Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gmoser ran an operation that distributed child pornography over the dark web. A jury rejected Gmoser’s insanity defense and convicted him under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g). Judge Bruce conducted the trial. While the case was on remand to deal with the lesser included offenses, the private bar learned that for several years Judge Bruce had been sending emails to the U.S. Attorney’s office without copying counsel for the defense. Judge Bruce was removed from criminal cases. Judge Shadid, to whom Gmoser’s case was transferred concluded that a single ex parte email sent during the Gmoser proceedings did not evince any actual or potential bias. Gmoser was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected arguments that a psychiatrist who testified for the prosecution should not have been allowed to do so because he did not personally examine Gmoser and that evidence supplied by Carnegie Mellon University in response to a subpoena should not have been admitted. The University produced the evidence without protest. Gmoser is not entitled to enforce the University’s rights. Gmoser was not entitled to a new trial based on Judge Bruce’s involvement. Gmoser’s trial was not even arguably affected by any improper communication or any material discretionary decision. View "United States v. Gmoser" on Justia Law

In 2014, Franklin was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on six prior convictions, including three for Minnesota burglary and two for Illinois residential burglary. Franklin neither appealed nor pursued 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral relief within a year. He sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 after the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision clarified that the Minnesota convictions did not qualify as ACCA predicates. Because three qualifying convictions remained, the district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that Illinois residential burglary convictions do not qualify as ACCA predicates. The government conceded that Franklin’s sentence is unlawful but opposed section 2241 relief, arguing that Franklin could have challenged the use of his Illinois burglary convictions as ACCA predicates on direct appeal or in a timely section 2255 motion.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of relief, citing its “Davenport” holding that a federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus "if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion.” Before the Mathis decision, any challenge to the use of his Minnesota or his Illinois burglaries as ACCA predicates was destined to fail given Eighth Circuit precedent. The limitations period in section 2255(f) blocked a Mathis-based motion in the sentencing court. View "Franklin v. Keyes" on Justia Law

Gaddis cut branches from McCombs’s tree that extended into his yard and threw them into McCombs’s yard. McCombs asked Gaddis to pick up the branches but he ignored her. Upon learning that a neighbor, Winstead, had spoken to McCombs about the branches Gaddis went to Winstead’s home and told Winstead to mind his own business. McCombs called the police. Officers arrived. After talking to neighbors, they told Gaddis through the door that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct. Gaddis refused to come out of his home. He stepped outside after officers stated he could also be charged with resisting arrest. Gaddis was arrested for disorderly conduct. Neighbors claimed that Gaddis was erratic and threatening. Gaddis brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, the city of Marion, and the neighbors, asserting false arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The police report provides ample information from which officers could have reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct. The consensual discussions between the officers and Gaddis did not amount to a “seizure.” At the time of Gaddis’s arrest, it was not clearly established that the officers’ statements that he would be charged with resisting arrest, followed by his choice to come out and face arrest, would violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on routine warrantless arrests inside the home. View "Gaddis v. DeMattei" on Justia Law

An ATF agent was shot. An arrest warrant was issued for Godinez. Agents obtained cellphone location data that placed a known telephone of Godinez at or near Segoviano’s apartment building. Agents entered the building to find Godinez. One occupant, Segoviano, stated that there was no one else in his apartment and consented to a search. The agents removed Segoviano, handcuffed him, and conducted a limited search. For 20‐30 minutes of questioning, Segoviano remained handcuffed; the agents then removed the handcuffs but continued the questioning. When Segoviano asked whether he was under arrest, they responded that he was “detained.” Segoviano acknowledged possessing marijuana and cocaine and the presence of firearms for which he possessed a FOID card. The agents informed Segoviano that based on that admission they could obtain a search warrant, Segoviano then signed a consent to search. The agents never provided Miranda warnings. The search yielded four firearms, marijuana, and cocaine. Segoviano was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Segoviano’s motion to suppress. The agents had no objective basis to suspect Segoviano of criminal wrongdoing other than his presence in the same building with some potential connection to the fugitive; those facts are insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion and insufficient to support prolonging the detention. View "United States v. Segoviano" on Justia Law

Johnson entered state custody in 2007. His history of prison misconduct led to his transfer in 2013 to serve accumulated segregation (solitary confinement). Johnson suffers from serious mental illness, including depression and bipolar disorder, and he was on crisis watch nine times while in segregation. Mental health professionals regularly monitored his condition and treated him with medication, which was periodically adjusted. Johnson’s misconduct continued in segregation, especially when he refused to take his medication. Many of his violations were serious enough to trigger penalties of 30-90 days of no “yard” access.Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in his pro se complaint that the cumulative yard restrictions (totaling about three years, with 24 months consecutive) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He also complained of unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation, summertime heat in his cell, excessive noise, and inadequate mental health treatment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Johnson obtained counsel and cited research on the harmful effects of solitary confinement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson never sought relief for the time he spent in solitary confinement; he sued over his loss of yard access, unhealthy conditions in his cell, and his mental-health treatment. The record is entirely undeveloped on the issue of the effects of prolonged solitary confinement. Claims not raised in the district court are waived. View "Johnson v. Prentice" on Justia Law

