Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued a series of executive orders that first required Illinois residents to shelter in place at their residences, compelled “non-essential” businesses temporarily to cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people (later increased to 50 people). Believing that these orders violated numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, several individuals joined with some Illinois businesses and sued the Governor in his official capacity. After granting the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court found that they lacked standing to sue. The court also concluded that it would be futile to allow a second amendment because, even if it had erred about the existence of a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. With respect to five out of six counts, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the criteria for Article III standing to sue. The remaining count attempts to state a claim under the Takings Clause. The business plaintiffs “may have squeaked by the standing bar” for that theory but have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nowlin v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Whyte was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide for killing his girlfriend, Weiland, during a 2006 altercation. In his habeas petition, Whyte argued his constitutional rights were violated when he was required to wear a stun belt in front of the jury. The parties dispute whether the jury ever saw the stun belt or understood the nature of the device but when Whyte took the stand to testify, he declined to reenact the altercation with Weiland for fear the jury would see the device and draw negative inferences. Whyte also claims the belt had a chilling effect on his testimony, rendering his account of the incident “stilted” and “emotionless,” which the state underscored in its closing argument. Whyte’s trial counsel did not object to the stun belt’s use. Whyte also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Whyte’s claims are procedurally defaulted under adequate and independent state grounds, so federal review is foreclosed. Whyte failed to challenge the stun belt or the effectiveness of his trial counsel, either on direct appeal or in a state court post-conviction motion. Whyte offered no external impediment that prevented him from complying with the state court pleading standards. View "Whyte v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

A fire consumed Jones’s house in 2013. York, a county sheriff’s investigator, initially blamed an electrical malfunction. When he learned that Jones’s friend, Onopa, claimed to have a recording of Jones admitting to arson, he reopened the investigation. York interviewed several witnesses, analyzed Jones’s telephone records, and secured Onopa’s recording, then referred the matter to the district attorney, After her conviction, Jones obtained new counsel and argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Onopa’s recording as created for the purpose of extortion. Before the court ruled on the matter, the district attorney dropped all charges against Jones. Jones then sued York and Adams County under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She contended that York violated her due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence, fabricating inculpatory evidence, testifying falsely at trial, and prosecuting her without probable cause.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find for Jones on any of her claims. Jones’s cell phone records were presented and discussed by both sides at trial. The jury heard testimony from York, Jones, and Onopa. Questioning by both sides exposed the discrepancies in each witness’s version of events. Jones failed to show a genuine dispute of fact as to whether York fabricated evidence. View "Jones v. York" on Justia Law

Ostrowski worked for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department before a workplace injury left him permanently disabled. He now receives a monthly pension payment from the County. Lake County’s disability pension plan does not provide cost-of-living increases, while its pension plan for non-disabled retirees does. Ostrowski filed suit, arguing that the difference between the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court held that Ostrowski’s suit was barred by a 2017 waiver that he signed while settling a “reasonable accommodation” claim against Lake County. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ostrowski’s claims were not barred by the waiver, but failed on the merits; the court noted a general exclusion in the agreement for matters affecting Ostrowski’s pension. Retired and other former workers are not protected by Title I of the ADA and Ostrowski forfeited his arguments with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Ostrowski’s Equal Protection claim qualified only for rational basis review. Lake County has a legitimate interest in providing pension plans that meet the differing needs of distinct groups; the cost-of-living adjustment is one of several relevant differences in the plans. The court reversed an award of fees and costs. View "Ostrowski v. Lake County, Indiana" on Justia Law

Berkman killed his drug supplier. An Indiana jury acquitted Berkman on a first-degree murder charge, but could not reach a verdict related to felony murder. At a second trial, a key prosecution witness, Timmerman, was declared unavailable due to illness; her testimony from the first trial was read into the record. Berkman appealed his subsequent conviction, challenging the admission of Timmerman’s testimony. The Court of Appeals of Indiana determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence given that Timmerman was unavailable and that Berkman had had an opportunity to cross-examine her at the first trial. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.Berkman filed a pro se federal habeas petition in which he maintained that the introduction of Timmerman’s testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of relief. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court’s “Crawford” decision. Timmerman initially was unavailable because she was hospitalized following a sudden illness. The trial court postponed the trial for several days; there is no Supreme Court precedent that required the court to reevaluate Timmerman’s condition after the early-lunch recess to determine whether her condition had improved so that she was able to testify. View "Berkman v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Inmates who were housed by three Illinois Department of Corrections centers between April-July 2014, alleged that the prison-wide shakedowns conducted violated their constitutional and statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The shakedowns involved uniformed tactical teams called “Orange Crush” that operated according to a uniform plan, which involved a loud entry, strip searches, handcuffing, and other procedures involving allegedly humiliating physical contact. The inmates allege that the planning and execution of the shakedowns violated the Eighth Amendment because it was designed to inflict pain and humiliation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed class certification. The plaintiffs satisfied the “commonality” requirement because they alleged that the defendants acted pursuant to a common policy and implemented the same or similar procedures at each institution and that the challenge was to the constitutionality of that common plan as enacted. The claims require resolution of key common factual and legal questions, specifically: “whether Defendants developed and carried out a uniform policy and practice that had the effect of depriving the putative class members of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; whether the shakedowns were executed in the manner Defendants contend or as Plaintiffs claim; whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the putative class members of their constitutional rights through the shakedowns; and whether the Defendants knew of, approved, facilitated and/or turned a blind eye to the alleged unconstitutional shakedowns.” Those questions do not require individualized consideration. View "Ross v. Gossett" on Justia Law

