contended that York violated her due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence, fabricating inculpatory evidence, testifying falsely at trial, and prosecuting her without probable cause.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find for Jones on any of her claims. Jones’s cell phone records were presented and discussed by both sides at trial. The jury heard testimony from York, Jones, and Onopa. Questioning by both sides exposed the discrepancies in each witness’s version of events. Jones failed to show a genuine dispute of fact as to whether York fabricated evidence. View "Jones v. York" on Justia Law

Ostrowski worked for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department before a workplace injury left him permanently disabled. He now receives a monthly pension payment from the County. Lake County’s disability pension plan does not provide cost-of-living increases, while its pension plan for non-disabled retirees does. Ostrowski filed suit, arguing that the difference between the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court held that Ostrowski’s suit was barred by a 2017 waiver that he signed while settling a “reasonable accommodation” claim against Lake County. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ostrowski’s claims were not barred by the waiver, but failed on the merits; the court noted a general exclusion in the agreement for matters affecting Ostrowski’s pension. Retired and other former workers are not protected by Title I of the ADA and Ostrowski forfeited his arguments with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Ostrowski’s Equal Protection claim qualified only for rational basis review. Lake County has a legitimate interest in providing pension plans that meet the differing needs of distinct groups; the cost-of-living adjustment is one of several relevant differences in the plans. The court reversed an award of fees and costs. View "Ostrowski v. Lake County, Indiana" on Justia Law

Berkman killed his drug supplier. An Indiana jury acquitted Berkman on a first-degree murder charge, but could not reach a verdict related to felony murder. At a second trial, a key prosecution witness, Timmerman, was declared unavailable due to illness; her testimony from the first trial was read into the record. Berkman appealed his subsequent conviction, challenging the admission of Timmerman’s testimony. The Court of Appeals of Indiana determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence given that Timmerman was unavailable and that Berkman had had an opportunity to cross-examine her at the first trial. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.Berkman filed a pro se federal habeas petition in which he maintained that the introduction of Timmerman’s testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of relief. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court’s “Crawford” decision. Timmerman initially was unavailable because she was hospitalized following a sudden illness. The trial court postponed the trial for several days; there is no Supreme Court precedent that required the court to reevaluate Timmerman’s condition after the early-lunch recess to determine whether her condition had improved so that she was able to testify. View "Berkman v. Vanihel" on Justia Law