Karr was convicted of rape and domestic battery for his assaults on A.P., his former girlfriend. Karr then fired his attorney, hired a new one, and pursued claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Those claims were rejected by the Indiana trial court and on direct appeal. Karr then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. The court rejected an argument that counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate A.P.’s history of medication use, and introduced no evidence about whether Karr used his cellphone during his second assault so that A.P.’s trial testimony could have been impeached. The jury had an ample basis on which to find A.P. credible. There is no reasonable probability that any evidence Karr references would have affected the trial’s outcome. Because Karr did not raise six additional claims in Indiana state court, he procedurally defaulted them. Those procedural defaults are not excusable under a narrow equitable exception delineated by the Supreme Court, which does not apply to “insubstantial defaulted claims such as the ones Karr presents” and does not apply in this procedural posture. View "Karr v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Bayon attempted to rob an Indianapolis gas station, then fled the scene in a vehicle. Numerous police officers gave chase. A high-speed pursuit through residential areas ensued. Officer Brink executed a maneuver that resulted in the Traverse spinning and crashing into a tree. Using a loudspeaker, Officer Myers ordered Bayon to exit the vehicle multiple times. Bayon took several minutes to exit the vehicle, saw 10-15 police officers, and heard commands to put his hands up and to show identification. He claims he reached for his wallet. The officers shot him. Three bullets hit Bayon; he fell face-first to the ground. Bayon claims that after he was rolled over, an officer said, “Oh, my God, he doesn’t have a weapon.” The officers claim that Bayon took several aggressive steps toward Myers and reached for something near his waistband. Two officers saw a black, hard object, and thought it was a gun. Another officer pulled “a car jack handle,” out of his pant leg.In Bayon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the facts were in dispute. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The parties’ claims are inseparable from disputed facts. View "Bayon v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

See is a law-enforcement officer for the Illinois Gaming Board, which often hires State Police officers. As a union representative, See expressed concern that the Board’s promotion policies gave State Police employees unfair advantages. See then began to exhibit signs of paranoia. He complained to Board management that his supervisor was spreading malicious rumors about him to intimidate and scare him. He said that his wife was “seriously afraid” that the State Police would harm them. Management became concerned about his mental stability and placed him on administrative leave pending an examination of his fitness for duty. A few weeks later See passed the examination and returned to work.See filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), section 12112, by requiring him to undergo a medical examination without a job-related justification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if See established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing him on leave and requiring a fitness-for-duty examination: they were genuinely concerned about his mental health. See presented no evidence that this reason was pretextual. See is an armed law enforcement officer, so the possibility of mental instability posed a serious public-safety concern the examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "See v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

An anonymous woman called 911 to report a man carrying a gun, "a 45,” wearing blue jeans, white gym shoes, a black skullcap, and a black coat with fur around the collar. She stated that the man had his hand in his right coat pocket "with a gun in it” and exclaimed that he “just walked into the liquor store.” The call was recorded; the caller’s cell phone number was captured by the system. The dispatcher stated “no number on the callback" and identified the man as black although the caller had not said so. Minutes later, Chicago Police Department officers entered the liquor store. They saw Swinney near the register, wearing a black coat with a fur-trimmed hood, a black skullcap, blue jeans, and white sneakers. The officers patted him down and found a loaded .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol in Swinney’s right coat pocket. In Illinois, it is a crime to carry a firearm on a public street and in any place that is licensed to sell alcohol.Swinney was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an illegal search. The police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop; the anonymous tip reliably reported criminal activity. View "United States v. Swinney" on Justia Law

Dash-cam video footage and testimony from Illinois State Trooper Payton indicated that Payton, specially trained in drug interdiction, made observations about Ambriz-Villa’s car which led him to suspect drug trafficking. When Ambriz-Villa’s car crossed onto the road’s shoulder, Payton executed a traffic stop. While processing a warning ticket, Payton questioned Ambriz-Villa. Ambriz-Villa’s unusual responses and excessively nervous and evasive reactions raised Payton’s suspicion. Payton handed Ambriz-Villa the warning ticket. Ambriz-Villa opened the door and began to exit the patrol car. With Ambriz-Villa “halfway out the door,” Payton asked, “Do you mind if I ask you a few more questions?” Ambriz-Villa agreed. Payton then asked whether he was involved in any drug activity (which Ambriz-Villa denied) and if he would consent to a search of his car. Ambriz-Villa said yes. Payton asked, “for clarification.” Ambriz-Villa confirmed that he consented to the search of his car. The search uncovered 13 packages of methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Ambriz-Villa’s motion to suppress, his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A) and within-Guidelines 168-month sentence. The scope of the stop was not unreasonable and did not violate Ambriz-Villa’s Fourth Amendment rights. Payton’s tone and behavior did not suggest coercion; Ambriz-Villa’s consent was voluntary because a reasonable person in his position would feel at liberty to disregard the questions and walk away.” View "United States v. Ambriz-Villa" on Justia Law