Lumpkin was convicted of various drug crimes. Wisconsin courts denied his appeal and post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his federal habeas corpus petition, in which Lumpkin argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The Wisconsin court’s determination that he suffered no prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s deficient performance in cross-examining a key witness was not an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, Even if Lumpkin’s trial counsel had impeached the witness so thoroughly that she could be deemed completely unreliable and her testimony could be set aside entirely, there existed overwhelming other evidence incriminating Lumpkin. During his arrest, officers uncovered from Lumpkin’s pockets three different types of drugs, separated into nearly thirty individual plastic bags plus more than $1100 in cash, all in small bills. The testimony of another witness and text messages provided overwhelming evidence proving that Lumpkin possessed drugs with an intent to deliver them. View "Lumpkin v. Hermans" on Justia Law

Under rules adopted and enforced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wisconsin lawyers must join and pay dues to the State Bar of Wisconsin. Active membership in the association is “a condition precedent to the right to practice law” in the state. This regulatory regime, often called an “integrated, mandatory[,] or unified bar,” authorizes the State Bar to use membership dues to aid the courts in the administration of justice, conduct a program of continuing legal education, and maintain “high ideals of integrity, learning, competence… public service[,] and high standards of conduct” in the bar of the state.Attorney File contends that requiring him to join and subsidize the State Bar violates his First Amendment free speech and associational rights. Recognizing that Supreme Court precedent forecloses this claim (Keller v. State Bar of Cal. (1990)), File argued that the Court’s more recent cases—particularly “Janus” (2018)--implicitly overruled Keller. The district court rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Keller “may be difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s more recent First Amendment caselaw, but on multiple occasions and in no uncertain terms, the Court has instructed lower courts to resist invitations to find its decisions overruled by implication.” View "File v. Kastner" on Justia Law

Smith was a passenger in Naylor’s car. Chicago police officers pulled them over for running a red light. Smith was “shaking.” Officer Holden asked Smith to step outside. Smith complied but immediately rested the front of his pelvis against the car. Holden asked Smith to step back, then performed an initial pat-down focused on Smith’s waistband, pockets, and lower leg. Holden did not find any contraband but placed Smith in handcuffs. Holden asked Smith to walk several steps. Smith “had that side-to-side walk, as if he was holding something in his crotch area.” Smith then rested his pelvis against the front of the police car. Holden performed the second pat-down by jiggling Smith’s pant legs. Nothing fell out. Holden then asked Smith to walk again and observed an exaggerated limp. About one minute later, Holden conducted the final pat-down, focusing on Smith’s groin area, and removed a loaded handgun from Smith’s underwear. Approximately 11 minutes elapsed between the initiation of the stop and the discovery of the gun.Smith was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court granted Smith’s motion to suppress certain statements but denied his motion to suppress the gun. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the totality of the circumstances—a nighttime traffic stop of an individual who appeared very nervous, walked strangely, and repeatedly rested his pelvis against cars as if to prop something up— reasonable suspicion supported the final pat-down. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The FBI conducted extensive surveillance, made more than 10 controlled purchases of heroin from Lottie, and secured court orders authorizing the interception of Lottie’s cellphone communications. Agents learned that Lottie agreed to a large heroin purchase. The supplier, who had recently suffered a leg injury, planned to arrive at a Rockford location to complete the transaction. To prepare for the deal, Lottie went to houses where he stashed drugs and money before returning to his residence. Shortly after, a white Corolla pulled into his driveway for 10-15 minutes before leaving. Law-enforcement officers followed the car and pulled it over after observing two traffic violations. Ochoa-Lopez was the driver; the suspected supplier was the passenger. One officer noticed that the passenger had a leg injury that required the use of an assistive device. Ochoa-Lopez claimed the two men were transporting the car for a company. Agents searched the vehicle and discovered a backpack containing $47,000 in cash.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence recovered during the warrantless search of the car. The agents had probable cause to search the car; based on the totality of the circumstances, there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found there. View "United States v. Ochoa-Lopez" on Justia Law